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Recent Decisions:
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
I. COMMERCIAL LAW
A. Judicial Deference to Deposit Agreements: Rewriting the UCC and
Allocating Risks to Customers
In Lema v. Bank of America,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
considered whether a deposit agreement 2 between a bank and an ac-
count holder that exempted the bank from liability for accepting an
unauthorized deposit' was valid under the Maryland .Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC).' Despite UCC section 3-401, which declares
that an account holder is not to be held liable for a bank's acceptance
of a deposit into the account that is not signed by the account holder
or his authorized agent, the Court of Appeals validated the deposit
agreement.5 The court concluded that UCC sections 4-205 and 4-
401(b), which allow a bank to supply a customer's endorsement to a
check and to hold a customer liable for the amount of an unsigned
check in specific circumstances pertaining to overdrafts, displaced sec-
tion 3-4016 and demonstrated that the UCC allows banks to charge
back a customer for the amount of an unlawful check.' In so holding,
the court not only misinterpreted the UCC, but it ignored analogous
precedent that consistently enforced UCC section 3-401, even while
1. 375 Md. 625, 826 A.2d 504 (2003).
2. A deposit agreement is a contract between "a financial institution and its customer
governing the treatment of deposited funds and the payment of checks and other de-
mands against a customer's account." BLACK's LAW DicrioONARv 321 (7th ed. 1999). Gener-
ally, deposit agreements are activated when a bank customer opens a checking account
and signs a signature card, which binds him to the bank's deposit agreement. M.H. Cer-
sonsky, Deposit Agreements Between Banks and Their Customers-A Wall of Protection or a Wall
with a False Foundation?, 31 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1, 3 (2000).
3. An unauthorized deposit is a check for a certain amount of money deposited into a
checking account, but not signed by the account holder or the account holder's author-
ized agent. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I §§ 3-401(a) to 3-403(a) (2002). In Maryland,
account holders are not liable for unauthorized deposits. Id.
4. Lema, 375 Md. at 627, 826 A.2d at 505.
5. Id. at 647, 826 A.2d at 517.
6. Id. at 63940, 826 A.2d at 513. Section 3-102 of the Maryland UCC specifies that
"[i]f there is a conflict between this title and Title 4 .... Title[ ] 4 govern[s]." MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-102(b) (2002).
7. Lema, 375 Md. at 647, 826 A.2d at 517; see also infra notes 113-129 and accompany-
ing text (examining the statutes relied on by the majority and their inapplicability to
Lema's factual scenario).
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simultaneously deferring to deposit agreements.8 Additionally, the
majority's interpretation of the UCC underscored a consistent trend
of judicial deference to deposit agreements, thereby providing banks
with a contractual advantage over their account holders and ex-
panding the ability of banks to impose unjust contract terms on their
customers.9 Lema demonstrates the need for courts to balance com-
mon law precedent with UCC provisions to protect equally the rights
of banks and their account holders.
1. The Case.-
a. Facts.-In 1999, Nkiambi Lema opened a business check-
ing account with Bank of America and endorsed a signature card
binding him to the terms of a deposit agreement.' ° The deposit
agreement declared that "[u] nless prohibited by applicable law or reg-
ulation," Bank of America could charge back Lema's account the
amount of any forged or altered checks that were wrongly credited to
his account.1' On November 24, 1999, a friend and former client of
Lema's, Willy Amuli, deposited a check for $63,000 into Lema's ac-
count without Lema's knowledge. 12 Lema said that he first noticed
the increase in his account balance at the end of that month.13 Amuli
then asked Lema to write checks periodically to Amuli for specified
amounts because he had no bank account in which to deposit the
$63,000 check and did not want to cash the entire amount of the
check at one time. 14 Following Amuli's request, Lema visited Bank of
America and was told that the proceeds from the check would be
available in seventeen days-the time estimated for the check to
clear. 5 Lema also requested a copy of the check, which Bank of
America sent to him in February of 2000.16
8. See infra notes 130-142 and accompanying text (describing analogous precedent
that reinforced UCC section 3-401's rule against customer liability for a bank's acceptance
of an unauthorized check).
9. See, e.g., First United Bank v. Philmont Corp., 533 So. 2d 449, 457 (Miss. 1988)
(enforcing the terms of a merchant agreement over the provision of Mississippi's commer-
cial law code); Etelson v. Suburban Trust Co., 263 Md. 376, 380, 283 A.2d 408, 410-11
(1971) (allowing a bank to contract out of the UCC through a contract located on the back
of a check); see also infra notes 150-176 and accompanying text (exploring the roots of
favoritism of contractual expediency over customer rights regarding the UCC).
10. Lema, 375 Md. at 628, 826 A.2d at 505.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 630, 826 A.2d at 506.
14. Id.
15. Id., 826 A.2d at 506-07.
16. Id., 826 A.2d at 507.
814 [VOL. 63:813
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Amuli's check was drawn by an Italian bank on its account at the
Bank of New York. 17 The check was designed with at least once inch
of space between the phrase "USD" and the amount of the check,
which was $63,000.18 In a series of transactions between December of
1999 and February of 2000, Lema withdrew money from his account
and sent it to Amuli in Africa. 19 On January 12, 2000, the Bank of
New York informed Bank of America that the amount of the check
Amuli deposited into Lema's account had been altered from $3,000 to
$63,000.20 On February 22, 2000, Bank of America informed Lema
that it was charging back his account for $60,000.21 The Bank col-
lected $57,888.60 from Lema's accounts. 2 2 In response, Lema sent
Bank of America an affidavit stating that he did not participate in al-
tering the check.2 3 Lema also alerted the United States Secret Service
of the check's alteration and assisted in the government's investiga-
tion regarding the check.2 4
b. Procedure.-On April 5, 2000, Lema filed a complaint in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to enjoin Bank of America from
charging back his account for the money he had transferred to
Amuli.25 Bank of America counterclaimed in an attempt to recover
damages resulting from the altered check, asserting that Lema had
breached the deposit agreement by permitting an altered check to
pass through his account.26 Bank of America also attempted to join
Amuli in the suit through a third party complaint, but Amuli evaded
service.27
In April of 2001, the circuit court entered a judgment for Lema,
citing UCC section 3-401, which provides that a customer is not re-
sponsible to a bank for a deposit unless the customer or his author-
ized agent signed it. 28 The circuit court rejected Bank of America's
counterclaims, holding that the Bank's right to charge back Lema's
17. Id. at 628, 826 A.2d at 506. Cassa di Risparmio di Padova e Rovigo designed the
check that Amuli altered. Id.
18. Id. at 653, 826 A.2d at 520 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 628, 826 A.2d at 506.
20. Id. at 629, 826 A.2d at 506.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 629 n.3, 826 A.2d at 506 n.3.
23. Id. at 630, 826 A.2d at 507.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 629, 826 A.2d at 506.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 629 n.2, 826 A.2d at 506 n.2.
28. Id. at 631, 826 A.2d at 507.
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account for an unauthorized check was limited by the deposit agree-
ment and section 3-401.21
In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed
the judgment and held that in light of sections 4-205 and 4-401 (b),
the deposit agreement controlled, and Bank of America was not pro-
hibited by applicable law from charging back Lema's account for
$60,000.30 Lema appealed, and the Court of Appeals granted certio-
rari to consider whether the deposit agreement invalidated section 3-
401's requirement that all items accepted by Bank of America must be
endorsed by the account holder or his agent.3 1
2. Legal Background.-Common law dictates that a bank ac-
cepting an unauthorized check cannot charge its customer's account
for its own mistake if the acceptance creates an overdraft. 32 This basic
principle was codified as UCC section 3-401. 3 Title 4 of the UCC
provides exceptions to this rule.34 Generally, courts defer to written
agreements between banks and customers that alter UCC provisions. 5
Validated by courts nationwide, such agreements are sometimes at-
tacked for neglecting customers' interests.3 6 Often debate over the
enforcement of these contracts turns on policy issues such as bank risk
assumption and customer rights.37
29. Id.
30. Id. The official comment to section 4-205 allows unauthorized deposits from
"'lock-box' agreements from customers who receive a high volume of checks." MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW I § 4-205 cmt. 1 (2002). Official comment 2 to section 4-401 allows banks
to charge back account holders for the amount of overdrafted checks, even if the customer
did not sign the check. Id. § 4-401 cmt. 2.
31. Lema, 375 Md. at 632, 826 A.2d at 508.
32. E.g., Leather Mfrs. Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96, 107 (1886) (noting the longstand-
ing rule that banks are liable for accepting unauthorized checks).
33. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-401 (2002).
34. See id. § 4-401 (b) cmt. n.2 (stating that in multiple account holder situations "the
nonsigning customer is not liable for an overdraft unless that person benefits from the
proceeds of the item"); see also id. § 4-205 cmt. 1 (stating that a bank may charge back an
account for an unauthorized deposit made pursuant to a "lock-box" agreement where no
signature requirement existed).
35. See, e.g., First United Bank v. Philmont Corp., 533 So. 2d 449, 455-56 (Miss. 1988)
(allowing a merchant agreement to change a bank's allowable charge back period from
the fallback period in the UCC provisions).
36. See Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. Girard Bank, 522 F. Supp. 414, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(finding a bank liable because it would be unfair to the customer to allow the bank to
exculpate itself through a deposit agreement).
37. Id.; see also Messing v. Bank of Am., 373 Md. 672, 701, 821 A.2d 22, 40 (2003)
(stating that facilitating commercial activities is a policy reason for permitting a bank to
shift the risk of loss to customers for unauthorized checks).
[VOL. 63:813
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a. The Evolution of the Common Law Rule Against Charge
Backs.-More than one hundred years ago, in Leather Manufacturers'
Bank v. Morgan,3" the Supreme Court of the United States determined
that a customer's bank account should not be charged back when a
bank accepts an unauthorized, forged, or altered check on the cus-
tomer's behalf.39 Maryland courts traditionally adhered to this rule.
For example, in Bank of Southern Maryland v. Robertson's Crab House,4 °
the Court of Special Appeals held a bank liable for accepting and de-
positing checks not signed by a customer or the customer's authorized
agent.4 Even though the customer in Robertson's Crab House retained
one trusted employee to deposit business checks, the court refused to
categorize the employee as an authorized agent and found the bank
liable for allowing the employee to divert business funds into a per-
sonal account.
42
The Court of Appeals reiterated this rule in Atlantic Trust Co. v.
Subscribers to Automobile Insurance Exchange.43 In Atlantic Trust, even
though a banker was deceived by a third person with the appearance
of authority, the court held the bank responsible for accepting an un-
authorized check and liable for the costs resulting from its mistake.
4
In that case, the resident manager of an automobile insurance com-
pany deposited insurance checks into a personal account under his
name, as well as checks on behalf of the auto insurance company into
a separate business account.45 Adhering to the principle that a cus-
tomer is not liable for the acts of another-except for a person em-
powered as an authorized agent to represent the account holder, the
court found that the resident manager lacked the authority to deposit
items as an agent for the insurance company into his personal ac-
count and held the bank liable.46
b. Statutory Codification of the Common Law Rule: UCC Sections
3-401, 4-205, and 4-401 (b).-The UCC codified the Leather Manufactur-
ers' Bank rule in section 3-401. 4 1 Section 3-401 states unequivocally
that a bank is liable for a customer's injury resulting from the bank's
38. 117 U.S. 96 (1886).
39. Id. at 107.
40. 39 Md. App. 707, 389 A.2d 388 (1978).
41. Id. at 723, 389 A.2d at 397.
42. Id. at 722, 389 A.2d at 397.
43. 150 Md. 470, 476-77, 133 A. 319, 321-22 (1926).
44. Id. at 476, 133 A. at 321.
45. Id. at 473, 133 A. at 320.
46. Id.
47. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-401 (2002).
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acceptance of an unauthorized check.4" However, a bank's only obli-
gation when executing the terms of a deposit agreement is to exercise
good faith and ordinary care to its account holders, which is the only
UCC obligation that an independent deposit agreement cannot al-
ter.49 Thus, a deposit agreement that alters the obligation of bank
liability for acceptance of unauthorized checks as stipulated in section
3-401 can supersede the UCC unless it is "manifestly unreasonable."5
In addition to section 3-401, Title 4 governs bank deposits and
collections. 5 Despite section 3-401's declaration of bank liability for
unauthorized deposits, two provisions of Title 4 allow banks to accept
unauthorized deposits on a customer's behalf in specified situations.52
For example, section 4-205 allows a bank to accept an unsigned check
and endorse it for the account holder if the customer personally deliv-
ers the check to the bank. 3 Also, section 4-401 (b) allows a bank to
accept unauthorized overdrafts by stating that "a customer is not liable
for the amount of an overdraft if the customer neither signed the item
nor benefits from the proceeds of the item. 54
c. Courts' Widespread Deference to Deposit Agreements.-A consis-
tent trend ofjudicial deference to deposit agreements has emerged in
case law.5 5 Courts have allowed banks to change UCC provisions in
deposit agreements in a variety of circumstances. In Etelson v. Subur-
ban Trust Co.,56 the Court of Appeals found that the customers of a
bank renounced their protection under the UCC by signing an en-
dorsement on the back of a check that granted the bank the right to
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. § 1-102 (b) (stating that UCC provisions can be altered by agreement as long as
they do not interfere with the obligations of "good faith, diligence, reasonableness and
care").
51. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw tit. 4 (2002).
52. The UCC also addresses conflicts between separate titles of the UCC. Sections 3-
102(b) and 4 -102(a) address direct conflicts between Title 3 and Title 4 of the UCC. Id.
§ 3-102(b); see also id. § 4-102(a). Section 3-102(b) states that if there is a conflict with a
provision in Title 3 and a provision in Title 4, the Title 4 provisions govern. Id. § 3-102(b).
Section 4-102(a), also discussing conflicts between UCC titles, confirms the rule of 3-
102(b). Id. § 4 - 102 (a) cmt. 1. Nevertheless, in the event that no conflict exists between the
Title 3 and Title 4, the Title 4 provisions remain subject to the provisions of Title 3, includ-
ing section 3-401. Id.
53. § 4-205(1) (2002).
54. Id. § 4-401(b).
55. See supra note 35 (discussing cases where courts affirmed deposit agreements).
56. 263 Md. 376, 283 A.2d 408 (1971).
818 [VOL. 63:813
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dispose of collateral without notice to them.57 Courts in other juris-
dictions have permitted even more deviation from the UCC. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court of Mississippi validated a merchant's
agreement that increased the allowable time for a bank to charge back
a customer's account from 3 days to 120 days in First United Bank v.
Philmont Corporation.5"
More recently, courts have expanded the applicability and en-
forceability of deposit agreements. In Tiffin v. First Union Bank,59 the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, held that a bank
may contractually exculpate itself from liability unless the customer
proves that the terms of the deposit agreement were unreasonable.6 °
In shifting the burden of proof to the customer, the Triffin court pro-
duced another obstacle for account holders to confront when suing a
bank. Furthermore, in National Title Insurance Corp. Agency v. First
Union National Bank,61 the Supreme Court of Virginia allowed a bank
to reduce the time frame in which a customer can sue a bank for
paying an item containing an unauthorized signature or alteration
from one year to sixty days.62  Triffin and National Title Insurance,
therefore, demonstrate judicial deference to independent deposit
agreements, despite such agreements infringing on the rights for cus-
tomers recommended by the UCC.6"
d. Risk Allocation: Balancing Bank Interests with Customer
Rights.-Policy reasons are the common judicial rationale for refusing
to enforce deposit agreements. For example, in Cumis Insurance Soci-
ety, Inc. v. Girard Bank,64 the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania invalidated a deposit agreement that
absolved the bank of liability in almost all circumstances.65 There,
Girard Bank accepted and paid five unauthorized checks and debited
the customer's account in the amount of $100,000.66 After the ac-
57. Id. at 379, 283 A.2d at 410. Specifically, the bank disposed of a 1969 truck, which
had been used as collateral to secure a loan for Mr. Etelson's business. Id. at 377, 283 A.2d
at 409.
58. 533 So. 2d 449, 457 (Miss. 1988).
59. 724 A.2d 872 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
60. Id. at 875.
61. 559 S.E.2d 668 (Va. 2002).
62. Id. at 672.
63. Id.; Triffin, 724 A.2d at 875.
64. 522 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
65. Id. at 423. Provisions of the agreement purported that "the company [Credit
Union] agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Bank . . . from any damages the Bank
may suffer." Id. at 416 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id. at 417.
8192004]
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count holders discovered that the bank had accepted five forged
checks for $20,000 each, they called upon their insurance company to
pay for the debt.67 The customer's insurance company then sued the
bank for $100,000, and the district court found that a deposit agree-
ment did not absolve the bank from liability for accepting unautho-
rized checks. 68 The Cumis court expressed doubt about the validity of
"any agreement which seeks to abrogate the fundamental rules of
forged signatures" in the UCC.69 The court cited policy reasons for its
holding, including the principle that industry must be prevented from
"contractually exculpating itself from the consequences of its own
negligence or lack of good faith in the performance of any of its bank-
ing functions."7 °
Courts also cite policy reasons as a basis for enforcing deposit
agreements, because deposit agreements further a primary objective
of the UCC-promoting commercial transactions.7" Recently, in Mes-
sing v. Bank of America,72 the Court of Appeals cited policy reasons as a
basis for allowing a bank to refuse to cash a check drawn on the bank
to a non-customer.7" The court acknowledged that banks face sub-
stantial risks of loss when conducting their business and should be
allowed to protect themselves from potential liabilities.74 Also, the
court found that reducing the risks associated with conducting busi-
ness encourages the growth of commercial practices, a legitimate and
important goal of public policy.75 In addition, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi justified a bank's right to minimize risk assumption by
charging back on provisional deposits in First United Bank v. Philmont
Corporation.76 The court recognized that bank losses were often
caused by customers withdrawing money provisionally deposited into
their accounts by banks.77 On this basis, the court validated a deposit
agreement extending the bank's right to charge back the account
from three days, as provided in the UCC, to 120 days.78 The First
67. Id.
68. Id. at 421.
69. Id. at 423.
70. Id. at 422.
71. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 1-102(2)(b) (2002).
72. 373 Md. 672, 821 A.2d 22 (2003).
73. Id. at 701-02, 821 A.2d at 39.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 533 So. 2d 449, 451-52 (Miss. 1988). In First United, the bank agreed to provision-
ally credit the customer's account for deposited credit card slips that the customer, a busi-
nessman, received by selling discount travel packages through a telemarketing scheme. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
[VOL. 63:813
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United court explicitly relied on policy influences, namely the bank's
right to allocate risks to customers, to justify its holding.79
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Lema v. Bank of America, the Court
of Appeals held that a deposit agreement and the UCC authorized
Bank of America to charge back an account holder for an unautho-
rized deposit of $60,000.80 Writing for the majority,81 Judge Battaglia
reasoned that charging back a customer's account after a bank accepts
an unauthorized check is not prohibited by section 3-401 because sec-
tions 4-401 and 4-205 designate specific situations in which banks may
accept unauthorized deposits.8 2 Acknowledging that section 3-401 re-
quires a customer's or an authorized agent's signature before a bank
can accept a check, the court turned to section 1-102(3), which allows
parties to alter provisions of the UCC by an independent agreement.
83
After citing various cases demonstrating that deposit agreements can
alter and negate UCC provisions, the court established that the con-
tract between Bank of America and Lema qualified as an
"agreement."8 4
Finding that the deposit agreement terms applied to the bank-
customer relationship unless "prohibited by applicable law," the ma-
jority turned to the UCC to determine whether any UCC provisions
prohibited validation of the deposit agreement.8 5 The majority found
both Title 3 and Title 4 of the UCC applicable law to the deposit
agreement and focused on two sections in Title 4 that permitted
banks to accept unendorsed checks in certain circumstances.86 First,
the court observed that section 4-401(b) authorizes a bank to accept
an unendorsed item and prevents a bank from liability if the customer
benefits from the deposit.87 The court cited this provision as evidence
of the UCC's permission for banks to accept unauthorized checks.88
In addition, the court speculated that section 4-205, which authorizes
acceptance of unsigned checks when deposited personally by the ac-
count holder, was further proof that the UCC permitted banks to ac-
79. See id. at 457 ("Bottom-line policy considerations favor the Bank's position here.")
80. Lema, 375 Md. at 647, 826 A.2d at 517.
81. Judge Battaglia was joined by Judges Raker, Wilner, and Cathell. Id. at 627, 826
A.2d at 505.
82. Id. at 639-40, 826 A.2d at 512-13.
83. Id. at 635, 826 A.2d at 510.
84. Id. at 638, 826 A.2d at 511.
85. Id. at 639, 826 A.2d at 512.
86. Id. at 63940, 826 A.2d at 512-13.
87. Id. at 640, 826 A.2d at 512-13.
88. Id.
2004]
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cept unauthorized checks."9 Reasoning that the Tide 4 provisions
demonstrated that charging back a customer's account for an unau-
thorized check was not prohibited by the UCC, the majority con-
cluded that the deposit agreement legally altered the effects of the
UCC, thereby making Lema liable for the $60,000.90
Finally, the majority disregarded Lema's claim that the deposit
agreement abandoned Bank of America's obligations of good faith
and ordinary care, as required under UCC sections 1-102(3) and 4-
103(a). 1 The court reasoned that nothing in the deposit agreement
explicidy relieved Bank of America of those obligations and con-
cluded that the duty of good faith was to be "read into" the deposit
agreement.
92
In his dissent, Judge Harrell suggested that the majority's reason-
ing may have been obscured because it suspected that Lema had par-
ticipated in a "sinister plot" with Amuli to deceive Bank of America. 3
Judge Harrell observed that according to section 3401, Lema was not
liable for the altered check.94 Reasoning that section 3-401 is the de-
fault provision for any unauthorized check, Judge Harrell criticized
the majority's conclusion that the UCC impliedly allows for banks to
charge back accounts for unauthorized checks. 5
Judge Harrell argued that for the Tide 4 exceptions to displace
section 3-401, there must be a direct conflict between Titles 3 and 4.96
Rejecting the majority's reliance on sections 4-205 and 4-401(b),
Judge Harrell cited the official comments of section 4-401 and 4-205
for support.97 First, Judge Harrell concluded that section 4-401 ap-
plied specifically to situations involving overdrafts, and thus was inap-
plicable to the situation in Lema. Then, Judge Harrell cited to the
section 4-205 stipulation that banks can accept unauthorized checks
only from holders, and established that Lema was not a holder under
the UCC. 9 After finding that neither section 4-205 nor section 4-401
applied to Lema, the dissent concluded that there was no direct con-
89. Id. at 639, 826 A.2d at 512.
90. Id. at 641, 826 A.2d at 513.
91. Id. at 643-44, 826 A.2d at 514-15.
92. Id. at 645, 826 A.2d at 516.
93. Id. at 649, 826 A.2d at 518 (Harrell,J., dissenting). Judges Bell and Eldridgejoined
the dissent. Id. at 648, 826 A.2d at 517.
94. Id. at 649, 826 A.2d at 518.
95. Id. at 649-50, 826 A.2d at 518.
96. Id. at 650, 826 A.2d at 518-19.
97. Id. at 651, 826 A.2d at 519.
98. Id.
99. A "holder" of a check is "the person in possession .... " MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW
I § 1-201(20) (2002).
822 [VOL. 63:813
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
flict between Title 3 and Title 4, and that section 3-401 was therefore
the controlling law.10 0 Because section 3-401 states that a customer
cannot be charged back for an unauthorized item, Judge Harrell con-
cluded that Bank of America was prohibited from charging back the
$60,000 to Lema's account. 1'
The dissent deduced that the Italian Bank should be liable for
the alteration because the design of its check invited alteration.0 2
Furthermore, Judge Harrell speculated that Bank of America chose to
sue Lema rather than the Italian bank because the litigation was less
expensive and because a victory against Lema would significantly ex-
pand Bank of America's contractual power over its account holders.
10 3
Judge Harrell further noted that the UCC prohibits agreements
that waive a bank's duty of good faith and ordinary care. 10 4 Observing
that Bank of America missed its deadline for giving Lema notice that
it was charging back his account and that notice is an unwaiveable
component of ordinary care, the dissent determined that the burden
of proof should have shifted to Bank of America to show that its ac-
tions were reasonable.
10 5
Finally, the dissent concluded that Titles 3 and 4 were applicable
law."0 6 Finding that UCC section 4-214 controlled, Judge Harrell de-
termined, according to section 4-214, that Bank of America's right to
charge back Lema's account depended on whether the deposit was
provisional or final.10 7 Because Section 4-214 stipulates that banks
cannot charge back an account once a settlement is final, the dissent
concluded that Bank of America failed to meet its burden of proving
that the deposit was, in fact, final.'0°
4. Analysis.-In Lema v. Bank of America, the Court of Appeals
relied on a deposit agreement to effectively negate section 3-401,
which holds banks liable for accepting unauthorized deposits on be-
half of their account holders.'0° Several factors render the majority's
holding unconvincing and vulnerable to criticism. First, the major-
ity's interpretation of statutory exceptions to the general rule of bank
100. Lema, 375 Md. at 651, 826 A.2d at 519 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 652-53, 826 A.2d at 519-20; see supra note 18 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the face of the check).
103. Lema, 375 Md. at 654, 826 A.2d at 521 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 655-56, 826 A.2d at 522.
105. Id. at 657, 826 A.2d at 523.
106. Id. at 659, 826 A.2d at 524.
107. Id. at 660, 826 A.2d at 524.
108. Id., 826 A.2d at 525.
109. Id. at 627, 826 A.2d at 505.
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liability for acceptance of unauthorized checks is problematic because
the statutory exceptions are inapplicable to the Lema case.11 ° Second,
nothing in Lema distinguishes it from similar cases where courts have
validated deposit agreements while applying the rule against customer
liability for a bank allowing an unauthorized deposit."1 ' Third, the
majority's reasoning surpasses the usual trend ofjudicial deference to
deposit agreements by weakening the rule that banks are liable for
accepting unauthorized checks and thereby forces account holders to
assume the risk of liability if an unauthorized check is deposited in
their account.' 1 2 In effect, the court's holding causes a debilitation of
the UCC rule against customer liability for unauthorized deposits and
represents the expansion of bank contracting power at the expense of
customers' rights.
a. The Majority's Reliance on Title 4 Provisions is Unconvinc-
ing.-The majority's reasoning depended heavily on sections 4-401
and 4-205, which allow banks to charge back customer accounts in
specific instances."' However, these sections are inapplicable to
Lema's situation and when no conflict between Title 3 and Title 4 of
the UCC exists, Title 3 controls.' 14 Thus, section 3-401's prohibition
of customer liability for bank deposits of unauthorized checks should
have applied and Bank of America should not have charged back
Lema's account for $60,000. 15
The majority's reliance on section 4-401's authorization of unen-
dorsed deposits in specific situations is inapposite to the Lema case.
While section 4-401 does permit a bank to charge-back a customer's
account for unauthorized overdrafts, it does not purport to apply to
altered checks like Amuli's. 116 When the Bank charged back Lema's
account for $60,000, it recovered $57,888.60 from Lema's accounts
with the Bank. 1 7 Thus, only one of the four checks that Lema wrote
to repay Amuli could have resulted in an overdraft of Lema's ac-
count.' " Because only one of the checks Lema wrote resulted in an
overdraft of Lema's account, UCC section 4-401 is inapplicable to the
110. See infra notes 113-129 and accompanying text.
111. See infta notes 130-142 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 143-176 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's dependence
on sections 4-401 and 4-205).
114. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 4-102(a) (2002).
115. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text (describing the dissent's view that
the majority's reliance on sections 4-401 and 4-205 was misplaced).
116. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 4-401(c) (2002).
117. Lema, 375 Md. at 629 n.3, 829 A.2d at 506 n.3.
118. Id. at 628, 829 A.2d at 506.
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other checks. If section 4-401 does not apply to the other checks that
Lema wrote Amuli, no conflict exists between Titles 3 and 4 for those
checks, and Title 3 controls.' 9 If Title 3 controls, then section 3-401,
which codifies the rule against customer liability for unauthorized de-
posits, is valid, and Lema should not be held liable.
1 21
The majority's interpretation of section 4-401 contradicts not
only the facts in Lema, but also the reasoning of precedent on this
issue. In Taylor, the Court of Appeals held that section 3-401 prohib-
ited a bank from charging back the customer's account for a forged
check. 121 The court in Taylor used section 4-401 to support its finding
that when a banker has been misled by a person appearing to have the
authority of the account holder, the bank is still answerable for any
loss when it accepts an unauthorized check.122 In Taylor, the Court of
Appeals interpreted sections 4-401, 3-404, and 3-401 to form collec-
tively an implied contract holding the bank liable for charging a cus-
tomer's account on any item not authorized by the customer.1 23 In
applying section 4-401 to Lema's altered check and upholding the
bank's charge back to his account, the Lema court contradicted its
own previous interpretations of these statutory provisions.
124
Likewise, the majority's argument that section 4-205 validates the
conclusion that the UCC generally permits banks to accept unautho-
rized checks is unpersuasive.12 5 Section 4-205 allows a bank to deposit
unsigned checks from a customer who is a "holder" of the check at the
time the check is deposited into a bank.1 26 However, Lema was not a
holder when Amuli deposited the check.1 27 Therefore, section 4-205
119. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 4-102(a) (2002).
120. Id.
121. 269 Md. 149, 157, 304 A.2d 838, 842-43 (1973).
122. Id.
123. Id. ("When these sections are taken together with § 4-401, the UCC codifies the
underlying contract implied between the bank and its customer that the bank will change
any item which is otherwise properly payable against the depositor's account only on the
order of the depositor or of someone authorized by him.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
124. See id.
125. Lema, 375 Md. at 640, 826 A.2d at 513. The majority cited to the official comment,
which explains that section 4-205 was intended to apply to account holders who had large
volumes of checks being deposited into their accounts. Id.
126. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 4-205(1) (2002).
127. Lema, 375 Md. at 650-51, 826 A.2d at 519; MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAw I § 1-201(20)
(2002). The UCC defines "holder" as "the person in possession if the instrument is paya-
ble to bearer or, in the case of an instrument payable to an identified person, if the identi-
fied person is in possession." Id. Lema never possessed the check; it was payable to Amuli,
who endorsed it and deposited it into Lema's account. Lena, 375 Md. at 628, 630, 826
A.2d at 505-07.
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is inapplicable to him.' 28 In allowing section 4-205 to influence its
holding, the majority thus relied on an inapposite UCC provision. 129
Because it relied heavily on an inapplicable Title 4 provision, the ma-
jority's reasoning remains vulnerable to criticism.
b. The Court Rejected Analogous Case Law in Allowing a Bank's
Acceptance of Unauthorized Checks.-Maryland courts have repeatedly
found that the UCC does not permit unendorsed checks to be depos-
ited by third parties.' ° In Robertson's Crab House, the Court of Special
Appeals found a bank liable even where a third party depositor was a
frequent visitor to the bank as the customer's trusted employee.1 3 1 In
that case, the court reasoned that the customer never assented to the
employee's actions and thus was not liable for diverted funds.132 In
contrast, Lema's relationship with Amuli was much more attenuated
than the employee's relationship with his employer in Robertson's Crab
House.'13  Amuli was Lema's client; he was not an employee regularly
entrusted with the duty of handling Lema's finances.' 4 Thus, it runs
contrary to previous Maryland cases to find Amuli's deposit permissi-
ble because unauthorized third party deposits have not been allowed
by Maryland courts." 5
In fact, the Court of Appeals has upheld the Leather Manufacturers'
rule that a bank may not charge a customer's account when it mistak-
enly accepts an unauthorized check while abiding by a deposit agree-
ment."' In Atlantic Trust, a resident manager of an insurance agency
was found to lack both actual and apparent authority to deposit
checks for his employer. 3 7 The court stated that a customer can be
128. Lema, 375 Md. at 639-40, 826 A.2d at 512.
129. Id.
130. E.g., Bank of S. Md. v. Robertson's Crab House, Inc., 39 Md. App. 707, 718, 389
A.2d 388, 394 (1977); see also At. Trust Co. v. Subscribers to Auto. Ins. Exch., 150 Md. 470,
474, 133 A. 319, 320-21 (1926) (explaining that an account holder can only be bound by
deposits that he authorized).
131. 39 Md. App. at 722-23, 389 A.2d at 396-97.
132. Id. at 719, 389 A.2d at 395.
133. Id. The depositor in Robertson's was a friend of Robertson's and the Bank accepted
an unauthorized check. Id. at 709, 389 A.2d at 390. However, given the frequency of the
employee's deposits for the employer in Robertson, the bank arguably had reason to believe
that the employee was, in fact, an agent. Id. In contrast, Amuli only deposited one check
in the Lema case, clearly not enough to establish a sufficient custom to deceive the bank
into believing he was an authorized agent of Lema. Leia, 375 Md. at 628, 826 A.2d at 505-
06.
134. Joint Record Extract, Lema (E095).
135. See supra notes 38-46 (discussing Maryland cases adhering to the rule against unau-
thorized third party deposits).
136. Ad. Trust Co. v. Subscribers to Auto. Ins., 150 Md. 470, 476, 133 A. 319, 321 (1926).
137. Id. at 475, 133 A. at 321.
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responsible for the acts of another only when that person is a desig-
nated agent and, even if a bank mistakenly believes that a person is an
authorized agent, the bank remains liable for accepting unauthorized
endorsements. 138 However, in the present case, Amuli was not Lema's
employee, much less a regular representative of Lema at the bank.' 39
Indeed, in Atlantic Trust, the bank had more reason to believe the
depositor was an authorized agent because the depositor was a famil-
iar face who regularly represented the account holder, unlike the de-
positor in Lema.140 Nevertheless, the Atlantic Trust court chose to
enforce the Leather Manufacturers' rule that a bank is liable for ac-
cepting unauthorized checks, even when the depositor was closely as-
sociated with the account holder.1 4 1 Amuli was not closely associated
with Lema from Bank of America's viewpoint, so Bank of America
should not have been able to justify the acceptance of the unautho-
rized check by claiming that Amuli had the implied authority to de-
posit for Lema.' 42 Thus, the Lema court departed from the holding in
Atlantic Trust by finding Bank of America not liable for $60,000, even
though in Atlantic Trust the court had more convincing reasons to ab-
solve the bank of liability than it had in Lema.
c. Judicial Tolerance of Customer Risk Assumption.-Generally,
courts enforce deposit agreements to promote commercial transac-
tions, even if those transactions are contrary to the customer's inter-
est.'43 Indeed, many scholars viewed the enactment of the UCC as an
attempt to shift the risk of loss from banks to customers. 44 Article 4,
in particular, was criticized for predetermining that liability would fall
with bank customers.14 5 The UCC was enacted amidst blatant accusa-
tions that Article 4 was "a deliberate sell-out of the American Law In-
stitute and the Commission of Uniform Laws to the bank lobby in
138. Id. at 475-76, 133 A. at 321.
139. Lema, 375 Md. at 628, 826 A.2d at 505.
140. Atl. Trust Co., 150 Md. at 475, 133 A. at 321.
141. Id. at 475-76, 133 A.2d at 321.
142. See Lema, 375 Md. at 628, 826 A.2d at 505.
143. See Messing v. Bank of Am., 373 Md. 672, 701, 821 A.2d 22, 39 (2003) ("In short,
when a bank cashes a check over the counter, it assumes the risk that it may suffer losses
for counterfeit documents, forged endorsements, or forged or altered checks. Nothing in
the Commercial Law Article forces a bank to assume such risks."); see also First United Bank
v. Philmont Corp., 533 So. 2d 449, 457 (Miss. 1988) (listing losses incurred by banks be-
cause they cannot charge back customers' accounts).
144. Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted,
61 YALE L.J. 334, 361 (1952) (declaring that "[a] careful examination of the wording of the
act will show that [Article 4 of the UCC] was drafted entirely with the purpose of protect-
ing the banks so that they could carry on their business at the risk of the customer").
145. See id. (stating that the UCC has shifted liability from banks to consumers).
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return for their support of the rest of the Code." 4 6 Even some draft-
ers and proponents of the UCC objected to the one-sidedness of Arti-
cle 4.147 Specifically, the provision permitting banks to contract out of
the UCC was attacked for the obvious advantages it gave to banks.'48
Since the UCC's enactment, the responsibility for maintaining a
fair balance between customer and bank rights has fallen on Ameri-
can courts. 1 49 However, courts have increasingly validated unreasona-
ble and unfair deposit agreements against customers in favor of bank
interests. 150 For example, the Court of Appeals found in Messing that
a bank should not be forced to assume the risk of cashing a check
drawn by a Bank of America customer over the counter to a non-cus-
tomer.15 1 Messing exemplified the court's willingness to consider the
risks that a bank takes in its transactions and a bank's right to protect
itself from potential liabilities.'5 2 As such, the Lema decision typifies
the trend of courts to neglect customer interests to uphold the inter-
ests of banks.1
53
The National Title case also demonstrates the trend ofjudicial def-
erence to deposit agreements at the expense of customer rights.15 4 In
enforcing a deposit agreement, the Supreme Court of Virginia
abridged customers' interests by drastically reducing the allowable
window of time in which a customer could sue a bank in National Ti-
tle.155 The National Title court validated a deposit agreement's provi-
sion that reduced the amount of time in which a customer could file a
claim against a bank from one year to sixty days. 156 The court noted
that altering a provision of the UCC by reducing the period of time in
which a customer can make a claim did not alter the inherent scheme
146. Id. at 362 (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Grant Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J.
364, 377 (1952). Gilmore wrote as a Yale law professor and a drafter of the UCC. Id. at
364.
148. Id. at 375.
149. Cersonsky, supra note 2, at 61.
150. See supra notes 55-63 (listing cases that shrink consumer rights granted by the UCC
by enforcing increasingly egregious deposit agreements).
151. Messing v. Bank of Am., 373 Md. 672, 701, 821 A.2d 22, 38 (2003). The would-be
depositor in Messing attempted to cash his check at Bank of America because it was written
on a Bank of America checking account. Id. at 680, 821 A.2d at 26.
152. Id. Also, by listing losses of banks in its opinion, First United demonstrates how
much weight and credit some courts give banks for conducting their business. First United
Bank v. Philmont Corp., 533 So. 2d 449, 457 (Miss. 1988).
153. See Lema, 375 Md. at 628, 826 A.2d at 505.
154. 559 S.E.2d 668, 672 (Va. 2002).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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of liability established in the UCC.' 57 By supporting its decision on
this basis, the National Title court implied that if the UCC-established
scheme of liability has been altered, then the provisions of the deposit
agreement would be invalid.158 In contrast to National Title, the de-
posit agreement in Lema did alter the ultimate scheme of liability be-
cause the presumption of liability for unauthorized deposits shifted
from the bank to the customer, where the UCC presumes that the
bank is liable.159 Thus, the Lema court's holding represented a more
obvious departure from the UCC than that of National Title because it
shifted the ultimate scheme of liability outlined in the UCC by allocat-
ing the liability for unauthorized deposits to the customer and not to
the bank.
160
In addition, other precedent that defers to the terms of deposit
agreements still contradicts the Lema court's rejection of the rule
against customer liability for unauthorized deposits.1 6' In First United,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld a deposit agreement that
extended the bank's right to charge back a customer's account from
the UCC designated period of 3 days to 120 days. 162 The First United
court never questioned the principle that a bank is liable for ac-
cepting unauthorized deposits, as the Lema court did.'63 The only is-
sue considered in First United was whether the deposit agreement
could validly increase the time frame in which a bank could charge
back from the time frame provided in the UCC, a query which does
not alter the UCC's fundamental method of determining liability.
164
On the other hand, the Lema court's interpretation of the UCC al-
lowed the deposit agreement to change which party was ultimately lia-
ble on the overdraft, not just the time period in which claims can be
157. Id. at 671-72.
158. Id. at 672.
159. See Lema, 375 Md. at 654, 826 A.2d at 521 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (stating that Bank
would be liable if the case were decided solely on statutory grounds).
160. See National Title, 559 S.E.2d at 672 (holding that a sixty-day time limit for a cus-
tomer to file an action against the bank was not unreasonable). The Supreme Court of
Virginia remained consistent with the Leather Manufacturers rule because it did not concede
that banks should not be held liable for accepting unauthorized checks. Id. at 670.
161. First United Bank v. Philmont Corp., 533 So. 2d 449, 457 (Miss. 1988).
162. Id.
163. Lema, 375 Md. at 642, 826 A.2d at 514.
164. First United, 533 So. 2d at 454 n.2. The court here observed that the merchant
agreement substituted the UCC provision stating that banks have three days to charge back
a customer's account, extending the time to 120 days. Id. However, this substitution does
not raise issues to the court of whether the change in charge back dates contradicts an-
other UCC provision, nor does the merchant agreement in this case hinge on whether its
terms are "prohibited by applicable law," as in Lema. Lema, 375 Md. at 659-60, 826 A.2d at
524.
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made.16 Consequently, the Lema court surpassed other courts' liberal
interpretations of deposit agreements by altering the fundamental sys-
tem of liability, not simply changing procedural requirements for
check depositing under the UCC.' 6 6
The Lema case highlights another legal concern that existed at
the time the UCC was enacted-that allowing banks to craft deposit
agreements contradictory to nearly all UCC provisions would result in
a system that devastates the rights of account holders. Without the
UCC to regulate them, banks can effectively exculpate themselves
from any liability.167 This fear has been expressed in both case law
and scholarly commentary. In Cumis, a court found a deposit agree-
ment that absolved a bank of liability in virtually any circumstance as
void against public policy.1 6 Although banks should naturally try to
protect themselves from business risks, the Cumis court believed that
such self-protection went too far when banks attempt "to abrogate the
fundamental rules of liability for forged signatures."' 69 Case law dem-
onstrates that standard, bank-written deposit agreements often, in an
attempt to minimize bank liability, condense the rights of customers
to sue. 1 70 While customers and banks benefit from an expeditious
and inexpensive bank collection system, society should remain wary of
unfair contracting power. 7 ' Virtually all banks write their own de-
posit agreements, and such agreements are cumbersome, difficult for
the average person to comprehend, and similar from bank to bank.172
Thus, customers lack meaningful choices if they intend to pick a bank
with a customer-friendly deposit agreement. The imbalance in con-
tracting power between banks and customers is reflected in the de-
posit agreements, which increasingly advantage banks' interests. 173
In truth, the courts are entrusted with the duty of maintaining a
fair balance between liability of banks and customer protection from
165. 375 Md. at 647, 826 A.2d at 517.
166. See supra notes 150-164 and accompanying text (exemplifying other courts' uses of
deposit agreements).
167. Cumis Ins. Soc'y v. Girard Bank, 522 F. Supp. 414, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1981). However,
banks may not waive their obligations to exercise good faith and ordinary care through a
deposit agreement. Id.
168. Id. at 423.
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 56-79 and accompanying text (discussing judicial treatment of de-
posit agreements and UCC provisions and their effects on customer rights).
171. Gilmore, supra note 147, at 376.
172. See id. (stating that bankers possess the knowledge to understand a complex deposit
agreement).
173. Id.
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risks.' 74 A bank's position commands the trust and confidence of en-
tire communities and must be regulated to prevent a breach of that
trust.175 The UCC was adopted as a mechanism to balance the poten-
tial liabilities of customers and banks, but the UCC provision that au-
thorizes parties to make independent contracts that supersede UCC
provisions does not warrant the cursory assumption that deposit
agreements are valid. 176 A more conscientious and balanced common
law approach towards enforcing deposit agreements is desperately
needed if customers' rights are to be preserved. Lema signifies the
abandonment of one of these cherished rights.
5. Conclusion.-A general common law rule, embodied in UCC
section 3-401, holds that when a bank accepts a check unsigned by the
account holder or the account holder's authorized agent, it will be
held liable for any damage to the account holder from that transac-
tion. 1 7 7 In Lema v. Bank of America, the Court of Appeals interpreted
the UCC in a controversial manner, ultimately allowing a deposit
agreement to protect Bank of America from liability for accepting un-
authorized checks on an account holder's behalf.178 The majority's
reasoning in Lema was questionable because it used two inapplicable
provisions of UCC Title 4 to negate the well-established rule against
customer liability for bank acceptance of unauthorized deposits. 79
Additionally, the Lema court departed from analogous precedent that
consistently enforced the rule against customer liability for bank ac-
ceptance of unauthorized deposits, even while deferring to deposit
agreements.'8 0 The culminating effect of the Lema decision is an ex-
pansion of the power of banks to escape liability under the UCC
through deposit agreements.' 8 '
SARAH E. BRULL
174. Cersonsky, supra note 2, at 61.
175. Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149, 156 n.7, 304 A.2d 838, 842 n.7 (1972).
176. See Brian Patrick Perryman, Note, Checking Checks: American Airlines Employees
Federal Credit Union v. Martin and the Amenability of Common Law Waiver to Deposit Agreement
Cutdown Provisions, 10 GEo. MASON L. REv. 551, 557-62 (2002).
177. See Leather Mfrs. Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96, 107 (1886); see also MD. CODE ANN.,
CoM. LAW I § 3-401(1) (2002).
178. Lema, 375 Md. at 646-48, 826 A.2d at 516-18.
179. See supra notes 113-129 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 130-142 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 143-176 and accompanying text.
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A. Driven to Distraction: Egregious Juror-Witness Misconduct Demands
Retrial Without Regard to Actual Prejudicial Effect on the
jury's Verdict
In Jenkins v. State,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Mar-
vin Jenkins a new trial after the court ascertained, after taking the
final verdict, that a juror and a witness had engaged in ex parte com-
munications during the trial.2 The court held that the mid-trial com-
munications were egregious and therefore created a presumption of
prejudice that the State could not rebut under the restrictions on
post-verdict juror testimony imposed by Maryland Rule 5-606.' Con-
cluding that the verdict could diminish the integrity of the jury pro-
cess, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion by not
granting Jenkins a new trial.4 In focusing on the egregious nature of
the juror-witness misconduct, the court failed to fully consider
whether Jenkins was actually prejudiced in the verdict and created no
substantive standard, even within the confines of Maryland Rule 5-606,
to determine whether egregious conduct discovered post-verdict is ac-
tually prejudicial to a defendant.5 The court's failure to grant the trial
court discretion to determine the actual prejudice of juror miscon-
duct suggests that any juror-witness misconduct discovered post-ver-
dict demands a retrial.6 Moreover, in attempting to protect the
1. 375 Md. 284, 825 A.2d 1008 (2003) [hereinafter Jenkins I].
2. Id. at 289, 825 A.2d at 1011; see infra notes 22-34 and accompanying text (discussing
Pikulski's and McDonald's interaction at a retreat during Jenkins' trial).
3. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 289, 825 A.2d at 1011. Maryland Rule 5-606 prevents jurors
from testifying post verdict as to the effect of any conduct or incident that may have influ-
enced the jury's decision-making process. Maryland Rule 5-606 provides, in relevant part:
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict.
(1) In any inquiry into the validity of a verdict, a juror may not testify as to
(A) any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations, (B) the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's
mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent or dissent from the
verdict, or (C) the juror's mental processes in connection with the
verdict.
(2) Ajuror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a
matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying may
not be received for these purposes.
MD. R. 5-606(b).
4. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 289, 825 A.2d at 1011.
5. See infra notes 170-190 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 191-211 and accompanying text.
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integrity of the jury system by declaring such misconduct prejudicial,
the court failed to recognize the harm done to the jury system when a
reasonably supported decision, despite egregious misconduct, is re-
versed.7 By creating a standard of review for juror misconduct that
fully considers the actual effect on the outcome in determining
prejudice, the court could have simultaneously affirmed thejudgment
in this case, maintained the discretion of the trial court, and protected
the integrity of the jury system.8
1. The Case.-
a. Background Facts.-On the night of April 13, 2000, Ste-
phen Dorsey, Jr. and Michael Clark were involved in a shooting near
Lincoln Park in Montgomery County, Maryland.9 Dorsey was shot and
killed. 10 The State charged Marvin Jenkins and David Barnett with
numerous crimes resulting from the shooting,'1 and the two were
tried separately in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.1 2
Detective Patricia Pikulski was the first of several detectives that inter-
viewed Clark at the scene of the shooting."3 At Jenkins' trial, Clark
was a witness for the State, testifying that Barnett shot Dorsey. 4 On
cross-examination, the defense entered Pikulski's notes as a defense
exhibit, and she answered questions concerning her interview of Clark
and the notes.15 On March 30, 2001, a jury convicted Jenkins of sec-
ond-degree murder, attempted first- and second-degree murder, first-
degree assault, and the use of a handgun in the commission of a
crime of violence. 6
b. Witness-Juror Interaction and Trial Court Evidentiary Hear-
ing.-On April 4, 2001, five days after Jenkins' conviction, Detective
Pikulski commented to Deborah Armstrong, the prosecutor in Jen-
kins' case, that during the trial she had an incidental encounter with
7. See infra notes 212-224 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 170-224 and accompanying text.
9. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 290, 825 A.2d at 1011;Jenkins v. State, 146 Md. App. 83, 95,
806 A.2d 682, 689 (2002) [hereinafter Jenkins 1].
10. Jenkins I, 146 Md. App. at 95-96, 806 A.2d at 689.
11. Id. Jenkins was charged with attempted first-degree murder, attempted second-de-
gree murder, second-degree murder, use of a handgun during the commission of a crime
of violence, first-degree assault, and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Id. at 94,
806 A.2d at 688.
12. Id. at 96, 806 A.2d at 689.
13. Id., 806 A.2d at 689-90.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 97, 806 A.2d at 690.
16. Id. at 94, 806 A.2d at 688.
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Bruce McDonald, one of the sittingjurors.'V That same day, Ms. Arm-
strong contacted the court and defense counsel and requested an
emergency hearing to investigate the incident.1 8 On April 5, 2001,
Armstrong informed the court of Pikulski's contact with McDonald
during the trial.1 9 On April 9, 2001, Jenkins filed a motion for a re-
trial on the basis that the improper contact between Pikulski and Mc-
Donald prejudiced him and deprived him of his right to a fair trial.2°
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-331 (a), the trial court scheduled an evi-
dentiary hearing for April 19, 2001.21
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court heard testimony from
Pikulski and McDonald.22 Both Pikulski and McDonald testified that
they attended a small religious retreat in Virginia on March 23 and 24
of 2001 .23 At the retreat, McDonald recognized Pikulski and ap-
proached her, indicating that he was a sitting juror in a trial in which
she testified. 24 Pikulski, assuming McDonald was a juror in the al-
ready-decided Barnett case, asked McDonald whether he was one of
the ones who had convicted the defendant.25 McDonald indicated
that he was presently unable to discuss the case.26 McDonald then
clarified that the trial was ongoing and that he was "right now" sitting
on the jury.27 After Pikulski realized that McDonald was involved in
the ongoing Jenkins trial, Pikulski and McDonald agreed, per the
17. Id. at 97, 806 A.2d at 690.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 98, 806 A.2d at 690.
20. Id.
21. Id. Maryland Rule 4-331 (a) provides that "within ten days after a verdict, the court,
in the interest of justice, may order a new trial." MD. R. 4-331 (a).
22. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 292, 825 A.2d at 1012. The court questioned McDonald, and
he explained the nature of his contact with Detective Pikulski, but-in accordance with
Maryland Rule 5-606-he was not asked questions pertaining to and did not testify as to
the effect this contact had on his decision-making process as a juror. Id. at 292 n.9, 825
A.2d 1013 n.9.
23. Jenkins I, 196 Md. App. at 99, 806 A.2d at 691. Twenty-five to thirty people attended
the retreat. Id.
24. Id. at 98, 806 A.2d at 690. The hearing record indicates that McDonald could not
remember specifically how he explained his involvement in the Jenkins case. Id. He testi-
fied that he "was" or "is" "on the jury." Id.
25. Id. Pikulski said to McDonald: "Oh, you're one of the ones that convicted him?" to
which McDonald replied, "I can't talk about it." Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 99, 806 A.2d 690-91.
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court's orders,28 that they could not talk about the case thereafter.2 9
McDonald testified that they did not discuss the case any further.3 °
Though they agreed not to talk about the case, Pikulski and Mc-
Donald unintentionally sat next to one another during the next day of
the retreat and, upon McDonald's invitation, went to lunch together
at the conclusion of the retreat.3 1 Based on the trial judge's instruc-
tions to the jury, Pikulski's and McDonald's decision to have lunch
together violated the court's order to avoid contact with one an-
other.32 After eating for approximately an hour and a half, Pikulski
then drove McDonald approximately one-half mile to pick up his
car. 33 After the retreat and lunch following, Pikulski and McDonald
had no further contact.
3 4
c. Trial Court Hearing on Jenkins' Motion for a Retrial.-On
June 20, 2001, the trial court held a hearing on Jenkins' motion for a
new trial and issued a written opinion denying the motion on July 16,
2001.3' The court concluded that the contact between Pikulski and
McDonald was improper but that Jenkins was not prejudiced in the
process.3 6 The court found that any possible confusion with Barnett's
trial and conviction resulting from Pikulski's statement, "you're one of
28. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 292-93 n.10, 825 A.2d at 1013 n.10. After jury selection, the
trial judge indicated thatjurors "must do everything reasonable within your power to avoid
contact with any of the witnesses, parties, or persons you see in close contact with them
outside of the courtroom." Id Prior to the weekend recess in question, the court offered
the following instructions to the jurors: "Do not have any contact outside the courtroom
with any of the parties, witnesses, or lawyers." Id (emphasis omitted). Though the record
is not clear whether Detective Pikulski was in the courtroom during either of the instruc-
tions, she was still subject to subpoena and was told not to "discuss your testimony with any
other witness or permit any other witness to discuss their testimony with you." Record at
307, Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 825 A.2d 1008 (2003) (No. 107).
29. Jenkins I, 196 Md. App. at 99, 806 A.2d 690-91.
30. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 294, 825 A.2d at 1013.
31. Id., 825 A.2d at 1014. Pikulski and McDonald ate lunch at a nearby restaurant for
approximately an hour and a half. Id. at 295, 825 A.2d at 1014. They each paid for their
own meals. Id Pikulski and McDonald were alone in the restaurant except for a brief time
when a friend of McDonald's joined them. Id. at 294 & n.12, 825 A.2d at 1014 & n.12.
During lunch, Pikulski and McDonald shared personal information about each other and
their families. Id at 295, 825 A.2d at 1014. Specifically, McDonald shared information
about his occupation in environmental matters and Pikulski shared information about her
son who was also interested in the environment. Jenkins I, 146 Md. App. at 100, 806 A.2d at
691.
32. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 292-93 n.10, 825 A.2d at 1013 n.10.
33. Jenkins I, 146 Md. App. at 100, 806 A.2d at 691. McDonald's car was being repaired
at a nearby dealership. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id, 806 A.2d at 692.
36. Id.
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the ones that convicted him," would not have harmed Jenkins because
Jenkins' defense was that Barnett shot Dorsey.3v Additionally, because
the defense adopted Pikulski's testimony to discredit Clark, the State's
primary witness, the court found that any enhanced credibility of
Pikulski in the eyes of McDonald "would have worked in [Jenkins']
favor."38 Finally, the court found that even if McDonald had an en-
hanced view of Pikulski's credibility, corresponding credibility did not
logically transfer to other police detective witnesses and therefore did
not enhance the State's case.39 The court held that even if prejudice
was to be presumed, the State had adequately rebutted the presump-
tion by showing thatJenkins was not actually prejudiced in the verdict
and was consequently not entitled to a new trial.4"
d. Jenkins' Appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.-Jenkins ap-
pealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the trial
court's refusal to grant a new trial.41 On appeal, Jenkins, inter alia,
contended that the improper contact between Pikulski and McDonald
deprived him of his right to an impartial finder of fact and that the
court's denial of a retrial was legal error.42 Jenkins maintained that
the improper contact gave rise to a "probability of prejudice" because
it enhanced Pikulski's credibility, enhanced the credibility of the en-
tire police department, implied Jenkins' guilt, and that the affirma-
tion of the misconduct in the form of upholding the verdict would
jeopardize the integrity of the judicial system.43
The court, applying an abuse of discretion standard, determined
that the factual findings of the trial court on the determination of
prejudice were supported by competent evidence; therefore, the deci-
sion to deny Jenkins' motion for a trial was sound and did not deny
Jenkins due process. 44 The court agreed with the trial court's deter-
mination that the defense relied on Pikulski's credibility and that any
enhanced credibility of Pikulski in McDonald's mind was only helpful
37. Id. at 102, 806 A.2d at 692. The court stated: "Indeed, part of the defense theory
was that Uenkins] was a victim of mistaken identity and that Barnett had committed the
murder with [Barnett's] brother, not with Jenkins]. Barnett's having been found guilty
was consistent with that theory." Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 101-02, 806 A.2d at 692.
40. Id. at 101, 806 A.2d at 692.
41. Id. at 141, 806 A.2d at 716.
42. Id. at 102, 806 A.2d at 692.
43. Id., 806 A.2d at 693.
44. Id. at 111, 806 A.2d at 698.
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to Jenkins' defense.4 5 Relying on the trial record, the court found
that because Pikulski was not tied strongly to either side of the case, it
would be incorrect to assume that she endorsed a particular outcome
of the case or communicated a desired particular outcome to McDon-
ald.46 Finally, the court rejected the argument concerning the preser-
vation of the public image of the criminal justice system because it was
not raised during trial.4 7
Jenkins appealed to the Court of Appeals.
48 The court granted
certiorari to consider whether the trial judge erred in refusing to grant
Jenkins' request for a new trial after it ascertained that a juror and a
State's witness engaged in ex parte communications during the trial.
4 9
2. Legal Background.-The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a
defendant in a criminal prosecution will be judged by an impartial
jury of his peers.5" Since the adoption of the "impartial jury" stan-
dard, the federal and state judicial systems have been in search of a
just, yet realistic and efficient method of ensuring this fundamental
right. The United States Supreme Court has opined that impartiality
is subjective and is, therefore, difficult to encapsulate in a rule or stan-
dardized test.5 1 Though "impartiality" implies absolute juror "indiffer-
ence," the Supreme Court and Maryland courts have determined that
the right to an impartial jury is only violated, particularly as a result of
juror communications with third parties, when the juror communica-
tions have a prejudicial effect on the outcome of the defendant's
trial.5" Both the Supreme Court and the Maryland courts have con-
45. Id. at 112, 806 A.2d at 698. The court noted that "a trial court may reasonably find
that extrinsic evidence that actually assists a defendant's case is not prejudicial to him and
therefore, not sufficient evidence upon which to direct a mistrial." Id., 806 A.2d at 699
(citing Allen v. State, 89 Md. App. 25, 49, 597 A.2d 489, 501 (1991)).
46. Id. at 115, 806 A.2d at 700.
47. Id. at 115-16, 806 A.2d at 700-01.
48. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 288, 825 A.2d at 1010.
49. Id at 289, 825 A.2d at 1010-11.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed"). The Fourteenth
Amendment extends this right to defendants in state proceedings. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (stating that no state can "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . .").
51. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-146 (1936). Chief Justice Hughes
stated: "Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertain-
ment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no
particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula." Id.
52. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 738 (1993) (noting that it is "virtually
impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect
their vote" and that the ultimate inquiry demanded by due process is whether the miscon-
2004]
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cluded that actual prejudicial effect, not inconsequential bias, is re-
quired in order for a defendant's due process rights to be violated.5"
However, the Maryland court's strict adherence to Maryland Rule 5-
606 introduces a complexity in determining actual prejudice resulting
from the rule's preclusion of post-verdict juror testimony regardingjurors' subjective decision-making process.54 In order to ensure that
trial court judges are accorded the proper discretion, Maryland law
has a well-established abuse of discretion standard of review to both
assess and assure the protection of the trial court judges's suiperior
vantage point in granting or denying a defendant's motion for a new
trial.55
a. The Development of the Supreme Court's "Ultimate Inquiry" into
Jury Prejudice: "Did the Intrusion Affect the Jury's Deliberations and Thereby
its Verdict?"56-The right to trial by a jury whose decision is based
solely on evidence developed at trial is a fundamental principle of
American jurisprudence. 57 As a result, communications between de-
liberating jurors and influential third parties inject doubt on the ju-
rors' ability to make a decision regarding the guilt of the defendant
based solely upon the evidence submitted at trial. 51 In 1892, the Su-
preme Court, in Mattox v. United States,59 addressed the concern of
potential prejudice resulting from juror-third party contact by adopt-
ing a rule forbidding such contact and invalidating a verdict unless
the State could show that no harm resulted from the contact. 60
In Remmer v. United States,61 the Court considered the potential
effect a third party who attempted to bribe a juror had on the out-
come of the trial.62 The Court created a procedural mechanism to
duct had a prejudicial impact on the jury's verdict); Allen v. State, 89 Md. App. 25, 49, 597A.2d 489, 501 (1991) (noting that, generally, misconduct that can be determined to assist a
defendant's case is not prejudicial to him).
53. See infra notes 56-108 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 109-118 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 119-127 and accompanying text.
56. Olano, 507 U.S. at 739.
57. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
58. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965) ("The requirement that a jury's
verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial goes to the fundamental
integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
59. 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
60. Id. at 150 ("Private communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and thirdpersons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the
verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to appear.").
61. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
62. Id. at 228.
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conduct a post-trial determination of prejudice to a defendant result-
ing from private communications between sitting jurors and third par-
ties.63 The Court determined that private communications between
jurors and third parties about the case presently pending before the
court is "presumptively prejudicial." 64 The Court further stated that
the presumption of prejudice was rebuttable and that the State bears
the burden of establishing that the communication did not harm the
defendant.65 The Court held that where communication takes place
between a sitting juror and a witness, the trial court should conduct a
hearing with all interested parties to determine the nature and cir-
cumstances of the contact during the trial, the effect of the contact
upon the juror, and whether the contact had a prejudicial effect upon
the defendant.66 The Court then remanded the case and directed the
lower court to grant a new trial if it determined that the prejudice
affected the jury's decision making process.67
In Turner v. Louisiana,6" the Court did not rely on Remmer explic-
itly, but it conducted a Remmer-like hearing to determine whether dep-
uty sheriffs who attended to the jury and simultaneously served as
witnesses in the trial prejudiced the defendant.69 In its opinion, the
Court reproduced a portion of the record transcribed from the hear-
ing where one of the deputies testified about his relationship with the
jurors.7 " The deputy testified that he had not talked about the case
with any of the jurors but throughout the course of the trial, he had
repeatedly spoken with the jurors, ate meals with them, ridden in the
same vehicles with them, and had made acquaintances with most of
the jurors.7 " From the deputy's testimony, the Court established that
the continuous association with the jurors throughout the three-day
trial, notwithstanding a lack of any conversation about the trial itself,
was prejudicial.72 Expanding the Court's holding in Remmer, the Tur-
ner Court determined that the establishment of a jury's confidence in
a witness, in addition to direct conversations about the matter pend-
63. Id. at 229.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 229-30.
67. Id. at 230.
68. 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
69. Id. at 468.
70. Id. at 468-69 n.6.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 473.
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ing before the jury specifically addressed in Remmer, had the capacity
to prejudice the defendant.73
In Smith v. Phillips,"4 the Court considered whether a sitting juror
who had a pending application in the District Attorney's Office, as-
sumedly predisposing the juror to favor the prosecution's case, vio-
lated the defendant's due process rights.75 In considering the
defendant's due process claim, the Court articulated that "due process
does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a
potentially compromising situation. ' 76 The Court reasoned that voir
dire77 and protective instructions, 78 though effective, could not elimi-
nate every influence that may affect ajuror's decision and that a Rem-
mer-like hearing could determine whether an influence was
prejudicial.79 Though upholding Remmer's admonition to conduct an
evidentiary hearing upon post-trial allegations of misconduct, the
Smith Court did not recognize misconduct as "presumptively prejudi-
cial" and indicated that the burden is on the defendant to establish
that the misconduct resulted in "actual bias."8" In addition to the sub-
stantive requirements of due process set forth in Remmer and Turner,
the Smith court recognized the procedural role of the trial judge in
preventing prejudicial occurrences and determining the ultimate ef-
fect of alleged misconduct.81
Finally, in United States v. Olano,8 2 the Court considered whether
the presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations was prejudi-
cial to the defendant.8 3 In examining the procedure for determining
73. Id at 474.
74. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
75. Id. at 212.
76. Id. at 217.
77. Voir dire helps to alleviate the problem of juror impartiality by providing judges
and counsel from both sides the opportunity to determine whether any member of the
venire panel are predisposed, either directly or indirectly, to harbor bias or prejudice that
would affect their ability to decide the case solely on the evidence before it. Davis v. State,
333 Md. 27, 35-36 (1993).
78. Though the actual effect of jury instructions has been the subject of speculation,
protective instructions are intended to assist juries in reaching a verdict according to the
law as opposed to their own assumptions about the law or predispositions toward a particu-
lar outcome in a case. See Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions:
A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 96 (1988); see also Firoz Dattu, Illus-
tratedJury Instructions: A Proposai, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 67, 68 (1998).
79. Smith, 455 U.S. at 217.
80. Id. at 215. The Court provided that "[t]his Court has long held that the remedy for
allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to
prove actual bias." Id. (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954)).
81. Id. at 217.
82. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
83. Id. at 727.
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whether a defendant's due process rights were violated, the Court re-
affirmed the use of evidentiary hearings proposed in Remmer.84 More
significantly, the Court clarified that regardless of a presumption of
prejudice or a specific showing of prejudice, the ultimate inquiry is:
"Did the intrusion affect the jury's deliberations and thereby its ver-
dict?" 5 In support of this finding, the Court insisted that "reversal
would be pointless" if no harm resulted from an intrusion. 6 In Olano,
the Court definitively clarified the purpose of the Remmer-like hearing
and insisted that a defendant's substantive due process right to an im-
partial jury is violated only when the court finds an actual prejudicial
effect on the outcome of the trial.8 7
b. Maryland's Determination of the Prejudicial Effect ofJuror Mis-
conduct.-In addition to a criminal defendant's right to an impartial
jury under the Sixth Amendment, the right to an impartial jury is a
right explicitly recognized in Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights.8" Maryland courts have determined that the right to an im-
partial jury is violated when the defendant is actually harmed by mis-
conduct between a juror and a third party.8 9 Maryland courts have
adopted Remmer's presumption of prejudice and the Remmer-like hear-
ing to determine the potentially prejudicial nature of misconduct be-
tween jurors and third parties.9 ° The Remmer-like hearings in
Maryland courts, however, are limited in the review that can occur
because ajuror is prohibited under Maryland Rule 5-606 from making
statements regarding any influences on his decision-making process.
91
Consequently, the Remmer-like hearings conducted in Maryland can-
not directly inquire into the potential prejudice in ajuror's subjective
decision-making process, and are thus limited solely to the external
facts surrounding the juror-witness misconduct and the trial itself.
9 2
84. Id. at 739-40.
85. Id. at 739.
86. Id. at 738.
87. Id. at 739-40.
88. MD. DECL. OF RTs. art. 21 (stating in relevant part "[t]hat in all criminal prosecu-
tions, every man hath a right to .. .a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose
unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty").
89. See, e.g., Eades v. State, 75 Md. App. 411, 423, 541 A.2d 1001, 1008 (1988) (noting
that a harmless error standard applies to improper juror misconduct).
90. Id. at 421, 541 A.2d at 1006.
91. MD. R. 5-606. Under Rule 5-606, jurors are unable to testify as to the effect of
anything upon any of the jurors' minds or emotions or anything that may have influenced
a juror's mental decision making in connection with the verdict. Id.
92. Id.
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(1) The Maryland Courts' Preservation of ImpartialJuries in Light
of Juror Misconduct.-In Eades v. State,9 3 the Court of Special Appeals
considered the potential prejudicial effect of a sitting juror discussing
a procedural evidentiary issue with her husband, who was a lawyer.94
The court recognized the potential for such communications between
jurors and third parties to prejudice the jury's decision.95 While the
Eades court recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in Smith,
which held that it was improper to impute bias when ajuror had ajob
application pending with the District Attorney's office, may have cast
doubt on Remmer's required "presumption of prejudice," the court
continued to embrace the Remmer presumption.9 6 After finding a pre-
sumption of prejudice, the court also followed Remmer's correspond-
ing requirement of a post-trial evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the defendant was prejudiced by improper contact between
jurors and third parties.9 7 After reviewing the evidence, the court af-
firmed the trial court's consideration of the contents of the juror-third
party conversation and its relation to the appellant's guilt or inno-
cence-and not the level of juror misconduct.9" The court affirmed
the trial court's decision to deny Eades' motion for retrial.99
In Allen v. State,'0 0 the Court of Special Appeals considered the
potential prejudicial effect of improper communications between an
alternate juror and a sitting juror.0 1 The court stated that a trial
court's determination of prejudice must consider the probability of
prejudice in relation to specific circumstances of each case. 10 2 In Al-
len, the court posited three distinct methods of dealing with poten-
tially prejudicial conduct: (1) if the court finds an affirmative showing
of prejudice to the defendant resulting from improper communica-
tions, the case requires reversal;1 0 (2) if the court can make no af-
firmative showing of prejudice, then that case does not require
93. 75 Md. App. 411, 541 A.2d 1001, cert. denied, 313 Md. 611, 547 A.2d 188 (1988).
94. Id. at 415, 541 A.2d at 1004.
95. Id. at 420, 541 A.2d at 1006.
96. Id. at 421, 541 A.2d at 1006.
97. Id. Maryland courts have determined that the "evidentiary hearing" required by
Remmer must only be sufficiently detailed to afford the judge the opportunity to determine
prejudicial effect and that a full evidentiary hearing is not necessary. Id.
98. Id. at 425, 541 A.2d at 1008.
99. Id.
100. 89 Md. App. 25, 597 A.2d 489 (1991).
101. Id. at 39, 597 A.2d at 496.
102. Id. at 46, 597 A.2d at 499 ("It is well established in Maryland that in determining
whether jury contact is prejudicial, a trial court must balance the probability of prejudice
from the face of the extraneous matter in relation to the circumstances of the particular
case.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. (relying on Eades, 75 Md. App. at 422-23, 541 A.2d at 1007).
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reversal;' 0 4 and (3) if the court is unable to determine the existence of
or lack of prejudice, the court is to presume prejudice and then the
State assumes the burden of rebutting the presumption 
of harm.1 1 5
Maryland courts have been reluctant to grant retrials and therefore
require that mistrials be declared only when the circumstances make
it absolutely necessary and the record demonstrates that the defen-
dant has suffered clear and egregious prejudice.1 0 6 Furthermore, the
Allen court explicitly stated that " [t] he general rule is that a trial court
may reasonably find that extrinsic evidence that actually assists a de-
fendant's case is not prejudicial to him and, therefore, not sufficient
ground upon which to direct a mistrial."'0 7 The Allen court reiterated
that declaring a mistrial in Maryland trial courts is a "drastic measure"
that should be declared only "under extraordinary circumstances and
where there is a manifest necessity to do so.
(2) Limited Post-Trial Inquiry Under Maryland Rule 5-606.-Af-
ter reasonable allegations of juror misconduct are presented to the
court, Remmer directs courts to conduct a hearing with all interested
parties to determine the nature and circumstances of the contact dur-
ing the trial, the effect of the contact upon the juror, and whether the
contact had a prejudicial effect upon the defendant.1 0 9 Maryland
Rule 5-606 imposes significant limitations on such post-verdict inquir-
ies by prohibiting a juror from making statements regarding influ-
ences upon his or her subjective decision-making process.1 1 0
Maryland Rule 5-606 is the codification of a principle set forth in 1785
in Lord Mansfield's opinion in Vaise v. Delaval, 1 Term R. 11 (KB.
1785).111
104. Id
105. Id. at 47, 597 A.2d 499-500 (relying on Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229
(1954), which held that private communications between jurors and third parties regard-
ing a matter before the court raises a presumption of prejudice).
106. Id. at 42, 597 A.2d at 497 (citing Leak v. State, 84 Md. App. 353, 358, 579 A.2d 788,
791 (1990), which required that the improper conduct in question must be "a direct and
contributing factor that resulted in substantial prejudice to the defendant").
107. Id. at 49, 597 A.2d at 501 (relying on Carpenter v. United States, 475 A.2d 369, 376
(D.C. App. 1984)).
108. Id. at 42, 597 A.2d at 497 (citing Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 429, 326 A.2d 707
(1974); Russell v. State, 69 Md. App. 554, 562, 518 A.2d 1081 (1987); Leak v. State, 84 Md.
App. 353, 358, 579 A.2d 788 (1990); Lusby v. State, 217 Md. 191, 195, 141 A.2d 893
(1958)).
109. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229-30.
110. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting that Rule 5-606 prohibits inquiries
into a jury's and individual juror's subjective decision-making processes).
111. Eades v. State, 75 Md. App. 411, 416, 541 A.2d 1001, 1004 (1988). Lord Mansfield
opined that allowing inquiry into jurors' decision making process would disclose "the
2004]
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As a result of Maryland Rule 5-606, Remmer-like hearings in Mary-
land are limited to factual findings surrounding the trial and alleged
misconduct rather than an actual determination of the juror's deci-
sion-making process.1 12 The continued application of Maryland Rule
5-606 in light of juror-witness misconduct has been historically justi-
fied on grounds that to allow such inquiry into jury decision-making
would be to violate the confidentiality of jury deliberations and in-
crease the likelihood of abuse by more readily exposing the jury to
opportunities for fraud and pejury."3 Reiterating this pre-Remmer
principle, the Eades court justified preserving the rule because it pre-
vents "the harassment of jurors" by losing parties and supports the
finality of judicial decisions.' 14
The Eades court reiterated that Maryland has adopted a strict in-
terpretation of the rule precluding "a juror from testifying as to any
matter that may have affected the verdict."'1 15 The court, however,
noted that even if Maryland maintained a strict application of Mary-
land Rule 5-606, a pre-verdict exception allows the court to question
individual jurors about circumstances that may have affected delibera-
tions before a final verdict is rendered.' 16 Through a procedural ele-
ment often incorporated as part of a jury trial, the judge has the
opportunity to examine the jury to determine whether their verdict
would be subject to question as a result of misconduct or other irregu-
larities. 7 The court reasoned that this pre-verdict exception sup-
ports the public policy rationale for the rule to be maintained while
giving the court an opportunity to ensure proper grounds for the final
verdict. 1 8 The Maryland court's strict adherence to Maryland Rule 5-
606 and the allowance of only a pre-verdict exception evidences the
court's desire to balance the court's discretion in ensuring fair trials
and the protection of the jury system.
secrets of the jury room and afford an opportunity for fraud and perjury." Id. at 417, 541
A.2d at 1004.
112. Id.
113. See Brinsfield v. Howeth, 110 Md. 520, 531, 73 A.2d 289, 294 (1909). The Brinsfield
court insisted that allowing inquiry into jury deliberations would "open such a door for
tampering with weak and indiscreet men that it would render all verdicts insecure;
and . . [would] permit a verdict, openly and solemnly declared in the Court, to be
subverted by going behind it and inquiring into the secrets of the jury room." Id.
114. 75 Md. App. at 417, 541 A.2d at 1004, cert. denied, 313 Md. 611, 547 A.2d 188 (1988)
(citation omitted).
115. Id. at 418, 541 A.2d at 1005.
116. Id. at 419, 541 A.2d at 1005.
117. Id.
118. Id.
[VOL. 63:832
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
(3) Abuse of Discretion Standard: The Maryland Courts'Deference
to Trial Court's Denial of Motion for New Tial.-In Maryland, a trial
judge's discretion extends to decisions regarding juror misconduct
and the misconduct of others that potentially may affect the jury's im-
partiality.' 19 A trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial is subject
to reversal only when the appellate court determines that the trial
court abused its discretion. 120 Maryland courts have given considera-
ble deference to the trial judge's determination of prejudice and the
decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial.1 2 1 Maryland courts
have applied this heightened standard of review because the trial
judge has the exclusive opportunity and superior vantage point to ob-
serve jurors during trial and determine whether a juror's misconduct
has compromised the defendant's right to an impartial jury.
122
The abuse of discretion standard demands that trial judges not
act in an "arbitrary or capricious" manner or "beyond the [letter or]
reason of the law."' 25 In other words, the trial record must adequately
reflect the judge's sound application of his or her discretion.'
24
Though substantially deferential to the trial judge, the Court of Ap-
peals has noted that this discretion is not "boundless.' 25 The court
has allowed a trial judge's discretion to expand and contract based
upon the facts of each case and whether the trial judge had an ade-
quate opportunity during the trial to determine whether the jury
reached a fair and just result.126 Though trial court decisions are sub-
ject to appellate review, the abuse of discretion standard attempts to
ensure that trial court judges will have a reasonable opportunity to
thoughtfully and efficiently assess whether misconduct has resulted in
prejudice to the defendant. 12 7
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Jenkins v. State, the Court of Ap-
peals considered whether the trial court abused its discretion in refus-
119. Id. at 420, 541 A.2d at 1006.
120. Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 600, 479 A.2d 1344, 1352 (1984).
121. Wright v. State, 312 Md. 648, 654, 541 A.2d 988, 991 (1988).
122. See Allen v. State, 89 Md. App. 25, 43, 597 A.2d 489, 497 (1991) (noting that the
trial judge is in the best position to determine whether a defendant's right to an impartial
jury has been violated such that the trial court's decision on a motion for a new trial will
not be overruled absent a clear abuse of discretion).
123. Nelson v. State, 315 Md. 62, 70, 553 A.2d 667, 671 (1989).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Wernsing v. Gen. Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406, 420, 470 A.2d 802, 809 (1984)
(noting that the trial judge has the ability to "evaluate the degree of probable prejudice
and whether it justifies a new trial").
127. Wright v. State, 312 Md. 648, 654, 541 A.2d 988, 991 (1988); Wilhelm v. State, 272
Md. 404, 429, 579 A.2d 707, 723 (1973).
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ing to grant Jenkins a new trial when the court ascertained, post-
verdict, that a juror and a witness engaged in ex parte communications
during the trial. 12' The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
Court of Special Appeals and held that egregious misconduct violated
Jenkins' right to an impartial jury and that the trial court's denial of
Jenkins' motion for a retrial was an abuse of discretion. 129 Judge
Cathell, writing for a unanimous court, determined that a presump-
tion of prejudice arose from mid-trial conversations between Detective
Pikulski and Juror McDonald and that the presumption of prejudice
could not be adequately rebutted under Maryland Rule 5-606's limita-
tion on post-verdict jury inquiry.1 30
The court began by recalling the judicial system's long tradition
of holding that communications between jurors and witnesses are im-
proper and will violate a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
an impartial jury unless the State can prove that the misconduct was
harmless.1 3 ' The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Remmer v. United States, noting that instances of misconduct between
jurors and third parties are presumed to be prejudicial and that the
State assumes the burden of showing the harmlessness of the con-
tact.'3 2 The court noted that Jenkins is the first case in Maryland to
require an interpretation of the presumption of prejudice established
in Remmer. 3 3 Nevertheless, the court noted that the Maryland courts'
interpretations of prejudice before the Remmer decision maintained
that a finding of improper communication and an inability to show
such conduct actually prejudiced the defendant creates a presump-
tion of prejudice."' The court referenced and cited approvingly the
Court of Special Appeals decision to adopt the Remmer presumption of
prejudice considered in Eades and Allen.'35
Next, the court considered the effect of Maryland Rule 5-606 on
post-verdict determinations of juror prejudice and concluded that
"[t]here simply is no way in a specific case for the trial court in that
128. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 289, 825 A.2d at 1011.
129. Id. at 340-41, 825 A.2d at 1041.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 301, 825 A.2d at 1018.
132. Id. at 301-02, 825 A.2d at 1018-19 (quoting Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227,
229 (1954)).
133. Id. at 302, 825 A.2d at 1019.
134. Id. at 304-05, 825 A.2d at 1020.
135. Id. at 305-06, 825 A.2d at 1021. Although the court recognized the potential limita-
tion of the presumption of prejudice introduced in the decisions of Smith v. Phillips, 455
U.S. 209 (1982), and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), it concluded that the
limitations did not apply to situations where egregious misconduct or improper contact
occurs between jurors and third parties or witnesses. Id. at 316, 825 A.2d at 1027.
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case to meaningfully investigate the matter of juror motives and im-
partiality during jury deliberations after the verdict is in and ac-
cepted." '36 The court also noted that overcoming the presumption of
prejudice is particularly difficult post-verdict because the limited in-
quiry permitted under Maryland Rule 5-606 lacks the requisite capac-
ity to show that the improper conduct did not affect the juror's
deliberations.' 37 The court noted that in both Eades and Allen the trial
court had the opportunity to investigate thoroughly the effect ofjuror
misconduct, as it was brought to the attention of the court prior to
when the jury rendered its verdict."3 '
Before focusing on the specific facts of the case, the court turned
to the Supreme Court's decision in Turner, which it considered help-
ful in analyzing Jenkins.13 9 The court recalled that in Turner, two
State's witnesses also served as parish deputy sheriffs who, during the
trial, ate, talked, and generally associated with the jurors.1 4 ° The
Court of Appeals noted that in Turner, the Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's decision not to grant a retrial and reasoned that the
continual association exhibited extreme prejudice and essentially evi-
denced that the jury would have come to the same conclusion
whether a formal trial had or had not been held. 4 ' The court high-
lighted Turner's finding that the circumstances of that case "operated
to subvert [the] basic guarantees of trial byjury."142 The court further
stated its belief that the situation in Jenkins was akin to the situation in
Turner. 14
3
Turning to Jenkins, the court reasoned that under its interpreta-
tion of the Supreme Court's precedent in Smith and Olano'4 and
under the Maryland Declaration of Rights, a presumption of
prejudice is required in cases where egregious juror-witness miscon-
duct jeopardizes the defendant's right to due process.' 45 The court
opined that the right to an impartial jury is a fundamental right that
"cannot be compromised by even the hint of possible bias or
136. Id. at 308-09, 825 A.2d at 1022 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 309, 316, 825 A.2d at 1023, 1027.
138. Id. at 309, 825 A.2d at 1022-23.
139. Id. at 316, 825 A.2d at 1027.
140. Id. at 316-17, 825 A.2d at 1027.
141. Id. at 318, 825 A.2d at 1028 (citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-74
(1965)).
142. Id. at 317, 825 A.2d at 1028 (emphasis omitted).
143. Id. at 318, 825 A.2d at 1028.
144. Id. at 319, 825 A.2d at 1028. The court read the Supreme Court decisions in Smith
and Olano to not eviscerate the concept of egregious actions established in Remmer and
Turner. Id.
145. Id.
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prejudice that is not affirmatively rebutted."1 46 In focusing on the im-
proper contact between Pikulski and McDonald, the court reasoned
that even if the presumption of prejudice doctrine did not exist in all
instances of misconduct, the concept of egregious actions in Remmer
and Turner demand that the deliberate and personal nature of the
interaction be considered presumptively prejudicial.147 In determin-
ing the egregiousness of the misconduct between Pikulski and Mc-
Donald, the court cited Pikulski and McDonald's blatant refusal to
avoid contact with one another, the extent of their contact, and their
shared failure to inform the court of their interaction during the
trial.1 41 While recognizing that not all incidental contacts are inher-
ently prejudicial, the court reasoned that the totality and intentional-
ity of the contact in explicit violation of court orders between Pikulski
and McDonald raised serious concerns. 49
After establishing the existence of a rebuttable presumption of
prejudice, the court considered the State's attempt to rebut the pre-
sumption. First, the State argued that because the defense embraced
Pikulski's testimony, any impartiality would have worked in the defen-
dant's favor and would not be, by definition, prejudicial to the defen-
dant.1 50 The court dismissed the argument and stated that the issue
was not the believability of Pikulski but that McDonald, as a result of
the friendship, would be likely to rule in the State's favor because
Pikulski was a State's witness.'51  The court continued by reiterating
that Rule 5-606 would make this issue nearly impossible to resolve. 152
Next, the court agreed with Jenkins' argument that the enhanced
credibility of Pikulski would have a spillover effect that would enhance
the credibility of all of the State's police witnesses and thus further
146. Id., 825 A.2d at 1028-29.
147. Id., 825 A.2d at 1029.
148. Id. at 319-20, 825 A.2d at 1029-30. The court cited the trial court's instruction to
Pikulski not to discuss her testimony with any other witness and the instruction to McDon-
ald to "do everything reasonable within your power to avoid contact with any of the wit-
nesses .... In addition, please avoid any contact with the . . . witnesses involved in this
case." Id. at 320-21, 825 A.2d at 1029-30 (emphasis omitted). The court had instructed the
Jury to write the court a note as soon as possible if anything contrary to the instructions
occurred. Id. at 321, 825 A.2d at 1030. However, neither Detective Pikulski nor McDonald
reported the incident. Id. at 323, 825 A.2d at 1031. The court heavily criticized Detective
Pikulski's actions in light of her twenty-two years of police experience, numerous testimo-
nies in other cases, and her remaining under subpoena while the conversation occurred.
I&.
149. Id. at 321-22, 825 A.2d at 1030.
150. Id at 329, 825 A.2d at 1034-35.
151. Id., 825 A.2d at 1035.
152. Id.; see supra note 3 and accompanying text (providing language of Rule 5-606).
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prejudice the defendant.153 The court reasoned that the voir dire pro-
cess is intended to give parties the option of excluding jurors who
know or have had contact with any of the parties, attorneys, or wit-
nesses.1 54 The court ruled that the failure to alert the trial court of
the mid-trial conduct deprived Jenkins of the right to conduct a mid-
trial voir dire of the jurors to determine the potential prejudicial effect
this relationship would have on his decision-making process.
155
The court conceded that it could not conclude that prejudice ac-
tually occurred in the case. 1 56 However, the court stated that the
heightened possibility of prejudice in this particular case demanded
that the "only method of affirmatively rebutting" prejudice to the defen-
dant was to ask McDonald, in violation of Rule 5-606, about his
thought process during jury deliberations.1 57 The court reasoned that
the imposition of Rule 5-606 would not allow the prejudice to be
rebutted.
158
Finally, the court argued that, most importantly, a failure to find
the egregious conduct prejudicial would compromise the standard of
impartiality necessary to uphold the integrity of the jury trial pro-
cess.1 59 The court stated that the appearance of impropriety resulting
from such egregious misconduct questions the integrity of the trial
process and diminishes the perception and integrity of the system in
the mind of defendants and the public.'6 ° The court found that the
State offered no rebuttal to the damage that would be caused to the
jury system by finding the misconduct in this case non-prejudicial.' 6 '
The court declared that it had an inherent interest in protecting the
integrity of the jury system and concluded that the verdict could not
stand. 16
2
4. Analysis.-In Jenkins v. State, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land held that mid-trial communications between ajuror and a State's
witness were egregious and created a virtually irrefutable presumption
of prejudice that the State could not rebut under the restrictions on
post-verdict juror testimony imposed by Maryland Rule 5-606, which
153. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 325, 825 A.2d at 1032.
154. Id. at 326-27, 825 A.2d at 1033.
155. Id. at 327, 825 A.2d at 1033.
156. Id. at 329, 825 A.2d at 1034.
157. Id. at 329-30, 825 A.2d at 1035 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 333, 825 A.2d at 1037.
159. Id. at 327-28, 825 A.2d at 1034.
160. Id at 328, 825 A.2d at 1034.
161. Id. at 333, 825 A.2d at 1037.
162. Id.
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prohibits inquiry into the jury's or a juror's decision-making pro-
cess. 163 The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion
in not granting Jenkins a retrial.'64 Unlike the trial court and the
Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals was distracted by the
particularly egregious nature of the juror-witness misconduct and the
limitations of Maryland Rule 5-606, and consequently failed to fully
consider the actual prejudicial effect of the juror-witness misconduct
on the outcome of the trial.'65 The court's failure to consider the ac-
tual prejudicial effect of the juror-witness misconduct on the outcome
of the trial suggests a bright-line rule that any post-verdict determina-
tions of egregious, mid-trial juror misconduct demand an automatic
retrial.' 6 6 The Jenkins precedent removes a trial judge's discretion to
determine the actual effect of mid-trial juror misconduct and results
in a significant deviation from the court's historic application of an
abuse of discretion standard to a trial court's denial of a motion for a
new trial. 167 Though the Jenkins decision was couched in an effort to
protect the integrity of the jury system, the court reversed a reasonably
determined verdict, ironically harming the efficiency and thereby the
integrity of the jury system it was so vigilantly trying to protect.1 68 The
court could have avoided this result by fully considering the actual
prejudicial effect of the misconduct on the jury verdict and by appro-
priately deferring to the trial court's superior ability to make such a
determination.1 6 9
a. A Distracted Court Demands that Egregious Misconduct is Nec-
essarily Prejudicial.-The Jenkins court focused on the nature of the ju-
ror-witness misconduct to the point of distraction and, resultantly,
suggested that a post-verdict determination of egregious mid-trial mis-
conduct cannot be rebutted in Maryland.' 7 ° In contrast to the Court
of Appeals, the trial court and Court of Special Appeals, even with the
limitations of Maryland Rule 5-606, were able to remain focused on
determining the prejudicial effect on the outcome of the trial and on
the defendant.17" ' The Court of Appeals, however, focused almost ex-
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See infra notes 170-197 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 198-211 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 198-211 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 212-224 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 170-224 and accompanying text.
170. See Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 340, 825 A.2d at 1041 (holding that the egregious miscon-
duct and the prohibitions of Maryland Rule 5-606 create "virtually irrefutable" prejudice to
the defendant.)
171. Jenkins v. State, 146 Md. App. 83, 111, 806 A.2d 682, 698 (2002).
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clusively on the egregiousness of the misconduct rather than on the
prejudicial effect of such conduct on the verdict and on the defen-
dant. 172 The court's focus represents a significant departure from the
prejudicial effect inquiry established by the Supreme Court in
01ano173 and by Maryland courts in Eades and AlLen.
174
The Court of Appeals' unyielding focus on what all parties admit
to be misconduct evidences the distraction of the court.175 The court
reasoned that the gross and excessive nature of the misconduct is it-
self evidence of prejudice to the defendant. 176 The court recited at
length the trial court's orders and primarily analyzed the prejudicial
effect of the misconduct from the perspective of McDonald and Pikul-
ski's conduct violating these orders, not from the substantive nature
or effect of the conduct on the verdict.1 77 The court's focus on the
violations rather than the substantive effect of the conduct is further
evidenced in the court's statement that "[t] hese gross violations of the
court's orders inherently prejudice [the] petitioner . ".'..- Upon
considering the potential public perceptions of the integrity of the
jury system by allowing this case to stand, the court explicitly stated
that its decision was based on a desire to admonish the misconduct
and to show the public that such conduct would not be tolerated.
1 79
While this determination of egregiousness and desire to protect the
integrity of the jury system is not inherently problematic, the court's
focus on the violation of the court orders and admonishing of the
juror-witness misconduct is more akin to a parental reprimand rather
than a substantive determination and explanation of actual prejudice
to the defendant required under Olano and Allen. 180
The court's focus on the egregious nature of the misconduct pre-
vented it from determining the actual prejudicial effect required by
the Supreme Court and Maryland case law. In Olano, the Supreme
172. See infra notes 175-178 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (demanding that the effect upon the
verdict, not the nature of the misconduct, is the ultimate inquiry).
174. See supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text (reasoning that evidence that actu-
ally assists a defendant's case is not prejudicial).
175. See, e.g., Jenkins I, 375 Md. at 323, 825 A.2d at 1031 (remarking on the incredibility
of a police officer engaging in the misconduct of going to lunch with a juror).
176. Id. at 319, 825 A.2d at 1029.
177. Id. at 320-21, 825 A.2d at 1029-30. The court recited at length the explicit instruc-
tions given to both McDonald and Pikulski to refrain from having any contact with other
witnesses, jurors, or parties and to notify the court immediately if anything occurred to the
contrary. Id.
178. Id. at 324, 825 A.2d at 1032.
179. Id. at 333, 825 A.2d at 1037.
180. Id. at 324-25, 825 A.2d at 1032.
2004]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Court indicated that the ultimate inquiry to determine prejudice is:
"Did the intrusion affect the jury's deliberations and thereby its ver-
dict?" ' 1 The meaning of this inquiry is clarified by the Olano court's
insistence that reversal is pointless if it can be determined that the
misconduct imposed no harm to the jury's verdict."8 2 The Olano
court's reasoning reveals that the misconduct's effect on the verdict,
not its level of egregiousness, is the necessary inquiry.'8 3 In Allen, the
Court of Special Appeals echoed this sentiment by reasoning that mis-
conduct that can be reasonably determined to assist a defendant's
case does not prejudice the defendant and is, therefore, an insuffi-
cient reason to declare a mistrial. 4 Olano and Allen together reveal
that there is a clear distinction between actual prejudice to the defen-
dant and inconsequential bias that ultimately has no effect upon the
verdict.18 5 An appropriate determination of prejudicial effect to the
defendant therefore insists that misconduct, even egregious miscon-
duct, that ultimately works in favor of a defendant's case, cannot be
prejudicial to the defendant.1 8 6
The Jenkins court's cursory consideration and dismissal of the
State's argument that any enhanced credibility of Pikulski in the mind
of McDonald actually supported Jenkins' case reveals that it did not
undertake a thorough determination of actual prejudice.1 8 ' The
court's minimal consideration of the prejudicial effect on the verdict
is also evidenced by the court's insistence that the "only method" of
determining whether the contact was prejudicial to Jenkins would be
to ask him, in violation of Maryland Rule 5-606, about his decision-
making process.118 The court's explicit holding that egregious juror-
witness misconduct discovered post-verdict creates a "virtually irrefuta-
ble" presumption of prejudice under the constraints of Maryland Rule
181. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739 (1993) (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 738 (quoting United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1391 (11th Cir. 1982)).
The inquiry in Olano focused on ensuring that the proper verdict is reached rather than
determining the level of egregiousness of the misconduct. Id.
183. Id.
184. Allen v. State, 89 Md. App. 25, 49, 597 A.2d 489, 501 (1991).
185. Olano, 507 U.S. at 739; Allen, 89 Md. App. at 49, 597 A.2d at 501.
186. Olano, 507 U.S. at 739. Olano insists that prejudice to the defendant demands that
the defendant suffer some harm as a result of the conduct. Id. If egregious misconduct
can ultimately be determined to have helped the defendant, then the defendant has suf-
fered no harm and the constitutional right to an impartial jury has not been violated. Id.
The logical extension of this argument insists that if misconduct can be determined to
have inured to the defendant's benefit and the defendant still loses the case, the jury's
decision is in fact reinforced because it shows that the defendant could not prevail even
with the benefit of such misconduct.
187. See Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 329, 825 A.2d at 1034-35.
188. Id., 825 A.2d at 1035.
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5-606 further illustrates the court's focus on a juror's subjective deci-
sion-making process, not a determination of actual prejudice to the
verdict as set forth in Olano and Allen.'89 By insisting on knowledge of
McDonald's decision-making process to determine prejudice, the
Court of Appeals foreclosed on the admonition of the Supreme Court
and previous Maryland decisions that bias that inures to a defendant's
benefit does not have the capacity to be prejudicial. 9 ° The Jenkins
court's focus on the egregiousness of the conduct, rather than the
substantive effect of the conduct on the outcome of the trial, repre-
sents a significant departure from substantive determinations of
prejudice established in Olano and in Allen.
b. The Court of Appeals Did Not Accord the Trial Court Proper
Deference.-In summarily dismissing the trial court's determination of
actual prejudice, the Court of Appeals did not accord the trial judge
the highest level of deference required-an abuse of discretion stan-
dard of review. 9 ' As noted previously, the abuse of discretion stan-
dard demands that a trial judge only be reversed if he or she exercises
discretion in an "arbitrary or capricious" manner or "without the let-
ter or beyond the reason of the law."' 92 Acting in accordance with
Remmer, the trial court in Jenkins immediately held an evidentiary hear-
ing to determine the nature and effect of the misconduct.'93
While staying within the bounds of Maryland Rule 5-606, the trial
court determined the extent, nature, and effect of the contact be-
tween Pikulski and McDonald. 1"4 After viewing the trial and post-trial
process in its entirety, the trial court determined that the defense's
reliance upon Pikulski's testimony to discredit the State's case re-
vealed that any enhanced credibility of Pikulski in the mind of Mc-
Donald actually assisted Jenkins' case.195 The trial court also based its
decision upon a reasonable determination that Pikulski was a neutral
witness with no strong ties to either side of the case and that she never
indicated to McDonald a preferred outcome or opinion regarding the
case.' 96 The trial record, as required under Ricks v. State, reflected
189. Id. at 340-41, 825 A.2d at 1041.
190. Olano, 507 U.S. at 739; Allen, 89 Md. App. at 49, 597 A.2d at 501.
191. Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 600, 479 A.2d 1344, 1352 (1984); Wernsing v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406, 420, 470 A.2d 802, 809 (1984).
192. Nelson v. State, 315 Md. 62, 70, 553 A.2d 667, 671 (1989).
193. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 288, 825 A.2d at 1010.
194. Record at 1631-39, Jenkins II (No. 107).
195. Id. at 1637, 1639.
196. Jenkins I, 146 Md. App 83, 115, 806 A.2d 682, 700 (2002); Record at 1638,Jenkins II
(No. 107).
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that the trial judge's determinations were reasonable, appropriately
supported, and well within his accorded discretion.17
c. Failure to Provide Proper Deference to Trial Court Demands Re-
trial Despite Possibility of Determining Prejudicial Effect of Juror Miscon-
duct.-Despite the court's couching its opinion under the unusual
circumstances of this case, the effect of the court's holding and failure
to afford the trial court the proper deference will clearly extend be-
yond Jenkins.19 In holding that egregious juror-witness misconduct
discovered post-verdict results in a virtually irrefutable presumption of
prejudice under the constraints of Maryland Rule 5-606, the court has
removed the trial judge's discretion to determine whether egregious
conduct amounts to actual prejudice and warrants a retrial.199
Though not quite a bright-line rule, the court's reasoning and hold-
ing suggest that all post-verdict determinations of egregious juror mis-
conduct require an automatic retrial.2"'
The court's failure to afford the trial court proper discretion in
this case is in direct contravention to the very premise of the rebutta-
ble presumption of prejudice and evidentiary hearing established in
Remmer and subsequently followed by the Supreme Court in Olano2°t
and Smith,2" 2 and the Maryland courts in Eades °3 and Allen.2" 4 Al-
though Remmer established the principle of a presumption of
prejudice in cases of irregularities involving sitting jurors and third
parties, Remmer also provided a procedural mechanism by which trial
court judges had the capacity to make a substantive determination as
to any prejudicial effect of the misconduct on a defendant's due pro-
cess rights.20 5 As indicated above, Olano specifically clarified that the
necessary inquiry in the case ofjuror misconduct is "Did the intrusion
197. Jenkins I, 146 Md. App at 116, 806 A.2d at 701.
198. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 340, 825 A.2d at 1041.
199. Id. at 340-41, 825 A.2d at 1041.
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (affirming the use of evidentiary hear-
ings established in Remmer and utilizing the hearing to determine the actual effect ofjuror-
witness misconduct).
202. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text (upholding the Remmer Court's admo-
nition to conduct an evidentiary hearing and using it to determine whether actual bias
resulted from the misconduct).
203. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (utilizing Remmers presumption of
prejudice and the post-trial evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant was
actually prejudiced).
204. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (reasoning that a presumption of
prejudice is assumed if the record does not show whether the misconduct prejudiced the
defendant).
205. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, (1954).
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affect the jury's deliberations and thereby its verdict? '20 6 The Olano
Court's provision of a determinative question logically demands that
trial court judges be afforded the discretion necessary to evaluate the
circumstances surrounding the misconduct and provide an answer.
In denying the trial court discretion to determine whether egregious
misconduct discovered post-verdict had an actual prejudicial effect on
the defendant, the Jenkins court has essentially removed Olano's in-
quiry from the trial court's consideration and has replaced it with a
demand for an automatic retrial.2 7
The court's limitation of the trial judge's discretion is further evi-
denced by the court's failure to adopt any assessment that considers
the actual prejudicial effect of the misconduct on the defendant.208
Despite the court not finding the State's argument that the juror's
misconduct inured to Jenkins' benefit persuasive, the court, at a mini-
mum, should have acknowledged that egregious misconduct could in
fact inure to a defendant's benefit, and that under those circum-
stances the defendant should not be granted a retrial °.2 9 For exam-
ple, if the court discovered post-verdict that Juror McDonald had
attended a retreat and had lunch with the defense's star witness during
the trial, the court assumedly would not grant Jenkins a retrial be-
cause Jenkins would clearly not have been prejudiced by such miscon-
duct. The Jenkins court's reasoning, however, allows for no such
determination because it is the egregiousness of the misconduct, not
the effect of the conduct on the verdict, which determines whether a
defendant was prejudiced and should be granted a retrial. 210 This
omission evidences the court's failure to consider the possibility that
the facts surrounding the misconduct, rather than a juror's subjective
decision-making process, could reasonably determine prejudice even
within the confines of Maryland Rule 5-606. Post-Jenkins, trial court
judges will be forced to grant retrials whenever egregious misconduct
is determined post-verdict, despite their capacity to reasonably find
that the defendant was not actually prejudiced by the verdict.21 1
d. An Attempt to Protect the Jury System from Egregious Miscon-
duct Fails to Recognize the Harm Done to the Jury System in Unnecessary Re-
versal.-The Jenkins court argued that allowing this case to stand in
light of the misconduct would irreparably damage the integrity of the
206. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739 (1993).
207. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 340-41, 825 A.2d at 1041.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 329, 825 A.2d at 1053.
210. Id.
211. See supra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.
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jury system.212 This argument fails to recognize the damage perpe-
trated against the integrity of the trial process when cases are unneces-
sarily reversed and remanded for retrial.213 The court reasoned that
the "inherent appearance of impropriety casts a shadow over the trial
process, which necessarily diminishes the integrity of the system in
[the] minds of defendants and the public itself. ' 214 This admonition
by the Court of Appeals reveals that the court is understandably con-
cerned about the public perception of the jury system as a result of
extra-judicial influences; however, a broad reading of Remmer's decla-
ration that "[t] he integrity of jury proceedings must not be jeopard-
ized by unauthorized invasions" could be interpreted to admonish
"invasions" made by the judiciary that demand retrying a case that was
appropriately decided by the lower courts.21 5
The court demanded that Jenkins be retried in part because of the
public perception of impropriety accompanying the juror-witness mis-
conduct in the case. 2 16 The court, while indicating that ajuror's com-
plaint about published defects in the Jenkins proceedings was not
determinative "to any degree" in its opinion, stated that such a re-
sponse illustrates the types of questions the public may raise about the
integrity of the jury system y.2 1  The court's suggestion that the juror
was upset due to an appearance of impropriety in the judicial system,
however, is a misinterpretation of the juror's anger. 218 The juror ex-
pressed anger resulting from wasting two weeks sitting on and render-
ing a verdict in a case that was going to be retried.2 9 The juror's
anger is an example of the public's desire to see cases resolved in a
timely and efficient manner.220 Protecting the integrity of the jury
system demands a holistic approach that includes not retrying cases
212. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 328, 825 A.2d at 1034.
213. See generally MARYLAND JUDicARY, ANNUAL REPORT, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT AND
COURT-RELATED AGENCIES 2001-02, at DC-9-DC-11 (charting the rising levels of cases that
come before the Maryland courts and implying the strain an increased case load puts on
the court system).
214. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 328, 825 A.2d at 1034.
215. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).
216. Jenkins I, 375 Md. at 333, 825 A.2d at 1037.
217. Id. The defense counsel stated, "I also note in one of our footnotes that another
juror had contacted chambers after the story had broke in 'The Journal' and had ex-
pressed extreme displeasure for having spent two weeks involved in this trial only to find
out that there was this serious defect in the proceeding .... " Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See David B. Rottman & Alan J. Tomkins, Public Trust and Confidence in the Courts:
What Public Opinion Surveys Mean to Judges, 36 COURT REVIEW 24, 28 (1999) (noting that
eighty percent of survey respondents do not feel that cases are resolved in a timely
manner).
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that were reasonably decided at the trial court level and appropriately
affirmed by the intermediate appellate court.
2 21
Moreover, the public wants to know that court will safeguard liti-
gants' inherent rights, but the public also wants to know that the time
they sacrificed or could sacrifice in the future as a member of a jury
will be put to good use.222 Despite the egregious misconduct in this
case, a well-reasoned opinion clearly defining prejudice as that which
harms the defendant through the rendering of an ill-affected verdict
would presumably be sufficient to justify the opinion for the sake of
public image. As stated by the Court in Smith, "due process does not
require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially
compromising situation."22' Thus, the Court of Appeals should have
appropriately acknowledged the misconduct and reasoned that the
misconduct did not violate due process in this case because there was
no prejudicial effect on the verdict.224 If the court had adopted this
approach, the court could have established a standard that properly
evaluates misconduct in light of its prejudicial effect upon the verdict,
affirmed the reasonable findings of the trial court, and maintained
the integrity of the judicial system.
5. Conclusion.-In Jenkins v. State, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land held that mid-trial communications between a juror and State's
witness were egregious and created a "virtually irrefutable" presump-
tion of prejudice that the State could not rebut under the restrictions
on post-verdict juror testimony imposed by Maryland Rule 5-606.25
The court's holding marks a regressive turn in the court's post-verdict
determination of impartiality by focusing its inquiry on juror motive
and public perception of the jury system rather than a substantive de-
termination of any prejudicial effect on the defendant required under
Supreme Court and Maryland jurisprudence.226 The court's failure to
consider the actual prejudicial effect of the juror-witness misconduct
suggests a bright-line rule that any post-verdict determinations of egre-
221. Id.
222. See generally id. at 28 (noting that public opinion surveys of the judiciary generally
suggest that the public desires a judicial system that is efficient, equally accessible to all
people, is administered by honest and fair judges, and provides equal treatment for poor
and minority groups).
223. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).
224. Id.
225. Jenkins II, 375 Md. at 340, 825 A.2d at 1041.
226. See id. at 332-33, 825 A.2d at 1036-37 (failing to fully consider the possibility that
misconduct, even egregious misconduct, that inured to the defendant's benefit is not prej-
udicial, and that this reasoning could adequately contravene the claimed damage to the
integrity of the jury system).
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gious, mid-trial juror misconduct demand an automatic retrial. 27
This bright-line rule significantly circumscribes a trial judge's discre-
tion to determine the actual effect of mid-trial juror misconduct and
results in a significant deviation from court's historic application of an
abuse of discretion standard to a trial court's denial of a motion for a
new trial. 228 Though couched in an effort to protect the integrity of
the jury system, the court reversed a reasonably determined verdict,
ironically harming the efficiency and thereby the integrity of the jury
system it was so vigilantly trying to protect.229 The Jenkins court could
have avoided this result by fully considering the actual prejudicial ef-
fect of the misconduct on the jury verdict and by appropriately defer-
ring to the trial court's superior ability to determine such prejudicial
effect.
BENJAMIN A. HOMOLA
227. See supra notes 198-211 and accompanying text (providing the foundation for an
inquiry into the actual prejudicial effect of the misconduct rather than relying on the Jen-
kins court's inquiry into ajuror's subjective decision-making process, which is prohibited by
Maryland Rule 5-606).
228. Id.
229. See supra notes 212-224 and accompanying text (reasoning that the integrity of the
jury system would be better served by creating a mechanism whereby reasonably deter-
mined opinions would not be reversed and remanded, and where juror-witness misconduct
could be explained as having no actual prejudicial effect on the verdict and thereby no
effect upon the defendant).
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A. Abrogating Interspousal Immunity: Modernizing Maryland Law
Through Judicial Action in the Face of Legislative Silence
In Bozman v. Bozman,2 the Court of Appeals of Maryland abro-
gated the doctrine of interspousal immunity and allowed a husband to
sue his wife for the tort of malicious prosecution.2 This abrogation,
which for the first time allows suits between spouses for all intentional
torts, completes the court's twenty-five year dismantling of what has
come to be seen as an outmoded doctrine.' As the courts gradually
discredited the arguments that supported interspousal immunity, the
doctrine increasingly became seen as an arbitrary rule of law that lim-
ited certain citizens' equal enjoyment of their rights.4 With complete
abrogation, courts in Maryland will finally treat the married and un-
married alike with respect to their tort claims, and will abandon the
"rule in derogation of married women."' The length of the period in
which Maryland retained the doctrine of interspousal immunity, how-
ever, demonstrates the tight grip that outdated and, at times, unjust
perspectives have on Maryland law.6 The doctrine's judicial abroga-
tion, nonetheless, shows the court's willingness to use public policy
arguments and overturn legal obstacles that prevent every citizen from
enjoying equally the administration of justice.7 Nevertheless, the
question remains of the Court of Appeals' legitimacy after acting
when the legislature clearly chose not to do so.8 Although the court
must refrain from usurping the legislature's responsibility, the court
1. 376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450 (2003).
2. Id. at 462, 830 A.2d at 451; see infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (explaining
the tort of malicious prosecution and the charges the wife had alleged).
3. Bozman, 376 Md. at 496-97, 830 A.2d at 471. The Court of Appeals in Lusby v. Lusby,
283 Md. 334, 335, 390 A.2d 77, 77 (1978), abrogated interspousal immunity as to any "out-
rageous, intentional tort," and in Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 275, 462 A.2d 506, 522
(1983), did so for all negligence claims.
4. See infra notes 178-180 and accompanying text (describing the increasingly negative
treatment by the courts of the historical reasons for upholding interspousal immunity).
5. Bozman, 376 Md. at 480, 830 A.2d at 461.
6. See, e.g., Gregg v. Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 668, 87 A.2d 581, 583 (1952) (noting that
"[t]he ancient and medieval restrictions placed upon married women" at common law
were still applied in Maryland, and could only be removed by legislative action).
7. See infra notes 237-239 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court of Appeals
correctly abrogated interspousal immunity given the arbitrariness of the rule and its unjust
effects).
8. Bozman, 376 Md. at 491-93, 830 A.2d at 468-69; see infta notes 240-243 and
accompanying text (describing the problem of legitimacy raised by judicial abrogation in
place of legislative action).
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will and must act to remove an unjust and arbitrary bar to certain
citizens from vindicating their wrongs; in this way, the Court of Ap-
peals has indeed upheld its legitimacy.
1. The Case.-William Bozman and Nancie Bozman were mar-
ried in 1968.' Mr. Bozman filed for divorce on February 24, 2000, on
grounds of adultery, and the couple divorced on March 12, 2001.10 In
January 2001, however, while still married, Mr. Bozman filed a com-
plaint for malicious prosecution against his wife in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore County."1 He complained in one count that he had
been arrested and charged with several crimes alleged by his wife. 12
She brought the charges against him on three separate occasions: one
seven days before he filed for divorce and twice in the ensuing
months.1 3 He alleged that all of the charges lacked probable cause
and that Ms. Bozman brought the charges solely to have him ar-
rested.14 He alleged that she was motivated by his failure to concede
to her demands during the divorce and that the charges served as a
retaliatory move for his having initiated the divorce. 5 As damages, he
claimed loss of liberty, legal expenses concerning his arrests, and emo-
tional distress.16
Ms. Bozman filed a motion to dismiss her husband's claim based
on interspousal tort immunity, and the circuit court granted the mo-
tion, with leave to amend.17 Mr. Bozman amended his complaint in
response, and this time he added allegations concerning his damages,
including the fact that he had been arrested and incarcerated multi-
ple times. 8 He further alleged that as a result of one charge he was
placed in home detention and forced to wear an ankle bracelet for
9. Bozman, 376 Md. at 462, 830 A.2d at 451.
10. Id. at 462-63, 830 A.2d at 451.
11. Id. The tort of malicious prosecution consists of: "1) a criminal proceeding insti-
tuted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff; 2) without probable cause; 3)
with malice, or with a motive other than to bring the offender to justice; and 4) termina-
tion of the proceedings in favor of the plaintiff." Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258, 264, 761
A.2d 56, 59 (2000).
12. Bozman, 376 Md. at 463, 830 A.2d at 451.
13. Id. Ms. Bozman brought charges of "Stalking, Harassment, and multiple counts of
Violation of a Protective Order." Record Extract at E-1, Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461,
830 A.2d 450 (2003) (No. 105).
14. Record Extract at E-2, Bozman (No. 105).
15. Id. He further alleged, as evidence of his wife's ill will and lack of credibility, that
she had been convicted of second-degree assault during the divorce proceedings. Id.
16. Id.
17. Bozman, 376 Md. at 463, 830 A.2d at 451.
18. Record Extract at E-25, Bozman (No. 105). Specifically Mr. Bozman alleged that as
a result of the criminal charges he "was arrested on five separate occasions and was incar-
cerated for 3 days, 10 days, I day, 1 day and 1 day respectively." Id.
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over eight months, until he was finally acquitted.19 Through the
amended complaint Mr. Bozman attempted to allege that his wife's
actions were sufficiently outrageous so as to defeat her interspousal
immunity defense.2 °
Finally, on the day of the hearing for the motion to dismiss the
amended complaint, Mr. Bozman filed a second amended complaint
and alleged through a second malicious prosecution count that his
wife had filed more charges of violating an ex parte order.2' He al-
leged that, although these charges were eventually dismissed, he was
incarcerated and spent additional money on legal services. 22 More-
over, he again tried to defeat interspousal immunity by urging that his
wife's motivation for the last charge was based on his first malicious
prosecution count, which had been dismissed after both parties were
divorced. 23 Because dismissal of the charges is an element in mali-
cious prosecution, Mr. Bozman argued that the second cause of action
had arisen after the divorce.24  Ms. Bozman, therefore, as Mr.
Bozman's (now) ex-wife, could not use interspousal immunity as a de-
fense. 25 The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted Ms.
Bozman's motion to dismiss for both counts alleged in the second
amended complaint.
26
Mr. Bozman appealed the dismissal of both counts to the Court
of Special Appeals.27 He again argued that interspousal immunity did
not apply to Count I given the outrageous nature of malicious prose-
cution and that it did not apply to Count II because the parties were
divorced when the cause of action arose.2' Although the Court of
Special Appeals questioned the doctrinal underpinnings of inter-
spousal immunity as a valid principle of law, it found itself bound to
19. Id. Mr. Bozman alleged in his complaint that "the charges were brought to trial
and [he] was acquitted of some counts and other counts were dismissed pre-trial." Id. at E-1
(emphasis added). Thus, it is unclear if some counts against Mr. Bozman were not dis-
missed, and therefore could not be included in Mr. Bozman's malicious prosecution com-
plaint. Id.
20. Bozman, 376 Md. at 463, 830 A.2d at 451. Interspousal immunity was not a defense
to outrageous, intentional torts. See Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 335, 390 A.2d 77, 77
(1978) (abrogating interspousal immunity where a husband kidnapped and raped his wife
with the help of two friends, who also attempted to rape the wife).
21. Bozman, 376 Md. at 464, 830 A.2d at 451.
22. Id.
23. Id., 830 A.2d at 452.
24. Id. at 465, 830 A.2d at 452.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 464-65, 830 A.2d at 452.
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apply the law of Maryland.2" Turning specifically to the issues on ap-
peal, the court upheld the dismissal of Count I because the allegations
did not reach the level of outrageousness required to defeat inter-
spousal immunity.30 The court reversed the dismissal of Count II,
however, stating that Mr. Bozman's second count of malicious prose-
cution did arise after the divorce, and thus interspousal immunity by
definition could not apply. 3 1
Both Mr. Bozman and Ms. Bozman filed petitions for Writ of Cer-
tiorari in the Court of Appeals.3 2 Mr. Bozman challenged not only
the Court of Special Appeals' determination of the outrageousness of
Count I, but he also challenged interspousal immunity as a proper
ground for dismissal. 33 Ms. Bozman, meanwhile, appealed the rever-
sal of the trial court's dismissal of Count II.3  The Court of Appeals
granted both petitions.35
2. Legal Background.-Common law, both in Maryland and
throughout the rest of the country, contained provisions for inter-
spousal tort immunity.36 The historical reasons for barring suits be-
tween husband and wife rested with the legal identity of the couple at
common law, especially with the husband's hierarchical role in society
and women's general lack of power and independent legal rights.37
The passing of the Married Women's Acts at the end of the nine-
teenth century revamped women's rights and social roles in many
ways, such as permitting a woman to sue independently from her hus-
band on contracts, property, or for other personal injuries she sus-
tained.38 Nevertheless, Maryland and many other states refused to
extend to a woman the right to sue her husband in tort for any such
29. Bozman v. Bozman, 146 Md. App. 183, 195-96, 806 A.2d 740, 747 (2002).
30. Id. at 197-98, 806 A.2d at 748. Specifically, the court recognized that Ms. Bozman's
alleged actions "did not involve extreme violence of the most personal and invasive sort,
the threat of death and a display of the means by which to carry out that threat, or the
physical and psychic trauma that the victim in Lusby endured." Id.
31. Id. at 200, 806 A.2d at 750.
32. Bozman, 376 Md. at 467, 830 A.2d at 453.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id., 830 A.2d at 454.
36. David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 534, 157 A. 755, 756 (1932).
37. See Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 337, 390 A.2d 77, 78 (1978) (noting that the com-
mon law "disabilities formerly existing insofar as women are concerned are difficult for
those of us of the present generation to fully comprehend," as they stem from a time
before the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which granted
women the right to vote, and other societal changes).
38. David, 161 Md. at 534-35, 157 A. at 756.
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injuries.:9 Maryland then consistently applied interspousal immunity
and barred tort suits between a married couple, and the courts cited
principles of marital harmony, stare decisis, and the desire to prevent
fraudulent or collusive claims all as reasons for maintaining the doc-
trine.40 Soon many jurisdictions, including Maryland, began seriously
criticizing interspousal immunity, and many also rejected the doc-
trine, with or without legislative action." The process of abrogation
in Maryland took longer than most states, but the Court of Appeals,
despite no action from the General Assembly, partially abrogated in-
terspousal immunity as to outrageous intentional torts in 1978,42 and
subsequently for negligence claims in 1983. 4' Even after 1983, how-
ever, spouses still could not sue each other for intentional, but not
outrageous, torts.44
a. Interspousal Immunity at Common Law.-Not only did the
law historically prevent women from suing their husbands, it joined
the two legally, and thus prevented married women from suing any-
one at all unless their husbands joined the suit.45 Specifically, the
common law, as noted by William Blackstone in the eighteenth cen-
tury, considered that a woman's independent recognition by the law
vanished during marriage, and her legal identity and existence was
subsumed into that of her husband.46 A married woman could not
sue independently from her husband, and any legal action she took
required his consent and would be brought in both their names.47
Therefore, she could not form independent contracts, own property
by herself, or sue for personal injuries in tort without obtaining her
husband's consent and filing the suit in his name.48 Such was the
39. See, e.g., Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 251-53, 136 A. 534, 535-36
(1927) (relying on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611
(1910), and denying under the Maryland's Married Women's Act that a married woman
could sue her husband for injury suffered in an automobile accident due to her husband's
negligence).
40. See, e.g., Gregg v. Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 666-68, 87 A.2d 581, 582-83 (1952) (uphold-
ing interspousal immunity, while disagreeing with some fundamental reasons supporting
it, because the legislature had not removed it by statute).
41. See, e.g., Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983) (abrogating inter-
spousal immunity as to negligence claims and including lengthy discussion of the doc-
trine's acceptance throughout the United States).
42. Lusby, 283 Md. at 357-58, 390 A.2d at 88-89.
43. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 275, 462 A.2d at 522.
44. Id.
45. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND, BOOK THE
FIRST 430 (1765).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 431.
48. Id.
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power of the husband during marriage that he could even legally pun-
ish his wife using physical force.4 9 Because the law did not indepen-
dently recognize a married woman, the law held a husband
responsible for his wife's actions, and it was, therefore, reasonable to
allow him the "power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement. '5
An interspousal suit, as an action by a husband against his wife, or
vice versa, is not logical under the premise that the husband and wife
are one legal identity, and that a married woman has no right to sue
without her husband.5 1 The common law, therefore, barred suits
from within this legal entity.52 Upon this particular view of the marital
relation, Maryland adopted its own legal structure, which included the
doctrine of interspousal immunity.53
b. Married Women's Acts and Thompson.-Many states' legis-
latures attempted to ameliorate married women's inferior position by
enhancing their rights and redefining their legal role in society.5 4 In
1898, for example, Maryland passed its own version of the so-called
Married Women's Acts in order to replace common law restrictions
on married women.55 The act allows a married woman to participate
in business and form contracts on her own, as well as sue indepen-
dently for those contracts, for the recovery of her property, or for tor-
tious injury-all as if she had never married.56 An amendment two
years later further provided that a woman could contract with her hus-
band, form partnerships with him and others, and sue on the con-
tracts made with him.57 Thus, the legal fiction of husband and wife as
a single identity began to dissolve.58 Not only could each take legal
action independently, but they could now contract with each other,
49. Id.
50. Id. at 432.
51. See Philips v. Barnet, 1 Q.B.D. 436, 438 (1876) ("[T]he objection to the action
[brought by an ex-wife who was beaten by her ex-husband before they divorced] is not
merely with regard to the parties, but a requirement of the law founded upon the principle
that husband and wife are one person.").
52. Id.
53. Barton v. Barton, 32 Md. 214, 224 (1870).
54. See Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 339, 390 A.2d 77, 79 (1978) (noting that "[o]ur
laws relative to women were completely revised by" the passage of the Married Women's
Act).
55. 1898 Md. Laws 457. This is currently codified in Maryland's Family Law Article
under the title, "Rights of Married Women." MD. ConE ANN., FAm. LAw § 4-204 (2003).
56. Id. § 4-204(1)-(7). The act specifically provides that a married woman can "sue for
any tort committed against her." Id. § 4-204(7).
57. 1900 Md. Laws 633 (currently codified in MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-204(4)-
(5)).
58. See David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 534, 157 A. 755, 756 (1932) (recognizing that the
Married Women's Acts have "had the effect of partially dissipating that fiction" of the legal
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which would be impossible without recognizing the couple as separate
legal entities.59 Some courts, however, refused to interpret the Mar-
ried Women's Acts as recognizing an independent right to sue a
spouse in tort.6 ° These courts refused despite the logical argument
that if the legal identity of husband and wife has been partly destroyed
by legislation, then interspousal immunity, founded on that identity,
should no longer be necessary.61
The Supreme Court of the United States considered the issue of
whether the new acts permitted interspousal tort suits in Thompson v.
Thompson,62 as it interpreted the District of Columbia's Married
Women's Act.63 Holding that the statute did not permit a wife to sue
her husband for assault and battery, a majority of the Court inter-
preted the legislative purpose of the law narrowly.64 It held that the
act expanded a married woman's rights only so far as to permit her to
bring a cause of action in tort, property, or contract in her own name
and without her husband's consent, as previously required.6" The ma-
jority refused to interpret the statute as permitting interspousal tort
suits.6 6 It reasoned that to do so would usher into the courtroom a
variety of false, trivial, or inappropriate claims brought by embittered
spouses and that such a consequence did not correlate with the legis-
lative intent as the Court interpreted it.67 Indeed, the Court stated
that, had the legislative intent been to allow tort suits between hus-
band and wife, the legislators could have stated as much in plain, un-
ambiguous terms.6" Moreover, the majority rejected the contention
identity of husband and wife by giving each independent legal rights, as well as the ability
to sue each other on contracts they have made).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 535, 157 A. at 756. But see Brown v. Brown, 89 A. 889, 891 (Conn. 1914)
(interpreting Connecticut's Married Women's Act as removing interspousal immunity).
61. David, 161 Md. at 535, 157 A. at 756. The Court of Appeals in David recognized "a
determined effort" in other jurisdictions to construe the Married Women's Acts in this
manner, and thus rid themselves of interspousal immunity fully. Id.
62. 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
63. Id. The D.C. statute is "practically identical" to that of Maryland, and extends to
married women the same legal rights "as if they were unmarried." Furstenburg v. Fur-
stenburg, 152 Md. 247, 249, 136 A. 534, 534 (1927).
64. Thompson, 218 U.S. at 617.
65. Id. at 617.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 617-18.
68. Id. at 618. The Court reasoned that allowing one spouse to sue another would
result in such "radical changes in the policy of centuries" that the Court would exceed its
proper role by inferring the change in the absence of absolutely clear language to that
effect. Id. The dissenting justice Harlan, however,joined byJustices Holmes and Hughes,
felt the legislators had designed the act to institute just this type of change, an intent he
drew from "the clearly expressed will of the legislature." Id. at 623-24 (Harlan, J., dissent-
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thatjustice required a married woman to have the ability to sue in tort
so as to redress the wrongs inflicted by her husband.6" Instead, the
majority reasoned that a married woman always retained the remedies
of divorce and alimony, and if need be, the recourse provided by crim-
inal courts.7" The dangers of allowing tort suits between husband and
wife, and the type of claims this would bring before the courts, out-
weighed any benefits of allowing married women to sue. 1
The Court of Appeals of Maryland followed the Supreme Court's
reasoning seventeen years later in Furstenburg v. Furstenburg,72 as it in-
terpreted Maryland's Married Women's Act.73 Because the Maryland
statute was similar to that of the District of Columbia, the Court of
Appeals deferred almost completely to the decision in Thompson and
incorporated broad passages of the majority's opinion in place of its
own independent analysis.7" The Court of Appeals focused specifi-
cally on the District of Columbia's statute, which included the word
"separately" in reference to the tort suits married women could now
bring.75 Although Maryland's statute does not include this term, the
court inferred by way of comparison that both statutes provided a very
limited right: they only allowed married women to sue and be sued on
their own, without having to join their husbands or obtain their
consent.
7 6
Moreover, the Court of Appeals considered the amendment
passed two years after the original Married Women's Act, which ex-
plicitly permitted married women to sue their husbands on contracts
they have formed together.7 7 The court noted not only that this
would be "wholly superfluous" had interspousal suits already been al-
lowed by the original statute, but had the legislature intended inter-
spousal tort suits, it would have been just as explicit as it had for
ing). Directly contradicting the majority, Justice Harlan stated that the Court's interpreta-
tion of the statute had adopted "a construction of its words that cannot be reconciled with
their ordinary meaning." Id. He was referring to the lines of the act, similar to Maryland's,
which stated that married women "may sue separately 'for torts committed against them, as
fully and freely as if they were unmarried.'" Id. at 622 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 617.
70. Id. at 619.
71. Id. at 617-18.
72. 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927).
73. Id. at 249, 136 A. at 534.
74. Id. at 249-51, 136 A. at 534-35.
75. Id. at 250-51, 136 A. at 535.
76. Id. at 251, 136 A. at 535.
77. Id. at 252, 136 A. at 535.
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contracts. 78 The court, therefore, agreed with the Supreme Court
and affirmed interspousal tort immunity as the law in Maryland.
79
c. Maryland's Application of Interspousal Immunity After Fur-
stenburg.-With the validity of interspousal immunity established in
Maryland, the State's courts continued to apply the doctrine, al-
though they questioned its supporting rationales frequently and devel-
oped novel reasons for applying it.8 ° As a whole the courts recognized
four major arguments in support of interspousal immunity: (1) up-
holding the fictional, legal identity of husband and wife; (2) prevent-
ing discord and disharmony from entering the marital relationship;
(3) preventing fraudulent, collusive, or trivial claims, which presuma-
bly would flourish with the ability of spouses to sue one another; and
(4) respecting principles of stare decisis and leaving changes in the law
to the legislature.8 1
(1) The Legal Identity of Husband and Wife as a Bar to Suits
Between Spouses.-The courts at first adopted the arguments from the
common law, and based their support for interspousal immunity on
the legal identity at common law of husband and wife.8 2 Shortly after
Furstenburg, however, the Court of Appeals in David v. David3 noted
that this legal fiction had begun to disintegrate, as women were given
independent legal rights, and in certain situations were in fact permit-
ted to sue their husbands.8 4 Increasingly as the twentieth century
progressed, married women's roles, both legal and otherwise, ex-
panded greatly in society. In turn, the legal identity of the husband
and wife argument diminished greatly in importance.8 5 Although this
precise idea served as the original argument in favor of interspousal
immunity, the courts eventually abandoned this line of reasoning en-
tirely, labeling it antiquated, "artificial," and no longer useful to sup-
port barring certain tort suits.
8 6
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 245, 462 A.2d 506, 507 (1983).
81. Id. at 256-57, 462 A.2d at 513.
82. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of marriage at
common law and the bar of suits between husband and wife).
83. 161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755 (1932).
84. Id. at 534-35, 157 A. at 756; see also supra notes 55-59 (discussing the effect of Mar-
ried Women's Acts on marital relationship).
85. See Gregg v. Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 666, 87 A.2d 581, 582-83 (1952) (rejecting "the
fiction of the legal identity of the husband and wife" as a ground for interspousal
immunity).
86. Id.
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(2) Protecting the Marital Relationship from Discord and Dishar-
mony.-As the legal identity of husband and wife deteriorated, the
Court of Appeals in David adopted an additional rationale for inter-
spousal immunity to support the precedent of Furstenburg. In place of
the "technical and artificial ground" of the fictional legal identity, the
court cited a more expansive social and political desire to prevent in-
troducing discord and disharmony into the marriage and the home;
interspousal immunity thus became a tool to promote the public wel-
fare.8 7 It was argued that allowing spouses to sue each other would
promote frequent and serious disputes in the home, and the ability to
litigate would increase already acrimonious disputes, such as
divorce.88
The prevention of discord and promotion of marital harmony,
however, was also abandoned soon after its adoption. 9 In Gregg v.
Gregg, ° for example, the Court of Appeals rejected this theory explic-
itly, as it pointed out that barring suits between spouses to prevent
discord ignored the fact that discord was already present; if the suit
was one for assault and battery, for example, preventing one spouse
from recovering for injuries did nothing to promote "marital har-
mony" or a healthy marriage relationship.9 1 Connecticut's high court
went even further, reasoning that prohibiting interspousal tort suits
would not only do nothing to promote marital harmony, but such a
bar would affirmatively harm both the marriage and the public wel-
87. David, 161 Md. at 535, 157 A. at 756.
88. See, e.g., Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 1950). In Corren, the Supreme
Court of Florida explained this rationale:
When one ponders the effect upon the marriage relationship were each spouse
free to sue the other for every real or fancied wrong springing even from pique or
inconsequential domestic squabbles, one can imagine what the havoc would be to
the tranquility of the home. Certainly the success of the sacred institution of
marriage must depend in large degree upon harmony between the spouses, and
the relationship could easily be disrupted and the lives of offspring blighted if
bickerings blossomed into law suits and conjugal disputes into vexatious, if not
expensive, litigation.
Id.
89. Gregg, 199 Md. at 666, 87 A.2d at 582.
90. 199 Md. 662, 87 A.2d 581 (1952).
91. Id. at 667. The court said of the theory that interspousal immunity protected the
marriage:
It applies to a post-bellum situation a theory which is clearly only applicable to
conditions prior to the difficulty which caused the bringing of the legal action.
After discord, suspicion and distrust have entered the home, it is idle to say that
one of the parties shall not be allowed to sue the other because of fear of bringing
in what is already there.
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fare.9 2 If courts could not adequately compensate the injuries mar-
ried people suffer at the hands of a spouse, the court stated that those
injured persons would instead privately seek out their own revenge.
93
Not only does this destroy any marital harmony, but it also harms the
public safety because the home, in place of the court, serves as a fo-
rum for private vengeance.9 4
(3) Prevention of Fraudulent, Collusive, or Trivial Claims.-An-
other fundamental argument supporting interspousal immunity arose
in an attempt to safeguard the courts from a rise in fraudulent, collu-
sive, or trivial claims, although this argument has received relatively
scant, explicit treatment by judicial opinions in Maryland.9" The Su-
preme Court in Thompson, for example, worried that destroying inter-
spousal immunity would flood the courts with embittered spouses
airing private, domestic concerns in public.9 6 Modern courts trans-
lated that early worry into a fear that insured spouses will instead con-
spire with one another, and an increase in litigation will result at the
expense of insurance companies.97 Without immunity, spouses would
feel free to concoct fictitious stories, and given that both are on oppo-
site ends of the lawsuit, there would be little chance of ferreting out
the truth and validity of the claim.9 8 Moreover, in Raisen v. Raisen, the
Supreme Court of Florida worried that even unintentional fraud
could take place, given the obviously close and intimate relationships
spouses have with one another.9 9 Because of this intimacy, the court
felt it unreasonable to assume that a negligent wife or husband would
seriously defend a case where a spouse stood to gain, and where an
insurance company would cover all damages.1 ° ° While Maryland case
92. Brown v. Brown, 89 A. 889, 892 (Conn. 1914).
93. Id.
94. Id. ("No greater public inconvenience and scandal can thus arise if [spouses] were
left to answer one assault with another and one slander with another slander until the
public peace is broken and the criminal law invoked against them.").
95. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 256-57, 462 A.2d 506, 513 (1983). This argument
was not mentioned seriously by the Court of Appeals in cases prior to Lusby v. Lusby, 283
Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978).
96. 218 U.S. 611, 617-18 (1910).
97. See Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1979) (holding, in a negligence suit
by a wife against her husband and his insurance company, that interspousal immunity is
"still a viable solution" for preventing fraudulent claims).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. The court reasoned:
We expect too much of human nature if we believe that a husband and wife who
sleep in the same bed, eat at the same table, and spend money from the same
purse can be truly adversary to each other in a lawsuit when any judgment ob-
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law has not addressed these arguments explicitly, several other juris-
dictions have, and they have found them persuasive as reasons to up-
hold interspousal immunity.0 1
Other states, while initially adopting this argument, have eventu-
ally rejected it. In Klein v. Klein,10 2 for example, the Supreme Court of
California recognized that the danger of fraud and collusion did exist
in the context of interspousal tort suits, but the court held it to be
unfair to deny a person who would otherwise receive compensation
for injuries solely because of a fear of fraud.103 Not only does the
possibility of fraud exist in any given case, but courts have stated that
in those cases they have ample means to weed out unmeritorious
claims.'0 4 Finally, some courts have relied on data showing that fraud
has not increased in jurisdictions where courts have abrogated inter-
spousal immunity.'0° The difficulty in having a court predict the ef-
fects of abrogation led the court in Klein further towards abrogation
because such a prediction involved the weighing of complicated judg-
ments of policy."0 6 The court held that arguments based on insurance
should be presented to the legislature, which can more appropriately
deal with complicated policy choices that might involve formal eviden-
tiary hearings.10 7 Until such a time, the court refused to bar valid
claims for a potentially invalid reason.'0 8
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, on the other hand, has not
stated its position either way; the court has mentioned the argument
based on fraud and collusion only by way of quoting from other juris-
dictions' opinions or from scholarly criticisms of interspousal immu-
nity.' A critical Chief Judge Gilbert of the Court of Special Appeals
has explicitly broached the topic in a footnote and stated that "[o] ne
cannot help but wonder in the light of present day circumstances
tained by the plaintiff spouse will be paid by an insurance company and will ulti-
mately benefit both spouses.
Id.
101. See Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161, 162 (Del. 1979) (upholding interspousal immu-
nity); Robeson v. Int'l Indem. Co., 282 S.E.2d 896, 898 (Ga. 1981) (upholding interspousal
immunity, where defendant-husband did not deny negligence).
102. 376 P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. 1962).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 73. In the context of insurance concerns regarding interspousal immunity,
for example, one court noted that insurance defense lawyers have developed ample means
and skills at hunting out fraudulent claims and defeating trivial ones during early stages of
litigation. Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343 (W. Va. 1978).
105. Beattie v. Beattie, 630 A.2d 1096, 1099 n.7 (Del. 1993).
106. KLin, 376 P.2d at 72.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 270, 462 A.2d 506, 520 (1983).
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whether the doctrine [of interspousal immunity] continues to exist to
protect the marriage or to protect an insurance carrier from possible
collusion."" Outside of a footnote or excerpt, however, Maryland
courts have not openly implicated insurance interests as a reason to
uphold interspousal immunity.
(4) Stare Decisis and the Role of the Judiciary in Changing the
Common Law.-By far the most frequently cited support for inter-
spousal immunity in Maryland cases has been adherence to stare deci-
sis, and the principle that the legislature, and not the court, should
determine the course of Maryland law.1" In Gregg, the Court of Ap-
peals began harshly criticizing the underlying reasons for interspousal
immunity but was unwilling to abrogate the doctrine.112 Instead, the
court held that "[t]he ancient and medieval restrictions placed upon
married women [could] only be removed by legislative action."
'113
The question of whether any such mandate had been issued from the
General Assembly was answered firmly in the negative by Furstenburg,
when the court narrowly interpreted the Married Women's Act.1 14
Furthermore, although the Court of Appeals proceeded to question
the validity of each of the arguments in support of interspousal immu-
nity for another twenty-six years, the court refused to abrogate the
doctrine in Fernandez v. Fernandez,115 Ennis v. Donovan, 16 Hudson v.
Hudson,'1 7 and Stokes v. Ass'n of Independent Taxi Operators, Inc.11 Even
though the court recognized interspousal immunity as ajudicially cre-
ated common law doctrine, it viewed its proper role only as an inter-
preter of the law, and not a body permitted to determine public policy
issues such as whether husband and wife should be able to sue each
other in tort.119 Because the Court of Appeals had ruled in Fur-
stenburg that the Married Women's Act did not permit interspousal
110. Linton v. Linton, 46 Md. App. 660, 661 n.2, 420 A.2d 1249, 1250 n.2 (1980) (hold-
ing that the application in a Maryland court of Virginia law, which does not bar suits be-
tween spouses, would not violate Maryland public policy).
111. See, e.g., Gregg v. Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 667-68, 87 A.2d 581, 583 (1952).
112. Id. at 667-68, 87 A.2d at 583.
113. Id. at 668, 87 A.2d at 583.
114. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 357, 390 A.2d 77, 88 (1978). No other legislation had
been passed on the question since the Married Women's Act and its amendments. See id.
(stating that "[t]he General Assembly has not heeded the suggestions by this Court that a
new statute be enacted").
115. 214 Md. 519, 135 A.2d 886 (1957).
116. 222 Md. 536, 161 A.2d 698 (1960).
117. 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961).
118. 248 Md. 690, 237 A.2d 762 (1968).
119. See Gregg v. Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 667, 87 A.2d 581, 583 (1952) ("[T]hese ancient
theories which form a part of the common law have to be followed by us unless they have
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tort suits, the court stated repeatedly that, regardless of its criticisms, it
must wait for a new, express legislative mandate before it could allow
such a suit. 12
0
d. Partial Abrogation of Interspousal Immunity in Maryland.-In
Lusby v. Lusby,' however, the Court of Appeals abandoned this re-
strictive view of the ideal role of the court, and it partially abrogated
interspousal immunity for the first time in Maryland. 122 Through the
abrogation, the court permitted a married woman to sue her husband
in tort; in the suit the woman alleged that, not only had her husband
threatened her by pointing a rifle at her while she was driving on the
highway, but he then forced her off the road with the help of two
friends, kidnapped her, raped her violently, and allowed the two
friends to attempt to rape her.123 The Court of Appeals refused to
apply interspousal immunity in this situation. 124
The court began its consideration of the case by noting the com-
mon law roots and historical arguments in favor of interspousal immu-
nity, and their subsequent evolution.125 The court conceded that
doctrines such as interspousal immunity are "difficult for those of us
of the present generation to fully comprehend."'1 6 It then traced the
conservative application of interspousal immunity in Maryland courts,
and it also recognized the current trend in other jurisdictions toward
abrogation. 127 It also noted that even though the courts might be di-
vided on the issue, scholarly commentators had almost unanimously
rejected interspousal immunity's continuing validity.121 Specifically,
however, the court asserted that no previous Maryland decision in-
volved intentional torts, nor the "outrageous conduct" alleged in the
case at bar.'2 9 It explained that the policy reasons cited in previous
been changed by legislative action, and the clear import of the decision in the David case is
that the emancipatory statutes must be strictly construed.").
120. See, e.g., Fernandez, 214 Md. at 521, 135 A.2d at 887 (noting that because of the strict
interpretation given to the Maryland Married Women's Act, the court was "unable to fol-
low the authorities elsewhere without overruling our prior decisions, despite the appeal to
reason and convenience that the rule [permitting interspousal tort suits] urged upon us
has").
121. 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978).
122. Id. at 335-36, 390 A.2d at 77-78.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 357, 390 A.2d at 88.
125. Id. at 337, 390 A.2d at 78.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 337, 350, 390 A.2d at 78, 84-85.
128. Id. at 350, 390 A.2d at 84-85.
129. Id. at 352, 390 A.2d at 86. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910), an assault
and battery case, served as the only slightly analogous case in the court's mind. Lusby, 283
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decisions, especially the marital discord and legal identity theories,
could never apply in the face of these allegations. 1' ° In fact, the court
could find no worthwhile public policy goals in modern society that
would support barring the woman's recovery in this situation.
131 In
the end, the court admitted that the only argument against abrogating
interspousal immunity came from stare decisis and the continued si-
lence on the part of the General Assembly. 13 2 Noting that no prior
case dealt with the conduct at issue, however, the Court of Appeals
asserted that it was not in fact overruling precedent. 133 To the con-
trary, the court found no support for the contention that a wife had
ever been prevented from suing a husband in Maryland for the al-
leged conduct.33 Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that one
spouse could sue another in Maryland for an "outrageous, inten-
tional" tort, and thus limited the application of interspousal immunity
to suits of this type.
135
The Court of Appeals further limited interspousal immunity in
Boblitz v. Boblitz,136 as it allowed a suit for negligence to proceed by a
woman against her husband. Prior cases having sufficiently discred-
ited most doctrinal rationales for interspousal immunity, the Court of
Appeals in this case struggled mainly with stare decisis, and how it could
justify abrogation without the legislature having acted. 137 Therefore,
the court discussed at length the status of the law in other jurisdic-
tions, outlined how other states' courts treated each of the arguments
in favor of interspousal immunity, and noted that modern scholars
criticized the rule extensively.' 38 Finally, after considering its own de-
cision in Lusby and the exacting analysis of interspousal immunity's
foundation conducted in that decision, the court recognized that "the
foundation [for the rule] was resting on sand.'
'1 39
Md. at 352, 390 A.2d at 86. The court noted that that case was decided before women had
attained the right to vote, and it "sense[d]" in the majority's opinion "a reluctance to per-
mit change." Id. at 357, 390 A.2d at 88.
130. Id. at 352-54, 390 A.2d at 86-87.
131. Id. at 357, 390 A.2d at 88.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 358, 390 A.2d at 89.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983).
137. Id. at 273-75, 462 A.2d at 251-52. Unlike outrageous, intentional torts, interspousal
immunity precedent barred negligence actions between spouses; therefore, the court
would have to overrule that precedent. Id.
138. See, e.g., id. at 269-73, 462 A.2d at 519-21 (examining scholarly criticism of inter-
spousal immunity, such as those of Dean Prosser and the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
139. Id. at 272, 462 A.2d at 521.
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The Court of Appeals, therefore, stated that it agreed with the
majority of jurisdictions that interspousal immunity no longer had a
place in the modern context posed by the facts of Boblitz.'4 ° While still
respecting the principles of stare decisis, the court held that given pre-
sent circumstances it was not bound to uphold the rule, which it con-
sidered merely a remnant of the past with no valid use. 4 '
Nonetheless the court constrained its abrogation to negligence cases,
given that stare decisis principles mandated that decisions of abroga-
tion should be made on a case-by-case basis.' 42 After Boblitz, Maryland
no longer barred actions brought by one spouse against the other for
claims of outrageous, intentional torts, or for negligence.' 43
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Bozman v. Bozman, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland abrogated interspousal immunity for intentional
torts, and thus continued the trend of Lusby and Boblitz.1" The high
court reversed the Court of Special Appeals' decision to dismiss Count
I of Mr. Bozman's second amended complaint, malicious prosecution,
and did not reach Ms. Bozman's issue on appeal regarding the refusal
to dismiss the count of malicious prosecution that was filed after the
divorce. 115
The Court of Appeals began by examining the common law roots
of interspousal immunity and the historical reasons for implementing
the doctrine.' 46 First, the court recognized that the judicially created
doctrine formed a part of the common law of Maryland, and indeed
had developed in an ancient context. 147 The court then traced the
historical arguments formulated in defense of the doctrine, including
the fictional, legal identity of the husband and wife at common law
and the husband's traditional authority, both practically and legally,
over his wife.' 41 Next, the court addressed the enactment of the Mar-
ried Women's Acts. Although these acts redefined the legal rights of
women in society, the court recognized that they were interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Thompson and by the Court of Appeals itself in
140. Id. at 273, 462 A.2d at 521.
141. Id. at 274, 462 A.2d at 522.
142. Id. at 275, 462 A.2d at 522.
143. Id.
144. 376 Md. 461, 496-97, 830 A.2d 450, 471 (2003).
145. Id. at 468, 830 A.2d at 454. Chief Judge Bell issued the unanimous opinion of the
court. Id. at 462, 830 A.2d at 450.
146. Id. at 468-69, 830 A.2d at 454-55.
147. Id.
148. Id.; see supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text (discussing treatment at common
law of the legal rights of married women).
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Furstenburg as leaving intact interspousal immunity.14 The court
noted that even though it continually barred interspousal tort claims,
it nonetheless continued to doubt the validity of the rule's underlying
support. 50 Despite these criticisms of the rule, however, the court
noted that it continued to apply interspousal immunity because of
stare decisis and because the legislature had not taken action.
15 1
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals examined the two judicial ab-
rogations of interspousal immunity in Maryland in Lusby and Bob-
litz. 152 The court recognized the careful analysis performed in these
cases of the state of the law both in Maryland and throughout the
country.153 It then stated that the holdings of those cases resulted in a
paradoxical situation where a married person's ability to recover for
an injury caused by a spouse depended on whether or not that injury
could be classified into one of two opposite types of harm-that
caused by negligence or that caused by an outrageous, intentional
tort. 154 The court then questioned whether modern times demand
this paradoxical situation to change to allow all spouses, regardless of
whether injured by negligence, a simple intentional tort, or an outra-
geous, intentional tort, to recover damages for those injuries. 55 The
court stated that whether or not the reasons for supporting inter-
spousal immunity remained valid in this modern context, and
whether or not these arguments could rationally justify the denial of
otherwise recoverable tort claims, would influence the court's
decision.
156
149. Bozman, 376 Md. at 471-73, 830 A.2d at 456-57; see supra notes 72-76 and
accompanying text (discussing Maryland's interpretation of the Married Women's Act).
150. Bozman, 376 Md. at 472-73, 830 A.2d at 457.
151. Id. at 473-74, 830 A.2d at 457 ("Our reluctance to change the common law and,
thus, our continued adherence to the interspousal immunity doctrine, was in deference to
the Legislature.").
152. Id. at 474, 830 A.2d at 457-58.
153. Id. The court stated that in Boblitz it had:
arrived at that holding only after conducting a thorough and exhaustive review of
the doctrine of interspousal immunity, including its history and rationale, the
impact and effect of the doctrine on women and women's rights, the Maryland
cases applying the doctrine and the foundation on which they rested, the applica-
tion and acceptance of the doctrine in our sister states, and, in particular, the
change that has occurred over time in the acceptance of the doctrine by the
courts of those States, the views of the legal scholars and the academic community
as to the continued viability of the doctrine, and the impact of abrogating the
doctrine in negligence cases.
Id. at 479, 830 A.2d at 461.
154. Id. at 486, 830 A.2d at 465.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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To begin, the court conducted another survey, as it had in Lusby
and Boblitz, of the law of interspousal immunity throughout the coun-
try. 15 7 Of the thirty-five states that had abrogated interspousal immu-
nity either fully or partially by 1983, the court observed that another
nine had abrogated the doctrine fully through judicial action. 15
Moreover, the court noted that Hawaii abrogated interspousal immu-
nity through statute, and the two remaining states, Delaware and
Georgia, had abrogated it partially. 159  Considering this status, the
Court of Appeals concluded that its view in Boblitz, that most jurisdic-
tions felt interspousal immunity to be an outdated doctrine serving
little use for society today, had only been strengthened by the continu-
ing trend towards abrogation.'6 °
The Court of Appeals then focused on each of the arguments Ms.
Bozman presented in support of interspousal immunity, and it re-jected each in turn.16 ' The court rejected Ms. Bozman's first argu-
ment that, while interspousal immunity does in fact treat married
individuals differently and bars only their recovery, such unequal treat-
ment of the married is acceptable, as well as prevalent, in other areas
of the law.' 62 Although the Court of Appeals conceded the point, it
did not find this argument persuasive against abrogation, and it did
not consider it sufficient grounds for upholding an otherwise flawed
doctrine. 16 3
The court did not accept any of Ms. Bozman's other arguments
against abrogation.' 64 In response to her second argument that otherjurisdictions' decisions should not influence Maryland courts, the
court recognized that the status of the law in other states could serve
as persuasive authority and may be considered, even though it would
never bind a Maryland court.'65 The Court of Appeals then flatly re-jected Ms. Bozman's third argument that alternate remedies exist to
157. Id. at 486-87, 830 A.2d at 465-66.
158. Id., 830 A.2d at 465.
159. Id. at 487, 830 A.2d at 465.
160. Id. at 488, 830 A.2d at 466.
161. Id. Interestingly, all of Ms. Bozman's arguments in favor of interspousal immunity
were in fact arguments against abrogation; she could offer no rationales that affirmatively
asserted that interspousal immunity itself was a valuable, useful, or just law. See id.
162. Id. at 488-89, 830 A.2d at 466-67. "[V]estiges of the common law," Ms. Bozman
maintained, still existed in the law's special treatment of married couples, as evidenced bydoctrines such as the tenancy by the entirety from the Real Property Article, spousal inheri-
tance in the Estates and Trusts Article, the ability to file joint tax returns, and various
provisions from family law, including alimony and divorce. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 488, 830 A.2d at 466.
165. Id. at 490, 830 A.2d at 467.
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protect spouses who could not sue for tort; although other actions
may be available to stop, prevent, or punish tortious conduct, the
court noted that no remedies other than a civil suit for intentional
tort can provide actual compensation for injuries suffered.
166
The court finally rejected Ms. Bozman's reliance on the princi-
ples of stare decisis, which had for decades served as the primary argu-
ment sustaining interspousal immunity against calls for abrogation.
167
The Court of Appeals stated that it had already dealt with this issue in
Boblitz, and in assessing Ms. Bozman's argument it relied heavily on
the reasoning applied in that judicial abrogation.'68 As stated there,
the court reasoned that it was not bound by a principle that no longer
applied to modern circumstances, or by a rule that had been decided
wrongly in a previous case.169 Finally, the court did not find persua-
sive the argument that unintended consequences would surely flow
from any abrogation, and that the court should defer to the legisla-
ture's judgment of whether abrogation should occur.'17 With the un-
derlying reasons supporting interspousal immunity discredited or
inapplicable due to time and change of circumstance, the Court of
Appeals, now following what it called "[t] he overwhelming weight of
authority," did not feel bound to apply the rule.17' As such, it abro-
gated interspousal immunity as to all intentional torts.
172
4. Analysis.-In Bozman, the Court of Appeals struck inter-
spousal immunity from the laws of Maryland and allowed a husband
to sue his wife for malicious prosecution. The decision in Bozman
demonstrates that the Court of Appeals remains willing to overturn
legal doctrines that it considers unjust and which have been outdated
by the progression of society's customs and norms. By abrogating in-
terspousal immunity, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the ra-
tionale for the rule could not support its unjust effects. After Bozman,
166. Id. at 490-91, 830 A.2d at 467-68.
167. Id. at 491-92, 830 A.2d at 468; see supra notes 111-120 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the role of stare decisis in the courts' treatment of interspousal immunity). Ms.
Bozman technically argued two "stare decisis" points: first that it should be the legislature's
role to determine the policy of Maryland, and secondly that "Boblitz [s]hould [n]ot [b]e a
[s]pringboard" to full abrogation of interspousal immunity. Respondent's and Cross-Peti-
tioner's Brief at 8-15, Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450 (2003) (No. 105).
168. Bozman, 376 Md. at 495, 830 A.2d at 470; see supra notes 141-143 and accompanying
text (examining the Court of Appeals' application of stare decisis in Boblitz).
169. Bozman, 376 Md. at 494, 830 A.2d at 470. The court stated stare decisis would not
control if "the applicable guiding law had been decided incorrectly." Id. The court cited
the Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Board of Education as an example. Id.
170. Id. at 495-96, 830 A.2d at 470-71.
171. Id. at 496, 830 A.2d at 471.
172. Id. at 496-97, 830 A.2d at 471.
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the married and unmarried alike will finally be treated equally by the
law of Maryland with respect to the ability to bring an action for inten-
tional torts.
Nevertheless, Bozman shows how prevalent outmoded doctrines,
like interspousal immunity, remain in Maryland law, and which con-
tinue to be applied despite the court's fervent criticism. This stems
from the court's deference to the legislative role and its respect for
stare decisis principles. 17 3 At the same time the decision to abrogate in
the way the court chose reflects the great deference owed to the legis-
lature, whose role it is to determine the public policy of Maryland. 174
Bozman demonstrates, however, that the Court of Appeals will not re-
main forever silent in the face of an unjust or arbitrary doctrine that
has no place in modem society, and it will overrule precedent, despite
legislative inaction. 175 One question that remains after Bozman, how-
ever, is the status of the court's legitimacy. Because of the fairness of
the abrogation, as well as the obvious respect still given by the court to
precedent and the legislature, this legitimacy remains intact. 76
a. Underlying Support for Interspousal Immunity is No Longer Per-
suasive.-As the justifications for interspousal immunity gradually
weakened, so too did the use and need of the doctrine, and the Court
of Appeals was correct in rejecting Ms. Bozman's arguments for re-
taining it. 177 First, courts have long discarded the majority of the fac-
tors purporting to hold interspousal immunity as a logical or useful
principle of law-such as the legal identity of husband and wife, the
prevention of discord and disharmony in the marriage, and the alter-
native remedies argument. 178 The two main arguments left for inter-
spousal immunity-preventing fraud and collusion, and bringing a
flurry of trivial or undesirable claims into the courtroom-were also
173. See supra notes 111-120 and accompanying text (discussing the role of stare decisis in
interspousal immunity cases).
174. See infta notes 191-208 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court of Appeals'
piecemeal abrogation exhibits such deference).
175. See infra notes 229-259 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court of Ap-
peals' decision to abrogate, despite no statement on the issue from the legislature, affects
its legitimacy).
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 161-172 and accompanying text (outlining Ms. Bozman's arguments
and explaining the court's reasons for rejecting them).
178. See Gregg v. Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 666, 87 A.2d 581, 582-83 (1952) (calling both the
legal identity of the marriage argument and the protection against marital discord argu-
ment "artificial"); see also supra note 166 (explaining that the alternative remedies argu-
ment was no longer accepted).
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deficient.' By using these inadequate and outdated factors as the
basis for her argument, Ms. Bozman could point to no evidence that
any undesirable consequences would in fact occur from repudiation
of the rule.'80
By contrast, decisions from jurisdictions such as Delaware suggest
the opposite. The Delaware Supreme Court in Beattie v. Beattie ex-
plained that empirical evidence had demonstrated that no rise in mar-
ital disharmony or insurance fraud had occurred when interspousal
immunity was abrogated in other jurisdictions."' Moreover, a num-
ber of states abrogated interspousal immunity for intentional torts at
the beginning of the twentieth century, and these jurisdictions did not
experience the grave problems predicted."8 2 Likewise, Maryland
courts survived twenty years of partial abrogation with no disastrous
consequences stemming from the increased ability of spouses to liti-
gate with one another.'
8 3
Even if problematic consequences would follow from abrogation
of intentional torts, notions of fundamental fairness favor abroga-
tion.'8 4 Interspousal immunity operates to bar otherwise valid claims,
and it prevents, for example, a battered spouse from recovering any
monetary compensation for his or her injuries.'8 5 Logically a court
should bar these meritorious claims only in the face of compelling
179. Ms. Bozman did not argue these points as such because insurance concerns are
irrelevant as few people have insurance coverage for an intentional tort such as malicious
prosecution. Respondent's and Cross-Petitioner's Brief, at 11-15, Bozman (No. 105).
180. Id.; see also Bozran, 376 Md. at 496, 830 A.2d at 471 ("[R]espondent has not pro-
vided any demonstrative evidence that any of the questions or problems she posits as possi-
ble and, indeed, 'undoubtedly will arise' have arisen [in any jurisdiction that has abrogated
interspousal immunity].")
181. 630 A.2d 1096, 1099 n.7 (Del. 1993). For support, the court cited an amicus curiae
brief submitted by the Delaware Trial Lawyers Association, which cited evidence finding
that abrogation did not result in a rise in fraudulent claims, and thereby an increase in
insurance premiums. Id.
182. The Court of Appeals in Bozman wisely inferred that the states had not faced the
problems of abrogation given that none of the states had reverted to the common law rule,
which they were free to do by legislative action. 376 Md. at 496, 830 A.2d at 471.
183. Had there been problems, of course, the legislature could have addressed this and
reverted to the common law rule.
184. Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. 1962) (holding that a fundamental principle of
tort law is that every person injured by another should, absent compelling policy reasons,
receive compensation); Brown v. Brown, 89 A. 889, 892 (Conn. 1914) ("Courts are estab-
lished and maintained to enforce remedies for every wrong upon the theory that it is for
the public interest that personal differences should thus be adjusted rather than that the
parties should be left to settle them according to the law of nature.").
185. In Brown, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors held that in the context of the
marriage it was especially dangerous to bar suits for tortious injury, especially intentional
tortious injury. 89 A. at 892. The court reasoned that without the ability of courts to
provide compensation to injured spouses, those spouses would exact their own private re-
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circumstances-a fear of fraudulent or trivial claims, however, is not
compelling. 8 6
First, as noted in Klein, the possibility of fraud exists in many situ-
ations outside of marriage, and were the fear of fraud to take prece-
dence over the right of an injured person to recover, all causes of
action could potentially be barred.1 8 7 In the average negligence ac-
tion, where the chance of fraud undoubtedly exists, the courts have
developed useful tools for eliminating trivial claims and for uncover-
ing fraudulent ones, and any fair system of justice should not bar
claims simply because that system does not provide an effective pro-
cess."88 A similar response can be applied to the argument that abro-
gation will inundate the courts with increased, vexatious litigation. A
system that denies hearing claims because it cannot handle their num-
ber cannot be said to promote any sense of justice.'8 9 Ending this
situation through abrogation, therefore, achieved a just result, as it
removed an artificial bar to recovery for otherwise compensable tor-
tious injury.'9 °
b. Married and Unmarried Will Be Treated Alike for Tort
Claim.-Bozman serves as a necessary change for Maryland law. It
removes an arbitrary rule whose effect discriminated against married
individuals, and especially married women, and now the married and
unmarried will be treated equally when pursuing tort claims.' 91 Be-
cause interspousal immunity distinguished between married and un-
married people, it gave certain individuals drastically different
venge, thereby leading the marriage relationship even further toward disharmony and dis-
rupting the public well-being. Id.
186. Klein, 376 P.2d at 72-73.
187. Id. at 73.
188. See id. In this regard the California Supreme Court stated:
It would be a sad commentary on the law if we were to admit that the judicial
processes are so ineffective that we must deny relief to a person otherwise entitled
simply because in some future case a litigant may be guilty of fraud or collusion.
Once that concept were accepted, then all causes of action should be abolished.
Our legal system is not that ineffectual.
Id.; see also Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343 (W. Va. 1978) (noting that the
adversary system, especially when in the hands of skilled insurance defense lawyers, is very
effective at discovering fraud).
189. Klein, 376 P.2d at 72 ("The argument about inundating the courts with trifling suits
is palpably unsound.").
190. The paradoxical nature of partial abrogation further shows the arbitrariness of the
rule-only some interspousal tort suits are barred. Id. at 71 (recognizing that "there is no
logical or legal reason for drawing a distinction" between intentional and negligent torts
for the purposes of abrogating interspousal immunity).
191. Bozman, 376 Md. at 486, 830 A.2d at 465.
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remedies for receiving the same injuries. 1 2 One individual who suf-
fered a battery at the hands of a stranger could receive full compensa-
tion for those injuries, while another individual who received identical
injuries at the hands of a spouse could recover nothing. 193 Not only
does the law require equal treatment, but unequal treatment has a
denigrating effect on those it singles out, as society shows equal re-
spect for all citizens by equally applying the law."'
Thus, interspousal immunity not only operated unfairly in that it
denied compensation, but also in that it expressed denigration to
those whom it denied by communicating to them that they are unwor-
thy of the rights and remedies given to others.195 Although the Court
of Appeals in Bozman accepted that married individuals may be
treated differently by the law, the court nevertheless suggested there
must be a viable reason for different treatment. 96 If a classification
has discriminatory effects on certain people and there is no good rea-
son for having it, the classification can, and should, be struck down.
19 7
As discussed above, the Court of Appeals admitted in Bozman that
the reasons supporting interspousal immunity no longer had merit,
and the classification was therefore arbitrary. 198 Interspousal immu-
nity, furthermore, not only discriminated against married couples by
barring certain tort claims, but the Court of Appeals recognized in
Boblitz that the doctrine discriminated particularly against married
192. See id. (pointing out that not only are married and unmarried individuals treated
differently, but some married individuals can recover while others cannot, based on
whether they sustained an "outrageous, intentional tort" or merely an intentional one).
193. Arguably the individual suffering injury at the hands of a spouse has sustained
greater injury, given the personal, intimate relationship that individual has with the bat-
terer. See id. (noting that the classification of the injury as outrageous or not also determined
the ability to sue a spouse).
194. Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REv. 359, 474 (1989).
When the state denies an innocent party hurt by another's blameworthy behavior
access to its civil justice system on the basis of marital status, the harmed spouse's
full worth as a human may be diminished and that individual's unique, indepen-
dent identity compromised. Because society expresses respect for people by treat-
ing each individual with equal regard, it should extend to every community
member the complete panoply of rights accorded all others, including a cause of
action for personal injuries suffered.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
195. Id. at 475.
196. Bozman, 376 Md. at 489-90, 830 A.2d at 467.
197. Id. at 489, 830 A.2d at 467 ("[Tihe fact that married persons are in a different
status from others is not sufficient to conceal interspousal immunity from judicial scru-
tiny.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
198. See supra notes 178-180 and accompanying text (discussing the invalidity of the rea-
sons for retaining interspousal immunity).
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women.' 9 9 Although the Court of Appeals in Bozman did not specifi-
cally address this issue, the sexist bend to the doctrine and the arbi-
trary classifications it created should have signaled a heightened level
of judicial scrutiny required by the courts. 20 0
A remaining issue for interspousal immunity that was never ad-
dressed in Bozman is whether the rule withstands increased scrutiny,
especially if the rule discriminates against married women. For exam-
ple, statistics show that men commit domestic violence and inten-
tional torts, such as battery, much more frequently than women.201
Men also tend to be the driver when riding in a car with a spouse, and
they are also the cause of most household accidents. 20 2 Because these
actions-domestic violence and household and automobile acci-
dents-most often occur in situations when the actor and the victim
are married, married women are the usual victims of male tortious con-
duct." 3 With interspousal immunity in place, these women are
barred from suing for their injuries. 2 4 Married men, however, while
equally barred from suing a spouse, are not as adversely affected by
interspousal immunity because their wives statistically commit tortious
injury much less frequently. 205 Therefore, it can be argued that inter-
spousal immunity promotes a hierarchical situation in which married
women are prevented from asserting similar rights as their
husbands. 20
6
Due to the potential discriminatory hierarchy promoted by inter-
spousal immunity, the Court of Appeals in Boblitz hinted that a lurking
question underlying the doctrine was whether it violates Maryland's
Declaration of Rights, which prohibits abridging or denying the equal-
ity of rights based on sex.20 7 The Court of Appeals did not address
199. See supra notes 169, 171 and accompanying text (examining the Court of Appeals
suggestion that interspousal immunity discriminates particularly against women).
200. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 245, 463 A.2d 506, 507 (1983) ("Application of the
words intespousal immunity to this ancient rule of law borders on mockery. It would more
aptly be called a rule in derogation of married women.").
201. Tobias, supra note 194, at 475.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. Tobias asserts that this situation is particularly denigrating in the context of
intentional torts, as married women cannot hold their husbands publicly accountable for
their actions, and because the immunity privatizes, and often worsens, spousal abuse. Id.
In many ways this situation perpetuates the eighteenth century perspective on marriage
into modern times, for in a real way husbands can be allowed, with the law's sanction, to
beat their wives. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing husband's legal
right at common law to punish his wife).
207. MD. DECL. OF RTs. art. 46 (2003).
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this issue in Bozman because of the factual situation in which the hus-
band sought to sue his wife for an intentional tort, and because the
issue was not raised in the litigation. 20  Regardless of the equal pro-
tection doctrine, interspousal immunity undeniably has a negative im-
pact primarily on the rights of married women. The court
demonstrated that the rule had an arbitrary basis in the law, and jus-
tice required that the court abrogate it. The problem remained of
how the court should go about deconstructing the doctrine, in spite
of precedent, and legislative inaction.
c. The Continuing Influence of Common Law Doctrine in Mary-
land.-Bozman illustrated the lingering effects that doctrines formu-
lated at common law continue to have on Maryland's legal structure.
Interspousal immunity, for example, dates from eighteenth century
English society, where married women had no independent legal
rights and were subservient to their husbands.2 °9 Such subservience
continued, under the guise of the legal identity of husband and wife,
as the fundamental reason to subsume interspousal immunity into
Maryland law.2 10 Even though the Maryland courts throughout the
twentieth century criticized interspousal immunity and one by one re-
jected every affirmative reason to apply it, the court had constrained
itself by its own decision in Furstenburg.
21 1
The Court of Appeals later suggested, however, that it had de-
cided Furstenburg incorrectly. 2 12 The Furstenburg court relied heavily
on the majority opinion in Thompson when it narrowly construed
Maryland's Married Women's Act and held, like Thompson, that the
208. Bozman, 376 Md. at 462, 830 A.2d at 450 (failing to address whether interspousal
immunity violates the Maryland Declaration of Rights). In addition, several federal courts
have ruled on the constitutional issue of whether interspousal immunity, as it dispropor-
tionately affects women, violates equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. E.g., Paiewonsky v. Paiewonsky, 446 F.2d 178, 181-82 (3d Cir. 1971).
Although the court in that case held that interspousal immunity did not violate the equal
protection clause, the court decided the case in 1971, and at that time it felt that the
doctrine continued to have "substantial vitality," and that it reasonably related to a compel-
ling government interest. Id. at 182. There might be a different outcome today given that
most government interests in maintaining the doctrine are not compelling, and in many
jurisdictions it has no 'vitality' whatsoever. See Bozman, 376 Md. at 497-500, 830 A.2d at 471-
74 (listing the present status of the interspousal immunity rule throughout the United
States).
209. Barton v. Barton, 32 Md. 214, 224 (1870).
210. Id.
211. See Gregg v. Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 666-68, 87 A.2d 581, 583 (1952) (criticizing the
rationale for interspousal immunity, but holding that without an express legislative man-
date the court could not abrogate it).
212. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 357, 390 A.2d 77, 88 (1978).
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language of the act did not permit interspousal tort suits.11 3 Thus, it
rejected the reasoning of Justice Harlan's dissent in Thompson, which
stated that the clear language did in fact permit tort suits between
spouses.2 1 4 Later, the Court of Appeals in Lusby stated that much of
Justice Harlan's arguments could actually be applied to Maryland's
Married Women's Act.2 15 The court correctly noted that a literal
reading of the Married Women's Act would in fact permit an inter-
spousal tort suit.2 6 The Court of Appeals in Lusby then stated, as an
afterthought, that it sensed in the majority's opinion in Thompson a
conservative pull against recognizing the change in societal norms
and the expansion of women's rights, and the court praised the repu-
tation of the dissenting Justices. 217 This suggests the Furstenburg court
erred in relying on the Thompson majority; had it not done so, inter-
spousal immunity could have been abrogated in 1927.218 Instead, the
court's rigid deference to precedent, as well as to the legislature, pro-
duced a long line of decisions that inappropriately applied inter-
spousal immunity, and incorrectly and unjustly prevented the recovery
of a certain class of people with valid tort claims. 219
d. The Strict Deference Given to the Legislature by the Court of Ap-
peals.-The counterpart to the proposition that Maryland law still re-
tains influences from the common law is the great deference shown by
the Court of Appeals to the legislature, or at least to legislative silence.
The Court of Appeals recognized interspousal immunity as a common
law doctrine created entirely from judicial opinions, but it held that it
would not judicially destroy it.22° Even though the court recognized
the fading validity of interspousal immunity throughout the twentieth
213. Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 253-53, 136 A. 534, 535-36 (1927).
214. Id.
215. Lusby, 283 Md. at 357, 390 A.2d at 88.
216. Id. The court had previously acknowledged that a literal reading of the act did
allow interspousal tort suits. Fernandez v. Fernandez, 214 Md. 519, 524, 135 A.2d 886, 889
(1957).
217. Lusby, 283 Md. at 357, 390 A.2d at 88. Moreover, the Supreme Court decided
Thompson seventeen years before Furstenbur, if the Supreme Court's opinion could be seen
as resisting change in 1910, then that opinion certainly must have been outdated by 1927,
after society's norms had evolved even further with such events as the passage of the Nine-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which granted women the right to
vote. Id.
218. Id.
219. Ironically, it was the Court of Appeals itself that finally corrected this unjust situa-
tion and overruled precedent in Lusby, Boblitz, and eventually Bozman, after so many de-
cades of waiting for the legislature. Id.; Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506
(1983); Bozman, 376 Md. at 462, 830 A.2d at 451.
220. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 244, 462 A.2d at 507.
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century, the Court of Appeals refused to abrogate the doctrine be-
cause abrogation is a question of public policy, within the legislature's
realm. 22' As Ms. Bozman argued, abrogation of interspousal immu-
nity implicates public policy because the decision to do so requires a
careful weighing of competing interests: fairness to those whose
claims are barred; the interest in reducing fraud and collusion; the
potential complications for divorce and other family law provisions;
and the possible rise in increasingly complex litigation, with intimate
family disputes aired in court.222
Judge Couch stressed the public policy concern in his dissent in
Boblitz, where the Court of Appeals abrogated interspousal immunity
for negligence cases. 223 Citing the Court of Appeals' decisions in
other contexts, Judge Couch asserted not only that abrogation of in-
terspousal immunity implicated public policy, but also that the court
traditionally believed such changes to public policy should be imple-
mented by the legislature.224 With its ability to undertake testimony,
for example, the General Assembly has more access to information
than the court, and thus can make more educated, expert deci-
sions.225 As the politically accountable branch of government, the
General Assembly will make decisions that reflect the popular will,
and therefore a non-elected judiciary should not overturn such deci-
sions lightly.226 With great hesitation to abrogate interspousal immu-
nity, the Court of Appeals followed the legislative precedent and
221. See, e.g., Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 543, 161 A.2d 698, 702 (1960) (noting that
authorization for a married woman to sue her husband in tort must come from the
legislature).
222. Respondent's Brief at 11-15, Bozman (No. 105).
223. 296 Md. at 282, 462 A.2d at 524 (Couch, J., dissenting).
224. Id. Judge Couch pointed out that between 1959 and 1983 the General Assembly in
Maryland had considered abrogating legislation seven times, but had failed to enact it each
time; for him, then, the legislature had considered the public policy involved, and for
whatever reason, ruled against it. Id. at 287, 462 A.2d at 527 (Couch, J., dissenting).
225. See Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 813 (Mo. 1959) ("Obviously, the general
assembly is not only better equipped than this court to investigate and develop the facts
pertinent to a determination of this phase of public policy but also has greater authority to
deal with the particular problem and at the same time the related ones.").
226. Id. With political accountability, so too comes special interest influences; while the
democratic process necessarily survives on the accountability of government with the popu-
lace, an independent judiciary is also vital to safeguarding the rights of all citizens equally
from the desires of the majority (or a powerful, vocal minority). One must wonder why,
given the deficient support for interspousal immunity, the Maryland General Assembly
never removed it; ChiefJudge Gilbert's statement suggests this might stem from insurance
interests. Linton v. Linton, 46 Md. App. 660, 661 n.2, 420 A.2d 1249, 1250 n.2 (1980); see
also Brawner, 327 S.W.2d at 813 (noting that "the insurance business is affected with a pub-
lic interest" in Missouri).
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showed great deference to the legislature. 22 7 At the same time, how-
ever, the General Assembly refused to undertake the careful analysis
called for by the Court of Appeals; the legislature did not state clearly
the public policy of Maryland, and interspousal immunity remained
the default public policy for most of the twentieth century.
228
e. The Legitimacy of the Court After Abrogation.-Bozman cor-
rectly abrogated interspousal immunity, thus demonstrating that the
Court of Appeals will not defer to the legislature, or ill-decided prece-
dent, indefinitely.229 When a court undertakes the extreme action of
encroaching on the legislature's role and overruling precedent, ques-
tions of the court's legitimacy arise. Because, in Bozman, the court
removed from the legal structure an outmoded principle that served
only to promote injustice by denying equal recovery without good rea-
son, the court's legitimacy remained intact.23 1 Moreover, had the
court continued to remain inactive, as did the legislature, the court's
legitimacy would have been further threatened. 32
Although stare decisis does mandate respect and deference for
precedent, the court retains the power and authority to overrule out-
dated laws. In both Boblitz and Bozman, the Court of Appeals quoted
its opinion in Harrison v. Montgomery County Board of Education,233
which reasoned that the court had never held that stare decisis prohib-
ited it from changing a common law principle when the circum-
stances of society had also changed, making the principle outdated
and ill-suited to current norms.23 4 The vitality of the common law
comes with its ability to evolve, and the courts should always be look-
ing for new ways to achieve fair solutions for society's problems.235 At
the same time, policy decisions should remain with the legislature,
227. The Court of Appeals abrogated interspousal immunity in a piecemeal fashion that
took fifty-one years from the first criticism of the doctrine. Compare Gregg v. Gregg, 199
Md. 662, 87 A.2d 581 (1952) (criticizing the continued validity of interspousal immunity),
and Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978) (abrogating interspousal immunity
for outrageous, intentional torts), with Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450 (2003) (com-
pletely abrogating interspousal immunity).
228. Cf Bozman, 376 Md. at 462, 830 A.2d at 451 (abrogating interspousal immunity in
2003).
229. Id. at 496-97, 830 A.2d at 471.
230. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-67 (1992).
231. See infra notes 244-258 and accompanying text (arguing that abrogation did not
threaten the court's legitimacy).
232. See infra note 259 and accompanying text (explaining that the failure to abrogate
and promote fairness would threaten the court's legitimacy).
233. 295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d 894 (1983).
234. Id. at 459, 456 A.2d at 903.
235. Id. at 460, 456 A.2d at 903.
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and thus the court should hesitate to abrogate the common law if
doing so would violate another public policy mandate, as expressed by
the legislature.236
Therefore, interspousal immunity certainly qualified for judicial
abrogation. Although there was arguably legislative support for the
doctrine by negative implication only, the courts had heavily criticized
the doctrine, and time and again it was held "a vestige of the past,"
with no viable, compelling argument supporting its continued appli-
cation. 217 The Court of Appeals in Bozman recognized that inter-
spousal immunity not only contravenes current social norms and no
longer serves any benefit, but that it had instead become a "pressing
societal problem" itself, necessitating judicial abrogation. 238 Not only
was the doctrine based on rampantly sexist notions from over two cen-
turies ago, but it also had the practical effect of discriminating in par-
ticular against married women.239
In addressing this unjust situation on its own, the court's action
raises questions of legitimacy.240 The court not only repeated in case
after case that it was the legislative function to decide to end inter-
spousal immunity, but it also repeatedly and openly called for the leg-
islature to act.241 As the dissentingJudge Couch recognized in Boblitz,
the General Assembly had considered abrogating legislation over
seven times between 1959 and 1983, and had failed to enact any new
statute.2 42 Although it cannot be inferred conclusively that this failure
equates to a legislative statement in favor ofinterspousal immunity, the
236. Id. In Harrison, the Court of Appeals did not decide the policy issue at stake in the
case (judicial abrogation of contributory negligence), given that not only had the legisla-
ture done nothing, but courts in Maryland had not particularly criticized the doctrine, and
abrogation of contributory negligence would have required the court to pick from three
options to replace it. Id. at 463, 456 A.2d at 905. The court concluded that society had not
yet outgrown contributory negligence enough for it to be considered "a vestige of the past"
requiring judicial abrogation. Id.
237. See Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 245, 462 A.2d 506, 507 (1983) (arguing the "rule
in derogation of married women" indeed was "a vestige of the past"); Lusby v. Lusby, 283
Md. 334, 357, 390 A.2d 77, 88 (1978) ("conceiv[ing] of no sound public policy in the latter
half of the 20th-century" that supports interspousal immunity).
238. 376 Md. at 467, 830 A.2d at 454.
239. Id. at 470-71, 830 A.2d at 455-56.
240. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-67 (1992) (holding
that stare decisis prohibited overruling precedent in this case given the threat to the Court's
legitimacy created by overturning a prior decision); see also id. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court's role in deciding
complicated public policy issues and removing these from the province of the state legisla-
tures' threatened the Court's legitimacy more than adhering strictly to precedent).
241. E.g., Lusby, 283 Md. at 357, 390 A.2d at 88 ("The General Assembly has not heeded
the suggestions by this Court that a new statute be enacted.").
242. 296 Md. at 287, 462 A.2d at 527 (Couch, J., dissenting).
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survival of the doctrine in the face of legislative attempts to change it
does question the appropriateness of its abrogation by thejudiciary.2 43
Nonetheless the Court of Appeals did act, and the decision in
Bozman does not unduly threaten its legitimacy for three main rea-
sons. First, the court did show deference to the legislature, and it ab-
rogated interspousal immunity with extreme hesitation. The doctrine
began to erode in 1978, twenty-six years after the Court of Appeals
issued its first harsh criticism of the rule and appealed to the legisla-
ture for a statutory change. 44 In 1978, the Court of Appeals abro-
gated the doctrine partially, as it did again in 1983.245 This piecemeal
abrogation destroyed the doctrine in a way that showed a great deal of
caution; the court safeguarded against unruly and unforeseen conse-
quences by allowing only certain suits between spouses to proceed.246
Furthermore, if such consequences had ensued or the citizens had
reacted negatively to abrogation, thus signaling that the Court of Ap-
peals had indeed misread public policy, the legislature was always free
to reenact the rule. 247
Finally, the Court of Appeals couched each decision with lengthy
reviews of the status of interspousal immunity in Maryland as well as
other states. 248 As noted above, this review included in-depth consid-
eration of the usefulness of the doctrine in present society and the
reasons that other jurisdictions, or previous Maryland courts, favored
abrogation. 249 The review, therefore, provided a great deal of support
for the abrogation, and thus enhanced the perceived legitimacy of the
court by showing that it was not embarking on an unusual, or unjust,
course of action.
250
243. See id. ("This history suggests to Uudge Couch] that this [failure to abrogate by
statute] is not simply a circumstance of non-action by the legislature but, indeed, one of
positive action, i.e., rejection, for whatever reason, of efforts to abrogate the immunity
rule.").
244. See supra note 227 (discussing the chronology of abrogation in Maryland).
245. See supra note 227.
246. See Boblitz, 296 Md. at 275, 462 A.2d at 522 ("Decision[s] in such cases necessarily
will be determined on a case to case basis.").
247. See Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 74 (Cal. 1962) (Schauer, J., dissenting) (pointing
out that the California legislature had re-enacted common law doctrines that had been
abrogated judicially).
248. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing review of the status of inter-
spousal immunity in Bozman).
249. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
250. The analysis of Lusby, for example, helped "to inform the decision" on whether to
abrogate partially, while the Boblitz review aided the court as it sought "to determine why
the interspousal immunity doctrine, once the long-standing majority rule, was no longer
widely favored and why those states applying it were, in fact, now in the minority." Bozman,
376 Md. at 475, 480, 830 A.2d at 458, 462.
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The second way in which the Bozman decision did not threaten
the Court of Appeals' legitimacy is that its decision wasjustified. The
court had held previously that no bar to abrogation existed if an out-
moded law no longer suited modem society, and instead operated to
promote injustice. 25 1 Unlike Harrison, in which the court refused to
abrogate contributory negligence judicially, interspousal immunity
did present a compelling case for removal.2 52 As opposed to contribu-
tory negligence, Maryland courts had long criticized interspousal im-
munity, and the court had been confronted with claims of an urgent
societal need for abrogation.253 Finally, the solution to the problems
presented by interspousal immunity could be solved with a single
choice-abrogation-unlike contributory negligence, which called
for a choice among new systems of comparative fault.254 The Court of
Appeals' decision was therefore easy and correct; given that inter-
spousal immunity served little use in modern times and instead per-
petuated an unjust denial of certain people's right to tort recovery,
the court's legitimacy did not suffer with abrogation.
The final reason the court's legitimacy remained intact is that it
was the court itself that decided Furstenberg incorrectly, and thereby
began a precedent that would confine it for most of the twentieth
century.2 5 5 While those such as Ms. Bozman argued that the Married
Women's Act codified interspousal immunity, the Court of Appeals
rejected this reasoning and held that the legislature in fact had never
spoken clearly on the status of the rule.2 56 Instead, it was the Court of
Appeals itself that interpreted, perhaps incorrectly, that the Married
Women's Act did not expand married women's rights to include the
right to sue a spouse in tort.25 7 While the court necessarily overruled
its own precedent through abrogation, it did not usurp the legislative
role if in fact it was the court that created the doctrine in the first
251. Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 459, 456 A.2d 894, 903
(1983).
252. Id. at 463, 456 A.2d at 905; Bozman, 376 Md. at 469-72, 830 A.2d at 455-56.
253. Bozman, 376 Md. at 472-84, 830 A.2d at 457-63.
254. Harrison, 295 Md. at 462, 456 A.2d at 904; Bozman, 376 Md. at 496-97, 830 A.2d at
471.
255. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court of Appeals sug-
gests that it decided Furstenberg incorrectly).
256. Bozman, 376 Md. at 495, 830 A.2d at 470. The Court of Appeals stated that Boblitz
implicitly rejected the claim that the Married Women's Act codified interspousal immunity
when the court held there was "no legislative barrier to abrogation." Id.; see Boblitz v.
Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 274, 462 A.2d 506, 522 (1983).
257. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text (discussing Furstenburg).
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place.25 Therefore, the court's legitimacy did not suffer through ab-
rogation. That legitimacy might have suffered more, in fact, if the
court had refused to abrogate a doctrine that it created, that the Gen-
eral Assembly refused to destroy, and that had not only outlived its
usefulness, but continued to permit the unjust denial of certain citi-
zens' rights.2
59
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals in Bozman, by fully abro-
gating the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity, permitted
a husband to sue his wife for the intentional tort of malicious prosecu-
tion. In so holding, Bozman resulted in the removal of arbitrary classi-
fications that barred certain individuals from recovering in tort, solely
because of marital status.2 6 0 The fact that such a law remained domi-
nant in Maryland until 2003, however, reflects the general prevalence
the common law still has in this state. 26" This results from the Court
of Appeals' deference to precedent, even when precedent may have
been decided incorrectly, and the court's clear hesitance to act when
the General Assembly refuses.26 2 In so doing, it removed a bar that
prevented all citizens from recovering equally for a tortious injury re-
gardless of marital status, and it formally removed the remaining
traces of the "disabilities" assigned to married women at common
law. 26" The court's decisions showed both due respect to precedent
and action when justice finally required a response to the legislature's
inaction. As such, the court removed an unjust, outmoded principle
of law which had for so long acted as a bar to Maryland citizens receiv-
ing equal compensation for their injuries.
JONATHAN E.C. MAY
258. See, e.g., Boblitz, 296 Md. at 244, 462 A.2d at 507 (stating that interspousal immunity
"is a creature of the common law that resulted exclusively from judicial decisions").
259. Bozman, 376 Md. at 494, 830 A.2d at 470 (noting, of the Supreme Court's decision
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that if the Court had deferred to Con-
gress, "it would have been powerless to end segregation in public education," a doctrine
itself created by a previous judicial decision).
260. See supra notes 191-208 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 209-219 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 209-219 and accompanying text.
263. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 337, 390 A.2d 77, 78 (1978).
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A. A Missed Opportunity to Safely Circumnavigate the Serbonian Bog'
and Decisively Settle a Conflict In Maryland Accident Law
In MAMSI Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Callaway,2 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland considered whether an insurance company prop-
erly withheld accidental death benefits from an Insured who died
while engaging in an act of autoerotic asphyxiation.3 The court held
that the insurance company's refusal to pay the accidental death bene-
fits was proper because the policy excluded recovery of benefits for a
loss that was caused in any way by a "self-inflicted injury."4 The court
reasoned that partial asphyxiation was an injury because a layperson
would understand it to be an injury, and because asphyxiation would
be an injury if someone else were to have partially asphyxiated the
Insured.5 While this analysis is well-reasoned and consistent with
other courts,6 the Court of Appeals nevertheless missed an opportu-
nity to settle an area of law in which Maryland has conflicting prece-
dent.7 The court had the opportunity to overrule the means-results
test,' which has become a dated and inflexible standard for determin-
ing what constitutes an accident.' Additionally, the court could have
1. JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, BK. 2, 1.592 (1667); see infra note 79 (explaining the
concept of the Serbonian Bog).
2. 375 Md. 261, 825 A.2d 995 (2003).
3. Id. at 280, 825 A.2d at 1006.
4. Id. at 267, 825 A.2d at 998. The policy specifically stated that no benefit would be
paid if the injury was caused "directly, indirectly, wholly or partly" by an intentional self-
injury. Id.
5. Id. at 283, 825 A.2d at 1007.
6. See, e.g., Sigler v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 506 F. Supp. 542, 545 (S.D. Iowa 1981)
(noting that if someone else had temporarily restricted the insured's ability to breathe, it
would be an injury).
7. Compare Gordon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 256 Md. 320, 341, 260 A.2d 338, 341 (1970)
(explicitly embracing the distinction between accidental means and accidental results),
with Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 359 Md. 298, 315, 753 A.2d 533, 542 (2000) (embrac-
ing the federal precedent that abrogates the distinction between accidental means and
accidental results).
8. MAMSI, 375 Md. at 274, 825 A.2d at 1002. Under the means-results test, a distinc-
tion is drawn between accidental means and accidental results; as such, an injury caused by
accidental means is an accident for purposes of an insurance policy, while an injury that is
the accidental result of intentional means is not an accidental injury for purposes of an
insurance policy. Id.
9. The newer, two-pronged test inquires into the subjective and objective expectations
of the Insured. Cole, 359 Md. at 315, 753 A.2d at 543. The first prong asks whether the
Insured expected the result of his actions. Id. If the subjective expectations of the Insured
are impossible to determine, the second prong of the test inquires whether a reasonable
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adopted the flexible and well-reasoned two-prong approach' that
serves as a better proxy for our intuitive understanding of what an
"accident" truly is.'" Instead of decisively settling an area of conflict-
ing law in favor of the better-reasoned standard, the court's inaction
perpetuates the ambiguity and confusion created by the existence of
two conflicting standards for determining whether an injury is an acci-
dent under Maryland law. 2
1. The Case.-On July 5, 2000, David B. Callaway was found dead
in his home.' 3 The Wicomico County resident was nude except for a
plastic grocery bag over his head that was secured at his neck with a
belt.' 4 Ropes bound his hands behind his back and his ankles to-
gether. 15 The wall facing Callaway was papered with magazine pic-
tures of nude women.' 6 The belt around Callaway's neck was attached
by a rope to a 25-pound weight that hung at the other side of the
room; this rope that connected the belt to the weight was strung
through two pulleys attached to the ceiling.' 7 One end of a second
rope was attached to the first rope at a point between the pulleys; the
other end of this second rope was tied loosely around Callaway's
hands and secured by a clothespin."t This second rope apparently was
person with similar experiences to that of the Insured, should have expected the injury. Id.
Applied to autoerotic asphyxiation cases, the two-pronged test virtually always proceeds to
the second prong because the decedent has engaged in the behavior many times before
and subjectively expects to live through the experience. See Bennett v. Am. Int'l Life Assur-
ance Co. of N.Y., 956 F. Supp. 201, 212 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that it was highly likely
that the Insured had engaged in the behavior on many previous occasions). Under the
second prong of the test, the autoerotic asphyxiation death would not be an accident if the
decedent should have expected his behavior, based on his past experiences, to cause his
death. Cole, 359 Md. at 315, 753 A.2d at 543.
10. See infra notes 232-278 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court of Appeals
could have overturned Gordon in favor of the two-pronged test in Cole because the parties
placed the cases at issue, and Cole is consistent with Maryland precedent).
11. See infra notes 280-285 and accompanying text (explaining the infirmities of the
means-results test).
12. See infra notes 290-310 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of the two-
prong test).
13. Appellant's Brief at E-40, MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Callaway, 375 Md. 261,
825 A.2d 995 (2003) (No. 98).
14. Id. at E-44.
15. Id. at E-40. The Sheriffs Office report also shows that the rope binding Callaway's
feet was attached to the floor by a U-shaped nail, and that a larger rope was inside of the
binding rope, providing a type of cushion to prevent the ankles from being cut. Id
16. Id.
17. Id at 4.
18. Id. Pulling on this rope would lift the weight and release the tension in the rope
around Callaway's neck, thus loosening his noose and allowing him to breathe. Id.
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meant to function as a safety device so that the pressure on the belt
could be alleviated before total asphyxiation.' 9
Callaway was engaged in an act of autoerotic asphyxiation when
he died. 20 Autoerotic asphyxiation is a mental disorder whereby the
individual cuts off his oxygen supply with a mask, rope, plastic bag, or
by means of chemicals to heighten his sexual arousal.2 ' The lack of
oxygen causes a state of asphyxia that stimulates nerve centers in the
brain by increasing the carbon dioxide and decreasing the oxygen in
the blood stream, which heightens the intensity of sexual gratifica-
tion.22 While most who engage in autoerotic asphyxiation employ
some sort of release or escape mechanism, the mechanisms some-
times fail,23 as Callaway's did in this instance.24
The Assistant Medical Examiner conducted an autopsy the day
after Callaway's body was discovered and confirmed that the immedi-
ate cause of death was asphyxiation. 25 The Medical Examiner also ob-
served that the asphyxiation mechanism Callaway used was common
for this kind of sexual activity, and confirmed the Assistant Medical
Examiner's conclusion that Callaway's death was caused by accidental
asphyxiation.26
Callaway owned a MAMSI life insurance policy that promised to
pay death benefits if he died from "an injury caused by an accident.
27
However, this provision contained certain exclusions that would pre-
clude the recovery of any benefits. 28 Specifically, the policy stated that
"[n]o benefit will be paid for any loss that results from or is caused
directly, indirectly, wholly or partly by: intentional self-injury, suicide or
attempted suicide, while sane or insane."29 After Callaway's death,
MAMSI refused to pay the benefit amount because it concluded that
Callaway's death was not an accident, but rather the result of a self-
inflicted injury."0 John W. Callaway, John CallawayJr., and BennettJ.
19. Id. at 4-5.
20. Id. at 3. Callaway's use of both a plastic bag to cover his head and a belt around his
neck is one of the more severe forms of autoerotic asphyxiation. Id. at 4.
21. MAMSI, 375 Md. at 264, 825 A.2d at 996.
22. Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002).
23. See, e.g., Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1450 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that
the decedent had designed his system of ligatures to loosen if he lost consciousness, but
that system appeared to have failed, causing his death).
24. MAMSI, 375 Md. at 266, 825 A.2d at 997.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id., 825 A.2d at 998.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 267, 825 A.2d at 998 (alteration in original).
30. Id. at 266, 825 A.2d at 998.
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Callaway, Callaway's brother and nephews, respectively, were the
named beneficiaries of the policy.3
The Beneficiaries filed suit against MAMSI for breach of insur-
ance contract in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County on October
16, 2000.32 MAMSI filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a
motion for summary judgment, asserting that Callaway injured him-
self by depriving his brain of oxygen and that the oxygen deprivation
caused his death.33 MAMSI argued that recovery was barred because
the insurance policy excluded recovery for losses caused by a self-in-
flicted injury such as asphyxiation.34
The Beneficiaries responded to MAMSI's motion with their own
motion for summary judgment, arguing that the existence of the es-
cape mechanism evidenced Callaway's lack of intent to injure him-
self.35 Thus, the Beneficiaries argued that the death resulted from an
accidental injury, not a self-inflicted injury.36 As such, the Benefi-
ciaries concluded that the life insurance policy provided coverage. 7
At a hearing before the Circuit Court of Wicomico County on the
two parties' motions in February 2001, the parties stipulated that the
policy was unambiguous and that there was no dispute of material
facts.3 ' The trial court found that because Callaway intended to cut
off his air supply and the resulting lack of air caused his death, Cal-
laway's death was not an accident. 39 Rather, the trial court reasoned
that the death was caused accidentally by an injury that was inflicted
intentionally.4 ° The trial court found that this intentional infliction of
the injury prevented Callaway's death from being classified as an acci-
dent under the policy.41 Additionally, the court stated that the as-
phyxiation was an injury, and therefore, even if the death were
accidental, the self-inflicted injury exclusion precluded recovery.4 2
31. Id. Calloway's brother and nephews will hereinafter be referred to as the
"Beneficiaries."
32. Id. at 267, 825 A.2d at 998.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 267-68, 825 A.2d at 998.
39. Id. at 268, 825 A.2d at 999.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 269, 825 A.2d at 999.
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The Beneficiaries appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.4"
They argued that the trial court failed to view the facts in the light
most favorable to the Beneficiaries and failed to draw reasonable in-
ferences in their favor from the undisputed facts." In the Benefi-
ciaries' opinion, the trial court did not give sufficient weight to the
determination of law enforcement personnel and the Medical Exam-
iner who concluded that the death was an accident.45 Additionally,
the Beneficiaries argued that Callaway's death was, under the policy,
the result of an injury caused by an accident and not the result of a
self-inflicted injury.4 6 MAMSI again responded that the death was the
result of an intentional injury, and thus was not accidental.47 Further-
more, MAMSI argued, even if the court decided that the death was
accidental under the terms of the policy, recovery was precluded be-
cause the death was the result of a self-inflicted injury.48
The Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Beneficiaries and
overruled the trial court's decision.49 Writing for a unanimous court,
Judge Hollander rejected both of MAMSI's arguments, finding that
the death was an accident and that intentionally restricting the flow of
blood to the brain was not an injury under the self-inflicted injury
exclusion.5" Judge Hollander drew an analogy between autoerotic as-
phyxiation and skydiving, arguing that both are activities that contain
inherent risk of severe injury if the preventive measures malfunc-
tion.5 According to Judge Hollander, a skydiver's voluntary jump
from a plane does not prevent any subsequent fatal injury from being
considered an accident.52 Likewise, she reasoned that the voluntary
behavior of autoerotic asphyxiation, though foolish, does not determi-
natively render any subsequent fatal injury non-accidental.53
43. Callaway v. MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co., 145 Md. App. 567, 582-83, 806 A.2d 274,
283 (2002).
44. Id. at 583, 806 A.2d at 283. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "all
inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Id. at 580, 806 A.2d at 281 (citing
Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 712, 633 A.2d 84, 87 (1993)).
45. MAMSI, 375 Md. at 269, 825 A.2d at 999. The Medical Examiner stated in the
autopsy report that the immediate cause of death was asphyxiation and the manner of
death was accident. Callaway, 145 Md. App. at 572, 806 A.2d at 277.
46. See Callaway, 145 Md. App. at 585, 806 A.2d at 284 (noting that Beneficiaries argued
that the Insured did not intend to injure himself in such a way that was likely to lead to his
death).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 604, 806 A.2d at 296.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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MAMSI appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing
four main issues. First, MAMSI questioned whether the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals erred in its conclusion that the terms "injury" and "acci-
dent" should be given their ordinary meanings on the ground that the
insurance policy was ambiguous.54 Second, MAMSI challenged
whether the Insured's death from autoerotic asphyxiation was an "ac-
cident" under the policy.55 Third, MAMSI argued that even if the
death were an accident, the act of autoerotic asphyxiation was a self-
inflicted injury that excluded recovery for an accidental death under
the terms of the policy.56 Finally, MAMSI questioned whether the two-
prong inquiry of Cole v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.5 7 applied to all
cases involving death by accident, and if so, whether Gordon v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co.5 was overruled, thus preventing Maryland
Courts from recognizing the distinction between accidental means
and accidental results. 9
2. Legal Background.-Though we may intuitively understand
what an accident is, the law has had a great deal of difficulty defining
what constitutes an accident. Whether the cause of an injury was an
"accident" has been decided in the past by drawing a distinction be-
tween injuries caused by accidental means, and injuries that are the
accidental result of purposeful means.6" However, a dissenting opin-
ion by Justice Cardozo in Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.6"
began a movement to abolish this means-results test in favor of tests
that are more in line with our intuitive understanding of what consti-
tutes an accident.62 State courts first abolished the distinction,6" and
54. MAMSI, 375 Md. at 272-73, 825 A.2d at 1002. Additionally, MAMSI asked the Court
of Appeals to decide whether the case should have been remanded to the circuit court to
allow MAMSI to introduce the meanings of the words, if they were found ambiguous. Id. at
273, 825 A.2d at 1002.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 359 Md. 298, 314, 753 A.2d 533, 542 (2000); see supra note 9 (explaining the two-
prong approach in Cole).
58. 256 Md. 320, 323, 260 A.2d 338, 339 (1970). The Gordon court explicitly reaffirmed
its adherence to the means-results test. Id.; see supra note 8 (explaining the means-results
test).
59. MAMSI, 375 Md. at 274, 825 A.2d at 1002.
60. Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 497 (1934).
61. 291 U.S. 491 (1934).
62. Id. at 499. Instead of examining whether the man's death was caused by accidental
means or was the accidental result of intentional means, Justice Cardozo stated that
"[w]hen a man has died in such a way that his death is spoken of as an accident, he has
died because of an accident, and hence by accidental means. So courts of high authority
have held." Id.
63. Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n, 67 N.E.2d 248, 252 (N.Y. 1946).
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some federal courts followed in kind.6 4 The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit developed a two-prong test that has sup-
planted the means-results test in many other jurisdictions.6 5 This two-
prong approach also has been used by many courts in cases of death
by autoerotic asphyxiation to determine the nature of the decedent's
death.6 6 Although Maryland precedent specifically embraces the
means-results test,6 7 many Maryland courts have decided whether an
occurrence is an accident without employing the means-results test.
68
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has adopted the two-prong test,
69
although no Maryland court has yet employed the test in an auto-
erotic asphyxiation case.
a. Justice Cardozo Creates a Fork in the Road of Accident Law.-
In Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.,7" the Supreme Court
determined if a man's unexpected death was accidental.7 1 The In-
sured died from sunstroke while playing golf.72 The two insurance
policies of the Insured provided benefits so long as the death was not
"caused directly, indirectly, wholly or partly by: intentional self-injuy,
suicide or attempted suicide."7 The insurance companies that wrote
these policies maintained that the death was not accidental and with-
held benefits, prompting the beneficiaries to file suit to recover the
benefits." Justice Stone's majority opinion embraced precedent and
held that under the relevant insurance policies, a death from sun-
stroke was not compensable as an accidental death because the death
was the accidental result of intentional means and not the result of
64. See, e.g., Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1086 (1st Cir.
1990) (electing to follow Justice Cardozo's dissenting opinion in Landress instead of the
majority's means-results test in Landress); Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident
Ass'n, 67 N.E.2d 248, 252 (N.Y. 1946) (abrogating the use of the accidental means-results
distinction in New York).
65. Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002); Todd v. AIG Life
Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 (5th Cir. 1995); Bennett v. Am. Int'l Life Assurance Co. of
N.Y., 956 F. Supp. 201, 210-11 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Parker v. Danaher Corp., 851 F. Supp.
1287, 1292-93 (W.D. Ark. 1994).
66. See, e.g., Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1126-27 (following the two-prong test articulated in
Wickman); Todd, 47 F.3d at 1456 (same).
67. Gordon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 256 Md. 320, 324, 260 A.2d 338, 340 (1970).
68. Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 342 Md. 634, 652, 679 A.2d 540, 548 (1996);
Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc., 248 Md. 148, 151-52, 235 A.2d 556, 558
(1967).
69. Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 359 Md. 298, 315, 753 A.2d 533, 542 (2000).
70. 291 U.S. 491 (1934).
71. Id. at 496.
72. Id. at 494.
73. Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 494.
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accidental means. 5 The court reasoned that the bodily injury from
the sun was not an accidental injury because the Insured voluntarily
exposed himself to the sun's rays, which caused the Insured's death.76
The court concluded that the death by sunstroke was the accidental
result of intentional means and found that the insurance company
had correctly withheld accidental death benefits from the benefi-
ciaries. 77 Justice Cardozo, in a strongly worded dissent, chastised the
majority for adhering to what he viewed as an ineffective and need-
lessly cryptic standard.71 Justice Cardozo warned that continued ad-
herence to the distinction between accidental means and accidental
results would "plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog. '79
Justice Cardozo contended that the artificial distinction had no mean-
ing, for if an occurrence was an accident at the beginning, it was an
accident throughout.8 ° He advocated an abrogation of the means-re-
sults test in favor of a common language standard such that "[w] hen a
man has died in such a way that his death is spoken of as an accident,
he has died because of an accident, and hence by accidental means." '81
Justice Cardozo's dissent has since divided judicial scholars on that
which constitutes an "accident," with two competing standards emerg-
ing across the country.82
b. Many States Soon FollowedJustice Cardozo's Directive and Abro-
gated the "Means-Results" Test.-Not long afterJustice Cardozo's dissent
in Landress, many state courts followed Justice Cardozo's path and
75. Id. at 496. The policy read that accidental death benefits would be paid if death
resulted "directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries effected
through external, violent and accidental means." Id. at 495.
76. Id. at 496.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 499.
79. Id. The reference to the Serbonian Bog comes from John Milton's Paradise Lost
Beyond this flood a frozen Continent Lies dark and wilde, beat with perpetual
storms Of Whirlwind and dire Hail, which on firm land Thaws not, but gathers
heap, and ruin seems Of ancient pile; all else deep snow and ice, A gulf profound
as that Serbonian Bog Betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old, Where Armies whole
have sunk.
JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, BK. 2, 1.592 (1667).
80. Landress, 291 U.S. at 501 (Cardozo,J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 499.
82. See Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1085 (1st Cir. 1990)(surveying state judicial interpretations of what is accidental and concluding that there are
two approaches to determine whether an injury is accidental); Lamb v. Northwestern Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 56 Md. App. 125, 129, 467 A.2d 182, 184-85 (1983) (noting that two opposing
standards for determining if an injury is an accident have emerged, just asJustice Cardozo
predicted).
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abolished the means-results test.83 Courts that abolished the test often
cited Justice Cardozo's dissent, specifically his recognition of the un-
necessary and artificial distinction between accidental means and acci-
dental results.8 4 State courts that abolished this distinction have
applied various tests in an attempt to mirrorJustice Cardozo's logic.85
The trend towards accepting Justice Cardozo's position in his dissent-
ing opinion in Landress began in the 1940s in New York.86
New York was one of the first states to follow Justice Cardozo's
directive and abrogate the distinction between accidental means and
accidental results. Just twelve years after Landress, the Court of Ap-
peals of New York, in Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Asso-
ciation,7 decided that the distinction between accidental means and
accidental results would no longer be recognized in New York.8 8 Jus-
tice Conway's opinion focused heavily on the cause of the Insured's
death,89 noting that the chain of causation between the accident and
the Insured's death was unbroken.9" Though the New York high
court did not cite Justice Cardozo's dissent in Landress, the court's re-
jection of the means-results test and its use of a common-sense defini-
tion of an "accident" accords with the logic and spirit of Justice
Cardozo's dissent.9 Just as Justice Cardozo encouraged, the New
York court guided its reasoning from the expectations of an ordinary
person.9 2 The court recognized that life insurance policies are written
for the common man and that the common man does not draw a
distinction between accidental means and accidental results; rather,
he is guided by his common sense.93
83. See, e.g., Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n, 67 N.E.2d 248, 252
(N.Y. 1946) (abrogating the use of the accidental means and results distinction in New
York).
84. E.g., Gaskins v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 104 So. 2d 171, 176 (La. 1958).
85. Compare Burr, 67 N.E.2d at 251-54 (utilizing a common sense standard and noting
that a common man would consider the death an accident because the chain of causation
was begun by an automobile accident), with Gaskins, 104 So. 2d at 177 (inquiring whether
the average man would regard the loss as unforeseen, unexpected, and extraordinary).
86. See, e.g., Burr, 67 N.E.2d at 252 (abrogating the use of the accidental means and
results distinction in New York).
87. 67 N.E.2d 248 (N.Y. 1946).
88. Id. at 252.
89. The Insured died when he slipped and hit his head while attempting to fix his car
on the side of a mountain road in a snowstorm. Id. at 250.
90. Id. at 253-54.
91. See Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 499 (1934) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting) (advocating a definition of "accident" that is in line with the common man's
understanding of what an accident is).
92. Burr, 67 N.E.2d at 251.
93. Id. at 252.
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana also abrogated the distinction
between accidental means and accidental results, echoing the logic in
Burr and approving Justice Cardozo's view in Landress.94 In Gaskins v.
New York Life Insurance Co., accidental death insurance benefits were
withheld from a patient who died from anaphylactic shock induced by
a blood transfusion during surgery.95 In its decision, the Gaskins court
disregarded the Supreme Court precedent established in Landress as
well as a similar Louisiana decision,96 Parker v. Provident Life & Accident
Insurance Co.97 The Gaskins court rejected the Parker test because it
was confusing and susceptible to manipulation to the point that it was
meaningless.9" The Gaskins court instead decided to determine
whether a death was an accident by asking whether an average man
would understand the death to be an accident.99 After citing Justice
Cardozo's dissent in Landress approvingly, the court held that an acci-
dent is an event that an average man regards as being so unforeseen,
unexpected, and extraordinary that he would consider it an
accident. 100
Pennsylvania soon joined New York and Louisiana in abandoning
the means-results test. The conclusion by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Beckham v. Travelers Insurance Co.5° ' resembled that of
the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Gaskins.' 2 Justice Roberts' opin-
ion abrogated the distinction between accidental means and acciden-
tal results on the ground that a failure to do so would have allowed
ambiguity in an area of the law where Pennsylvania courts had previ-
ously insisted on clarity and specificity. 103 The motivation for such a
move was in part a recognition of the national judicial trend away
from the means-results test and in part an admission that Pennsylvania
jurisprudence on the issue was mired in the Serbonian Bog.' 04 In
94. Gaskins v. New York Life Ins. Co., 104 So. 2d 171, 177 (La. 1958).
95. Id. at 172.
96. Id. at 175.
97. 152 So. 583, 586 (La. 1934).
98. Gaskins, 104 So. 2d at 175. In disregarding the Louisiana precedent, the Gaskins
court noted the similarities between Parker and the majority's opinion in Landress. Id.
99. Id. at 177.
100. Id.
101. 225 A.2d 532 (Pa. 1967).
102. Id. at 535.
103. Id.
104. Id. The court noted that "Our own cases have also confirmed Cardozo's prediction
about plunging this branch of law into a Serbonian bog." Id The court continued by
noting cases where accidental death benefits were denied under the means-results test,
although in the view of the court, common sense and prudence indicated that the injuries
clearly were accidental. Id.
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place of the means-results test, the court substituted Justice Cardozo's
common sense standard set forth in Landress.
0 5
In Republic National Life Insurance Co. v. Heyward,10 6 the Supreme
Court of Texas similarly rescued the Texas courts from the Serbonian
Bog by holding that Texas no longer recognized the difference be-
tween accidental death and death by accidental means.1 17 Like the
courts discussed above, the court was persuaded by Justice Cardozo's
dissent in Landress, but the Supreme Court of Texas applied a some-
what different definition of the term "accident."' ' The court applied
a test that would evolve into the modern two-prong test used by those
jurisdictions embracing Cardozo's position. 10 9 In applying this test,
the court looked at the occurrence from the viewpoint of the Insured,
and held that an occurrence is an accident if the injury reasonably
could not have been anticipated by the Insured from the actions that
caused the injury.110
c. Courts Faced with Deaths by Autoerotic Asphyxiation Have De-
clined to Apply the Distinction Between Accidental Means and Accidental Re-
sults When Deciding Whether the Death Was an Accident.-Similar to the
state courts that abrogated the means-results test, many courts faced
with deaths resulting from autoerotic asphyxiation have declined to
use the means-results test. These cases typically involve a refusal by an
insurance company to pay accidental death benefits because of the
voluntary nature of the behavior that caused the death. 1 ' In declin-
ing to apply the means-results test, the courts have recognized that the
distinction between accidental means and results is a poor measure of
whether a death was accidental when faced with these autoerotic as-
phyxiation fact patterns that are strikingly similar to each other."
12
While the courts consistently have declined to examine the distinction
between accidental means and results in favor of Justice Cardozo's
105. Id. at 537.
106. 536 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1976).
107. Id. at 557.
108. Id.
109. See id. (abrogating the means-results test and examining the death of the insured
from the subjective expectations of the insured); Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co.,
908 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Republic in establishing the two-prong test that was
later adopted in many state and federal courts).
110. Republic, 536 S.W.2d at 557.
111. E.g., Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1450 (5th Cir. 1995).
112. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981) (describing a typical autoerotic asphyxiation fact pattern: the Insured was found
dead, with rope around his neck, inadvertently having been strangled to death while en-
gaging in an autoerotic act).
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common sense standard, the tests that the courts initially applied were
vague and inconsistent, resulting in inconsistent outcomes.' 13
In Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Tommie,'14 the Court of
Civil Appeals of Texas was faced with an autoerotic asphyxiation
case."' The Insured was found dead in his bedroom, inadvertently
asphyxiated during an autoerotic act.116 The Texas Court of Civil Ap-
peals gave the term "accident" its usual and ordinary meaning and
upheld ajury decision that the death was accidental because the activ-
ity was not the type of activity that would cause the Insured reasonably
to expect that he would die, even though the act was both foolish and
risky." 7 The life insurance policy contained an exclusion for death
caused by self-inflicted injury that the court found did not exclude
recovery." 8 In finding that the self-inflicted injury exclusion did not
preclude recovery, the court reasoned that autoerotic asphyxiation is
not included in the usual and ordinary understanding of the word
"injury." 19 Thus, the court found that recovery under the insurance
policy was appropriate because death from autoerotic asphyxiation is
an accident, not a self-inflicted injury that would exclude recovery for
the beneficiaries of the insurance policy in question. 2 °
In Sigler v. Mutual Benefit Lfe Insurance Co., 2 ' the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa was faced with a case
factually analogous to Tommie, but concluded the contrary by finding
that the Insured's death was not an accident and that autoerotic as-
phyxiation was a self-inflicted injury.'2 2 The court similarly aban-
doned the distinction between accidental means and accidental
results in one of the first autoerotic asphyxiation cases in federal court
but reached an opposite conclusion as had the court in Tommie.123
The Insured was found dead in his hotel room, asphyxiated in an
113. Compare id. at 202-03 (holding that an autoerotic asphyxiation death was an acci-
dent, because while the behavior was "fraught with substantial risk of injury or death," the
behavior was not "of such a nature that the [I] nsured should have reasonably known that it
would probably result in his death"), with Sigler v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 506 F. Supp.
542, 544 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (holding that an autoerotic asphyxiation death was not an acci-
dent because a "reasonable person would have recognized that his actions could result in
his death").
114. 619 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 201.
117. Id. at 202-03.
118. Id. at 203.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 506 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
122. Id. at 545.
123. Id. at 544-45.
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autoerotic act.1 24 The district court agreed with the insurance com-
pany that the death was not accidental because "a reasonable person
would have recognized that his actions could result in his death.'
'1 25
Like the insurance policy in Tommie, this policy contained an exclu-
sion for self-inflicted injuries. 12 6 However, unlike the Tommie court,
the Sigler court held that partial asphyxiation was an injury because it
would have been an injury if someone else had partially asphyxiated
the Insured.127 Therefore, not only did the Sigler court find that auto-
erotic asphyxiation was not an accident, but it also found that auto-
erotic asphyxiation was an injury that precluded recovery of accidental
death benefits under the insurance policy.
128
In Kennedy v. Washington National Insurance Co.,129 the Court of
Appeals of Wisconsin declined to use the means-results test in an auto-
erotic asphyxiation death. ° With no discussion of the distinction be-
tween accidental means and results, the Kennedy court applied what it
referred to as the "average man" test in interpreting whether an auto-
erotic asphyxiation death was an accident and found that the In-
sured's death was an accident.13 ' Under this test, the court gave the
word "accident" its ordinary and everyday meaning and held that the
customary expectation of a policy holder is that a death is accidental if
the policyholder reasonably believes that his conduct does not make
death an expected result.132 This "average man test" is very similar to
the common sense test for which Justice Cardozo advocated in his dis-
senting opinion in Landress.133 Applying the test, the court concluded
that the Insured's death was an accident because there was no evi-
dence that the Insured's death was highly probable, expected, or the
natural result of his actions.' 3 4 The court rejected the insurance com-
pany's attempt to analogize the Insured's death to the death of some-
one engaged in Russian Roulette.' 3 5 This insurance policy did not
124. Id. at 543.
125. Id. at 544.
126. Id. at 545.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 544-45.
129. 401 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
130. The Insured was found dead, hanging by a rope from a shower head, inadvertently
asphyxiated during an autoerotic act. Id. at 844.
131. Id. at 84546.
132. Id. at 846.
133. See Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 499 (1934) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "when a man has died in such a way that his death is spoken of as
an accident, he has died because of an accident, and hence by accidental means").
134. Kennedy, 401 N.W.2d at 846.
135. Id. at 845. Russian Roulette is an act of bravado consisting of spinning the cylinder
of a revolver loaded with one cartridge, pointing the muzzle at one's head, and pulling the
2004]
MARYLAND LAw REvIEw
include an exclusion for self-inflicted injuries, prompting the court to
note that the insurance company could have protected itself from the
adverse outcome of this case through the language of the contract by
excluding the voluntary exposure to this type of unnecessary danger
from the accidental death coverage. 136
d. Federal and State Courts Have Begun to Apply a Two-Prong
Test in Determining Whether Autoerotic Asphyxiation Deaths Are Acciden-
taL.-In Wickman v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 137 the First Cir-
cuit articulated a two-prong test for determining if an injury was
caused by an accident; this test has provided consistency in decisions
for both federal and state courts faced with autoerotic asphyxiation
cases. 3 ' The First Circuit abandoned the distinction between means
and results, explicitly embraced the principles ofJustice Cardozo's dis-
sent in Landress, and established a comprehensive test to examine the
subjective expectations and, if necessary, the objective expectations of
the Insured.1 9 While this standard did not arise in an autoerotic as-
phyxiation case, it has been applied in many such cases, affording con-
sistency to the analysis in autoerotic asphyxiation cases. 1 40  In
Wickman, the First Circuit was faced with an Insured who died after a
fall from a bridge.' 4 ' The Insured intentionally climbed over the
guardrail to the edge of the bridge and fell to the ground after hang-
ing from the bridge by only one hand.'42 He died later at the hospital
from cardiac arrest.' 43 The insurance company withheld payment of
accidental death benefits, claiming the death was not an accident
under its policy.'44
Judge Rosenn's opinion recognized that two competing stan-
dards existed in the country for determining whether an injury was an
accident. 14 5 In rejecting the means-results test and its distinction be-
tween accidental means and accidental results, the court cited Justice
trigger. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, SECOND EDITION, VOL. XIV (.A. Simpson et al.
eds., 1989).
136. Kennedy, 401 N.W.2d at 846.
137. 908 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1990).
138. Id. at 1086.
139. Id. at 1085-88.
140. See, e.g., Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 (5th Cir. 1995) (following the
two-prong test).
141. 908 F.2d at 1080. The case was heard in federal court because it dealt with issues
arising under ERISA, the Employee Retirement Income Security Program. Id. at 1079 n.1.
142. Id. at 1080.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1081.
145. Id. at 1085.
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Cardozo's dissent in Landress approvingly, and noted that recently,
"courts consistently have rejected the distinction between accidental
means and accidental results."146 After deciding that such a rejection
was the result of better reasoning, the court engaged in a two-prong
analysis.147 In the first prong of this analysis, the court asked whether
the Insured either expected the injury he suffered or reasonably
should have expected the injury he suffered.148 The court then rea-
soned that should a fact-finder conclude that the evidence is not suffi-
cient to determine the Insured's subjective expectations, the court
should then proceed to the second prong of the test.149 In the second
prong, the objective prong, the court asks if a reasonable person, simi-
lar in background and experience to the Insured, would have thought
that the injury was highly likely to occur as a result of the Insured's
voluntary conduct. 5 °
The Wickman two-prong test has been used in numerous auto-
erotic asphyxiation cases arising in federal courts. In Todd v. AIG Life
Insurance Co., 5' the Fifth Circuit explicitly embraced the application
of the Wickman two-prong test to a death by autoerotic asphyxia-
tion.'5 2 The Insured in Todd was found strangled on his hotel bed,
with a dog collar around his neck and a system of dog leashes that
allowed him to regulate the amount of oxygen that he received.'
The circuit court found that the Wickman test was appropriate because
it recognized that the Insured did not expect to die and that the be-
havior was not of such a nature that he was likely to die.' 54 The court
also noted that the first prong of the Wickman test requires that the
Insured's expectations be reasonable; the subjective expectation of
the Insured, if unreasonable, is not enough to warrant coverage.'
55
In Padfield v. AIG Life Insurance Co., 156 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning in Todd and also
applied the two-prong test in an autoerotic asphyxiation death. 157 In
146. Id. at 1086.
147. Id. at 1089-90.
148. Id. at 1088.
149. Id
150. Id.
151. 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995).
152. Id. at 1456.
153. Id. at 1450.
154. Id. at 1456-57.
155. Id. at 1456. Additionally, the court noted that the expectation of death must reach
a "substantial certainty" but stated that this was the equivalent of the "highly likely to oc-
cur" standard used in Wickman. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. 290 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2002).
157. Id. at 1126.
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adopting the Wickman test, the court noted that the utility of the test
rested in objectively predicting the expectation of the decedent when
determining the actual expectation is not possible.15 In Padfield, the
Court of Appeals was faced with a slightly different autoerotic asphyxi-
ation fact pattern. The Insured was found asphyxiated in the back of
his van, with a necktie tied around his neck at one end and the van's
sliding door hinge at the other. 59 This situation was different from
most autoerotic asphyxiation deaths because the Insured also used an
industrial solvent, chlorohexanol, to heighten the effect of the
asphyxiation. 60
Like many other courts, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
death was accidental using the Wickman test. 1 ' Unlike other courts,
however, the Ninth Circuit found that partial asphyxiation was not an
injury that would trigger the self-inflicted injury exclusion and pre-
clude recovery of benefits. 162
e. Maryland State Precedent Still Acknowledges the Means-Results
Test, Although Maryland Courts Also Have Adopted the Wickman Two-
Prong Test.-Accident law has evolved differently in Maryland than it
has around the rest of the country. Maryland still recognizes the
means-results test, but Maryland courts also have adopted the two-
prong test as well.' 6 ' Compounding the problem is that the means-
results test is seldom used, and the courts that adopted the two-prong
test never explicitly overruled the means-results test. 1 64 Therefore,
Maryland has two competing and contradictory standards for deter-
mining what constitutes an accident.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland explicitly reaffirmed the dis-
tinction between accidental means and accidental results in Gordon v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.'65 In Gordon, the Insured died from an
unexpected reaction to an intentionally self-injected dose of heroin;
as a result, his insurance company withheld accidental death bene-
fits.166 The court refused to overrule John Hancock Mutual Life Insur-
158. See id. at 1127 (noting that the requirement that death not be substantially certain
to occur makes the objective inquiry a reliable proxy for subjective expectation).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1125.
161. Id. at 1126-27.
162. Id. at 1130.
163. Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 359 Md. 298, 314-15, 753 A.2d 533, 542-43 (2000).
164. See, e.g., id. (explicitly embracing the Wickman two-prong test, but not specifically
overruling Gordon and the means-results test).
165. 256 Md. 320, 260 A.2d 338 (1970).
166. Id. at 321-22, 260 A.2d at 338-39. The court reasoned that when an Insured injects
himself with a dangerous drug and nothing unusual happens in the actual injection, but
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ance Co. v. Plummer 6 7 and abrogate the distinction between accidental
means and accidental results.1 68 Though the court recognized that
many jurisdictions have declined to distinguish between accidental
means and accidental results, Judge Digges refused to follow Justice
Cardozo's reasoning because he thought that abandoning the distinc-
tion would not prevent Maryland courts from plunging into the mo-
rass thatJustice Cardozo feared.
1 69
While Gordon stands as state precedent, it is a rarely cited case,
170
and recent Maryland decisions have not embraced the means-results
test.1 7 1 In fact, Maryland courts have declined to use the means-re-
sults test both before and after Gordon was decided.172 Harleysville Mu-
tual Casualty Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc.173 was decided three years
before Gordon, and the Court of Appeals did not use the means-results
test in deciding if an occurrence was an accident. 174 In Harleysville, an
excavating company sought coverage from its insurance company for
damage the company caused when it burned large piles of trees in a
neighborhood, causing smoke damage to some of the homes.' 75 The
insurance company refused subrogation of the judgment against the
excavation company, claiming the original damage was not accidental
the Insured dies from the injection, there is no reason to ignore the distinction between
accidental means and accidental results so that the Insured can recover under his insur-
ance policy. Id. at 324, 260 A.2d at 340. The means of the death are intentional; it is only
the result of those means that is accidental. Id. Consequently, there was no coverage. Id.
167. 181 Md. 140, 28 A.2d 856 (1942). In Plummer, an insurance company withheld
accidental death benefits when the Insured died from anesthetic administered during a
dentistry procedure. Id. at 141, 28 A.2d at 857. The court followed the "weight of author-
ity" in finding that the death from anesthesia was a death from an accidental result, not a
death by accidental means. Id. at 143, 28 A.2d at 858.
168. Gordon, 256 Md. at 323, 260 A.2d at 339.
169. Id. at 323-25, 260 A.2d at 339-41. In Judge Digges' view, the 'Serbonian Bog' en-
compasses more than just the distinction between means and results; rather, it encom-
passes the entire field of accident law. Id. at 325, 260 A.2d at 340.
170. According to Wesdaw, Gordon has been cited only three times by Maryland courts
since 1970.
171. See Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 359 Md. 298, 314-15, 753 A.2d 533, 542-43
(2000) (using the Wickman two-prong test to determine if a shooting was an accident under
an insurance policy); Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 342 Md. 634, 652, 679 A.2d 540, 548
(1996) (deciding if negligent misrepresentation is an accident under an insurance policy
based on the foresight and expectation of the Insured).
172. See Sheets, 342 Md. at 652, 679 A.2d at 548 (deciding if an occurrence was an acci-
dent without using the means-results test, twenty-six years after Gordon); Harleysville Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc., 248 Md. 148, 151, 235 A.2d 556, 558 (1967) (deciding if
an occurrence was an accident without using the means-results test, three years before
Gordon).
173. 248 Md. 148, 235 A.2d 556 (1967).
174. Id. at 151, 235 A.2d at 558.
175. Id. at 149-50, 235 A.2d at 556-57.
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under the terms of their insurance agreement.1 76 The court engaged
in a brief analysis with no mention of Gordon, reasoning that the dam-
age was an accident because it was unexpected and unforeseeable. 177
Sheets v. Brethren Mutual Insurance Co.178 is another case where the
Court of Appeals did not apply the means-results test.' 79 In that case,
decided twenty-six years after Gordon, the Court of Appeals deter-
mined whether negligent misrepresentation could be an accident
under an insurance contract. 8" The buyers of a house sued the sell-
ers of the house, claiming that the sellers never disclosed that the
house had a defective septic system that caused substantial flood-
ing.'81 The sellers sought indemnification for any liability stemming
from the suit from their insurance company, pursuant to their insur-
ance coverage for accidental property damage.'82 In deciding if the
property damage was indeed an accident under the policy, the court's
inquiry centered on the subjective expectation of the Insured.' 8 The
Insured sellers of the house allegedly were negligent in not discover-
ing the defective septic system; it was this non-discovery that qualified
the damage as an accident.'84 Though the sellers allegedly were negli-
gent, they did not foresee or expect the damage; therefore, the court
found that the damage was accidental under the policy.' 85 This analy-
sis is consistent with the previous Court of Appeals decisions in Glens
Falls Insurance Co. v. American Oil Co.' 86 and Harleysville, both of which
decided if an occurrence was an accident with no mention of the dis-
tinction between accidental means and accidental results. 87
Maryland courts not only have declined to apply the means-re-
sults test in numerous cases, but the Court of Appeals has also
adopted the two-prong test. In Cole v. State Farm Mutual Insurance
176. Id. at 150-51, 235 A.2d at 557.
177. Id. at 151, 235 A.2d at 558.
178. 342 Md. 634, 679 A.2d 540 (1996).
179. Id. at 652, 679 A.2d at 548.
180. Id. at 646, 679 A.2d at 545.
181. Id. at 637, 679 A.2d at 541.
182. Id, at 638, 646, 679 A.2d at 542, 545.
183. Id. at 652, 679 A.2d at 548.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 658, 679 A.2d at 551.
186. 254 Md. 120, 254 A.2d 658 (1969). In Glens Falls, the Insured drove his car into a
gas station intentionally. Id. at 122, 254 A.2d at 660. In examining whether the crash was
an accident, the court embraced Harleysville and the principle that whether an occurrence
is an accident turns on the foresight and expectation of the Insured. Id at 127-28, 254
A.2d at 662-63.
187. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc., 248 Md. 148, 151, 235 A.2d 556,
558 (1967); Glen Falls, 254 Md. at 127-28, 254 A.2d at 662-63.
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Co., s88 the Court of Appeals adopted the two-prong test to determine
if an intentional tort was an accident under an insurance policy.' 89 In
Cole, the Insured was shot and killed as she sat in her car.190 The
insurance company refused to pay accidental death benefits because it
did not believe that the Insured's injuries resulted from an acci-
dent. '9 The court reasoned that the two-prong test, used most often
in federal courts, was appropriate under Maryland law because it was a
more detailed version of the analysis in Sheets.192 According to the
Court of Appeals, the two-prong test was appropriate not only because
it mirrored the analysis in Sheets, but also because it conformed to the
court's prior holdings concerning Maryland accident law.19
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In MAMSI Life & Heath Insurance Co.
v. Callaway, the Court of Appeals overruled the Court of Special Ap-
peals by a 5-2 vote, and held that the Circuit Court for Wicomico
County had properly granted summary judgment for MAMSI, thus
withholding accidental death benefits from Callaway's benefi-
ciaries.' 94 Judge Harrell's majority opinion 19 5 stated that the appeal
raised four specific questions for the court's consideration.1 96 The
first issue the majority focused on was whether the Court of Special
Appeals erred in its conclusion that the terms "injury" and "accident"
should be given their ordinary meanings because the insurance policy
was ambiguous.1 97 Second, the court examined whether the Insured's
death from autoerotic asphyxiation was an "accidental" death under
the policy. 98 Third, the court considered whether autoerotic asphyxi-
ation was a self-inflicted injury under the terms of the policy. 99 Fi-
nally, the court considered whether the two-prong inquiry of Cole
applied to all cases involving death by accident, and if so, whether
Gordon was overruled, preventing Maryland courts from recognizing
188. 359 Md. 298, 753 A.2d 533 (2000).
189. Id. at 315, 753 A.2d at 542-43.
190. Id. at 301-02, 753 A.2d at 535.
191. Id. at 302, 753 A.2d at 535.
192. Id. at 315, 753 A.2d at 542. In Sheets, the court examined the subjective expectation
of the Insured to determine if the Insured expected or foresaw the damage. 342 Md. 634,
652, 679 A.2d 540, 548 (1996).
193. Cole, 359 Md. at 315, 753 A.2d at 54243.
194. MvIAMSI, 375 Md. at 283, 825 A.2d at 1008.
195. Judges Eldridge, Raker, Wilner, and Cathell joined the opinion. Id. at 264, 825
A.2d at 996.
196. Id. at 272-74, 825 A.2d at 1002.
197. Id. at 272-73, 825 A.2d at 1002.
198. Id. at 273, 825 A.2d at 1002.
199. Id.
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the distinction between accidental means and accidental results. 2 ° °
The court found the third issue, whether or not autoerotic asphyxia-
tion is a self-inflicted injury under the terms of the policy, to be dis-
positive and therefore declined to address the remaining three
questions.2 0
Because this case came to the Court of Appeals from a trial court
order of summary judgment, the court reviewed the judgment de
novo.2 0 2 The court engaged in a brief discussion of contract interpre-
tation under Maryland law, as well as Maryland law concerning ambig-
uous contract terms. 2 3  However, after this discussion, the court
continued with no further mention of contract interpretation, inter-
preting the term "injury" in the manner that "a layperson would un-
derstand."20 4 In framing the argument, Judge Harrell stated that
because the insurance policy clearly limited recovery if the death was
the result of a self-inflicted injury, the court must examine if the In-
sured intended to cause the injury that ultimately led to his death, as
well as whether asphyxiation is an "injury" within the terms of the pol-
icy.20 5 Judge Harrell elaborated further, citing disagreement with the
Court of Special Appeals' attempt to consolidate the analysis of the
terms "accident" and "injury" to a single issue because the two terms
require separate and unique inquiries under the terms of the pol-
icy. 20 6 After illuminating the two main issues, Judge Harrell reasoned
that the question of whether there was a self-inflicted injury was dis-
positive because recovery would be precluded if autoerotic asphyxia-
tion is a self-inflicted injury even if the death were an accident. 20 7
200. Id. at 274, 825 A.2d at 1002.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 278, 825 A.2d at 1005. On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the
reviewing court has the same facts before it and considers the same issues of law as the trial
court; its role is to determine whether the trial court's grant of summary judgment was
correct as a matter of law. Tyma v. Montgomery Co., 369 Md. 497, 504, 801 A.2d 148, 152
(2002).
203. MAMSI, 375 Md. at 279-80, 825 A.2d at 1005-06.
204. Id. at 283, 825 A.2d at 1007. Though the court did not state specifically the stan-
dard of contract interpretation that it employed, the use of the meaning that "a layperson
would understand" implies that the court found the term "injury" not to be ambiguous. Id
Maryland law states that courts should give non-ambiguous words their customary, ordi-
nary, and accepted meaning; using the understanding of a layperson is consistent with this
standard and is evidence that the court did not find the term "injury" to be ambiguous. Id.
at 279, 283, 825 A.2d at 1005, 1007. The court would have been required to examine
outside sources to determine the meaning of the terms had the court found the term to be
ambiguous. Id. at 279, 825 A.2d at 1005.
205. Id. at 280, 825 A.2d at 1006.
206. Id.
207. Id.
[VOL. 63:891
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
The court's reasoning focused on the relative consistency of the
outcome in out-of-state autoerotic asphyxiation cases where the insur-
ance policy provided an exclusion for self-inflicted injuries. 20 8 The
opinion observed that the majority of similar autoerotic asphyxiation
cases from other jurisdictions concluded that autoerotic asphyxiation
is a self-inflicted injury and that denial of benefits is proper.20 9 The
court detailed analogous cases from other circuits involving insurance
policies with similar self-inflicted injury exclusions where the courts
found that autoerotic asphyxiation was an injury, and thus denied
benefits. 2
1 0
The court referenced Sims v. Monumental General Insurance Co.,
where the Fifth Circuit denied accidental death benefits in a case of
autoerotic asphyxiation because of a policy exclusion for self-inflicted
injuries. 1 The court noted that the Fifth Circuit relied on evidence
that strangulation causes tissue damage in the neck and prevents the
brain from obtaining the oxygen in concluding that autoerotic as-
phyxiation was an injury under the definition of the policy.
21 2
The Court of Appeals elaborated further on the plain language
interpretation of the term "injury" by referencing two analogous cases
where New York courts found that autoerotic asphyxiation was a self-
inflicted injury and denied accidental death benefits. 21  One such
case that the Court of Appeals discussed favorably was Cronin v. Zurich
American Insurance Co., where the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York detailed the physical injury caused by the partial
strangulation of autoerotic asphyxiation. 2 14 Judge Harrell highlighted
that the Cronin court also examined whether asphyxiation was an in-
jury from the aspect of the physical effects of asphyxiation.21 5 Specifi-
cally, the Court of Appeals noted that "It]he effect on the brain
produced by this activity is abnormal; the higher cerebral functions of
thought, consciousness and awareness are compromised; and a dan-
gerous loss of coordination and self-control results. Temporary cell
damage results, and reduced brain activity occurs."216
208. Id. at 280-81, 825 A.2d at 1006-07.
209. Id. at 280, 825 A.2d at 1006.
210. Id. at 280-81, 825 A.2d at 1006-07.
211. 960 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1992).
212. MAMSI, 375 Md. at 280-81, 825 A.2d at 1006.
213. Id. at 281, 825 A.2d at 1006-07.
214. 189 F. Supp. 2d 29, 37-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
215. MAMSI, 375 Md. at 281, 825 A.2d at 1006.
216. Id. (quoting Cronin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 38).
2004]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The Court of Appeals also noted Critchlow v. First UNUM Life In-
surance Co. ofAmerica, 7 where the United States District Court for the
Western District of New York focused on the effect of asphyxiation on
the respiratory system in its analysis of whether asphyxiation was a self-
inflicted injury.2 18 The Court of Appeals mentioned the Critchlow
court's observation that while partial asphyxiation may be done with-
out more lasting injury, the partial asphyxiation itself is still an
injury. 219
After discussing these cases, the Court of Appeals specified that it
disagreed with the Court of Special Appeals on the issue of whether
self-inflicted asphyxiation is a self-inflicted injury under the terms of
the insurance policy. 220 After outlining the reasoning of the Court of
Special Appeals and its reliance on the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Padfield, the Court of Appeals stated that it disagreed with the Court of
Special Appeals' interpretation of how a layperson would construe the
contract terms. 2 21 The court disagreed because it concluded that a
layperson would understand partial strangulation to be an injury. 222
The court supported its interpretation of a layperson's under-
standing with three points. First, the court employed a transitive argu-
ment, reasoning that if someone else had partially strangled the
Insured, it would be certain that the Insured was injured.223 Next, the
court reiterated its main point, that a layperson would consider the
lack of oxygen that results from partial strangulation to be an injury
whether or not any permanent marks are left on the body.2 24 Lastly,
the court stated that even though this type of harm may be temporary
when performed correctly, the Insured had nonetheless injured his
brain by preventing its ability to function by depriving it of oxygen. 225
Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special Appeals
and upheld the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to MAMSI,
holding that the insurance company properly withheld accidental
death benefits from the Beneficiaries. 226
217. 198 F. Supp. 2d 318 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).
218. Id. at 323.
219. MAMSI, 375 Md. at 281, 825 A.2d at 1007.
220. Id. at 283, 825 A.2d at 1007.
221. Id. at 282-83, 825 A.2d at 1007.
222. Id. at 283, 825 A.2d at 1007. The Court of Special Appeals reached the opposite
conclusion, finding that "the term 'injury' would commonly be understood by a layperson
to mean physical damage or harm to the body, whether permanent or temporary." Cal-
laway v. MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co., 145 Md. App. 567, 603, 806 A.2d 274, 295 (2002).
223. MAMSI, 375 Md. at 283, 825 A.2d at 1007.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 283, 825 A.2d at 1008.
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4. Analysis.-In MAMSI, the Court of Appeals of Maryland cor-
rectly decided that the Beneficiaries were not due accidental death
benefits because Callaway's death was caused by a self-inflicted in-
jury.227 However, the court missed an opportunity to settle a disputed
area of Maryland law by overruling Gordon and establishing the two-
part Cole test as the Maryland standard for determining whether an
occurrence is an accident. The court had the opportunity to make
such a ruling because the parties placed the two cases at issue.22 8 The
court could have overruled Gordon because the two-prong test of Cole
is consistent with Maryland precedent. 229 Additionally, the court
should have used the opportunity in MAMSI to settle the conflicting
precedents in Gordon and Cole.230 Finally, the court should have over-
ruled Gordon because the two-prong test of Cole is a better reasoned
standard for determining if an occurrence is an accident.
23
'
a. The Court Had the Opportunity to Overrule Gordon, as the
Parties Placed the Conflicting Cases at Issue.-The parties in MAMSI posi-
tioned the conflicting precedents of Gordon and Cole as a central issue
for the court to decide. 23 2 MAMSI argued that the Cole two-part test
was not applicable to the case at bar.233 In support of this argument,
MAMSI first maintained that the case at bar was not factually analo-
gous to Cole because the Insured in Cole did not cause the injury.
234
MAMSI further argued that Cole was not applicable because it was in-
consistent with the court's decision in Gordon.235
By contrast, the Beneficiaries argued for application of the Cole
two-prong test.236 They argued that the two-prong test has drawn
widespread acceptance in circuits across the country and that the only
Fourth Circuit precedent rejecting the two-prong test occurred when
227. Id.
228. Appellant's Brief at 14-28, MAMSI (No. 98), Appellee's Brief at 16-22, MAMSI (No.
98).
229. See Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 359 Md. 298, 315, 753 A.2d 533, 542 (2000)
(noting that the two-prong test conforms with Maryland law).
230. See infra notes 307-310 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court of Appeals
should have overruled Gordon in favor of Cole because Cole is a better-reasoned standard
and consistent with Maryland precedent).
231. See infra notes 290-310 and accompanying text (arguing that the two-pronged test is
a better-reasoned standard).
232. Appellant's Brief at 14-28, MAMSI (No. 98), Appellee's Brief at 16-22, MAMSI (No.
98).
233. Appellant's Brief at 20, MAMSI (No. 98).
234. Id. at 18.
235. Id. at 20.
236. Appellee's Brief at 16, MAMSI (No. 98).
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the court was obliged to apply law "peculiar" to Virginia.23 7 In their
most compelling argument, the Beneficiaries pointed out that the
Court of Special Appeals found the two-prong test, as applied in
Padfield, to be consistent with Cole, Harleysville, and Glens Falls.238
The Court of Appeals recognized this conflict in Maryland law
and inquired as to whether the two-part test of Cole should be applied,
and if so, whether Gordon should be overruled so that Maryland law
would no longer distinguish accidental means from accidental re-
sults. 2 3 9 However, the court never reached this issue because it de-
cided that Callaway's act of autoerotic asphyxiation was a self-inflictedinjury, and that recovery of benefits was thus barred.24 ° Nonetheless,
the court had the opportunity to overrule Gordon to settle the conflict
in Maryland's accident jurisprudence because the parties placed the
two standards at issue.2 41
b. The Court of Appeals Could Have Overruled Gordon Because
Cole 's Two-Prong Test is Consistent with Maryland Precedent.-The Court
of Appeals also could have overruled Gordon and embraced Cole be-
cause the two-prong test in Cole is consistent with Maryland prece-
dent.24 2 Adopting the two-prong test would not have represented a
sea change in Maryland law because the Court of Appeals already had
decided many cases without using the means-results test.243
The court's previous decisions in Harleysville and Glens Falls sup-
port acceptance of the Cole two-prong test.24 4 This line of Maryland
cases differs from Gordon because the Harleysville and Glens Falls courts
decided whether an occurrence was an accident without examining
distinctions between accidental means and accidental results.2 4 5 With-
out explicitly abrogating the means-results test and without mention-
237. Id. at 17.
238. Id. at 21.
239. MAMSI, 375 Md. at 274, 825 A.2d at 1002.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 359 Md. 298, 315, 753 A.2d 533, 542 (2000)
(noting that the two-prong test conforms with Maryland law).
243. See Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 342 Md. 634, 652, 679 A.2d 540, 548 (1996)
(deciding if an occurrence was an accident without using the means-results test); Harleys-
ville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc., 248 Md. 148, 151, 235 A.2d 556, 558 (1967)
(same).
244. Appellee's Brief at 21, MAMSI (No. 98) (noting the consistency of these cases with
Cole).
245. See Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Am. Oil Co., 254 Md. 120, 127-28, 254 A.2d 658, 662-63
(1969) (deciding whether an occurrence is an accident without examining the distinction
between accidental means and accidental results); Harleysville, 248 Md. at 151, 235 A.2d at
558 (same).
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ing Gordon, Harleysville, and Glens Falls instead determined if an
occurrence was an accident based on what was expected and foresee-
able by the Insured.246 These cases were decided both before and
after Gordon; as such, the failure to follow Gordon undermines the
strength of the case.2 47
In Harleysville, the Court of Appeals plainly stated that "the fact
that an injury is caused by an intentional act does not preclude it from
being caused by accident if in that act, something unforeseen, unusual
and unexpected occurs which produces the result. '2 48 This assertion,
re-affirmed two years later in Glens Falls, shows that the Court of Ap-
peals recognized that even if some part of an act is intentional, the
result of the act still can be accidental. 249 This recognition suggests
that the means-results test in Gordon is inconsistent with Harleysville
because it is impossible under the means-results test for an accident to
result from an intentional act.250 Supporting the Harleysville court,
the Court of Appeals held in Sheets that the negligent actions of home-
owners produced an accidental result under the insurance policy.
251
The court based its determination on the reasoning in Harleysville,
particularly the Harleysville court's reliance on the Insured's expecta-
tion and foresight.252
These principles of foresight and expectation reaffirmed in Sheets
are at the heart of the Cole two-prong test.253 In adopting the two-
prong test in Cole, Judge Harrell was influenced by the similarity be-
tween the two-prong test in Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Ev-
ans2 5 4 and existing Maryland law. 255  Judge Harrell properly
recognized that Maryland law determines if an occurrence is an acci-
dent based on the subjective expectations and the foresight of the In-
246. See, e.g., Harleysville, 248 Md. at 151, 235 A.2d at 558 (holding that the damage was
accidental because it was unexpected and unforeseeable).
247. See supra note 170 (noting that Gordon is a rarely cited case).
248. 248 Md. at 151-52, 235 A.2d at 558.
249. Id.
250. See Gordon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 256 Md. 320, 324, 260 A.2d 338, 340 (1970)
(drawing a distinction between accidental means, which would warrant coverage under the
policy, and intentional means, which would not warrant coverage under the policy).
251. Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 342 Md. 634, 652, 679 A.2d 540, 548 (1996). The
homeowners were liable for intentional and negligent misrepresentation of the condition
of their home when they sold it. Id.
252. Id. The Sheets court stated directly that "when a negligent act causes damage that is
unforeseen or unexpected by the [I] nsured, the act is an 'accident' under a general liabil-
ity policy." Id.
253. Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 359 Md. 298, 314, 753 A.2d 533, 542 (2000).
254. 943 F. Supp. 564, 570 (D. Md. 1996).
255. Cole, 359 Md. at 315, 753 A.2d at 542.
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sured.2 5 6 The lynchpin of Judge Harrell's acceptance of the two-
prong test was the close conformity of the Lincoln court's reasoning
with Maryland precedent.2" 7
The argument that Maryland law supports abrogation of the
means-results test is further supported by Judge Harrell's statement in
Cole that the two-prong test is essentially a restatement of the Court of
Appeals' reasoning in Sheets.25  MAMSI argued in its brief that Cole is
applicable only when the Insured is not the one that causes the injury,
but this narrow reading ignores the dicta in Cole that the nature of a
supposed accident is most appropriately examined from the perspec-
tive of the Insured.259 The Cole court recognized that the Insured is
the one that is protected from accidental loss under any accidental
injury insurance policy, so the important inquiry is whether the act
that caused his loss was an accident to him.26 °
This reasoning is at the heart of the two-prong test in Cole.261' The
first prong of that test asks whether the Insured expected an injury
similar to the one that he suffered.262 This subjective analysis is an
excellent measure of our understanding of what an accident is. 2 6 3
The average person would typically understand an accident to be an
occurrence that one does not expect or foresee. 264 The two-prong
test would be useful in the typical autoerotic asphyxiation case, but
the Insured has usually kept the behavior a secret.265 Consequently,
determining the subjective expectation of the Insured is nearly impos-
sible; thus, the second prong of the test becomes particularly help-
256. Id. at 314, 753 A.2d at 542.
257. Id at 315, 753 A.2d at 542 (noting that the Lincoln court adopted the Wickman test).
258. Id. In Sheets, the court's reasoning centered on the foreseeability of the occurrence
sought to be characterized as an accident. 342 Md. 634, 652, 679 A.2d 540, 548 (1996).
259. Cole, 359 Md. at 315, 753 A.2d at 542.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 314, 753 A.2d at 542.
262. Id. The specific language of the Cole test is relevant to an injury on the Insured by
another party. Id. When applying the test to a self-inflicted injury, the courts have asked
"if the [I]nsured actually expected an injury similar in type or kind to that suffered." Lin-
coln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 943 F. Supp. 564, 568 (D. Md. 1996).
263. See Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1088 (1st Cir. 1990)
(noting that the subjective inquiry is the proper starting point in determining whether an
accident occurred).
264. See id. at 1086-88 (noting that the means and results distinction is not in harmony
with the understanding of the common man, then adopting a test centered on the expecta-
tions of the Insured).
265. See, e.g., Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting
that though a wife knew of her deceased husband's former habit of autoerotic asphyxia-
tion, he had concealed his recent resumption of the practice).
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ful.26 6 This second prong serves as an accurate proxy for the
subjective expectations of the Insured by asking what a person with
similar experiences as the Insured would have expected.267 Thus, the
court can determine whether an occurrence was an accident, in line
with our common sense understanding of what is accidental, without
having actual knowledge of the expectations of the Insured.
The ability of the two-prong test to approximate a person's com-
mon sense understanding of an accident is also essential to Maryland
contract law, which is used to interpret insurance contracts. 268 Judge
Hollander, in her opinion for the Court of Special Appeals, noted
that Maryland law calls for courts to interpret insurance contracts that
are unambiguous as a matter of law.269 In interpreting the contract,
the court analyzes the plain language of the contract according to the
ordinary and accepted meanings of that language. 270 The Cole two-
prong test is well-suited to that task.2 71 The value of the test is its
approximation of what we intuitively understand an accident to be: an
occurrence that we did not foresee or expect. 272 A person's intuitive
understanding of what an accident is accords with the word's accepted
and ordinary meaning, which is the meaning that must be used under
Maryland law in interpreting insurance policies such as the one at
bar.273 In comparison, the means-results test often will lead to deter-
minations that occurrences that we understand to be accidents are by
law not accidents. 274
The Wickman two-prong test is an attempt to create a definition of
an accident that responded to "Cardozo's tautology that an accident is
266. See Lincoln, 943 F. Supp. at 570 (applying the second prong of the Wickman test
because the actual expectation of the Insured could not be determined).
267. See Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1088 (noting that the utility of the two-prong test is that
using both prongs allows a fact finder to approximate what the Insured expected even if
the actual expectations could not be discerned).
268. SeeCallawayv. MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co., 145 Md. App. 567, 581, 806 A.2d 274,
282 (2002) (noting that courts are to interpret the plain language of a contract); see also
Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1452 n.1 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that the language
of an insurance contract should be given its ordinary meaning).
269. Callaway, 145 Md. App. at 582, 806 A.2d at 282.
270. Id. at 581, 806 A.2d at 282.
271. Cf Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 536 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1976) (stat-
ing that accidental injury provisions in insurance contracts should be given their ordinary
meaning, which is in line with the understanding of the average man).
272. See Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 359 Md. 298, 312-15, 753 A.2d 533, 54142
(2000) (reconciling the Harleysville accident standard of unforeseen and unexpected with
the two-prong test of Wickman).
273. Callaway, 145 Md. App. at 581, 806 A.2d at 282.
274. See, e.g., Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 496-97 (1934) (hold-
ing that death resulting from sunstroke is not accidental).
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what the public calls an accident." 275 The Wickman court, in its gene-
sis of the two-prong test, indicated that the objective prong of the test
was to be reached only when the subjective intent of the Insured can-
not be determined. 276 The Court of Appeals adopted this test and the
reasoning behind it in Cole. 2 7 7 The two-prong test is not only consis-
tent with Maryland law, but it is also the natural next step in the evolu-
tion of Maryland law that recognizes the need to determine the
nature of an accident from the subjective viewpoint of the Insured. 2 7
c. The Court of Appeals Should Have Decided What Precedent Rep-
resents Maryland Law Because the Two Precedents Directly Conflict with Each
Other.-The high court is the ultimate authority on questions of con-
flicting state law, and as such should have decided whether Gordon or
Cole represents Maryland law because application of the two tests leads
to two different conclusions on the nature of the accident. 279 Apply-
ing the means-results test from Gordon to Callaway's death leads to the
conclusion that the death was not an accident. 280 In a situation such
as Callaway's, the means that caused the death clearly were intended;
it was only the result of those intentional means that was accidental. 28 1
A finding that Callaway's death was not an accident is counterintui-
tive; Callaway had clearly engaged in this behavior before, and he em-
ployed multiple safety mechanisms to prevent death.2 2 Because these
275. Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1086 (1st Cir. 1990); see also
Peter Nash Swisher, Insurance Causation Issues: The Legacy ofBird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 2 NEv. L.J. 351, 380 (2002) (stating that the goal of the Wickman court was to
create a test that followed Justice Cardozo's dissent in Landress, and that rejected the cryp-
tic and overly technical means-results test, but still would find that the Insured's unreasona-
ble expectation of survival did not guarantee him insurance coverage).
276. Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1087-88.
277. Cole, 359 Md. at 315, 753 A.2d at 542-43.
278. See id. at 312-15, 753 A.2d at 541-42 (reconciling the Harleysville accident standard
of unforeseen and unexpected with the two-prong test of Wickman).
279. See MAMSI, 375 Md. at 274, 825 A.2d at 1002 (recognizing that the tests in Gordon
and Cole are mutually exclusive; the acceptance of one necessitates overruling the other).
280. See, e.g., Runge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 1157, 1159 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding
that an autoerotic asphyxiation death was not the result of accidental means and therefore
not an accident).
281. MAMSI, 375 Md. at 267, 825 A.2d at 998. Callaway clearly intended to tie the rope
around his neck, but there is no indication whatsoever that Callaway intended to kill him-
self. Id.
282. Id. at 265-66, 825 A.2d at 997. The Court of Special Appeals noted that those who
engage in autoerotic asphyxiation do so to "derive sexual pleasure, which requires their
survival." Callaway v. MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co., 145 Md. App. 567, 602, 806 A.2d 274,
294 (2002).
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safety mechanisms were present, the average man would understand
the death to be accidental.283
In contrast to the result under the Gordon test, application of the
Cole test leads to the conclusion that Callaway's death was an acci-
dent.28 4 This result is consistent with our understanding of what an
accident is; with all of the safety devices that Callaway had, one neces-
sarily concludes that Callaway did not want to die and that he ex-
pected to prevent death, and so we understand his death to be an
accident.285 In the case at bar, this finding would not have changed
the ultimate outcome because of the self-inflicted injury exclusion,
but settling this conflict in Maryland law would have been beneficial
for two reasons. First, by leaving the question unanswered, the court
likely will have to hear a similar case and once again consider whether
Gordon or Cole properly states Maryland law. Should a case arise where
the insurance policy does not contain the "self-inflicted injury" exclu-
sion that was dispositive in this case, the court will be compelled to
decide whether Gordon or Cole is the appropriate Maryland prece-
dent.286 In the interests ofjudicial economy and efficiency, the court
should have settled the question when it had the chance.287
The second reason that the court should have decided what acci-
dent standard is correct is that the question of whether an occurrence
is an accident arises in many other cases aside from autoerotic asphyx-
iation cases. 211 While insurance companies can word their contracts
283. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that an autoerotic asphyxiation death was accidental under the state's "average
man" test, which examines the understanding of a common man).
284. Callaway, 145 Md. at 602, 806 A.2d at 294.
285. The Court of Special Appeals found that the first prong of the Cole test could not
be determined because Callaway was dead and did not communicate his expectations to
anyone while he was alive. Id. The court then applied the second, objective, prong of the
test that left no doubt that Callaway "would not have considered the fatal injury highly
likely to occur." Id.
286. Because the court found that Callaway's death was the result of a self-inflicted in-
jury, the court did not have to decide whether Cole or Gordon controls. MAMSI, 375 Md. at
274, 825 A.2d at 1002. Without the presence of this exclusion, the court would have had
no choice but to overrule either Gordon or Cole. Id.
287. Settling the question during the case at bar would have prevented this same issue
from being relitigated by the Court of Appeals, any other Maryland court, or any federal
court, sitting in diversity and applying Maryland law. Relitigation will cost two limited and
precious resources: taxpayer money and the court's time. SeeJed I. Bergman, Putting Prece-
dent in its Place: Stare Decisis and Federal Predictions of State Law, 96 COLUM. L. Rv. 969, 985
(1996) (noting the importance of stare decisis in limiting the agenda of courts by preventing
redundant cases from being litigated).
288. See, e.g., Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc., 248 Md. 148, 151-52,
235 A.2d 556, 558 (1967) (determining whether smoke damage to homes was accidental
for insurance purposes).
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to avoid liability in autoerotic asphyxiation deaths, many other in-
stances of accidental injuries and losses will require a decisive stan-
dard of how to determine if the injury or loss was an accident.2"9 The
court could have provided that standard by overruling Gordon.
d. The Two-Prong Test Is a Better Reasoned Standard for Deter-
mining if an Occurrence Is an Accident.-The main thrust of Justice Car-
dozo's dissent in Landress is best characterized as an appeal to
common sense.29 ° Justice Cardozo properly recognized that the dis-
tinction between accidental means and accidental results of the
means-results test was artificial; the attempt to reconcile this artificial
distinction with a person's common sense view of what is accidental is
what created the metaphorical Serbonian Bog.2"' While the means-
results test may have been useful for courts to reason through doubts
about the nature of a supposed accident, it is by no means a tenet of
American law that must withstand the emergence of a more carefully
considered analysis. 29 2 Insurance policies, particularly life insurance
policies, are taken out to safeguard against accidents and unforeseen
events. 293 As such, these contracts must be understood and inter-
preted in line with the understanding of a common man.294 To give
the word "accident" a technical meaning, as the means-results test at-
tempts to do, is "not in harmony with the understanding of the com-
mon man."295 Courts employing the two-prong test often have done
289. See Kennedy v. Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)
(noting that insurance companies can easily insulate themselves from having to pay for
autoerotic asphyxiation deaths by writing exclusions into their policies).
290. Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 499 (1934) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting).
291. Id.
292. The distinction between accidental means and accidental results is a construct of
insurance companies in an attempt to reduce payments for non-fatal injuries and emeyged
during the latter half of the nineteenth century in England, long after the states adopted
the British common law. See generally Adam F. Scales, Man, God and the Serbonian Bog: The
Evolution of Accidental Death Insurance, 86 IOWA L. REV. 173 (2003). The first use of the
distinction in a court did not appear until 1886, in Southard v. Railway Passengers Assurance
Co., and thus the standard was only a forty-eight-year-old precedent when Justice Cardozo
dissented against its use. Landress, 291 U.S. at 499 (CardozoJ., dissenting).
293. Landress, 291 U.S. at 499 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (noting that common man is
convinced that accidents happen, so he takes out accident insurance); see also Burr v. Com-
mercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of Am., 67 N.E.2d 248, 251 (N.Y. 1946) (stating that
when interpreting whether an occurrence was an accident under an insurance policy,
"[o]ur guide must be the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary business
man when making an insurance contract").
294. Burr, 67 N.E.2d at 251.
295. Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1086 (1st Cir. 1990) (cita-
tion omitted). Additionally, one of the first courts to abrogate the distinction between
accidental means and results questioned the validity of the distinction finding validity in
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so because the test accords with the common man's understanding of
an accident and its unexpected nature.296  An average person
purchases insurance not for what he intends to do but rather to pro-
tect himself from his own "foibles and imperfections. "297
A benefit of the two-prong test is that the test examines the sub-
jective intent of the Insured, but does not encourage reckless or risky
behaviors in which a deluded individual may engage because it re-
quires that the expectations of the Insured be reasonable.298 As
pointed out by the Todd court, it is not enough under the two-prong
test that the Insured expected to live through his autoerotic asphyxia-
tion.299 Though the test is subjective, the test requires that the subjec-
tive belief of the Insured be reasonable, injecting a measure of
restraint and control into the test. °° The individuals that engage in
autoerotic asphyxiation often do so because of a mental disorder, and
it is possible that their behavior is motivated by a variety of reasons.30 1
It would not be just for those who engage in autoerotic asphyxiation, a
high risk behavior, to receive coverage simply because they enter-
tained unreasonable and deluded expectations.30 2
the layman's understanding of what an accident is. Gaskins v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 104 So. 2d
171, 176 (La. 1958).
296. Bennett v. Am. Int'l Life Assurance Co. of New York, 956 F. Supp. 201, 205-06
(N.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating the importance of Justice Cardozo's dissent in Landress and his
call for a common man standard); see also Swisher, supra note 275, at 380 (noting that the
Wickman test is "a very persuasive and realistic interpretive approach").
297. Brenneman v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 192 A.2d 745, 748 (Pa. 1963).
298. Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 (5th Cir. 1995).
299. Id.
300. Id. Compare id. (holding that the risk of death must be "substantially certain" for
the Insured's subjective expectation of survival to be unreasonable), and Padfield v. AIG
Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (accepting the "substantially certain" test,
as in Todd), with Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1088-89 (requiring that death be substantially likely
to occur as a result of the Insured's actions for the subjective expectation to be unreasona-
ble), and Bennett, 956 F. Supp. at 211 (adhering to the "substantially likely" test of Wickman,
but pointing out that while the court did not see "the two standards as entirely synony-
mous, they are clearly not in conflict").
301. See MAMSI, 375 Md. at 264, 825 A.2d at 996 (noting that autoerotic asphyxiation is
classified as a mental disorder).
302. The additional premium costs of individuals who engage in risky and reckless be-
havior with the unreasonable expectation of survival should not be borne by the general
body of policyholders or the insurer. See Gary Schuman, Suicide and the Life Insurance Con-
tract: Was the Insured Sane or Insane? That is the Question-Or Is It?, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 745,
748 (1993) (arguing that costs caused by suicides should not be borne by policyholders or
the insurers). Because autoerotic asphyxiation cases reach high courts, insurance compa-
nies are aware of the act and can include "self-inflicted injury" exclusions to prevent liabil-
ity in autoerotic asphyxiation deaths. See Todd, 47 F.3d at 1457 (stating that "[t]he life
insurance companies have ample ways of avoid[ing]" adverse judgments).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The two-prong test also represents the most logical test, because
in autoerotic asphyxiation cases, the Insured often has repeated the
same behavior many times before without suffering serious injury and
certainly without dying.30 3 Given this repeated behavior, and the rea-
sonable expectation of survival that goes with it, it is illogical to sug-
gest that a death is not accidental solely because the decedent
committed an intentional act that ultimately caused his death." 4
There is a substantially low instance of death among those that epigage
in autoerotic asphyxiation, and those who do engage in it fully expect
to live through the experience.10 5 However, the means-results test
would compel courts to find that all individuals that die from auto-
erotic asphyxiation died a non-accidental death. 0 6
The two-prong test serves as an improved means of determining if
an occurrence is an accident because it attempts to mimic a person's
basic perception of what an accident is: it is something that a person
does not expect to happen. 0 7 To be sure, this test will not completely
free this area of law from the Serbonian Bog; the caveat of the Court
of Appeals in Gordon that the Bog is actually the whole field of acci-
dent law still rings true. 08 However, accepting this more comprehen-
sive standard in Maryland will serve to simplify one facet of the field of
accident law and will further one purpose of the Court of Appeals by
settling a conflict in Maryland law. This two-prong test will not disad-
vantage insurance companies; the advice of the Fifth Circuit that the
"life insurance companies have ample ways to avoid judgments like
this one" suggests that insurance companies have many ways of draft-
ing contract language that insulates them from paying for autoerotic
asphyxiation deaths.3 9 The burden to prevent having to pay benefits
for this type of death should be on the insurance companies.31 An
insurance company should not be helped by the courts in withholding
303. See Bennett, 956 F. Supp. at 212 (noting that it was highly likely that the Insured had
engaged in the behavior on many previous occasions).
304. See id. (holding that the Insured reasonably expected to survive).
305. Padfield, 290 F.3d at 1127.
306. Cf Runge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 1157, 1159 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that,
under Virginia law, an autoerotic asphyxiation death is not an accident because it is the
result of intentional means).
307. Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1088 (1st Cir. 1990).
308. 256 Md. 320, 325, 260 A.2d 338, 340 (1970).
309. Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1457 (5th Cir. 1995).
310. The insurance companies have ample opportunity and right to protect against un-
favorable outcomes in autoerotic asphyxiation cases. See Todd, 47 F.3d at 1457 (noting that
insurance companies can word their life insurance policies in a way that avoids liability for
autoerotic asphyxiation deaths). Additionally, the exclusion for self-inflicted injuries is de-
sirable to insurance companies and policyholders because it serves to lower premiums for
all policyholders by reducing payout both in cases of suicide and deaths from autoerotic
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accidental death benefits when the company easily can place into the
policy an exclusion from recovery if the injuries are caused by a self-
inflicted injury to avoid liability in autoerotic asphyxiation deaths.
5. Conclusion.-In MAMSI, the Court of Appeals held that
MAMSI properly withheld accidental death benefits from Callaway, a
man who died from autoerotic asphyxiation, because self-inflicted as-
phyxiation was an injury that precluded recovery under the insurance
contract."'1 In dealing with the nature of an autoerotic asphyxiation
death, the Court of Appeals properly decided that partial asphyxiation
is an injury; however, the court missed an opportunity to settle con-
flicting precedent in Maryland accident law.312 The court had the op-
portunity to settle the conflict because the parties placed the
precedents at issue.31 3 The court should have overruled Gordon's
means-results test in favor of the Cole two-prong test because the two-
prong test is consistent with Maryland law.3 4 Additionally, the court
should have adopted the Cole two-prong test because it is a better rea-
soned standard for determining whether an occurrence is an acci-
dent-it is the best approximation of what we intuitively understand
an accident to be.3 5
PETER M. NOTHSTEIN
asphyxiation. See Schuman, supra note 302, at 748 (noting that exclusions of coverage for
suicide in life insurance policies reduce premiums for all policy holders).
311. MAMSI, 375 Md. at 283, 825 A.2d at 1007-08.
312. See supra notes 232-241 and accompanying text (discussing the court's opportunity
to overrule Gordon in favor of Cole because the parties placed the cases at issue).
313. See supra notes 232-241 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 242-278 and accompanying text (discussing the consistency of the
two-prong test of Cole with Maryland precedent).
315. Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 359 Md. 298, 315, 753 A.2d 533, 542 (2000).
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V. PROPERTY
A. A Misapplication of the Doctrine of Implied Negative Reciprocal
Covenants and a Missed Opportunity to Modernize the Law of
Servitudes in Maryland
In Roper v. Camuso,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether a property owner whose land was not expressly subject to re-
strictive covenants2 could apply the doctrine of implied negative recip-
rocal covenants3 so that she might enjoy the benefit of the restrictions
and enforce them against a neighbor whose land was expressly bur-
dened by their requirements.4 The court held that a property owner
whose lot is found to be burdened by restrictions on the use of land
under the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants has
threshold standing to seek enforcement of the covenants against her
neighbors,5 notwithstanding that such a property owner already has
standing under the laws of real covenants6 and the law of equitable
servitudes.7
As such, the court unnecessarily extended the doctrine of im-
plied negative reciprocal covenants beyond its existing boundaries in
an effort to give Roper threshold standing under this doctrine to en-
force the covenants.8 Furthermore, the court missed a unique oppor-
1. 376 Md. 240, 829 A.2d 589 (2003).
2. A restrictive covenant is an agreement, often included in or filed with a deed or
lease, that restricts the use of real property. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 371 (7th ed., 1999).
3. Under the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants, restrictions can be
enforced against land not expressly subject to them if certain criteria are met. Schovee v.
Mikolasko, 356 Md. 93, 102-03, 737 A.2d 578, 583-84 (1999).
4. Roper, 376 Md. at 247, 829 A.2d at 594.
5. Id. at 273, 829 A.2d at 609.
6. A real covenant, or a covenant running with the land, is a covenant that relates to
the land and therefore binds successive grantees. BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY, supra note 2, at
371. Roper had standing under this doctrine because she was a successive grantee of land
with restrictive covenants placed on it by the original grantor. Roper, 376 Md. at 243-44,
829 A.2d at 592.
7. Historically, a restriction pertaining to the use of real property could be enforced
by injunction as an equitable servitude. Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md. 487, 497 (1870).
Roper had standing under the law of equitable servitudes because she owned a restricted
lot in a subdivision with the expectation that other lots would be similarly restricted. See
Adams v. Parater, 206 Md. 224, 227-37, 111 A.2d 590, 591-96 (1955) (applying the doctrine
of equitable servitudes to enforce prohibition of the sale of malt liquor against one prop-
erty owner when ninety-five other property owners were also prohibited from doing so).
8. The traditional application of the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal cove-
nants has been to hold the common grantor, or his assigns, to the same restrictions other
grantees in a general plan of development are held. Roper, 376 Md. at 595, 829 A.2d at
249.
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tunity to unite the law of real covenants with the law of equitable
servitudes, which, existing as separate doctrines, are confusing, com-
plex, and archaic.9 The court should have adopted the unified ap-
proach set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Property to eliminate the
confusion created by the numerous labels that have developed to de-
scribe restrictions on the use of privately owned land.1"
1. The Case.-The W.C. and A.N. Miller Development Company
(Miller) developed Spring Meadows, a residential subdivision in
Montgomery County, Maryland.1 1 To maintain open spaces and the
residents' views of nearby rolling hills, Miller created covenants for
Spring Meadows.12 The covenants restricted, among other things, the
materials that may be used to enclose or divide a particular lot.
13
They further restricted the height of such enclosures or dividers to a
maximum of four feet. 4 Each owner of a lot in Spring Meadows that
was subject to the covenants had the right to enforce the covenants
and take any legal or other action necessary to do so."
On August 25, 1988, Miller conveyed lot 35 in Block D of Spring
Meadows to Suzanne Camuso and her husband.' 6 The deed provided
that the lot was "subject to covenants and restrictions of record," and a
9. See Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 347-48, 111 A.2d 855, 861-62 (1955) (noting
the split in authority pertaining to the enforcement of restrictions on real property and
pointing out that some scholars and cases urge that restrictions be enforced as contracts
with assignable rights, while others urge that restrictions be connected as the land itself);
see also Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55
S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1281-83 (1982) (describing the requirements governing enforcement
of land restrictions as "mysterious" and describing some of the historical concerns that led
to their development).
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY. SERVITUDES § 1.3 reporter's note (1988).
11. Roper, 376 Md. at 243, 829 A.2d at 591.
12. Id.
13. Joint Record Extract at 33, Roper v. Camuso, 376 Md. 240, 829 A.2d 589 (2003)
(No. 01554). One Spring Meadows covenant specifically stated,
No line fence or wall, or fence or wall used for the purpose of dividing or enclos-
ing a lot, in whole or in part, shall be placed, erected or permitted to remain on
any lot, or any portion thereof, except hedge, shrubbery, stone, brick, ornamental
iron, mortised post and split rail, or plank, which does not exceed four (4) feet in
height, except with the written consent of the [Architectural Control]
Committee.
Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 34. The enforceability section of the Spring Meadows covenants reserves to
the grantor, the Architectural Control Committee, each grantee of a restricted lot within
Spring Meadows, and the successors and assigns of the grantor and the grantees, the right
to enforce the covenants. Id.
16. Roper, 376 Md. at 243, 829 A.2d at 591-92.
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copy of the covenants was recorded with the deed. 17 On August 18,
1992, Miller conveyed lot 36 in Block D of Spring Meadows to Elise
Roper. 8 While the deed provided that this lot was also subject to all
covenants and restrictions of record, the covenants for Spring Mead-
ows were not recorded with the deed.' 9
In a letter dated October 5, 1992, the Vice President of Miller's
Architectural Control Committee informed Roper that a resident of
Spring Meadows had expressed concern over Roper's failure to con-
form with the covenants.2" In this letter, the Vice President offered to
approve Roper's plans for her fence and driveway lamp if they con-
formed with the community's requirements." Roper did not respond
to this letter or the follow-up letter dated July 1, 1993.22
In 1997, Camuso planted approximately sixty-five trees along the
common boundary between her property and Roper's.23 By the sum-
mer of 2000 the trees, according to Roper, had grown over eight feet
tall.24 Roper and her husband, without Camuso's consent, pruned
some of the branches-including some on the Camusos' side of the
property.25
On August 30, 2000, Camuso filed trespass and destruction of
property claims against Roper in district court in Montgomery
County.26 The case was removed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County when Roper requested a jury trial.27 Roper also filed a
counter-claim.28 She sought a declaration that the trees reaching
heights over four feet tall violated the covenants, an injunction requir-
ing Camuso to comply with the covenants, and damages for malicious
prosecution. 29 The trespass and malicious prosecution claims went to
trial; the jury returned a verdict in favor of Camuso on both counts
17. Id., 829 A.2d at 592. The act of recording refers to the filing of a document that
affects title to land at the location designated by the county. ROGER BERNHARDT & ANN M.
BURKHART, REAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 332 (2000).
18. Joint Record Extract at 36, Roper (No. 01554).
19. Roper, 376 Md. at 244, 829 A.2d at 592. At trial, Roper introduced evidence that
Miller gave her a copy of the covenants at closing. Brief for Petitioner at 27-28, Roper v.
Camuso, 376 Md. 240, 829 A.2d 589 (2003) (No. 100).
20. Joint Record Extract at 38, Roper (No. 01554).
21. Id.
22. Roper, 376 Md. at 244, 829 A.2d at 592.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 244-45, 829 A.2d at 592.
26. Id. at 245, 829 A.2d at 592.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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and awarded damages.30 Additionally, the trial court dismissed
Roper's counter-claims for declaratory and injunctive relief on the
grounds that Roper had not proven that she had standing to enforce
the covenants. 3' Roper appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.
2
In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court agreed
that Roper lacked standing to enforce the covenants and reasoned
that the trial court could not have reasonably inferred that Roper's lot
should be burdened by the covenants. 33  Moreover, the court held
that Roper had failed to rebut the presumption that her property was
not intended to be burdened by the covenants. 4
Roper petitioned to the Court of Appeals.35 The court granted
certiorari to consider whether, under the doctrine of implied negative
reciprocal covenants, a property owner whose land is not expressly
subject to restrictive covenants may nevertheless enforce the cove-
nants against a property owner whose land is expressly burdened.36
Additionally, the court agreed to coriider the type and amount of
evidence necessary to show that land not expressly burdened by re-
strictive covenants is, in fact, supposed to be subject to the
covenants.
37
2. Legal Background.-It is well settled in Maryland that when a
landowner sells a piece of her land, she may restrict the land she sells
to benefit the land she retains. 8 This initial sales transaction may be
fashioned in such a way as to impose the obligation on heirs and as-
signs of the buyer and retain the benefit for heirs and assigns of the
30. Id. at 245, 829 A.2d at 592-93. Camuso was awarded $1,170 on her trespass com-
plaint. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Roper (No. 100).
31. Roper, 376 Md. at 245-46, 829 A.2d at 593.
32. Id. at 247, 829 A.2d at 594.
33. Roper v. Camuso, No. 1554, slip op. at 7-8 (Md. App. Sept. 9, 2002). The Court of
Special Appeals' analysis focused on the fact, conceded by Roper, that her deed was re-
corded without the covenants and that her land was therefore not expressly burdened. Id.
at 5, 7-8. The court concluded that, because most of the deeds to lots in Spring Meadows
were recorded with copies of the covenants and there was no explanation on the record of
why Roper's deed was not, her lot was not intended to be part of the general scheme. Id. at
1, 7-8.
34. Id. at 7-8. To enforce covenants against a party whose land is not expressly bur-
dened by them, the party seeking enforcement must meet a set of requirements. See infra
notes 145-150 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for enforcement). The
Court of Special Appeals said that Roper, as the party seeking enforcement of the cove-
nants, had not successfully shown that her land was intended to be part of the general
scheme, which was the fourth requirement of the test. Roper, No. 1554, slip op. at 7-8.
35. Roper, 376 Md. at 247, 829 A.2d at 594.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Halle v. Newbold, 69 Md. 265, 270, 14 A. 662, 663 (1888).
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grantor.3" Maryland courts have decided these kinds of cases, in
which a grantor imposes restrictions that burden the land conveyed
and benefit the land retained, either on the basis of whether the re-
striction constitutes a covenant running with the land or on the basis
of equitable principles.4 °
American jurisprudence concerning the running of covenants at
law, or "real covenants," has evolved from a famous common law case
entitled Spencer's Case,41 while cases dealing with the running of cove-
nants in equity date back to another common law case, Tulk v.
Moxhay.42 The two lines of cases have developed separately, yet simi-
larly, although the historical reasons for their separate development
have become obsolete.43 While the Court of Appeals has expressed a
preference to decide such cases under equitable principles,44 both
lines of cases have been incorporated into Maryland jurisprudence.
The court has acknowledged the split in authority regarding the ap-
propriate way to decide cases involving restrictions on real property
and has declined to discern the "true, underlying concept of the prin-
ciple" that has controlled the court's decisions.45
The law of enforcing restrictions on real property has evolved in
Maryland to the point that, in some cases where restrictions do not
expressly apply to a particular piece of land, courts have enforced cov-
enants on the basis of implications that arise from the conduct of the
parties or the language of the deed.46 The doctrine of implied nega-
39. Id. at 270-71, 14 A. at 663.
40. Gallagher v. Bell, 69 Md. App. 199, 209 & n.7, 516 A.2d 1028, 1033 & n.7 (1986).
41. 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (KB. 1583).
42. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
43. "When the doctrines of real covenants and equitable restrictions were first estab-
lished, the provinces of law and equity were completely separate." RICHARD R. POWELL,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.04[2], at 60-40. In England, land agreements could only
be enforced at law or in equity, but American law was more pragmatic and rendered the
distinctions useless. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.4 cmt. a (1998).
44. See Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 346, 111 A.2d 855, 860 (1955) (noting that the
jurisdiction of equity to protect certain rights in land does not depend on such issues as
whether the covenant runs with the land, which are so important at law).
45. Id. at 347, 111 A.2d at 861 (referencing Bristol v. Woodward, 167 N.E. 441 (N.Y.
1929)). In Bristol, the New York Court of Appeals stated,
We do not need to choose now between these conflicting methods of ap-
proach .... Each of the two methods will doubtless have contributed a share to
the ultimate generalization. In the end we may find that they have come together
so often and in so many ways that there is no longer space between the paths, no
longer choice to make between them. What began as a contractual right may be
so protected by remedies, legal and equitable, that it will be indistinguishable
from a real interest, a title to the land itself.
Bristo 167 N.E. at 446.
46. 20 Am Jur. 2D Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 157 (1995).
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tive reciprocal easements, or servitudes, as it has been called by the
Court of Appeals, protects landowners who purchase restricted land
with the understanding that the surrounding land would be similarly
burdened from instances where the common grantor failed to ex-
pressly burden land he subsequently sells.4 7
a. Covenants Running with the Land at Law in Maryland.-A
covenant is a formal agreement, usually established by a contract.
48
When a covenant is made part of a conveyance of real property, the
covenant can either be personal or attached to the land. 49 If the origi-
nal covenanting parties intend for their rights or obligations to pass to
their successors, the covenant is said to run with the land.5 ° It is not
necessary for both the rights and the obligations to pass to the parties'
heirs or assigns in order for the covenant to run with the land; if only
the benefit passes from the grantor to her successor, or if, alterna-
tively, only the burden passes from the grantee to her successor, the
covenant is attached to the land.51
The English Common Law case, Spencer's Case, is the source of
much of Maryland's covenant law.52 The two main criteria for cove-
nants to run with the land that Maryland courts have adopted from
Spencer's Case are the "touch and concern" and "in esse" require-
ments. 53 The "in esse" test requires that, when the covenant extends
to something that does not yet exist, the parties must express their
intent for the benefit or burden to run with the land. 54 If, on the
other hand, the covenant extends to a thing "in esse," or "in exis-
tence," the covenant runs with the land and, therefore, binds the as-
signee. 55 The "touch and concern" test requires that, for the benefit
or burden to run with the land, the requirement must relate to the
land.56
47. Schovee v. Mikolasko, 356 Md. 93, 107-08, 737 A.2d 578, 587 (1999).
48. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 369.
49. Gallagher v. Bell, 69 Md. App. 199, 206, 516 A.2d 1028, 1032 (1986).
50. Id. Alternatively, if the original covenanting parties do not intend to pass their
rights or obligations to their successors, the covenant does not run with the land and is
considered to be personal. Id. This type of covenant may also be called a covenant "in
gross." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERY. SERVITUDES § 1.3 cmt. d (1998).
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.3 cmt. d (1998).
52. Galagher, 69 Md. App. at 207, 516 A.2d at 1032.
53. Id.
54. Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 74 (K.B. 1583).
55. Id.
56. See id. (noting "[b]ut although the covenant be for him and his assigns, yet if the
thing to be done be merely collateral to the land, and doth not touch and concern the
thing demised in any sort, there the assignee shall not be charged").
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In Gallagher v. Bell, 5 7 the Court of Special Appeals traced the de-
velopment of the doctrine of real covenants in Maryland from its com-
mon law roots in Spencer's Case up to the case at bar.5' Based on that
review, the court concluded that the elements of a covenant running
with the land at law are (1) the covenant touches and concerns the
land, (2) the parties desire the covenant to run with the land, and (3)
there is privity of estate.5 9
The "touch and concern" test, the court noted, is an important
one, requiring that the covenant's restriction affect the "quality, value,
or mode of enjoying" the land itself.6 ° The Court of Special Appeals
acknowledged that the Court of Appeals had, on several occasions,
characterized the "touch and concern" requirement as whether the
terms of the covenant enhance the value of the land.6" Observing that
the high court's view dealt primarily with the benefit and not the bur-
den of the covenant, the court considered the test proposed by Dean
Harry Bigelow and adopted by Richard Powell, stating that the cove-
nant "touches and concerns" the land if its result is that either the
buyer's land becomes less valuable or the seller's land becomes more
valuable.6 2
The Gallagher court then listed helpful factors for determining
whether a right or benefit was intended by the original covenanting
parties to run with the land: "1) the retention of adjacent land by the
grantor-covenantee; 2) the benefiting of retained land as a result of
the agreement; and 3) the establishment of a common plan of devel-
opment which includes land retained by the grantor."6 The court
suggested that the burden or obligation was intended to run with the
land if the result of the covenant was permanent in nature and was
made as part of a common development plan.64
The Gallagher court next noted that vertical privity is required for
a covenant to run with the land.6 5 Vertical privity requires the person
presently claiming the benefit or burden of the covenant to be a suc-
cessor to the estate of the person who originally claimed the benefit or
57. 69 Md. App. 199, 516 A.2d 1028 (1986).
58. Id. at 207-08, 516 A.2d at 1032-33.
59. Id. at 209, 516 A.2d at 1033. The court noted that the covenant may also be re-
quired to be in writing. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 210, 516 A.2d at 1033.
62. Id., 516 A.2d at 1034.
63. Id. at 213-14, 516 A.2d at 1035-36.
64. Id. at 214, 516 A.2d at 1036.
65. Id. at 217, 516 A.2d at 1037.
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burden of the covenant.66 While this view of the privity requirement
had not been adopted formally in Maryland, the Gallagher court found
nothing in the law to preclude such adoption.67 While other types of
privity68 had been mentioned by the courts, the Court of Special Ap-
peals adopted the modern view that, when querying whether a cove-
nant runs with the land, the focus of the privity test should be vertical
privity.
6 9
The Court of Appeals adopted the Gallagher court's explication of
the elements of a covenant running with the land at law in Mercantile-
Safe Deposit & Trust Company v. Mayor of Baltimore.7" There was no disa-
greement by the parties in Mercantile as to whether the covenant in
question was in writing or whether there was privity of contract."
Rather, the controversy centered on whether the covenant touched
and concerned the land, and whether the original covenanting parties
intended the covenant to run with the land.72
To determine whether the covenant in question touched and
concerned the land, the court applied the "Powell-Bigelow" formula-
tion, stating that whether or not a covenant touches and concerns the
land should be considered in terms of the burdens or benefits the
covenant imposes.7" Specifically, the court noted that if the restric-
tion adds value to the interest in land of the covenantee or detracts
value from the interest in land of the covenanter, then the Powell-
Bigelow test is satisfied and the covenant touches and concerns the
land.74
While the touch and concern test is objective and focuses on the
relationship between the performance of the covenant and the value
of the land, the intent test focuses on the subjective intent of the cove-
nanting parties. 75 The court explained that the question of intent is a
factual one, and that language in the writing expressly binding the
66. Id. at 216, 516 A.2d at 1037.
67. Id. at 217, 516 A.2d at 1037.
68. Mutual privity requires that the covenanting parties have a mutual interest in a
common piece of land, and horizontal privity requires that the covenant be made in con-
nection with the conveyance of land from one of the parties to another. Id. at 216, 516
A.2d at 1037.
69. Id. at 217, 516 A.2d at 1037.
70. 308 Md. 627, 632, 521 A.2d 734, 736 (1987).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 633, 521 A.2d at 737.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 637, 521 A.2d at 739.
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successors and assigns of the covenanting parties is strong evidence of
intent for the covenant to run with the land.76
b. Covenants Enforced at Equity in Maryland.-Covenants en-
forced at equity, or equitable servitudes, are private agreements re-
stricting the use of real property.77 Equitable servitudes arose initially
to protect those landowners not protected at law.7" The doctrine de-
veloped to protect the interests of landowners who buy restricted lots
in subdivisions and expect neighboring lots to be similarly restricted.79
In Tulk v. Moxhay,8 0 a famous English common law case, Lord
Chancellor Cottenham declared that the question of whether a cove-
nant runs with the land is irrelevant in an equity court.81 He ad-
dressed whether, after a grantor sold a plot of land with restrictions to
a purchaser, the purchaser could then sell the land to a third party
free of the restrictions.8 2 The Lord Chancellor discerned that the real
question was not whether the covenant runs with the land, but
whether a subsequent buyer may use land in a manner inconsistent
with the contract to which his seller entered into, when the buyer had
notice of the restrictions at the time of purchase.8" The court en-
forced the covenant by injunction, despite the fact that it would not
have been enforceable at law, because the contrary result would have
been inequitable.8 4 The resulting policy of enforcing covenants in eq-
uity when they may not be enforceable at law was adopted by Mary-
land courts over a century ago. 5
The Court of Appeals reiterated the policy of enforcing cove-
nants in equity in Clem v. Valentine. 6 The court noted that generally,
76. Id. at 638, 521 A.2d at 739.
77. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoNARY, supra note 2, at 371. Equitable servitudes are also called
restrictive covenants in equity, restrictive covenants, and equitable easements. Id.
78. See Clem v. Valentine, 155 Md. 19, 26, 141 A. 710, 712 (1928) (explaining that any
grantee of land with an appurtenant benefit is entitled to the benefit even if the right does
not rest on a covenant and even if he cannot protect the right at law).
79. See Adams v. Parater, 206 Md. 224, 227-37, 111 A.2d 590, 591-96 (1955) (applying
the doctrine of equitable servitudes to enforce prohibition of the sale of malt liquor
against one property owner when ninety-five other property owners were subject to the
prohibition).
80. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
81. Id. at 1144.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1144-45. Lord Chancellor Cottenham observed, "nothing could be more in-
equitable than that the original purchaser should be able to sell the property the next day
for a greater price, in consideration of the assignee being allowed to escape from the liabil-
ity which he himself had undertaken." Id. at 1144.
85. Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md. 487, 497 (1870).
86. 155 Md. 19, 25-26, 141 A. 710, 712 (1928).
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if an agreement exists that touches and concerns the land and subse-
quent grantees have notice of that agreement, the agreement may be
enforced in equity whether or not it could be enforced at law.8 7 The
court further stated that if the positions of the parties, the surround-
ing circumstances, and the language of the covenant show that the
covenant was entered into for the benefit of the land retained by the
covenantee, then the grantee of the covenantee may enforce the re-
strictions."8 The court explained that while many cases arise where
general schemes of development exist, the principle applied by the
courts does not depend on the existence of a general scheme."9
Rather, the court explained, it depends upon the intention of the par-
ties to make the covenant applicable to the land."°
In McKenrick v. Savings Bank of Baltimore,1 the Court of Appeals
summarized the law of covenants in Maryland up to 1938, reiterating
the importance of the intent and the touch and concern require-
ments.92 Furthermore, the court noted that covenants should be con-
strued in favor of freedom of the land and against the person in
whose favor they are made. 3 When an assignee is trying to enforce a
covenant that is not specifically expressed, the court explained that
the burden is on that party to show that the common grantor in-
tended the covenant to affect the land retained as part of a uniform
scheme of development. 4
In McKenrick, a grantee, after entering into a contract to buy a
plot of land, refused to pay for the land on the grounds that it was
encumbered by development restrictions and therefore did not have
good and merchantable title.95 The court accepted as fact that the
common grantor sold six different lots at six different times to six
different buyers.9 6 The grantor sold two of the properties subject to
identical sets of restrictions, but granted the four other properties sub-
ject to four sets of restrictions that differed in various ways from each
87. Id.
88. Id. at 27, 141 A. at 713.
89. Id. at 28, 141 A. at 713.
90. Id.
91. 174 Md. 118, 197 A. 580 (1938).
92. See id. at 128, 197 A. 580 at 584-85 (recognizing that when a landowner grants a
piece of land to another, she may impose restrictions on one piece of land for the benefit
of another; that the covenants can either be personal or run with the land; and that in
some cases covenants that do not run with the land can be enforced in equity).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 120, 197 A. 580 at 581.
96. See id. at 128-29, 197 A. 580 at 585 (describing each plot of land sold as well as the
similarities and differences between restrictions on the land).
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other and from the identical pair. 7 The court held that the restric-
tions applied only to the land conveyed by the deeds and that the
deeds were not sufficient to show the existence of a general uniform
scheme of development.9" Having failed to prove that the common
grantor intended to restrict the land at issue, the court concluded that
the grantee's land was free from restrictive covenants. 99
In Schlicht v. Wengert,'0 the Court of Appeals decided whether a
covenant filed with a particular deed was intended to benefit other
landowners in the area and was, therefore, enforceable by them."'
The court explained that, in the absence of a writing expressly stating
that the restrictions were intended to benefit other purchasers of lots
in the development, the party seeking enforcement must show that
such intent can be inferred from the circumstances.' 0 2 The court
noted that most grounds of valid inference may be considered, but
despite the seeming clarity of present testimony by a developer as to
the meaning and purpose of a covenant, it is questionable as to
whether this particular kind of evidence may be offered. 1' Conclud-
ing that the grantor intended the land to be part of the common
scheme of development, the court made several observations."0 4 First,
the court noted that one large lot was divided into several lots for
sale.'0 5 Second, the court found that a uniform covenant was filed
with almost every deed. 0 6 Third, the court observed that the cove-
nant on its face appeared to be designed to give a particular character
to the entire neighborhood.10 7 Fourth, the court noted that a uni-
form, general scheme of development had been adopted, and the
benefits of the covenant were intended for owners of the other lots. l0 8
Under the circumstances, the court asserted, the purchasers of the
lots, and their successors, could enforce the covenant.10 9
97. Id.
98. Id. at 131, 197 A. at 586.
99. See id. (affirming the lower court's decree requiring the grantee to specifically per-
form his contract).
100. 178 Md. 629, 15 A.2d 911 (1940).
101. Id. at 635, 15 A.2d at 913.
102. Id. at 634, 15 A.2d at 913.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 636, 15 A.2d at 913.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 635-36, 15 A.2d at 913.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 636-37, 15 A.2d at 914.
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In Adams v. Parater,"° the court again addressed whether a prop-
erty owner could enforce restrictions against another whose land was
not expressly burdened by restrictions."1 1 Landowners' lots were sub-
ject to restrictions against the manufacture or sale of malt liquors.1 12
Of the ninety-nine lots in the subdivision, ninety-five lots were ex-
pressly subject to these restrictions.11 3 Parater's lot was subject to re-
strictions as well, but his deed also included a clause that suggested
any legitimate business purpose was a proper use of the land.1 14 The
court observed that, to determine whether the restrictions common to
the ninety-five lots could be enforced against Parater, the court need
not look only to the construction of the deed, but could also consider
inferences from sources outside of the deed such as the existence of a
common scheme of development.
1 1 5
Turning first to the deed from the common grantor to Parater,
the court construed the phrase, "[subject] to the following restrictions
to run with the land" to clearly establish that the grantor intended to
impose restrictions on Parater's land. 1 6 However, the deed included
two conflicting clauses, which the court found created an ambiguity as
to the intended terms."1 7 The court stated that every part of a deed is
to be given effect, with the intentions of the parties prevailing.1 ' The
court articulated a rule that all parts of a deed should be construed
together and that specific language should prevail over general lan-
guage." 9 As such, the court concluded that the clause in Parater's
deed allowing him the use of his land for "all legitimate commercial
purposes" did not trump the more specific clause forbidding the man-
ufacture, sale, or storage of malt liquors.' 20 The court remanded to
the trial court so that the Chancellor could decide, based on infer-
ences from sources outside the deed such as the existence of a com-
110. 206 Md. 224, 111 A.2d 590 (1955).
111. Id. This case differs from the others in that Parater's grant included the restric-
tions common to the landowners' deeds, but it included an extra provision that appeared
to negate those restrictions. Id. at 228, 111 A.2d at 591.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 230, 111 A.2d at 592.
116. Id. at 232-33, 111 A.2d at 593.
117. Id. at 231, 111 A.2d at 593. Clause 2 of the deed prohibited spirited or malt liquors
from being made, sold, or kept for sale on the premises. Id. at 228, 111 A.2d at 591.
Clause 4, however, stated simply: "[slubject to the uses thereof for all legitimate commer-
cial purposes." Id. Parater proposed that the two clauses created an ambiguity that should
have been resolved in favor of the free use of property. Id. at 231, 111 A.2d at 593.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 235-36, 111 A.2d at 595.
120. Id. at 236-37, 111 A.2d at 595-96.
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mon scheme of development, whether the restrictions against the sale
of beer could be enforced against Parater.
121
c. The Doctrine of Implied Negative Reciprocal Covenants in Mary-
land.-In Maryland, a restrictive covenant may also arise by implica-
tion from the language of the deed or the conduct of the parties. 122 If
a common grantor conveys a lot with restrictions that burden the lot
sold and benefit the lot or lots retained, the restriction becomes mu-
tual and the owner of the lots retained is not permitted to do anything
the owner of the conveyed lot cannot do.123 The grantor may protect
himself from an implied covenant by expressly reserving to himself
the right to change or release restrictions or by including language in
the conveyance that states that there is no restriction upon the re-
tained land. 12
4
In Turner v. Brocato,125 business partners Brocato and Raymond
owned a lot in Poplar Hill, a plot of land first subdivided by Charles
Fenwick in 1927.126 In 1930, a plat was prepared showing 88 lots.
1 2 7
All of the numbered lots were expressly restricted by covenants, with
the exception of lot 86.128 There was no explanation for the lack of
restrictions on lot 86, but the owners agreed that it was subject to the
restrictions to the same extent as all of the other lots. 1 29 A group of
Poplar Hill homeowners sought a declaration that the partners' lot
was part of the Poplar Hill development and restricted by the cove-
nants despite the fact that the lot was not one of the ones numbered
on the plat and had been deeded free of restrictions. 130
The court articulated a test to determine whether it could con-
clude that the restrictions were implemented for the common advan-
tage of all buyers in a common scheme of development, thereby
restricting the partners' land. 13 1 First, there must be proof that there
is a common scheme of development in place to benefit the prop-
erty.13 2 There must be an intent for all purchasers to enter into the
121. Id. at 237, 229, 111 A.2d at 596, 592.
122. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 157 (1995).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 206 Md. 336, 111 A.2d 855 (1955).
126. Id. at 340, 111 A.2d at 858.
127. Id. at 341, 111 A.2d at 858.
128. Id. at 342, 111 A.2d at 859.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 339, 111 A.2d at 857.
131. Id. at 349, 111 A.2d at 862.
132. Id.
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covenant as part of a general plan. 133 Finally, each buyer must not
only have notice of the general scheme but the covenant must have
been part of his decision whether to purchase. 1
34
The court also reinforced the rule that, wherever possible, the
intentions of the parties should be enforced. 35 Where some lots are
conveyed without restrictions, the court noted that it does not necessa-
rily follow that there is no general comprehensive plan for develop-
ment.136 The court, after finding that the homeowners met the
burden of proof as to the existence of a general plan of development,
looked not only to the language in the deed, but also to conduct,
conversation, and correspondence to determine the intent of the
grantor.137 Expressly adopting the doctrine of implied negative recip-
rocal covenants, the Court of Appeals found that the partners had
both actual and constructive notice of the covenants binding the
other lots in the subdivision and held that the partners' lot was subject
to the restrictions.1 38
The Court of Appeals set a bright line rule for determining
whether there is notice of a set of restrictions in Steuart Transportation
Co. v. Ashe.1 39 Quoting a student-written note about Turner, the court
stated that a subsequent purchaser must not only search the records
for encumbrances on the property she seeks to buy, but she must also
look for express restrictions imposed by her grantor on other convey-
ances because, under the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal cov-
enants, these restrictions raise the implication that the grantor
intended to restrict the entire development. 4 ° The court recognized
that the rule was a harsh one, but that nevertheless it is well estab-
lished that grantees in Maryland are constructively notified of restric-
tions on their property so long as the restrictions could be found
using a grantor-grantee index of land records.1 41
In Schovee v. Mikolasko,142 the Court of Appeals considered
whether the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants could
overcome a presumption that a plot of land was not intended to be
subject to a set of restrictions because it was notably absent from a
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 352, 111 A.2d at 864.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 346-47, 111 A.2d at 861.
138. Id. at 355, 111 A.2d at 865.
139. 269 Md. 74, 304 A.2d 788 (1973).
140. Id. at 95-96, 304 A.2d at 800-01.
141. Id. at 96, 304 A.2d at 801.
142. 356 Md. 93, 737 A.2d 578 (1999).
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declaration defining the property subject to the conditions.1 43 The
court stressed the importance of both the function of the doctrine of
implied negative reciprocal covenants and its historical context. 144
Without expressly accepting it as an appropriate test, the court
repeated the reading of the Court of Special Appeals of Turner that,
under the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants, a party
may enforce restrictions against land not expressly subject to them if
she can prove five factors. 145 First, a common grantor must have sub-
divided the property into a number of lots for sale. 146 Second, the
grantor must have intended to create a general scheme of develop-
ment in which land use was restricted. 147 Third, the majority of lots
should contain restrictive covenants that reflect the general
scheme. 148 Fourth, the property against which the party seeks to en-
force the covenants must have been intended to be part of the general
scheme.' 49 Finally, the purchaser of the lot in question must have had
notice of the restrictions. 1 50
The covenants in Schovee specifically listed the lots to which it
would apply, and the lot in question was not listed. 15' The court
found no basis in the record that would overcome the inference that
the lot was not to be included as part of the community. 152 The lot in
question was thus not restricted under the doctrine of implied nega-
tive reciprocal covenants.' 3 The court did not go so far as the Re-
statement view, which allows the application of the doctrine only
when the developer does not record a general plan. 15 4 Rather, the
court held that a declaration recorded by the developer will ordinarily
143. Id. at 105, 737 A.2d at 585.
144. Id. at 112, 737 A.2d at 588. The court explained that the doctrine arose to protect
those who purchased land in what they expected was a general development where each
lot would be equally burdened and benefited. Id. at 107, 737 A.2d at 586. Grantors com-
monly placed restrictions in individual deeds and represented verbally to the buyers that
similar restrictions would be placed in deeds to other lots. Id. at 108, 737 A.2d at 586.
When the developer did not then include those restrictions in subsequent conveyances,
litigation arose. Id.
145. Id. at 103, 737 A.2d at 583-84.
146. Id., 737 A.2d at 583.
147. Id.
148. Id., 737 A.2d at 583-84.
149. Id., 737 A.2d at 584.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 113, 737 A.2d at 589.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY. SERVITUDES § 2.14, cmt. i (1998)
(asserting that the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal servitudes only comes into play
when the common grantor does not record the common restrictions applicable to an en-
tire subdivision).
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suffice to establish both the existence of a general scheme of develop-
ment and which individual properties are subject to the restrictions,
and is not considered a mere piece of evidence. 5
5
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Roper v. Camuso, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland reversed the decision of the Court of Special Ap-
peals and held that Roper had threshold standing to seek
enforcement of the covenants at Spring Meadows. 156 To reach this
holding, the court first rejected the reasoning of the Court of Special
Appeals that the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants
does not apply to a case unless a grantee attempts to enforce cove-
nants against a common grantor. 157 The court explained that the
doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants originally was devel-
oped to preserve the grantor's general scheme of development. 15
The court observed that it is merely "happenstance" that the majority
of cases have been brought by grantees against common grantors. 159
The underlying principles of the doctrine of implied negative recipro-
cal covenants, the court reasoned, are not furthered by denying Roper
the opportunity to employ the doctrine to protect her expectations. 160
The court then addressed Camuso's primary argument that
Roper had not met the requirements of the fourth factor of the
Schovee test, which requires the property against which application of
an implied negative reciprocal covenant is sought to have been in-
tended by the common grantor to be part of the general scheme of
development. 16' The court observed that extrinsic evidence may be
used if the writing is insufficient to show the intent of the parties. 162
The court found the language of the deed to be ambiguous and there-
fore had to examine extrinsic evidence to determine whether Roper's
land was intended to be part of the general scheme.' 63 In characteriz-
ing the extrinsic evidence, the court observed both the actions of the
155. Schovee, 356 Md. at 113, 737 A.2d at 589.
156. Raper, 376 Md. at 273, 829 A.2d at 609.
157. See id. at 269, 829 A.2d at 606-07 (observing that the purpose of the doctrine is to
preserve the uniform scheme of development intended by the common grantor, a goal
which is not necessarily reached only through the enforcement of the covenants by grant-
ees against common grantors).
158. Id. at 269, 829 A.2d at 606.
159. Id.
160. Id., 829 A.2d at 607.
161. Id. The court offered a cursory discussion of the first, second, third, and fifth fac-
tors, which were not seriously challenged, before concentrating on the fourth factor. Id. at
250, 829 A.2d at 596.
162. Id. at 272, 829 A.2d at 608.
163. Id.
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grantor and the actions of the grantees.164 First, the court noted that
Miller, the grantor, did not include the covenants with Roper's deed,
but did, however, include language in Roper's deed subjecting her
land to the "covenants and restrictions of record." '165 Furthermore,
the court noted that Miller's Architectural Review Committee chal-
lenged Roper's compliance with the covenants. 166 In so doing, the
court reasoned, the committee had expressed an assumption that
Roper's land was subject to the covenants. 1 6 7
Examining the actions of the grantee, the court first reviewed
Roper's testimony as to why she purchased her lot. t68 The court con-
cluded that Roper's interests were identical to the ones the covenants
sought to protect.169  The court further noted that the grantees
sought to assert the rights under the covenant against Roper when
they alerted the Architectural Review Committee to her noncompli-
ance with the covenants. 170 As such, the court concluded that Roper
and her neighbors believed that Roper's lot was subject to the Spring
Meadows covenants.'1
7
The court next distinguished Roper from Schovee, calling attention
to the express language in the sales contracts in Schovee which ex-
cluded the lot at issue from the restrictions of record.' 72 The court
observed that the common grantor's recorded declaration specifically
listing the lots to which the covenants would apply was held by the
Schovee court to establish conclusively which lots were subject to the
covenants, meaning that lots not included in the declaration were
deeded free of restrictions.' 7' Reviewing the record of Roper, the
court observed that there was no evidence similar to the recorded dec-
laration on Schovee indicating that Miller had intentionally excluded
Roper's lot from the general plan. 174 The court concluded that to
exempt Roper's lot from adherence to the covenants would be "con-
164. Id., 829 A.2d at 608-09.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 273, 829 A.2d at 609.
167. Id.
168. Roper testified that she had bought her lot because of its beautiful view of the
rolling hills. Id. at 272-73, 829 A.2d at 609. Miller had also testified that the covenants
were intended to protect similar interests. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 273, 829 A.2d at 609; see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (noting
that the Architectural Review Committee sent two letters to Roper requesting her compli-
ance with the covenants).
171. Roper, 376 Md. at 273, 829 A.2d at 609.
172. Id., 829 A.2d at 608.
173. Id., 829 A.2d at 608-09.
174. Id. at 273, 829 A.2d at 609.
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trary to the stated purposes of the covenants." '75 Concluding that the
trial court erred in not finding Roper's lot subject to the covenants,
the court held that the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal cove-
nants gave Roper threshold standing to enforce the covenants.1 6
4. Analysis.-In Roper v. Camuso, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land held that a plot of land not expressly subject to restrictive cove-
nants was nonetheless intended to be part of a subdivision and subject
to its covenants.177 The court further concluded that the owner of the
plot not expressly burdened nevertheless had threshold standing
under the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants to en-
force the restrictions against neighboring landowners.178 This hold-
ing overstates the intent of the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal
covenants in that it fails to recognize that the doctrine was developed
to protect landowners in the unfortunate instances where they were
not already protected by existing laws of real covenants or equitable
servitudes. 179 A more reflective analysis of the facts of the case as they
relate to the laws of real covenants and equitable servitudes would
have revealed Roper's right to enforce the covenants under both bod-
ies of law.18° Moreover, such an analysis would have brought these
laws' similarities to light and should have inspired the Court of Ap-
peals to adopt a unified definition of servitudes.181
a. The Court of Appeals'Extension of the Doctrine of Implied Nega-
tive Reciprocal Covenants.-The Roper court began its analysis by accu-
rately asserting that the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal
covenants does not preclude grantees from enforcing covenants
against other grantees. 18 2 However, the court incorrectly assumed
that if the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants restricted
Roper's property, then she would have threshold standing to enforce
the covenants against Camuso. 83 Under this assumption, the court
erroneously concluded that Roper, whose land was restricted by the
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 269, 829 A.2d at 606 (asserting that the doctrine of implied negative recip-
rocal covenants is meant to preserve the uniform scheme of development originally in-
tended by the owner).
180. See infra notes 197-216 and accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 217-233 and accompanying text (explaining how the Court of Ap-
peals could have used Roper to adopt a unified definition of servitudes).
182. Roper, 376 Md. at 269, 829 A.2d at 606.
183. Id.
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Spring Meadows covenants under the doctrine of implied negative re-
ciprocal covenants, automatically had standing to sue Camuso. 184
In Roper, the court first considered whether Roper was precluded
from enforcing the covenants against Camuso on the theory that a
grantee may not, under the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal
covenants, enforce restrictions against another grantee.18 5 The court
accurately asserted that it was not a correct statement of the law in
Maryland to say that the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal servi-
tudes could only be used by a grantee to enforce restrictions against a
common grantor."8 6 The court recalled that in Turner a group of
grantees was successful in their quest to burden the land of another
grantee whose lot was not expressly subject to the covenants.1 8 7 How-
ever, the court unconvincingly rationalized the situations in Turner
and Roper to be similar on the grounds that the interest being pro-
tected-that of the grantee landowner-is the same in both cases.18 8
While Roper is not precluded from enforcing the covenants because
of a restriction allowing the doctrine only to be enforced against a
common grantor, it should not follow, as the court presumed by draw-
ing from Turner, that Roper automatically had standing to enforce the
covenants against her neighbor. In Turner, a grantee whose lot was
expressly burdened was successful in benefiting from the restrictions
by burdening the lot of another grantee under the doctrine of im-
plied negative reciprocal covenants."8 9 The parallel situation under
the Roper facts would present itself if Camuso, as a prior purchaser of a
restricted lot, tried to enforce the restrictions against Roper. °90 Con-
sequently, Roper, as the party whose land was not expressly restricted,
is similarly situated to the parties in Turner. The Turner court held
that the parties' land was restricted by the covenants, but it did not
hold that the parties had the right to enforce the covenants against
the other landowners in the development. 1 ' The court should have
found it significant that Roper's situation was analogous to the part-
ners' in Turner, and not the homeowners, because by allowing Roper
to enforce the restrictions, the court extended the doctrine of implied
184. Id. at 273, 829 A.2d at 609.
185. Roper v. Camuso, No. 1554, slip op. at 6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 9, 2002).
186. Roper, 376 Md. at 269, 829 A.2d at 606.
187. Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 349, 111 A.2d 855, 862 (1955).
188. Roper, 376 Md. at 269, 829 A.2d at 606-07.
189. Turner, 206 Md. at 353, 111 A.2d at 864.
190. See supra notes 161-176 and accompanying text (discussing the court's application
of the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants to Roper's land).
191. Turner, 206 Md. at 353, 111 A.2d at 864.
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negative reciprocal covenants to allow any landowner whose land is
not expressly burdened to do the same.
While the court correctly concluded that the doctrine of implied
negative reciprocal covenants subjected Roper's land to the Spring
Meadows covenants, it incorrectly went on to hold that Roper had
threshold standing under the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal
covenants to seek enforcement of the covenants. 19 2 The court, with-
out explanation, extended this doctrine beyond its purpose-to bur-
den land not expressly restricted by covenants-by allowing the owner
of the land to enforce the benefit of the covenants on the landown-
ers.19 Prior to the Roper court's holding, when a common grantor
following a specific development plan sold multiple lots to multiple
buyers but subject to the same restrictions, the restrictions could be
enforced (1) by parties whose land was expressly restricted against the
land retained by the common grantor and (2) by parties whose land
was expressly restricted against the land retained by the common
grantor after it is subsequently sold, even if the retained land is sold
without being expressly subject to the restrictions. 94 Under the
court's holding, the restrictions may now be enforced by the subse-
quent grantees of the common granter, despite the failure of the
grantor to expressly subject the land to the restrictions.1 95
The only reason the court gave for this extension of the doctrine
of implied negative reciprocal covenants was that the underlying pur-
poses of the doctrine would not be furthered by denying Roper the
opportunity to enforce the covenants.' 96 The court should have ac-
knowledged the leap it was making and offered a more thoughtful
explanation of that leap. Furthermore, while the court was reasona-
ble in asserting that it would be inequitable to deny a landowner in
Roper's position the opportunity to enforce the covenants to which
192. See Roper, 376 Md. at 273, 829 A.2d at 609 (noting that the trial court erred by
concluding that Roper's lot was not subject to the covenants but erroneously assuming that
the doctrine of implied reciprocal covenants, therefore, must also convey threshold stand-
ing to enforce the covenants).
193. See Schovee v. Mikolasko, 356 Md. 93, 112, 737 A.2d 578, 588 (1999) (articulating
the function of the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants).
194. See Roper, 376 Md. at 269, 829 A.2d at 606 (suggesting that the doctrine of implied
negative reciprocal covenants can be used to protect grantees of burdened land against a
common grantor and grantees of burdened land against other grantees, and grantees
whose land is not expressly burdened against other grantees).
195. See id., 829 A.2d at 606-07 (suggesting that the doctrine of implied negative recipro-
cal covenants can also be used to protect grantees whose land is not expressly burdened
against other grantees).
196. Id. at 273, 829 A.2d at 609. The court noted that the evidence indicated the exis-
tence of a common plan which would suffer if Roper's lot were determined to be the only
lot in Spring Meadows not subject to the covenants. Id.
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she would be subject to by implication, it would not have frustrated
the purposes of the doctrine if Roper was allowed her redress under
the laws of real covenants or equitable servitudes.
b. Enforcing Roper's Right to the Benefit Under Traditional Laws
of Equity or Real Covenants.-In Roper v. Camuso, the Court of Appeals
unnecessarily extended the doctrine of implied negative reciprocal
covenants when it permitted Roper to enforce the covenants even
though her property was not expressly burdened. The court could
have reached the same result by enforcing a covenant in equity
against Camuso or, alternatively, under the line of cases concerning
real covenants. The Spring Meadows covenants meet the three re-
quirements for a covenant to be enforced at equity by an assign of the
original covenanter: (1) intent, (2) touches and concerns, and (3) no-
tice. 19 7 The covenants also meet the test for a covenant to run with
the land at law, which are: (1) intent, (2) touches and concerns, (3)
privity, and (4) writing.' 98
Undoubtedly, Camuso and Miller intended to enter into a cove-
nant when Camuso bought her land.199 Moreover, the language of
the covenants between Miller and Camuso establishes the parties' un-
derstanding that the benefit of the covenant would run with the
land.20  The language strongly implies an intent on Miller's part to
enter into the covenants for the benefit of the land retained, and not
for its own personal benefit. 20 ' As the covenants expressly reserve to
the grantor, Miller, and its successors and assigns the right to enforce
the covenants, 2 ° 2 it seems clear that Miller intended that subsequent
purchasers like Roper receive the benefit of enforcing the covenants.
That Miller retained land which was benefited by the restrictions
when it sold Camuso her land, and that a common scheme of develop-
ment existed at the time of the conveyance, was accepted as fact by the
court. 20 3 Such factors were considered helpful by the Gallagher court
197. RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.04[2] at 60-39.
198. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 308 Md. 627, 632, 521
A.2d 734, 736 (1987).
199. Roper, 376 Md. at 243, 829 A.2d at 592.
200. See id., 829 A.2d at 591 (quoting language from the covenants which reserves the
right to enforce the covenants to Miller and its assigns).
201. See Clem v. Valentine, 155 Md. 19, 27, 141 A. 710, 713 (1928) (differentiating be-
tween covenants entered into for the benefit of the grantor, and those entered into for the
benefit of the land retained). If a covenant is entered into for the benefit of the owner, it
was not intended to run with the land, but if it was entered into for the benefit of the land,
it was the intent of the original covenanters for it to run. Id.
202. Roper, 376 Md. at 243, 829 A.2d at 591.
203. Id. at 251, 829 A.2d at 596.
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in determining that a benefit was intended to run with the land.
20 4
Thus, Roper meets the first prong of both the equitable servitudes
and real covenants tests; Miller intended that Roper be permitted to
enforce the covenants.
The "touch and concern" prong of the equitable servitude and
real covenant tests is also met because the covenants burdened
Camuso and all other purchasers of land in Spring Meadows with the
restriction that they could not use certain materials in their yard, nor
could they erect certain structures. 205 These restrictions certainly de-
tracted from the value of each person's land, thus satisfying the re-
quirement for the "touch and concern" test, in that they could not
necessarily use the land as they might like.2 6
Furthermore, whether the parties have notice is not at issue here,
as Camuso was an original party to her deed and does not dispute that
her land is burdened by the covenants. 207 Thus, the provisions of the
deed satisfy the intent test for enforcing equitable servitudes,2 °8 the
restrictions "touch and concern" the land,20 9 and Camuso had notice
of her obligations under the covenants. 210  As an assign of Miller,
Roper, therefore, meets the requirements for enforcing the covenants
against Camuso at equity.
There are two more requirements that Roper must meet in order
to be able to receive the benefit of the covenants at law as well: privity
and writing. Because Roper bought her property directly from Miller,
vertical privity existed.211 Vertical privity requires only that the person
claiming the benefit be a successor in the estate of the person origi-
nally entitled to the benefit.2 12 According to Gallagher, only vertical
privity is required in Maryland for the benefit of a covenant to run
with the land. 21 3 Roper thus meets the privity prong of the test and,
204. Gallagher v. Bell, 69 Md. App. 199, 213-14, 516 A.2d 1028, 1035-36 (1987).
205. Roper, 376 Md. at 243, 829 A.2d at 591. The purpose of the restrictions is to keep
the subdivision open and more panoramic. Joint Record Extract at 9, Roper (No. 01554).
This meets the Powell-Bigelow touches and concerns test in that preserving views in a sub-
division adds value to the land of the covenantee. See Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 308 Md. 627, 633, 521 A.2d 734, 737 (1987) (discussing and apply-
ing the Powell-Bigelow test as to whether a covenant touches and concerns the land).
206. See supra note 205.
207. Roper, 376 Md. at 243, 829 A.2d at 592-93.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 202-204.
209. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
210. Roper, 376 Md. at 243, 829 A.2d at 592-93.
211. Id., 829 A.2d at 592; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining that
vertical privity exists with sale of land).
212. Gallagher v. Bell, 69 Md. App. 199, 216, 516 A.2d 1028, 1037 (1987).
213. Id. at 217, 516 A.2d at 1037.
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because the covenants are in writing and recorded with Camuso's
deed, she meets the final writing prong as well.214 Roper, as an assign
of Miller, thus meets the requirements for enforcement of a real
covenant.
In order for a covenant to run at law in Maryland or be enforced
as an equitable servitude, it must meet the tests for intent and "touch
and concern. "215 Furthermore, an equitable servitude must meet the
test for notice, and a real covenant must meet the privity and writing
requirements. 216 As Roper meets each of the five requirements, satis-
fying both tests, her right to enforce the benefits of the covenants
against Camuso could have been protected by either the laws of real
covenants or equitable servitudes.
c. Unifying the Laws of Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes
into a Single Concept of Servitudes.-Roper would have had threshold
standing to sue to enforce the covenants at Spring Meadows under
either the law of real covenants or the law of equitable servitudes.217
Had the Court of Appeals analyzed the case under either of these
traditional servitude laws, the antiquated distinction between the legal
and equitable remedies would have been apparent, presenting the
court with the opportunity to adopt the unified concept of servitudes
articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Property.218 This move would
simplify the law governing restrictions on real property in Maryland by
delineating a single test for courts to apply.
The Restatement (Third) has abolished the distinction between cov-
enants that run at law and equitable servitudes and has developed a
new servitude that creates a right or obligation that runs with land or
an interest in land.219 Under this formulation, not all covenants are
servitudes, but a covenant becomes a servitude if the obligation or the
right runs with the land.220 The requirements for creating a servitude
under the Restatement (Third) are that the owner of the property to be
burdened enters into a contract or makes a conveyance with the in-
214. Roper, 376 Md. at 243, 829 A.2d at 591.
215. See supra notes 197-198 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 197-198 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 197-216 and accompanying text.
218. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY. SERVITUDES § 1.4 (1998).
219. Id. § 1.1. "Running with the land means that the right or obligation passes auto-
matically to successive owners or occupiers of the land or the interest in land with which
the right or obligation runs." Id.
220. Id. § 1.3.
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tent to create a servitude. 221 Intent may be express or implied, with
no particular form of expression required.2 2
When Camuso purchased her land from Miller, she entered into
a contract with Miller that placed a restriction on her property.2 2 3
This restriction obligated Camuso to refrain from using her land in
particular ways. 224 The covenant expressly reserves to Miller, its suc-
cessors and assigns, and to Camuso and her successors and assigns,
the right to enforce the restrictions.225 Thus, Camuso and Miller had
the requisite intent to create a servitude.226 Miller's benefit would,
therefore, transfer to Roper with the purchase of her land,227 giving
her standing to enforce the covenants of record under the servitude
articulated by the Restatement. Because Roper meets the requirements
to enforce the Spring Meadows Covenants under the laws of equitable
servitudes, real covenants, and the Restatement (Third) unified servi-
tude, Roperwas an ideal opportunity for the Court of Appeals to reject
the antiquated real covenant and equitable servitude tests and adopt a
modern, efficient, unified concept of servitudes.
Courts deciding cases about restrictions on real property in Mary-
land presently have to decide whether they will apply the real cove-
nant test or the equitable servitude test.228 It is not uncommon for
courts to devote a good deal of their energies to making this threshold
decision about which test to apply. 229 However, the historical split be-
tween the two paths of law no longer makes sense, as the only differ-
ing requirements-those of privity in the case of real covenants and
notice in the case of equitable servitudes-have become relatively easy
221. Id. § 2.1.
222. Id. § 2.2.
223. Roper, 376 Md. at 243, 829 A.2d at 592.
224. Joint Record Extract at 33, Roper (No. 01554).
225. Id. at 34.
226. See id. (showing the intent of the parties for their benefits to pass to their heirs,
successors, or assigns).
227. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY. SERVITUDES § 1.1 cmt. b (1998) (clarifying
that, if a plot that is benefited by a servitude is transferred for any reason, the servitude
transfers as well).
228. Gallagher v. Bell, 69 Md. App. 199, 209 n.7, 516 A.2d 1028, 1033 n.7 (1987).
229. See Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 346-48 111 A.2d 855, 861-62 (1955) (dedicating
the better part of three pages to discussing whether real covenants or equitable servitudes
controlled the outcome of the case).
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to meet.2 0 The outcome is that the two tests reach identical
results.231
The Restatement test efficiently disposes of the need to show privity
or notice, but benefits from the continuity of existing legal doctrine
by retaining the touches and concerns requirement 23 2 and the intent
requirement from equitable servitude and real covenant jurispru-
dence. This simpler, single determination of restrictions on land
saves courts time reconciling the two paths of law and allows them to
decide these cases on the basis of a descriptive and illustrated body of
law.2 3  The Maryland Court of Appeals should have used Roper to
adopt the Restatement view of servitudes, thereby establishing a single
test for all servitudes cases and simplifying the law in Maryland.
5. Conclusion.-In Roper v. Camuso, the Court of Appeals held
that a property owner whose land is not expressly burdened by restric-
tive covenants may nevertheless benefit from the covenants and en-
force them against another property owner whose land is expressly
burdened. 234 In holding that Roper may enjoy the benefit under the
doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants, the court unneces-
sarily extended the doctrine. 2 5 Instead, the court should have con-
sidered the well established laws of equitable servitudes and real
covenants together, taking the opportunity to adopt the Restatement's
modern view that the two distinct servitudes ought to be replaced by
one unified servitude. 236
ZARA G. FRIEDMAN
230. SeeSteuartTransp. Co. v. Ashe, 269 Md. 74, 96, 304 A.2d 788, 801 (1973) (asserting
the admittedly harsh rule in Maryland that as long as express restrictions imposed by a
grantor on other grantees are recorded, there is sufficient notice of restrictions on the
property); Gallagher, 69 Md. App. at 216, 516 A.2d at 1037 (asserting that, for a finding of
privity, it need only be proved that the person claiming the benefit or burden must be a
successor to the estate of the person originally benefited or burdened).
231. See supra notes 197-216 and accompanying text (applying the real covenants test
and the equitable servitudes test to the facts of Roper and reaching the same conclusions in
each case).
232. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (describing the touch and concern
test). The Restatement defines a servitude as creating a right, obligation, or interest that
runs with the land. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.1 (1998). These
rights, obligations, or interests necessarily impact the value of the land; thus, it follows that
in order for a restriction to be a servitude it must touch and concern the land.
233. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY- SERVITUDES § 2 (1998) (delineating the re-
quirements for the creation of a servitude).
234. 376 Md. 240, 273, 829 A.2d 589, 609 (2003).
235. See supra notes 192-196 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 217-233 and accompanying text.
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VI. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Blurring the Advantages of Separation Agreements: The Newly Adopted
Bright-Line Rule Requiring a Party to Use Specific Language to Defeat the
Statutory Presumption that Alimony Terminates upon Remarriage.
In Moore v. Jacobsen,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland consid-
ered whether the terms of an alimony provision in a separation agree-
ment were sufficient to satisfy section 11-108 of the Maryland Code,2
which allows parties to override the statutory presumption that ali-
mony ceases upon remarriage if the parties "agree otherwise. "'
Before analyzing the terms of the alimony provision, the court
adopted a bright-line rule, requiring explicit mention of the word "re-
marriage" to defeat the statutory presumption in section 11-108.' The
court supported its adoption of the bright-line rule with cases from
other jurisdictions reaching similar conclusions.' Additionally, the
court held that the alimony provision, which contained a limited term
of payment of seven years and a non-modification clause, did not
meet the strict standard of the bright-line rule because it failed to
mention explicitly the word "remarriage."6 To effectuate the bright-
line rule and end the alimony obligation, the court found the non-
modification clause did not pose a barrier because it concluded that
"modification" is not synonymous with "termination."7
The court's reading of "agree otherwise" as requiring an express
mention of the word "remarriage" is not supported by traditional no-
tions of statutory interpretation and is completely inapposite to the
policy and purpose behind separation agreements.8 As a result, di-
vorcing parties may be deterred from entering into settlement agree-
ments because they can no longer rely on the statute's seemingly
broad language granting the power to contract out of statutory pre-
sumptions. Moreover, the court's decision to differentiate between
"modification" and "termination" of alimony to effectuate the bright-
1. 373 Md. 185, 817 A.2d 212 (2003).
2. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 11-108 (1999).
3. Moore, 373 Md. at 186, 817 A.2d at 213.
4. Id. at 190, 817 A.2d at 215.
5. See id. at 192-94, 817 A.2d at 216-17 (discussing cases from Washington, Missouri,
and California and citing cases from Georgia, Minnesota, and Virginia).
6. Id. at 191, 817 A.2d at 215.
7. Id., 817 A.2d at 215-16.
8. See infra notes 126-143, 171-179 and accompanying text (discussing the broad defi-
nition of "otherwise" and the effect of the bright-line rule on a party's freedom to
contract).
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line rule was not consistent with prior case law and produced a troub-
lesome precedent that severely interferes with an obligee's interest in
alimony.9 Despite the court's effort to promote judicial economy
through a bright-line rule, the ultimate effect of its decision will be an
increase in litigation. Future divorcees will no longer choose to settle
their differences through private agreements because of the looming
uncertainly that the court will not honor the terms of the agreement
and the interests of the parties.
1. The Case.-On March 13, 2000, the Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County granted Suzanne Gibbs Moore (Ms. Gibbs) an abso-
lute divorce from Edwin Gibbons Moore, III (Mr. Moore).1" Prior to
obtaining the divorce decree, both parties entered into a separation
agreement, which included terms of alimony, property division, and
child support.11 The separation agreement was incorporated but not
merged into the divorce decree. 12
The terms of the separation agreement required Mr. Moore to
pay $833.33 per month in alimony to Ms. Gibbs, providing:
The husband shall pay to the wife non-modifiable alimony in
the amount of $833.33 per month commencing on April 1,
2000 and payable on the 1st day of each month thereafter for
eighty-four consecutive months or until the payment due on
April 1, 2007.
The parties expressly covenant and agree pursuant to Sec-
tion 8-101 through Section 8-103 of the Family Law Article
Annotated Code of Maryland, that no court shall have the
power to modify this agreement with respect to alimony, sup-
port or maintenance of either spouse except as provided
herein. 13
Mr. Moore met his alimony obligations for six months, but he
suddenly stopped paying after Ms. Gibbs remarried on September 2,
2000."4 In response, Ms. Gibbs filed suit in the circuit court for a
money judgment for alimony arrearages and attorney's fees.' 5 Mr.
Moore defended his decision to cease payment by arguing that Ms.
9. See infra notes 162-170 and accompanying text (discussing the negative impact on
an obligee's interest in preventing the termination of alimony and cases where the terms
"modification" and "termination" were used interchangeably).
10. Moore v. Moore, 144 Md. App. 288, 293-94, 797 A.2d 839, 841 (2002).
11. Id. at 294, 797 A.2d at 841.
12. Id.
13. Moore, 373 Md. at 187, 817 A.2d at 213.
14. Id. at 188, 817 A.2d at 213.
15. Id.
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Gibbs' remarriage automatically terminated his obligation to pay ali-
mony. 6 The circuit court rejected this claim and awarded Ms. Gibbs
$8,833.33, the total arrearages past due.' 7 Mr. Moore filed a timely
appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.' 8
On appeal, Mr. Moore argued that because the separation agree-
ment was silent as to his obligation to pay alimony in the event of
remarriage, the agreement failed to override Family Law Article sec-
tion 11-108 of the Maryland Code. 9 Section 11-108 requires alimony
to terminate upon remarriage of the obligee spouse "[u] nless the par-
ties agree otherwise. '"20 Therefore, according to Mr. Moore's interpre-
tation of section 11-108, the terms of the separation agreement did
not qualify as "agree[ing] otherwise" because there was no express
mention of the event of remarriage.2' Mr. Moore also claimed that
the non-modification clause in the separation agreement did not pre-
clude a court from terminating alimony because "modification" and
"termination" are two distinct concepts. 22 Mr. Moore asserted that
,'modification" and "termination" are not the same action because
they are addressed in separate sections of the Family Law Code.23
The Court of Special Appeals rejected Mr. Moore's claims and
held that the separation agreement was not silent as to remarriage,
but by its terms met the requirement of section 11-108 to "agree other-
wise."24 Relying on traditional rules of contract construction, the
Court of Special Appeals interpreted the terms of the separation
agreement to be "anything but silent."25 Specifically, the Court of
Special Appeals found the separation agreement's inclusion of a non-
modification clause and an exact date on which the payments would
end indicated the parties' intent for alimony to survive in the event of
remarriage.6 The Court of Special Appeals also rejected Mr. Moore's
16. Id.
17. Id. The circuit court also awarded Ms. Gibbs $750 in attorney's fees. Id.
18. Id., 817 A.2d at 214.
19. Moore v. Moore, 144 Md. App. 288, 298, 797 A.2d 839, 844 (2002). Family Law
Article section 11-108, provides: "Unless the parties agree otherwise, alimony terminates:
(1) on the death of either party; (2) on the marriage of the recipient; or (3) if the court
finds that termination is necessary to avoid a harsh and inequitable result." MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 11-108 (1999).
20. § 11-108.
21. Moore, 144 Md. App. at 298, 797 A.2d at 844.
22. Id.
23. Id. Section 11-107 concerns modification of alimony, while Section 11-108 con-
cerns termination of alimony payments. Id.
24. Id. at 306-08, 797 A.2d at 849-50. Additionally, the Court of Special Appeals re-
versed the circuit court's award of attorney's fees. Id. at 310, 797 A.2d at 851.
25. Id. at 308, 797 A.2d at 850.
26. Id.
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claim that a court is not prohibited from terminating the alimony as
set out in the separation agreement and authorized by Family Law
Article section 8-103 because "termination" of alimony was not synony-
mous to "modification. '"27 The Court of Special Appeals, relying on
case law using the terms interchangeably, found that termination is a
type of modification.28
Mr. Moore filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari, which the
Court of Appeals granted. 29 The issue presented to the Court of Ap-
peals was whether the alimony obligation set forth in the settlement
agreement survived remarriage when it did not expressly state the ef-
fect of remarriage, but did contain a non-modification clause and a
definite term of alimony of seven years.30
2. Legal Backgound.-In Maryland, the right to receive alimony
traditionally terminates upon remarriage.3' However, section 11-108
allows divorcing parties to contract out of this presumption. 2 The
case of Moore v. Jacobsen presented an issue of first impression concern-
ing the extent and specificity of the language required in a private
agreement to trump section 11-108's presumption.38 Without guiding
precedent, the Court of Appeals instead relied on various traditional
rules of statutory interpretation, the history of alimony in Maryland,
and case law of other jurisdictions. 34 Consequently, it is first impor-
tant to explore how the court has historically construed and inter-
preted statutory language to understand the court's analysis of the
meaning of the words "agree otherwise" in section 11-108. 35 Second,
the court's jurisprudence concerning alimony is significant, including
the establishment of the presumption that alimony terminates upon
remarriage and a party's ability to contract out of the presumption.36
Third, the court's traditional acceptance of separation agreements as
27. Id.
28. Id. Specifically, the Court of Special Appeals relied on Bauer v. Votta, 104 Md. App.
565, 657 A.2d 358 (1995), a case where the petitioner filed a modification of alimony
seeking either termination or a reduction of alimony. Id.
29. Moore, 373 Md. at 188, 817 A.2d at 214.
30. Id. at 187, 817 A.2d at 213.
31. E.g., Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 596, 87 A. 1033, 1038 (1913).
32. MD. CODE ANN., Fsm. LAw § 11-108 (1999).
33. Appellant's Brief at 2, Moore v. Jacobsen, 373 Md. 185, 817 A.2d 212 (2003) (No.
55).
34. Moore, 373 Md. at 190-94, 817 A.2d at 215-17.
35. See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text (discussing the rules of statutory inter-
pretation and various Maryland cases construing the word "otherwise").
36. See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text (discussing the history of alimony and
the establishment of the rule that alimony terminates upon remarriage of the obligee
spouse).
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a valid method to contract out of the statutory presumption that ali-
mony terminates upon remarriage must be considered." Fourth, the
court's historical application of the objective law of contract interpre-
tation to separation agreements is important. Additionally, results
reached by other jurisdictions when applying similar interpretation
rules to alimony provisions that do not explicitly mention the effect of
remarriage is also significant.3 8 Finally, the court's historical use of
the terms "modification" and "termination" as evidenced in Maryland
case law is necessary to consider.39
a. Maryland Rules of Statutory Construction.--The essential
goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and effectuate the inten-
tion of the legislature.4" To discern legislative intent, a court must
first look to the words of the statute.41 If the words used in the statute
are unambiguous, a court's interpretation of legislative intent usually
begins and ends with the application of a word's ordinary meaning.4 2
In determining a word's ordinary meaning, a court may take into con-
sideration the context or general purpose of the statute as a whole.4"
However, a court may not add or delete words to effectuate a meaning
not evident in the words chosen by the legislature.44 A court is also
prevented from expanding or limiting a statute's meaning by adding
or deleting words from the statutory language.45 Moreover, statutory
construction cannot be used to restrict a word's meaning that would
"subvert the purposes of the statute. '"46
Although there is no case law interpreting section 11-108's lan-
guage or the words "agree otherwise," there is case law indicating that
in a statute the words "other" and "otherwise" should be construed
broadly.47 In Vytar Associates v. Mayor of Annapolis, the Court of Ap-
peals rejected the interpretation that the language "other fees or
37. See infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text (discussing the validity of separation
agreements in Maryland).
38. See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text (discussing the rules of contract inter-
pretation as applied to separation agreements in Maryland and other jurisdictions).
39. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text (discussing cases that use the terms
"modification" and "termination" interchangeably).
40. E.g., Powell v. State, 179 Md. 399, 401, 18 A.2d 587, 589 (1941).
41. Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993).
42. Id. at 145-46, 626 A.2d at 950.
43. Id. at 146, 626 A.2d at 950.
44. Id. at 145, 626 A.2d at 950.
45. Id.
46. State v. Smith, 73 Md. App. 378, 383, 534 A.2d 371, 373 (1987).
47. Vytar Assocs. v. Mayor of Annapolis, 301 Md. 558, 564 n.4, 483 A.2d 1263, 1266 n.4
(1984).
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charges" present in the Revenue and Taxes statute48 did not include
license fees.49 The Court of Appeals, relying on Latrobe Brewing Co. v.
Comptroller of the Treasury,5° reasoned that the word "other" is an "un-
compromising" word to be construed broadly.5 Similarly, the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland rejected the narrow
construction of the word "otherwise" as contained in an insurance pol-
icy excluding double indemnity for death resulting from inhalation of
gas whether "voluntary or otherwise. 5 2 In Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of
Baltimore v. New York Life Insurance Co., the district court held the
meaning of the term "otherwise" was broad and encompassed more
than the direct antithesis of a term." The district court rejected the
plaintiffs construction of "otherwise" as being overly narrow and held
the language "voluntary or otherwise" included not only the term in-
voluntary, but also the terms "consciously," "unconsciously," "inten-
tionally," or "unintentionally."5 4
b. The Statutory Presumption that an Alimony Obligation Termi-
nates upon Remarriage.-In Maryland, alimony serves as a rehabilitative
mechanism which enables the obligee spouse to become self-suffi-
cient." It is a well-established rule in Maryland that alimony obliga-
tions cease upon remarriage of the obligee spouse.5 6 In Emerson v.
Emerson, the Court of Appeals of Maryland faced an issue of first im-
pression of whether an alimony provision should be discarded from a
48. The Court of Appeals was interpreting Article 81, section 215 of the Maryland
Code, which was repealed in 1988. Id. at 560, 483 A.2d at 1264; MD. CODE ANN. art. 81,
repealed by 1988 Md. Laws 110, § 2 and 1996 Md. Laws 10, § 15.
49. Vytar Assocs., 301 Md. at 564, 483 A.2d at 1266.
50. 232 Md. 64, 192 A.2d 101 (1963). The Court of Appeals, in interpreting the lan-
guage of Article 81, section 215 of the Maryland Code, which states that "any special taxes
which were erroneously or illegally assessed or collected," found tax on beer to be in-
cluded. Id. at 68, 192 A.2d at 103. The Court of Appeals found the word "any" of "any
special tax" to be broad and "uncompromising." Id, at 70, 192 A.2d 101, 103-04 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
51. VytarAssocs., 301 Md. at 564 n.4, 438 A.2d at 1266 n.4.
52. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt. v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 14 F. Supp. 721, 725-76 (D.
Md. 1936) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. at 726.
54. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. See Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md. App. 487, 531, 497 A.2d 485, 507 (1985) (ex-
plaining that since the enactment of Article 16, section 1 of the Maryland Code in 1980,
alimony's principal function is to rehabilitate the obligee spouse until he becomes self-
supporting, whereas prior to 1980 the common law defined alimony as a lifetime obliga-
tion subject to modification upon a material change in circumstances or the remarriage of
the obligee spouse).
56. See, e.g., Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 596, 87 A. 1033, 1038 (1913) (finding
the policy behind Maryland law requires relieving a former husband of the obligation to
pay alimony upon his ex-wife's remarriage).
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decree because of the wife's remarriage or whether remarriage should
be viewed as a factor to consider in modifying or reducing alimony. 7
The court chose the former view, noting it was more reasonable to
conclude that the law did not intend for a woman to receive support
from two men.58 Subsequently, the rule established in Emerson that
alimony terminates upon remarriage was codified in the Maryland
Code at Family Law section 11-108. 59
Although section 11-108 continues the tradition of terminating
alimony upon remarriage of the obligee spouse, its language explicitly
grants parties the freedom to contract out of its requirements.6" A
party may, in an alimony provision of a separation agreement, con-
tract for alimony to continue past remarriage of the obligee spouse.61
In Campitelli v. Johnston, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held
that a separation agreement containing a provision that alimony was
to continue regardless of the remarriage of the recipient spouse was
not void as contrary to public policy.62 The court began its analysis by
noting the language "[ulnless the parties agree otherwise" contained
in section 11-108 "specifically left room for parties to create their own
contracts according to their own unique situations." 63  The court
opted to uphold the freedom to contract granted by section 11-108
because it did not find any public policy preventing the extension of
alimony past remarriage.64
c. Separation Agreements Are Contracts that Are Recognized as
Valid and Enforceable Mechanisms to Settle a Divorce Dispute.--Although
the courts possess the power to award alimony upon a bill of com-
plaint or as part of a divorce decree, 65 Maryland recognizes a party's
57. Id. at 588, 594-95, 87 A. at 1035, 1037.
58. Id. at 595, 87 A. at 1037.
59. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 11-108 (1999). Section 11-108 states that "[u]nless the
parties agree otherwise, alimony terminates: (1) on the death of either party; (2) on the
marriage of the recipient; or (3) if the court finds that termination is necessary to avoid a
harsh and inequitable result." Id.
60. See Campitelli v. Johnston, 134 Md. App. 689, 698, 761 A.2d 369, 373 (2000) (stat-
ing that by including the phrase "[u]nless the parties otherwise agree" in section 11-108,
the Maryland General Assembly specifically left room for parties to create their own con-
tracts that may continue alimony payment even after the remarriage of the obligee
spouse).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 11-101 (1999) (stating"[t]he court may award ali-
mony: (1) on a bill of complaint for alimony; or (2) as a part of a decree that grants: (i) an
annulment; (ii) a limited divorce; or (iii) an absolute divorce").
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ability to contract privately to terms of alimony.66 An agreement
reached between two parties concerning alimony has long been up-
held by Maryland courts" and its validity is now codified in the Mary-
land Code at Family Law section 8-101.68 Courts now encourage
settlement agreements between divorcing parties as a peaceful way of
ending "marital strife and discord."69
A separation agreement may either be merged or incorporated
into a court's divorce decree.7 ° If the separation agreement is incor-
porated, the court may enforce the provisions of the agreement either
through its contempt power or as an independent contract. 71 If the
agreement is enforced as an independent contract, the terms and con-
struction of the agreement are analyzed by a court according to the
accepted rules of contracts.72 Thus, under Maryland law, a separation
agreement is viewed according to the objective law of contracts.71
d. The Objective Law of Contracts as Applied to Non-Ambiguous
Terms in a Separation Agreement.-In analyzing terms of a contract that
are deemed unambiguous, the court's main function is to ascertain
the parties' intentions as evidenced by the terms of the contract. 74 In
so doing, a court must apply the "ordinary and usual meaning" of a
term in a contract while taking into account the context in which the
66. See Gordon v. Gordon, 342 Md. 294, 300, 675 A.2d 540, 543 (1996) (noting that
although contracts between husbands and wives made in lieu of divorce were traditionally
unenforceable, section 8-101 of the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code explicitly
allows parties to contract for support and property).
67. See, e.g., Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 677, 141 A. 387, 388 (1928) (recognizing an
agreement between the parties for permanent alimony of $25 per week that was made
during the divorce proceeding).
68. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-101 (1999). Section 8-101 states that "A husband
and wife may make a valid and enforceable deed or agreement that relates to alimony,
support, property rights, or personal rights." Id.
69. Gordon, 342 Md. at 301, 675 A.2d at 544 (1996) (quoting 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11:7, at 396-99 (R. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1993)).
70. See Campitelli v. Johnston, 134 Md. App. 689, 694, 761 A.2d 369, 371 (2000) (ex-
plaining a court's power to modify a separation agreement when the agreement is either
merged or incorporated with a divorce decree).
71. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw, § 8-105 (1999).
72. See Goldberg v. Goldberg, 290 Md. 204, 212, 428 A.2d 469, 474 (1981) (stating that
property settlement agreements, like all other contracts, are to be analyzed according to
the contract law of Maryland).
73. See iL, 428 A.2d at 474-75 (applying the Maryland principles of objective construc-
tion to a separation agreement).
74. Taylor v. NationsBank, 365 Md. 166, 178-79, 776 A.2d 645, 653 (2001) (quoting
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261, 492 A.2d 1306, 1310
(1985)).
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contract was created. 75 A court may also look to the contract as a
whole in assessing the intent of the parties.76
Objective contract interpretation precludes a court from looking
to the actual intent of the parties. 77 Rather, a court may only effectu-
ate intent from the contract's terms themselves by deciding what a
reasonable person in the parties' position would have meant at the
time of contracting. Therefore, terms of the contract, irrespective of
the parties' intent at the time of contracting, will determine the liabili-
ties of the parties.79
e. Other Jurisdictions Have Found Terms of a Separation Agree-
ment to Indicate an Intent to Continue Alimony Beyond Remarriage Despite
the Failure to Mention Explicitly the Word "Remarriage" or the Effect of "Re-
marriage. "-In Maine, the Supreme Judicial Court interpreted a settle-
ment agreement in Raymond v. Raymond ° to provide for a
continuation of alimony past remarriage despite the agreement's fail-
ure to mention explicitly the word "remarriage" or its effect on the
alimony obligation. 8 ' Focusing on two provisions in the agreement,
the court found an intent by the parties to continue the obligation
despite the wife's possible remarriage in the future.8 2 Specifically, the
agreement required alimony to terminate after five years or upon the
death of the obligee, whichever occurred first.8 3 The court concluded
that the parties' confinement of alimony to a definite period of five
years indicated an intent for alimony to continue during this period
regardless of any other occurring event.84  Similarly, both Penn-
sylvania and Minnesota courts have found limiting provisions, such as
a fixed term of years or specific terminable events (other than mar-
riage), to indicate an intent for alimony to continue beyond the obli-
gee's remarriage.85 Neither of the agreements in Pennsylvania or
75. Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, 363 Md. 232, 251, 768 A.2d 620, 630 (2001).
76. Gordon v. Gordon, 342 Md. 294, 313, 675 A.2d 540, 550 (1996).
77. Taylor, 365 Md. At 179, 776 A.2d at 653 (quoting General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261, 492 A.2d 1306, 1310 (1985)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 447 A.2d 70 (Me. 1982).
81. Id. at 71.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 71-72.
85. See McMahon v. McMahon, 612 A.2d 1360, 1364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding
that provisions indicating alimony would terminate when the "youngest living child
reaches the age of twenty-one, is emancipated or finishes college whichever occurs last"
evinced an intent to continue alimony despite the remarriage of the obligee spouse);
Telma v. Telma, 474 N.W.2d 322, 323 (Minn. 1991) (holding that a separation agreement
9572004]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Minnesota specifically mentioned the word "remarriage" or the effect
of remarriage on the alimony obligation. s6
f Use of the Terms "Modification" and "Termination" in Mary-
land Case Law Pertaining to Alimony Obligations.-In Maryland, the
terms "modification" and "termination" have been used interchangea-
bly both in motions by an alimony obligor and by courts. In Bauer v.
Votta, 7 the Court of Special Appeals confronted the issue of whether a
trial court erred in reducing an alimony obligation by $200 due to a
change in the financial circumstances of the obligee.88 The obligee's
income had increased 150% from $9,000 to $22,000 since the original
alimony award.8" Due to the increase, the obligor filed a Petition for
Modification of Alimony in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.90
Under the Petition for Modification, the obligor sought either termina-
tion or reduction of the alimony due to the increase in income of the
obligee."
In Young v. Young,9 2 the Court of Special Appeals determined
whether newly enacted alimony laws applied to an alimony order en-
tered prior to the enactment, once a motion regarding the order was
filed after the enactment." Below, the trial court applied the newly
enacted law, and under an Order of Modification, it ordered alimony
to terminate at a prospective date.94 In overruling the trial court's
improper application of the new law, the Court of Special Appeals
stated "[t] he chancellor erroneously applied the post-July 1, 1980, ali-
mony law to achieve the modification."95 Thus, the court described the
trial court's termination of alimony as a modification.
indicated intent to continue alimony despite the obligee's remarriage according to provi-
sions stating the obligee would receive alimony of $1200 per month for five years or until
the obligee's adjusted income exceeded $30,000 per year).
86. In McMahon, the terms of the separation agreement required alimony to terminate
when the youngest child reached the age of 21, became emancipated, or finished college,
whichever event occurred last. McMahon, 612 A.2d at 1364. In Telma, the separation agree-
ment provided that the alimony obligation would continue for five years or until the obli-
gee's adjusted gross income was in excess of $30,000 per year. Telma, 474 N.W.2d at 323.
87. 104 Md. App. 565, 657 A.2d 358 (1995).
88. Id. at 573, 657 A.2d at 362. The court also faced the issue of whether a pension
waiver provision in the parties' separation agreement precluded the trial court from con-
sidering the obligor's pension in his income when calculating alimony. Id. at 570, 657 A.2d
at 360.
89. Id. at 572-73, 657 A.2d at 361.
90. Id. at 568, 657 A.2d at 359.
91. Id.
92. 61 Md. App. 103, 484 A.2d 1054 (1984).
93. Id. at 105-06, 484 A.2d at 1056.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 109, 484 A.2d at 1058 (emphasis added).
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Court of Appeals, in reviewing
this case of first impression, held that a separation agreement must
expressly state that alimony survives remarriage in order to override
section 11-108's automatic termination of alimony upon remarriage of
the obligee spouse." The court rejected Ms. Gibbs' argument that
the terms of the alimony provision were equivalent to "agreeing other-
wise" as permitted by section 11-108 so as to override the presump-
tion.97 Furthermore, the court found that the non-modification
clause had no bearing on its ability to terminate the alimony obliga-
tion because it defined termination as a separate and distinct concept
from modification.9"
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by adopting a bright-line
rule requiring parties to insert an explicit provision in a separation
agreement stating that an alimony obligation survives remarriage. 99
The court concluded that if this provision is not found in a separation
agreement, Maryland courts must find that the obligation terminates
automatically upon remarriage of the obligee spouse.' 00 Because the
issue was of first impression, the court looked to the language and the
public policy underlying section 11-108.1°1 In analyzing section 11-
108's language "[u] nless the parties agree otherwise," the court admit-
ted that the statute did not provide whether the agreement "other-
wise" needed to be expressly stated in the separation agreement.
10 2
The court examined the public policy behind section 11-108 and
found it very clear that alimony was not intended to survive the remar-
riage of the recipient.10 3 Based on the "clear" aim of section 11-108,
the court concluded that any exception to the goal of section 11-108
of terminating alimony upon remarriage must be equally as clear.
10 4
The court rationalized its adoption of a rule requiring an express as-
sertion of survival past remarriage by noting the positive effect onjudi-
cial economy.1°5 Lastly, the court declared that a bright-line rule
would increase predictability and reduce litigation and ambiguity.' °6
96. Moore, 373 Md. at 187, 817 A.2d at 213.
97. See id. at 191, 817 A.2d at 215 ("We do not construe the language contained in 8.0
of the agreement before us to evidence an intent of the parties that petitioner was required
to continue to pay alimony to respondent for seven years, even if she remarries.").
98. Id., 817 A.2d at 215-16.
99. Id. at 190, 817 A.2d at 215.
100. Id. at 189-90, 817 A.2d at 214.
101. Id., 817 A.2d at 214-15.
102. Id. at 189, 817 A.2d at 214.
103. Id., 817 A.2d at 215.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Using the newly adopted bright-line rule, the court analyzed the
alimony provision of the separation agreement and concluded neither
the non-modification clause nor the definite end period of payment
met the standard of clarity as required by the bright-line rule."°7 The
court rejected Ms. Gibbs' argument that the non-modifiability clause
was akin to "agreeing otherwise" as permitted by section 11-108 be-
cause the clause did not actually bar termination of alimony but only
prohibited modification by a court.1" 8 Therefore, the court reasoned
that inserting the clause was not equivalent to the actual use of the
word "remarriage" in the agreement.109
To further support its holding, the court cited a number of cases
from sister states that adopted similar bright-line rules in response to
statutes that terminated alimony upon remarriage unless the parties
agreed otherwise." 0 The court emphasized the Washington Supreme
Court's holding that a party must specifically mention remarriage in
order to defeat the automatic termination of alimony upon remar-
riage as required by Washington law.' 1 ' The Moore court noted that in
In re Marriage of Williams, the Washington Supreme Court found the
terms of an alimony provision, which included a non-modifiability
clause and required the husband to pay alimony "until [the wife] com-
pletes her bachelor's degree or until 4 years pass, whichever comes
first" did not satisfy the "agreed otherwise" requirement of the stat-
ute. " 2 The court also pointed to the Missouri Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Glenn v. Snider"W that a separation agreement must specifically
mention the effect of remarriage on alimony obligations to override
the presumption of the Missouri statute that alimony terminates auto-
matically upon remarriage."14 Finally, the court noted the California
Court of Appeal's conclusion in Glasser v. Glasser l5 that a separation
agreement containing a non-modifiability clause and a definite term
107. Id. at 190-191, 817 A.2d at 215.
108. Id. at 191, 817 A.2d at 215-216. The court concluded the words "termination" and
"modification" are not synonymous because Black's Law Dictionary defines modify as
"'[t]o alter; to change in incidental or subordinate features"' and terminate as "'[t]o put
an end to; to make to cease; to end.'" Id. (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1004, 1471 (6th
ed. 1990)). The court also noted that Maryland Family Law statutes deal with termination
of alimony and modification of alimony in two separate sections; section 11-108 deals with
termination, and section 11-107 deals with modification. Id. at 191, 817 A.2d at 216.
109. Id. at 191, 817 A.2d at 216.
110. Id. at 192, 817 A.2d at 216.
111. Id. at 192-93, 817 A.2d at 216-17.
112. 796 P.2d 421, 425 (Wash. 1990) (en banc).
113. 852 S.W.2d 841 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
114. Moore, 373 Md. at 193, 817 A.2d at 217.
115. 226 Cal. Rptr. 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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of four years payment of alimony was not specific enough to indicate
the parties intended for the obligation to survive remarriage." 6 Al-
though the California court noted that no specific language was re-
quired to extend alimony past remarriage, the Court of Appeals found
the Glasser court's conclusion persuasive that silence and a non-modi-
fication clause were insufficient to defeat the statutory
presumption." 7
Finally, the court supported its adoption of a bright-line rule with
a brief mention of various commentators in the field of family law."' 8
The court noted that the commentators "appear to assume" specific
language is required in order to override a statute that mandates auto-
matic termination of alimony upon remarriage. 1 9 Furthermore, the
court highlighted that certain commentators encourage practitioners
to be specific in drafting separation agreements because of the statu-
tory presumption that alimony terminates upon remarriage.
120
4. Analysis.-In Moore v. Jacobsen, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land, on first impression, considered whether a separation agreement
containing a non-modification clause and a definite term of payment
were enough to override the statutory presumption that alimony
ceases upon remarriage of the obligee spouse. 12' The Court of Ap-
peals adopted a bright-line rule and held that only an express men-
tion of the word "remarriage" and its effect on the obligation of
alimony could defeat the statutory presumption. 122 The Court of Ap-
peals' bright-line rule improperly restricts the common meaning of
the word "otherwise" found in the statute and is inapposite with the
policy and purpose of separation agreements. Moreover, the Court of
Appeals' manipulation of the non-modification clause, to effectuate
the bright-line rule, severely undermines an obligee's interest in
alimony.
The Court of Appeals' decision is problematic for a number of
reasons. First, the court's quick adoption of the bright-line rule, with-
out first applying the rules of statutory construction, allowed it to gloss
over the true meaning of the word "otherwise" and apply an overly
restrictive reading. Second, if the court applied the broad, common
116. Moore, 373 Md. at 194, 817 A.2d at 217.
117. See id. (noting the Glasser court's discussion of silence and non-modification
clauses).
118. Id. at 194-95, 817 A.2d at 217-18.
119. Id. at 194, 817 A.2d at 217.
120. Id. at 194-95, 817 A.2d at 218.
121. Id. at 189, 817 A.2d at 214.
122. Id. at 195, 817 A.2d at 218.
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meaning of "otherwise," the terms of the separation agreement would
indicate an intent to continue the alimony obligation past remarriage
under Maryland rules of contract construction. 123 Third, the court's
disregard of the purpose of non-modification clauses in order to effec-
tuate the bright-line rule is also problematic because it undermines an
obligee's ability to contractually protect his alimony interest. 12' Fi-
nally, the court's interpretation of section 11-108 and the non-modifi-
cation clause is inconsistent with the purpose and policy behind
separation agreements and may discourage future divorcees from set-
ding their differences through private agreements.125
a. The Court's Narrow Reading of "Agree Otherwise" Is Not Con-
sistent with the Ordinary Meaning of "Otherwise" and Is Not Supported by
Language Used Throughout the Maryland Code.-The court failed to
properly effectuate the legislature's intent by disregarding Maryland's
traditional rules of statutory interpretation by ignoring the ordinary
meaning of the word "otherwise." Webster's Dictionary defines "other-
wise" as 1. "in a different way or manner," 2. "in different circum-
stances," 3. "in other respects. '1 26  The Oxford English Dictionary
defines "otherwise" as "[i]n another way, or in other ways; in a differ-
ent manner, or by other means; differently."1 27 Both dictionaries at-
tribute a broad common meaning to the word "otherwise." There is
nothing in the definitions indicating that to "agree otherwise" a per-
son must specifically state the exact opposite of the provision around
which he is contracting. In fact, the phrases "in other respects" and
123. See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Bait. v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 14 F. Supp. 721, 726 (D.
Md. 1936) (holding the meaning of "otherwise" is broader than a term's exact antithesis or
exact opposite). According to this definition of "otherwise" a party is not confined when it
"agrees otherwise" to use the specific term "remarriage" as required by the Court of Ap-
peals' bright-line rule.
124. The Court of Appeals' decision that the non-modification clause does not prohibit
a court from terminating alimony leaves an obligee with no protection from the worst
possible outcome-that of complete eradication of his interest in alimony. See infra notes
162-165 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the court's interpretation of the
words "termination" and "modification" on an obligee's interest in receiving alimony). In
contrast, the court's interpretation of the non-modification clause still protects the obli-
gor's interest of protecting against the increase of his alimony obligation because increas-
ing alimony is a modification.
125. See infra notes 171-179 and accompanying text (discussing the public policy ratio-
nale behind separation agreements, including judicial economy, private negotiation, and
efficient resolution of difficult issues).
126. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 823 (10th ed. 1993).
127. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 984 (2d ed. 1991).
962 [VOL. 63:949
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
"in other ways" are plural, indicating that more than one method may
satisfy the statutory term "otherwise. '"28
Moreover, the Court of Appeals and the District Court for the
District of Maryland have found the words "other" and "otherwise,"
respectively, as having broad meanings.1 29 In Vytar, the Court of Ap-
peals compared the word "other" to the word "any" and found both
terms were "uncompromising" words to be construed broadly.
1 30
Also, in Safe Deposit, the district court, although not interpreting lan-
guage of a statute, found the common meaning of "otherwise" to be
broad.'3 1 The district court held the meaning of "otherwise" was not
confined to the exact opposite of the connective term.1 32 The district
court explained that to read the term "otherwise" as found in the lan-
guage "involuntary or otherwise" as only referring to the term "volun-
tary" is too narrow a construction of the common meaning.
133
Therefore, according to Vytar and Safe Deposit, the Court of Appeals'
construction of the language "agree otherwise" is inappropriately nar-
row.13" The common meaning of "otherwise" does not indicate that
the direct antithesis of "alimony terminates upon remarriage"-that
alimony does not terminate upon remarriage-is required in the sep-
aration agreement. 13 Nor is the broad meaning of "otherwise" con-
fined to the use of the specific word "remarriage." Rather, according
to its common meaning, "otherwise" provides broad discretion for
contracting parties to defeat the statutory presumption.
36
The Court of Appeals' narrow reading of "agree otherwise" is also
not supported by language used throughout the Maryland Code.
Where the legislature has required the use of specific language in an
agreement, it has expressed this intention through more limiting lan-
128. See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt., 14 F. Supp. at 726 (looking to the definition of
"otherwise" in Webster's New International Dictionary and concluding that "otherwise" is
not limited to the direct contrast of a specific word, but rather is broad and carries the
meaning "in any other manner").
129. Vytar Assocs. v. Mayor of Annapolis, 301 Md. 558, 564 n.4, 483 A.2d 1263, 1266 n.4
(1984); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt., 14 F. Supp. at 726.
130. VytarAssocs., 301 Md. at 564 n.4, 483 A.2d at 1266 n.4.
131. See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt., 14 F. Supp. at 726 (rejecting the limited con-
struction of "otherwise" to include the mere antithesis of the term and adopting a broad
meaning encompassing "in any other manner").
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Moore, 373 Md. at 195, 817 A.2d at 218 (holding that to agree otherwise a party
must explicitly mention remarriage).
135. See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt., 14 F. Supp. at 726 (holding the meaning of
otherwise" is broader than a term's exact antithesis or exact opposite).
136. See id. (emphasizing that the broad meaning of the term "otherwise" encompasses a
number of relevant terms).
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guage. 13 7 There is nothing in section 11-108 to indicate specific lan-
guage is needed when parties "agree otherwise" to override the
statutory presumption.1 38 In Family Law section 1-203 of the Mary-
land Code, the legislature, in defining the powers of an equity court in
matters of alimony, annulment, and divorce, states that "[u]nless the
court expressly provides otherwise, the filing of an action for an annul-
ment, a limited divorce, or an absolute divorce does not constitute lis
pendens3 9 with respect to any property of a party."14 In the section
of the Maryland Code on Estates and Trusts the legislature repeatedly
requires that "[u] nless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will"
certain presumptions apply.14" ' As the preceding examples illustrate,
where the legislature did not require that an intent be expressly indi-
cated it used language such as "[u] nless the will otherwise provides" to
imply a lesser degree of precision in contract language.' 42
As evidenced by the language used commonly throughout the
Maryland Code, when the legislature intended for specific language to
be required in an agreement it used language such as "expressly" to
limit the term "otherwise. '"143 Arguably, when the legislature chose to
use the words "agree otherwise" in section 11-108 over more specific
language, which would have emphasized the need for an express term
to be present in an agreement, it gave contracting parties more leeway
in their choice of terms. Therefore, the court interpreted the lan-
guage of section 11-108 too narrowly and incorrectly adopted a bright-
line rule requiring specific mention of the word "remarriage" in order
to defeat the statutory presumption that alimony terminates upon the
remarriage of the obligee spouse.
b. If the Court Applied the Broad Meaning of "Otherwise" and Al-
lowed the Parties the Appropriate Room to Contract According to Their Own
Terms, the Court Could Have Found the Terms of the Alimony Provisions Suf-
137. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 8-103(c) ("The court may modify any provi-
sion of a deed, agreement, or settlement . . . regardless of how the provision is stated,
unless there is: (1) an express waiver of alimony or spousal support; or (2) a provision that
specifically states that the provisions with respect to alimony or spousal support are not sub-
ject to any court modification.") (emphasis added).
138. Id. § 11-108.
139. Lis pendens is the "jurisdiction, power, or control acquired by a court over prop-
erty while a legal action is pending." BLACK'S LAW DicrIoNARY 942 (7th ed. 1999).
140. Id. § 1-203 (emphasis added).
141. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 4-404 to -406, 4-408, 4-410 (2001) (emphasis
added).
142. It § 4-412(b); see also id. § 4-411 (c) (stating "[u]nless the will provides otherwise").
143. See id. §§ 4-404 to -406, 4-408, 4-410 (using language such as "[u]nless a contrary
intent is expressly indicated").
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ficient to Defeat the Statutory Presumption.-The seven-year duration of
alimony payments and the lack of any contingencies limiting these
payments indicate the parties' intent for alimony to continue through
the specified period regardless of the event of remarriage."' In ana-
lyzing the terms of the separation agreement under principles of con-
tract law as followed in Maryland,1 45 the language of the alimony
provision limiting alimony to "$833.33 per month commencing on
April 1, 2000 and payable on the 1st day of each month thereafter for
eighty-four consecutive months or until the final payment due on
April 1, 2007" indicates to a reasonable person that alimony must con-
tinue during this period with no limitation or exceptions.1 4 6 A con-
clusion similar to this one has been determined and upheld in a
number of Maryland's sister states.
In Raymond v. Raymond, the Supreme Court of Maine held that a
separation agreement that was silent on the issue of remarriage but
provided that alimony terminated after five years or at the death of
the obligee, whichever occurred first, evidenced intent to continue
alimony past remarriage. 4 7 The Raymond court focused on the fixed
period of alimony finding that if the parties "took the trouble to limit
the duration of the payments... they would have expressly provided
for any further limitation in the duration of the payments such as the
remarriage of the wife, had the parties so intended." a' Similarly, the
terms of the separation agreement in Moore limited the alimony obli-
gation to seven years.1 49 Mr. Moore and Ms. Gibbs "took the trouble"
to limit the obligation to a specified period and not list any other ter-
minating factors during this period; thus, the terms indicate an intent
for alimony to continue during the seven years regardless of the oc-
currence of any other event.1 50
Similarly in McMahon v. McMahon, the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania found that the terms of a separation agreement gave no indi-
144. Moore v. Moore, 144 Md. App. 288, 308, 797 A.2d 839, 850 (2002).
145. Because the terms of the alimony provision are not ambiguous, the court must give
effect to the "plain meaning" of the terms. Sy-Lene of Washington, Inc. v. Starwood Urban
Retail II, 376 Md. 157, 167, 829 A.2d 540, 546 (2003). The terms must be observed from
the view of a reasonable person in the position of the party at the time of contracting. See
id. (quoting Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 436, 727 A.2d 358, 363 (1999)).
146. Moore, 373 Md. at 187, 817 A.2d at 213.
147. 447 A.2d 70, 71 (Me. 1982).
148. Id. at 71-72 (quoting Sprentall v. Smallridge, 347 N.Y.S.2d 659, 661 (1973)).
149. See Moore, 144 Md. App. at 308, 797 A.2d at 850 (specifying April 1, 2007 as the date
that alimony payments would stop).
150. See Raymond, 447 A.2d at 71 (accepting that an agreement for a specific date for
termination of alimony with no additional conditions should be regarded as having no
additional conditions).
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cation that the parties intended for alimony to terminate upon
remarriage of the obligee spouse.'51 The superior court analyzed the
separation agreement as an independent contract under principles
similar to those required in Maryland. 152 The separation agreement
in McMahon provided that alimony would terminate when the "young-
est living child reaches the age of twenty-one, is emancipated or fin-
ishes college[,] whichever occurs last.115  Similar to the reasoning in
Raymond, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania focused on the fact that
both parties had the ability, at the time of contracting, to add provi-
sions to the agreement specifying when the alimony obligation should
terminate.1 54 Likewise, in Moore the only event that terminated the
alimony obligation was the end of the seven-year period. 155 During
negotiations, Mr. Moore could have required additional factors to be
listed as terminating events or he could have refused to sign the agree-
ment as drafted.1
56
Even the case that the Court of Appeals cited as support for its
adoption of the bright-line rule allows room for parties to contract in
a separation agreement to continue alimony past remarriage without
express mention of remarriage.1 57 In Telma v. Telma, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota reversed an appellate court's termination of a
husband's alimony obligation.1 58 Minnesota Statute section 518.64 is
almost identical to section 11-108 and provides termination of ali-
mony upon remarriage unless otherwise agreed by the contracting
151. 612 A.2d 1360, 1364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
152. Id. The court interpreted the terms of the agreement as being unambiguous and
thus the only inquiry that remained was to look at the actual language of the agreement
and effectuate the parties' intent. Id.; seeWells v. Chevy Chase Bank, 363 Md. 232, 251, 768
A.2d 620, 630 (2001) (explaining that Maryland courts follow the principles of objective
contract interpretation and when language in a contract is unambiguous the court is to
effectuate the contract's meaning according to its terms).
153. McMahon, 612 A.2d at 1364.
154. Id.
155. See Moore v. Moore, 144 Md. App. 288, 308, 797 A.2d 839, 850 (2002) (noting the
significance of the end date for alimony payments provided by the separation agreement).
156. Arguably, Ms. Gibbs could have also required more specific language in the ali-
mony provision. However, this lack of specificity regarding the effect of remarriage indi-
cated both Ms. Gibbs' and Mr. Moore's assumption that specific language was not needed
to continue the alimony obligation for the seven-year period regardless of remarriage.
Whereas, when the parties thought specific language was needed and when they intended
for an obligation to terminate upon marriage, they explicitly stated so. For example, in the
child support provision, the separation agreement specifically provides that the obligation
terminates upon the child's marriage. Appellant's Brief at 32, Moore (No. 55).
157. Telma v. Telma, 474 N.W.2d 322, 323 (Minn. 1991). The Moore court cites Telmain
support of its conclusion that other states apply a bright-line rule similar to the rule the
Moore court decided to adopt. Moore, 373 Md. at 192, 817 A.2d at 216.
158. Telma, 474 N.W.2d at 323.
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parties.1 59 The terms of the separation agreement required the obli-
gee spouse to receive alimony of $1200 per month for five years or
until the obligee's adjusted gross income exceeded $30,000 per
year. 6 " Although prior precedent required that remarriage be ex-
pressly stated to override the statutory presumption, the Telma court
affirmed the trial court's interpretation that alimony terminated "on
the occurrence of either of two specific events, neither of which was
[the obligee's] remarriage."161 Therefore, even a jurisdiction that
had a preexisting rule requiring explicit mention of remarriage found
that specific mention of a terminating event, like the date provided in
Mr. Moore's and Ms. Gibbs' separation agreement, evidenced the par-
ties' intent for alimony to continue.
c. The Court of Appeals' Manipulation of the Non-Modfication
Clause by Differentiating "Modification" and "Termination" of Alimony to
Effectuate its Bright-Line Rule Severely Undermines an Obligee's Right to Pro-
tect his Alimony Interest.-The Court of Appeals' differentiation be-
tween the words "modification" and "termination" will detract from
the purpose of settlement agreements by unjustly limiting an obligee's
right to alimony, making it impossible to protect alimony interests
from judicial interference. 162 The conclusion that a non-modification
clause prohibits a court from modifying alimony but not from termi-
nating alimony unfairly maintains the interest of the obligor, as it pro-
hibits an increase of alimony by the court.163  This conclusion,however, leaves the obligee's primary interest in alimony vulnerable to
159. Id. at 322. Minnesota Statute section 518.64 states: "Unless otherwise agreed in
writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to pay future maintenance is
terminated upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the party receiving mainte-
nance." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.64(3) (West 1990).
160. Telma, 474 N.W.2d. at 323.
161. Id. The separation agreement also contained a waiver of rights by the obligor, simi-
lar to the non-modification clause present in the agreement. Id. The waiver clause con-
tained in the separation agreement provided that the obligor waived "any right he may
have under Minn. Stat. § 518.[64] and applicable case law to petition this Court for modifi-
cation of his obligation to pay maintenance, either as to amount or duration or termina-
tion." Id.
162. See 2 ALEXANDER LINDEY & Louis I. PAP-LEY, LINDEY AND PARLEY ON SEPARATION
AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 65.02 (2d ed. 2002) (listing drafting consider-
ations for practicing attorneys when inserting modification clauses into separation agree-
ments, including the different interests of the parties).
163. See Moore v. Moore, 144 Md. App. 288, 298, 797 A.2d 839, 844 (2002) (explaining
Mr. Moore's argument that the non-modification clause only prohibited modification of
the amount of alimony under section 11-107 of the Family Law Article of the Maryland
Code).
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judicial order.164 Therefore, while the primary interest of the obligor
is protected-that the alimony award should not be increased-the
primary interest of the obligee-to receive alimony at all-is at risk. 1 65
The Moore court's distinction between the two terms produced an in-
equitable result that favors the obligor and makes vulnerable separa-
tion agreements that may not contain the precise language the court
now requires. Therefore, obligors can easily be relieved of their sup-
port obligation despite the obligee's understanding that the non-mod-
ification clause prohibited judicial interference into a privately
contracted alimony decision.
The court's distinction between "modification" and "termination"
is also not supported by the use of the terms in prior case law. In fact,
the opposite conclusion is reached because the courts often use the
terms interchangeably.166 For example, in Bauer v. Votta, the peti-
tioner filed a modification of alimony "seeking either termination or
reduction of the alimony" based upon a change in circumstances.' 67
The petitioner's relief of either termination or reduction was filed
under one broad petition for modification of alimony.16 Likewise, in
Young v. Young, the petitioner filed for a modification of an alimony
award order "requesting several changes including termination of the
alimony."' 69 Also, the Young court in its opinion used the terms "mod-
ification" and "termination" interchangeably.170 Therefore, the dis-
tinction between what is a modification and a termination is not as
rigid as the court in Moore asserts.
d. The Court's Adoption of a Bright-Line Rule and Manipulation
of the Non-Modification Clause Undermines the Purpose and Policy of Separa-
tion Agreements by Hindering Divorcing Parties' Freedom to Contract.-The
164. The obligee also has an interest in preventing the decrease of alimony, but secur-
ing against the termination of alimony all together is arguably of higher priority.
165. See Quarles v. Quarles, 62 Md. App. 394, 405, 489 A.2d 559, 565 (1985) (differenti-
ating between child support payments, which are always modifiable by a court to protect
the interests of the children, and alimony payments, which can be non-modifiable if the
parties decide that it is in their best interests).
166. Moore, 144 Md. App. at 308, 797 A.2d at 850; see also Moore, 373 Md. at 195-196, 817
A.2d at 218 (Battaglia, J., dissenting) (expressing a problem with the majority's stretching
of the traditional meanings of the words "modification" and "termination" to reach its
conclusion).
167. 104 Md. App. 565, 568, 657 A.2d 358, 359 (1995).
168. Id.
169. 61 Md. App. 103, 105, 484 A.2d 1054, 1056 (1984).
170. See id. at 112, 484 A.2d at 1059 (using case law which held "modification must be
based on a present change in circumstances, not on speculation that there will be a change
in circumstances" to support overruling a chancellor's decision to terminate the alimony
obligation at a future date).
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court's manipulation of the non-modification clause and adoption of
a bright-line rule undermine the public policy of separation agree-
ments by limiting a party's ability to settle disputes outside the court-
room.1 7 1  Separation agreements are "indispensable tools" in
resolving complex issues surrounding the dissolution of a marriage.172
Separation agreements allow parties to avoid the litigation process
and personally negotiate family matters. 173 Avoiding litigation by pri-
vately resolving matters of custody, visitation, support, and distribu-
tion of property saves the parties time, money, and emotional
trauma.1 74 Separation agreements are also favored by courts because
they relieve the court of resolving usually difficult issues. 175
The policy reasons behind separation agreements are now frus-
trated because of the court's restriction of the parties' contractual
freedom by mandating specific language. 176 In the future, parties may
not be willing to solve their issues privately if, at any given time, the
court can refuse contractual language seemingly allowed by the broad
language of the statute, but not in favor with judicial economy. 177
Moreover, support obligees may be less willing to contract for alimony
if the non-modification clause does not protect them from termina-
tion by the court.1 78 The result of the court's bright-line rule may in
fact discourage judicial economy by forcing divorcing parties to en-
dure unending litigation to resolve their private matters. 171
5. Conclusion.-In Moore v. Jacobson, the Court of Appeals
adopted a bright-line rule and held that only an express mention of
171. See Campitelli v. Johnston, 134 Md. App. 689, 698, 761 A.2d 369, 373 (2000) (con-
cluding that public policy generally upholds freedom to contract and that there is no clear
public policy reason not to uphold separation agreements).
172. MORRIS PLOSCOWE ET AL., FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 792 (2d ed. 1972).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Moore, 373 Md. at 190, 817, A.2d at 215 (holding a party must mention the word
"remarriage" in order to meet the bright-line rule and defeat the statutory presumption
that alimony terminates upon remarriage).
177. See Doris Del Tosto Brogan, Divorce Settlement Agreements: The Problem of Merger or
Incorporation and the Status of the Agreement in Relation to the Decree, 67 NEB. L. REV. 235, 239
(1988) (noting that when parties participate in the bargaining process based on a certain
understanding of the law, but then later discover that "the presumptions upon which they
had negotiated were illusory" because ofjudicial interpretation, the parties and their law-
yers are driven to avoid settlement).
178. See id. (stating that lawyers and lay persons are discouraged from settlements when
they cannot determine whether or how to make an agreement non-modifiable).
179. See PLOSCOWE ET AL., supra note 172, at 792 (describing litigation as unsatisfactory
and negotiation as a better means of resolving alimony issues despite the difficulty of
reaching compromises).
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"remarriage" and its effect on the obligation of alimony could trump
the statutory presumption of section 11-108 that alimony terminates
upon remarriage.1 80 The Court of Appeals' bright-line rule is prob-
lematic because it improperly restricts the common meaning of the
word "otherwise" found in the statute and is inapposite with the policy
and purpose of separation agreements.1 8 1 Moreover, the Court of Ap-
peals' manipulation of the non-modification clause, to effectuate the
bright-line rule, severely undermines an obligee's right to secure his
alimony interest and may discourage parties from negotiating in the
future.' 8
2
AMBER N. CsAszAR
180. 373 Md. at 195, 817 A.2d at 218.
181. See supra notes 126-143, 171-179 and accompanying text (discussing the broad
meaning of the word "otherwise" and the purposes of settlement agreements).
182. See supra notes 162-170 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the court's
interpretation of the words "termination" and "modification" on an obligee's interest in
receiving alimony).
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VII. TORTS
A. A Changing Relationship: The Court Rightfully Expands a Landlord's
Duty to His Tenants
In Hemmings v. Pelham Wood L.L.L.P.,' the Court of Appeals of
Maryland addressed the duty of a landlord to protect his tenants from
the criminal activities of third parties.2 Specifically, the court ex-
amined "whether a landlord has a duty to [fix] a known dangerous or
defective condition [in] his control to prevent a foreseeable . . . crimi-
nal attack [by a third party] within the leased [premises]."' The court
answered this question in the affirmative, holding that a landlord's
duty to provide a reasonable amount of security in common areas ex-
tends to preventing foreseeable injuries within the leased premises as
well.4 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on its hold-
ings in previous cases involving property damage, even though this
case involved personal injury.5 The court's reliance on property dam-
age cases was misplaced because Hemmings, which involves a third
party criminal attack, is factually dissimilar from a property damage
case, and raises unique causation issues.6 Instead of relying on prop-
erty damage cases, the court should have relied on more factually sim-
ilar cases that address a landlord's duty to prevent physical attacks on
tenants.7 In addition, the court could have cited policy considerations
to strengthen its holding.8 Thus, even though the holding in Hem-
mings is consistent with prior tenant injury cases, the court employed a
problematic route in arriving at its conclusion by relying solely on
property damage cases in order to rightfully expand the liability of
landlords.
1. The Case.-On June 13, 1998, an unidentified, armed in-
truder entered Pelham Wood and broke into Howard and Suzette
1. 375 Md. 522, 826 A.2d 443 (2003).
2. Id. at 526, 826 A.2d at 445-46.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 543, 826 A.2d at 455.
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 143-146 and accompanying text (discussing the different factual and
legal issues in Hemmings as compared to the property damage cases on which the majority
relied for support).
7. See infra notes 149-178 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the holding in
Hemmings follows logically from the holdings in Matthews and Scott, two personal injury
cases).
8. See infra notes 179-192 and accompanying text (describing how various policy con-
cerns support the court's expansion of a landlord's liability).
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Hemmings' second floor apartment through the sliding glass door on
the balcony.9 The intruder encountered Mr. Hemmings in the apart-
ment.1" The intruder then shot Mr. Hemmings, who later died from
his injuries at the University of Maryland Shock Trauma Center."
Before this incident, the Hemmings had entered into a lease for
the apartment in Pelham Wood on November 25, 1997.12 The lease
provided that "[the] Landlord has the right to enter the [apartment]
at any time by master key or by force, if necessary, to inspect the Prem-
ises, to make repair/alterations in the [apartment].... 13 The lease
also stated "[t]hat ... [the] Landlord shall be responsible for repairs
to the [apartment], its equipment and appliances furnished by [the]
Landlord . ". .. " The lease specified that the Landlord agreed that
"the [apartment] will be made available such that it will not contain
conditions that constitute, or if not properly corrected would consti-
tute, a fire hazard or a serious and substantial threat to the life, health
or safety of occupants." 15 Finally, the lease stated that the tenant
agreed that the Landlord "shall not be liable for an injury, damage or
loss to person or property caused by other tenants or other per-
sons ... unless the same is exclusively due to the omission, fault, negli-
gence or other misconduct of [the] Landlord."' 6
At the time of the burglary, there were several security measures
in place at Pelham Wood, including exterior lighting surrounding the
complex, dead bolts on the front doors of the apartments, alarm sys-
tems on ground level apartments, and "Charlie Bars" for units with
sliding glass doors. 7 The contractor who was hired to repair the slid-
ing glass door following the burglary in the Hemmings' apartment,
however, did not find a Charlie Bar in the apartment.' 8
In addition, several Pelham Wood residents testified about the
insufficiency of the exterior lighting at the complex.1" The resident
who lived directly below the Hemmings claimed that the area behind
9. Hemmings, 375 Md. at 528, 826 A.2d at 447.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 526, 826 A.2d at 446.
13. Id. at 527, 826 A.2d at 446 (alterations in original).
14. Id. (alterations in original).
15. Id. (alteration in original).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 528, 826 A.2d at 446. A "Charlie Bar" is a horizontally mounted bar that is
wedged into a sliding door to prevent it from being opened. Id.
18. Id. at 529, 826 A.2d at 447. The contractor stated that he believed a Charlie Bar
had been on the door at some point because the frame in which the bar is mounted was
present. Id.
19. Id. at 529-30, 826 A.2d at 447.
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the apartment building was "[p]itch dark."2 ° Another tenant testified
that there was not a light fixture outside the Hemmings' apartment.
2
'
A third tenant stated that the area behind the building was dark until
the Landlord added lighting after the burglary at the Hemmings'
apartment.22
In the two years prior to the Hemmings' break-in, there were two
armed robberies at Pelham Wood, as well as twenty-nine burglaries or
attempted burglaries filed with the police department. 23 The burglar
used the sliding glass door to gain entry to the apartment in five of
these burglaries.24 On October 3, 1996, an intruder entered through
the sliding glass door and burglarized the same unit that the Hem-
mings leased one year later.25 The Landlord's corporate designee
stated that the police notified the rental office of such criminal activity
and requested the Landlord's assistance in watching for suspected
criminal activity at the complex.
26
On June 14, 1999, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Ms.
Hemmings filed wrongful death and survival claims against the Land-
lord of Pelham Wood.2 7 Among these allegations, Ms. Hemmings
contended that the Landlord had not exercised reasonable care in
preventing harm to the Hemmings and had been negligent in permit-
ting a dangerous condition to remain unfixed in the Hemmings'
home.28 Following discovery, both parties moved for summary judg-
ment.29 On July 30, 2001, the circuit court heard arguments on the
motions and granted the Landlord's request for summary judgment.30
The circuit court found that by furnishing working locks for the apart-
20. Id. at 529, 826 A.2d at 447. The same resident also stated, "You can't see anything.
Even if I would look outside, I couldn't identify anyone in that area because it is really
dark." Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 529-30, 826 A.2d at 447.
23. Id. at 530, 826 A.2d at 448.
24. Id. There were forty reports of burglaries during the two-year period. Id. at 530
n.2, 826 A.2d at 448 n.2. In addition, there were reports of violent crimes including first-
and second-degree assault, kidnapping, rape, and armed robbery. Id. at 530, 826 A.2d at
448.
25. Id. at 531, 826 A.2d at 448.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 532, 826 A.2d at 449.
28. Id.
29. Id. The Landlord argued that he had no duty to protect Mr. Hemmings from an
attack within his apartment, and that he had maintained all of the security devices that he
provided to the residents of Pelham Wood. Id. Mrs. Hemmings argued that, as a matter of
law, the Landlord had a duty to adequately secure the Hemmings' apartment, as well as
provide sufficient exterior lighting. Id.
30. Id.
2004] 973
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ment doors, the Landlord had met his duty of reasonable care and
thus was not negligent."
Ms. Hemmings noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Ap-
peals, which affirmed summary judgment for the Landlord on May 6,
2002.32 The court reasoned that the Landlord did not have a duty to
protect tenants from criminal activities occurring within the leased
premises. 3 The court did recognize that a landlord has a duty to pro-
vide a reasonable amount of security in common areas to protect te-
nants from crime. 4 The court refused, however, to extend this duty
to the leased premises.3"
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether a
landlord has a duty to repair a known defective condition within a
leased premises if he has control over the condition, and the repair
may prevent a foreseeable attack by a third party.36 The court also
considered whether there was sufficient evidence of such a defective
condition in the Hemmings' case to make summary judgment for the
Landlord inappropriate.3 7
2. Legal Background.-To state a negligence claim, a plaintiff
must show that (1) the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff,
(2) the defendant breached this duty, (3) the plaintiff was injured,
and (4) the defendant's breach was the proximate cause of the plain-
tiff s injury. 38 In general, the question of whether a duty exists is a
matter of law. 39 The Court of Appeals of Maryland has adopted an
evolving standard for determining duty in the specific context of the
landlord-tenant relationship.4" In earlier cases that dealt primarily
31. Id. The circuit court judge reasoned that the Landlord had fulfilled his duty of
reasonable care because the apartment was secure such that the intruder had to forcibly
enter the apartment. Id.
32. Hemmings v. Pelham Wood L.L.L.P., 144 Md. App. 311, 314, 797 A.2d 851, 853
(2002).
33. Id. at 323, 797 A.2d at 858.
34. Id. at 318, 797 A.2d at 855-56.
35. Id. at 317 n.4, 797 A.2d at 855 n.4.
36. Hemmings, 375 Md. at 533, 826 A.2d at 449-50.
37. Id., 826 A.2d at 450.
38. E.g., Todd v. Mass Transit Admin., 373 Md. 149, 155, 816 A.2d 930, 933 (2003)
(citation omitted); Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 351 Md. 544, 553, 719 A.2d
119, 123 (1998) (citation omitted).
39. Todd, 373 Md. at 155, 816 A.2d at 933.
40. See, e.g., Kinnier v. J.R.M. Adams, Inc., 142 Md. 305, 307, 120 A. 838, 839 (1923)
(holding a landlord liable for property damage resulting from a defective condition in the
common area); Matthews, 351 Md. at 570, 719 A.2d at 131-32 (stating that the jury was
justified in holding the landlord liable where, among other factors, the harm to persons
and property was foreseeable).
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with property damage, the court found that the landlord had a duty to
remedy defective conditions over which he maintained control.4' The
court, considering cases of personal injury, gradually expanded the
landlord's duty to repair dangerous conditions of which he had
knowledge.42 Finally, the court further expanded the landlord's duty
to protect tenants from foreseeable harm resulting from dangerous
conditions.43
a. The Landlord's Control Over the Defective or Dangerous Condi-
tion.-A fundamental part of a landlord's duty to his tenants is the
notion that a landlord is ultimately responsible for the maintenance
of areas which he continues to control.44 In 2310 Madison Avenue, Inc.
v. Allied Bedding Manufacturing Co.,45 the Court of Appeals held that
there was ample evidence to let a jury determine a landlord's liability
for flood damage to an apartment due to clogged drains.46 The court
stated that a tenant may maintain a negligence action against a land-
lord if the landlord has contracted to make the repairs, and the tenant
has provided notice of the defect and given the landlord a reasonable
amount of time to make the repairs.47 The court added that this
claim would be subject to considerations of proximate causation and
possible contributory negligence. 48 The court went a step further to
conclude that even if a landlord does not contract to make certain
repairs, an implied duty to repair exists where the landlord has re-
tained control of a certain area available for common use by all
tenants.49
41. See, e.g., 2310 Madison Ave., Inc. v. Allied Bedding Mfg. Co., 209 Md. 399, 411-12,
121 A.2d 203, 210 (1956) (stating that the landlord is liable when injury results from condi-
tions under which the landlord has control).
42. See, e.g., Langley Park Apts., Sec. H., Inc. v. Lund Adm'r, 234 Md. 402, 403, 199
A.2d 620, 620-21 (1964) (emphasizing the landlord's obvious knowledge of the dangerous
condition).
43. See, e.g., Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 169, 359 A.2d 548, 554 (1976) (applying the
landlord's duty to exercise reasonable care in providing safety for his tenants in common
areas to cases of criminal activity).
44. See, e.g., 2310 Madison Ave., Inc., 209 Md. at 407, 121 A.2d at 208 (stating that it is
well-settled law in Maryland that a landlord may be held liable where, among other factors,
the landlord has contracted to repair the defect) (citations omitted).
45. 209 Md. 339, 121 A.2d 203 (1956).
46. Id. at 406, 121 A.2d at 207.
47. Id. at 407, 121 A.2d at 208 (citations omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 408, 121 A.2d at 208. The court reviewed several earlier cases that supported
the proposition that a landlord has a duty to maintain common areas, ensuring that they
are in a safe condition. Id., 121 A.2d at 209. In Kinnier v. JRM. Adana, Inc., the court
adopted the view that the landlord is liable to tenants or other lawful guests for injuries
caused by improper management of, or failure to fix defects in, the common areas. 142
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The court limited a landlord's duty in Elmar Gardens, Inc. v.
Odell,5 ° stating that owning a property does not render a landlord lia-
ble for injuries occurring on that property.5 ' The court did not find a
landlord liable for injuries to a tenant's hand when the tenant con-
tended that the landlord had negligently installed the glass door on
which he injured his hand. 2 In this case, the tenant stuck his hand
through the glass door in an effort to stop the door from closing on
his infant son.53 Despite finding no liability, the court did note that a
landlord has a duty to keep the property reasonably safe by exercising
ordinary care.5 4 Furthermore, the court explained, when a landlord
has leased parts of the property separately, and has retained control
over common areas, it is only obligated to maintain the common areas
in a reasonably safe condition.5 5 In this case, although the landlord
had replaced the glass on which the tenant cut his hand just a few days
prior to the accident, the court concluded that there was insufficient
evidence that the landlord had been negligent.5 6
b. The Landlord's Knowledge of the Defective or Dangerous Condi-
tion.-After Elmar Gardens, the court began to expand a landlord's lia-
bility to situations where it knew, or should have known, about a
harmful condition on the premises.5 7 In Langley Park Apartments, Sec.
H., Inc. v. Lund, Administrator,58 the Court of Appeals held a landlord
liable for injuries sustained by a tenant who slipped on a patch of ice
on a walkway under the landlord's control. 59 The court used policy
considerations to support its holding, stating that it would be unrea-
sonable and impractical to make tenants responsible for maintaining
the common walkways. 6" In addition, the court found significant that
the ice on the walkway that presented a dangerous condition was obvi-
Md. 305, 307, 120 A. 838, 839 (1923). In Kinnier, the court held the landlord liable for
damages caused by leaking pipes. Id. at 308-09, 120 A. at 840. The Court of Appeals reaf-
firmed this holding in Commercial Realty Co. v. National Distillers Products Corp., another case
involving an overflowing water pipe. 196 Md. 274, 279, 76 A.2d 155, 157 (1950).
50. 227 Md. 454, 177 A.2d 263 (1962).
51. Id. at 457, 177 A.2d at 265.
52. Id. at 458, 177 A.2d at 266.
53. Id. at 456, 177 A.2d at 264.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 459, 177 A.2d at 266.
57. See, e.g., Langley Park Apts., Sec. H., Inc. v. Lund Adm'r, 234 Md. 402, 403, 199
A.2d 620, 620-21 (1964) (focusing on the landlord's obvious knowledge of a dangerous
condition on common walkways).
58. 234 Md. 402, 199 A.2d 620 (1964).
59. Id. at 410, 199 A.2d at 624.
60. Id. at 408, 199 A.2d at 623.
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ous to the landlord.6" The court was careful to restrict its holding,
however, emphasizing that the landlord will not automatically be
found liable if it has snowed, but rather if he knew, or should have
known, of the dangerous conditions created by the snow.
6 2
In Macke Laundry Service Co. v. Weber,63 the Court of Appeals held
a landlord liable for injuries a three-year-old boy sustained when he
placed his hand in the drive mechanism of a clothes dryer in an at-
tempt to stop the dryer.64 The court stated that although a landlord
generally does not owe a greater duty of care to children, the landlord
in this case should have known that children frequently visited the
laundry room, which was made available to all the tenants.63 Based on
these facts, the court concluded that the landlord breached its duty of
reasonable care to the child by failing to replace the shield on the
dryer's drive mechanism.6 6
c. The Harm Resulting from the Defective or Dangerous Condition
Must Be Reasonably Foreseeable.-In 1976, the Court of Appeals first con-
sidered a landlord's liability for a third party attack on a resident ten-
ant in Scott v. Watson.6 7 In Scott, the daughter of a tenant who was
murdered in his apartment's underground parking garage brought a
wrongful death suit against the landlord of the apartment complex.6 8
The court considered the extensive record of crime in and near the
apartment complex in the year prior to Scott's murder.69 The court
reaffirmed its holding in Macke by reiterating that a landlord is not
liable for injuries to tenants merely because he owns a building;
rather, the landlord has a duty to exercise reasonable care in main-
taining the safety of areas set aside for common usage by all tenants.7y
The court noted that this duty has evolved under Maryland law prima-
rily in response to injuries resulting from defective property. 7' The
court went further, in Scott, and broadened the scope of a landlord's
61. Id. at 409, 199 A.2d at 624.
62. Id. at 409-10, 199 A.2d at 624.
63. 267 Md. 426, 298 A.2d 27 (1972).
64. Id. at 427-28, 298 A.2d at 28.
65. Id. at 432-33, 298 A.2d at 31.
66. Id. at 433, 298 A.2d at 31.
67. 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976).
68. Id. at 161-62, 359 A.2d at 549-50.
69. Id. at 163-64, 359 A.2d at 551. The court noted that, despite the high volume of
crime, the defendants were not aware that any tenants had been subject to violent crimes
in the parking garage or other common areas of the complex before Scott's murder. Id. at
164, 359 A.2d at 551.
70. Id. at 165, 359 A.2d at 552.
71. Id.
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liability by stating explicitly that the landlord's liability should also ex-
tend to injuries resulting from criminal acts by third parties in the
common areas. The court made clear, however, that this holding
did not impose a special duty on landlords to protect tenants from
criminal acts on the landlord's property.71
The court considered separately the question of whether this
duty is imposed on the landlord when he has knowledge of substantial
criminal activity on or near the property.74 The court concluded that
if the landlord knew, or should have known, of substantial criminal
activity in the common areas, then the landlord has a duty to take
appropriate measures to eliminate conditions facilitating or contribut-
ing to such activity. 75
Finally, the court in Scott explained that determining proximate
cause is essential to stating a claim in negligence, noting that Mary-
land cases have failed to address the issue of causation in cases with
similar factual contexts.76 The court commented that the approach
offered by the Restatement (Second) of Torts would be a fair solution to
the issue of causation in this context. 7  The Restatement suggests that
even when an actor's conduct creates a situation that allows a third
party to commit a crime, the third party's criminal act is a superseding
cause of harm to the victim, except where the actor knew, or should
have known at the time of acting, that a situation might arise where
the third party was likely to commit a crime. 7' Relying on the Restate-
ment, the court concluded that if a landlord breaches a duty, it is only
72. Id. at 165-66, 359 A.2d at 552.
73. Id. at 166, 359 A.2d at 552. The court declined to accept the holding in Kline v.
1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970), upon which Scott
relied heavily. Scott, 278 Md. at 167, 359 A.2d at 553. In Kline, the majority found that the
landlord had both a specific duty to protect tenants from crimes on the premises and a
contractual obligation to properly maintain the security devices that the landlord had in-
stalled. 439 F.2d at 477.
74. Scott, 278 Md. at 168, 359 A.2d at 553.
75. Id. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554. The court noted that this duty arises from criminal
activity on the property rather than in the neighborhood or the surrounding area. Id. In
the three months prior to Scott's murder, there were two apartment burglaries, a car theft
from the garage, and a rape and robbery in one of the stores on the ground level of the
apartment complex. Id. at 170, 359 A.2d at 554. The court found these activities were
sufficient evidence that the landlord knew, or should have known, of substantial criminal
activity on the property. Id
76. Id. at 171, 359 A.2d at 555. The court noted that other jurisdictions were split on
the issue of causation in this context. Id.
77. Id. at 172-73, 359 A.2d at 556.
78. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 488 (1965)).
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liable for the breach if its actions increase the likelihood of crime by a
third party.
79
Since Scott, there have been several subsequent cases defining the
scope of a landlord's duty to its tenants. In Shields v. Wagman,8 0 the
court held a landlord of a commercial area liable for the injuries sus-
tained by a tenant and a customer when they were attacked by another
tenant's pit bull.s ' Both victims were attacked in the parking lot of
the strip mall, after the pit bull escaped from its owner's shop.8 2
There was sufficient evidence that the landlord was aware the tenant
owned a pit bull and kept it at his shop.8 3 The court reasoned that the
landlord was liable because he knew of the potential danger
presented by the pit bull and had the ability to eliminate the risk it
posed to others.8 4 The court explicitly stated that it was refraining
from deciding whether or not such a rule applies to injuries occurring
in the leased premises, rather than the common area.
8 5
In Matthews v. Amberwood Associates Limited Partnership,"6 the court
held a landlord liable for the death of a tenant's guest, which oc-
curred in the tenant's leased premises and was caused by the tenant's
pit bull. 7 The court specifically stated that although a landlord is not
generally liable for injuries that occur due to dangerous conditions in
the leased premises after a tenant has taken control, this rule is not
without exceptions."' The court concluded that the jury was justified
in finding the landlord had breached a duty based on four factors.8s
First, the landlord retained control in the lease over the matter of
animals in tenants' apartments.9 ° The lease contained a clause
prohibiting tenants from having pets on the premises, a breach of
which would result in defaulting on the lease. 9 ' Second, pit bulls have
a propensity for dangerousness.9 2 Third, the landlord had knowledge
79. Id. at 173, 359 A.2d at 556.
80. 350 Md. 666, 714 A.2d 881 (1998).
81. Id. at 690, 714 A.2d at 892-93.
82. Id. at 671-72, 714 A.2d at 883.
83. Id. at 687, 714 A.2d at 891.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 690, 714 A.2d at 893.
86. 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119 (1998).
87. Id. at 544, 548, 719 A.2d at 119, 120.
88. Id. at 555, 719 A.2d at 124.
89. Id. at 570, 719 A.2d at 131-32.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 558, 719 A.2d at 125-26. Such a provision would have allowed the landlord
legally to evict the tenant for breach of lease if she failed to get rid of the dog. Id.
92. Id. at 570, 719 A.2d at 131-32. The court cited several opinions recognizing the
excessive dangerousness of pit bulls. Id. at 561-63, 719 A.2d at 127-28.
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of the pit bull's past vicious behavior.9 3 Several maintenance workers
had reported to the manager that they had been attacked, or nearly
attacked, by the dog.9 4 Fourth, the harm caused by the dog was fore-
seeable.9 5 The court reasoned that the maintenance workers' testimo-
nies established that the dog's attack was clearly foreseeable. 96 This
case, therefore, expanded the potential liability of landlords for dam-
ages within leased premises, emphasizing the foreseeability of the
harm and the landlord's control over the harm.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Hemmings, the court held that "a
landlord has a duty to repair a known dangerous or defective condi-
tion" to protect a tenant from a third party attack within the leased
premises, provided that the condition is under the landlord's control,
and the attack was reasonably foreseeable. 7 Writing for the major-
ity, 9 8 Judge Battaglia first explained that a landlord's duty in a particu-
lar case depends on the following factors developed through case law:
(1) the landlord's control over the defective or dangerous condition,
(2) the landlord's knowledge of the condition, and (3) the foresee-
ability that the particular harm would have resulted from the
condition.99
The court reasoned that the amount of control that a landlord
possesses over a condition has always been a crucial factor in evaluat-
ing a landlord's liability.1 00 Typically in cases where the landlord has
been held liable, the court observed that the landlord has retained
control over an area either because the area is a common space for all
tenants, or because the landlord has specified control through a
clause in the lease.' If a landlord has relinquished control of an
area, however, the court noted that the landlord generally is not re-
sponsible for maintaining the area.10 2 The court observed that the
landlord's liability includes a tenant's injuries that occur in common
areas, whether due to defective property or third party criminal at-
93. Id. at 570, 719 A.2d at 131-32.
94. Id. at 549-50, 719 A.2d at 121.
95. Id. at 570, 719 A.2d at 131-32.
96. Id. at 561, 719 A.2d at 127.
97. Hemmings, 375 Md. at 533, 826 A.2d at 450.
98. Id. at 526, 826 A.2d at 445. Judges Bell, Eldridge, and Wilnerjoined the opinion.
Id.
99. Id. at 537, 826 A.2d at 452.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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tacks, because the landlord has the ability to prevent or rectify such
conditions.
1 0 3
The court then analyzed the second factor in determining a land-
lord's duty, stating that if a landlord knows, or should know, about
criminal activity taking place on the property, it has a duty to amelio-
rate the conditions facilitating such activity. 104
Finally, the court established a standard for the foreseeability fac-
tor of assessing a landlord's liability.10 5 The court reasoned that a
harm is foreseeable if an ordinary and reasonable person, who knew
of the dangerous or defective condition, should have foreseen the
harmful results.106 Specifically, in the context of the landlord-tenant
relationship, the court determined that this standard requires a land-
lord to evaluate the kind of criminal activity known to have taken
place on the premises and to act to prevent the kind of harms that an
ordinary person would associate with such activity. 107
The court then addressed the Court of Special Appeals' argu-
ment that its holding in Scott should not apply to the current case
because the criminal activity at issue took place inside the leased
premises instead of common area.'0 8 The court found persuasive
Hemmings' argument that Scott should apply because the court has
previously held that a landlord can be liable for foreseeable injuries
that occur in the leased premises that are caused by the landlord's
negligent maintenance of the common areas.1 09 The court reasoned
that its holding in 2310 Madison Avenue and Kinnierjustified the con-
clusion that a landlord's duty to maintain reasonably safe common
areas to protect tenants from criminal activity also extends to injuries
from such criminal activity that might occur within the leased prem-
ises. " 0 In other words, the court concluded that a landlord's liability
103. Id. at 538-39, 826 A.2d at 453.
104. Id. at 540-41, 826 A.2d at 454. Quoting Scott, the court explained that a landlord's
duty arises from knowledge of criminal activity taking place on the premises, and not from
general knowledge of crime in the surrounding neighborhood. Id. at 540, 826 A.2d at 454
(citation omitted).
105. Id. at 541, 826 A.2d at 454.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 541-42, 826 A.2d at 454-55.
109. Id. at 542, 826 A.2d at 455.
110. Id. at 543, 826 A.2d at 455. In 2310 Madison Avenue, Inc. v. Allied Bedding Manufac-
turing Co., the court held the landlord liable for water damage to a tenant's apartment even
though the injury occurred within the leased premises. 209 Md. 399, 408-10, 121 A.2d 203,
209-10 (1956). The drainage system that leaked, however, was part of the water system
employed by the whole building. Id. In Kinnier v. JRM. Adams, Inc., the court held that a
jury should decide if the landlord was negligent when a pipe burst and damaged items in
the tenant's apartment. 142 Md. 305, 309, 120 A. 838, 840 (1923).
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is not precluded solely because the injury took place in the leased
premises.1 1
The court also defined the landlord's duty by reasoning that once
a landlord undertakes to provide certain security devices, it must
maintain these devices in reasonable condition." 2 The court applied
this basic principle of tort law here as it had in Scott, stating that a duty
arises if a landlord voluntarily acts to initiate security measures.1 1
Even if a duty does not exist to actually initiate these measures, the
court reasoned, once a landlord does so, it has a continuing duty to
ensure that the measures are taken." 4 The court stated that for a
landlord to fulfill this duty, it must regularly inspect and maintain the
security measures, using ordinary care and diligence.' 15 The court
found this duty analogous to the duty to keep the areas under the
landlord's control in a reasonably safe condition.' 16 As applied to
Hemmings, the court concluded that the landlord had a duty to main-
tain the exterior lighting at Pelham Wood. 1 7
The court disagreed with the trial judge's ruling that the Land-
lord fulfilled its duty to the Hemmings by providing a working lock on
the sliding glass door.1 8 The court stated that the trial court's conclu-
sion that the Landlord had fulfilled his duty was the result of insuffi-
cient analysis.1 ' In contrast to the trial court, the Court of Appeals
found that the Landlord had a duty to maintain the outdoor lighting,
111. Hemmings, 375 Md. at 543, 826 A.2d at 455.
112. Id. at 546-47, 826 A.2d at 457-58.
113. Id. at 546, 826 A.2d at 457 (quoting Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 171, 359 A.2d
548, 555 (1976)).
114. Id. at 547, 826 A.2d at 458.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Langley Park Apts., Sec. H., Inc. v. Lund Adm'r, 234 Md. 402, 407, 199
A.2d 620, 623 (1964)).
117. Id. at 548, 826 A.2d at 458. The court refuted the Landlord's argument that other
jurisdictions support a finding that the Landlord fulfilled its duty to the Hemmings. Id. at
543-44, 826 A.2d at 456. The court reasoned that although the facts of Cramer v. Balcour
Property Management, 441 S.E.2d 317 (S.C. 1994), were almost identical to Hemmings, the law
in* Maryland holds landlords to a different standard than the law of South Carolina. Hem-
mings, 375 Md. at 544, 826 A.2d at 455. The court noted that in South Carolina, a landlord
is not liable for the criminal acts of third parties, even if such attacks occur in common
areas. Id. at 543-44, 826 A.2d at 455.
The court went on to distinguish several cases from other jurisdictions that the Court
of Special Appeals cited approvingly in support of its conclusion that the Hemmings' land-
lord was not liable. Id. at 545, 826 A.2d at 457. In rebuttal, the court offered several cases
from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that a landlord may be held liable for
injuries that occur within the leased premises, but result from the landlord's failure to
adequately maintain the common areas. Id. at 545-46, 826 A.2d at 457.
118. Id. at 548, 826 A.2d at 458.
119. Id. The trial court's conclusion that the Landlord fulfilled his duty was based solely
on the fact that the Landlord provided a functioning lock on the patio door. Id. The
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which it provided as a crime deterrent. 20 Accordingly, the court re-
manded the case for a closer evaluation of whether the Landlord had
breached its duty to properly maintain e xisting security devices. 12
In her dissent, Judge Raker focused on the Landlord's inability to
exercise control over a tenant's apartment once it has been leased. 122
First, Judge Raker emphasized that there was no evidence that the
Landlord had notice that the exterior lighting was defective, because
it had not received any complaints.1 21 Judge Raker reasoned that no
general duty exists to protect another person from crime, and the
court has not imposed a special duty on landlords. 124 Furthermore,
even if the Landlord had a duty to maintain this lighting, Judge Raker
argued that it was illogical to extend this duty to include protecting
tenants from injury within the leased premises. 125 Judge Raker also
argued that the majority should not have applied Scott to the present
case, because in Scott the murder occurred in the common area of the
premises.126 Finally, Judge Raker contended that it was problematic
and unsupported for the majority to reach its conclusion by combin-
ing two different lines of case law: cases where a landlord was held
liable for physical harm suffered by tenants in the common area and
cases where a landlord was held liable for property damage within a
leased premises that was caused by a condition in the common
area. 127
4. Analysis.-The court in Hemmings held that "a landlord has a
duty to repair a known dangerous and defective condition" to protect
a tenant from a third party attack within the leased premises, provided
Court of Appeals found that this analysis failed to consider other relevant factors in deter-
mining the scope of the Landlord's liability. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 546-48, 826 A.2d at 457-59.
122. Id. at 549, 826 A.2d at 459 (Raker, J., dissenting). Judges Cathell and Harrell
joined in the dissent. Id.
123. Id. at 550, 826 A.2d at 459-60.
124. Id. at 551-52, 826 A.2d at 460-61. In addition, Judge Raker found the majority's
argument that the Landlord in the present case voluntarily assumed a duty of protection
unpersuasive. Id. at 553, 826 A.2d at 461. According to Judge Raker, the installation of a
light in the rear of the building was insufficient to constitute a voluntary undertaking of
security within the apartment. Id. Furthermore, she reasoned that the failure to maintain
the outside lighting did not make it foreseeable that a murder would occur within a ten-
ant's apartment. Id. at 561, 826 A.2d at 466.
125. Id. at 551-54, 826 A.2d at 460-62.
126. Id. at 554-55, 826 A.2d at 462-63.
127. Id. at 556-57, 826 A.2d at 463. In a separate dissent, Judge Cathell remarked that
the majority's decision effectively makes a landlord an insurer against crime. Id. at 562,
826 A.2d at 467 (Cathell,J., dissenting). To support this argument, Judge Cathell cited the
reasons set forth in the dissenting opinion of Matthews. Id.
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that the condition is under the landlord's control, and the attack was
reasonably foreseeable.1 2 This conclusion is consistent with Mary-
land case law and follows logically from the court's holdings in Mat-
thews and Scott.'2 ' In reaching this decision, however, the majority
relied too heavily on its holdings in 2310 Madison Avenue and Kinnier,
both of which held a landlord liable for property damage within a
leased premises. 13 0 As Judge Raker noted in her dissent, this reason-
ing is problematic because the majority is applying rules for property
damage to a situation involving physical harm to a tenant, without any
support. 13 1 The majority could have reached the same conclusion
and avoided this problematic reasoning by relying more heavily on
Matthews and Scott.132 The majority should have shown that the con-
clusion in Hemmings follows logically from the holdings in these two
cases, which contain more similar fact patterns to Hemmings and are
more recent decisions of the court.133 In addition, there are several
policy arguments that support the majority's holding and offset the
policy concerns raised by the dissent.
a. Misplaced Reliance on Property Damage Cases.-The majority
relied heavily on the court's previous holdings in 2310 Madison Avenue
and Kinnier to reach the conclusion that a landlord can be held liable
for a tenant's injury that occurs within the leased premises.' The
distinctive element in Hemmings is that the injury to the tenant oc-
curred within the leased premises, rather than in the common area. 1
35
If Hemmings had been murdered in a common area at Pelham Wood,
the court could have simply applied the standard of duty for a land-
lord determined in Scott and concluded that the landlord breached
128. Id. at 533, 826 A.2d at 450.
129. See Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 351 Md. 544, 570, 719 A.2d 119,
131-32 (1998) (holding that a landlord can be held liable for a dangerous condition in the
leased premises when the landlord knew of the condition and could have reasonably fore-
seen the harm); Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 165, 359 A.2d 548, 552 (1976) (holding that
a landlord can be liable for reasonably foreseeable crimes that occur in a common area).
130. See 2310 Madison Ave., Inc. v. Allied Bedding Mfg. Co., 209 Md. 399, 411-12, 121
A.2d 203, 210 (1956) (holding a landlord liable for damage inside an apartment due to
flooding); Kinnier v. J.R.M. Adams, Inc., 142 Md. 305, 308-09, 120 A. 838, 840 (1923)
(holding a landlord liable for damage to an apartment from broken water pipes).
131. Hemmings, 375 Md. at 556-57, 826 A.2d at 463 (Raker, J., dissenting).
132. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 548, 719 A.2d at 120 (involving a wrongful death suit for a
social guest killed by a tenant's pit bull); Scott, 278 Md. 160, 161, 359 A.2d 548, 549-50
(involving a wrongful death action for the murder of a tenant).
133. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 550, 719 A.2d at 121-22 (where victim was attacked within
the tenant's apartment); Scott, 278 Md. at 162-63, 359 A.2d at 550 (where tenant was mur-
dered by an unknown third party).
134. Hemmings, 375 Md. at 542-43, 826 A.2d at 455.
135. Id. at 522, 826 A.2d at 443.
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his duty to provide a reasonable amount of security in the common
areas."' 6 Because Hemmings' murder occurred within the leased
premises, however, the court had to expand the Landlord's duty
under current Maryland law to find the Landlord liable. 13 7 The court
justified this expansion of duty by using its holdings in 2310 Madison
Avenue and Kinnier to support its contention that the landlord's liabil-
ity is not necessarily precluded solely because the injury occurred
within the leased premises, rather than in the common area.13 The
landlord can be held liable for injuries occurring in the leased prem-
ises, if the injuries resulted from the landlord's failure to correct a
defect in the common area, over which it had control.'39 Although
these cases deal with water damage, the majority argued that it follows
from these cases that a landlord's duty to provide a reasonable level of
security in the common areas, as set forth in Scott, also extends to
preventing injuries that occur in the leased premises. 140  Further-
more, the majority stated that the holdings in these cases support the
application of Scott to Hemmings, even though the attack occurred
within the leased premises. 4 ' The majority offered no other support
for expanding the Landlord's duty, but relied solely on 2310 Madison
Avenue and Kinnier to justify holding a landlord liable when the crimi-
nal attack occurred within the leased premises, rather than in the
common area.
14 2
This comparison represents a logical inconsistency, which the ma-
jority failed to address. Cases involving property damage and cases
involving physical harm as a result of a third party criminal attack have
vast factual dissimilarities, as well as different legal implications.1 43 As
Judge Raker stated in her dissenting opinion, there is no authority or
case in the country that supports the majority's combination of two
different lines of cases.' 4 4 In both 2310 Madison Avenue and Kinnier,
136. Scott, 278 Md. at 168-69, 359 A.2d at 553-54. The court asserted that "if the land-
lord knows, or should know, of criminal activity against persons or property in the com-
mon areas, he then has a duty to take reasonable measures, in view of the existing
circumstances, to eliminate the conditions contributing to the criminal activity." Id. at 169,
359 A.2d at 554.
137. See id. (representing the standard, previous to Hemmings, for a landlord's duty to
tenants for injury from third-party attacks within the common areas).
138. Hemmings, 375 Md. at 542-43, 826 A.2d at 455.
139. Kinnier v. J.R.M. Adams, Inc., 142 Md. 305, 307, 120 A. 838, 839 (1923).
140. Hemmings, 375 Md. at 542-43, 826 A.2d at 455.
141. Id. at 543, 826 A.2d at 455.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 556-57, 826 A.2d at 463 (Raker, J., dissenting) (noting two separate lines of
case law in Maryland for property damage and physical harm).
144. Id.
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on which the majority relies, the property damage resulted from main-
tenance problems, and there was no crime involved.' 45 In Hemmings,
however, a tenant was murdered by a third-party criminal. 14 6 Third-
party criminal attacks raise unique causation issues, which are not pre-
sent in the property damage cases. 14 7 The majority does not address
the inadequacy of applying cases that deal solely with property dam-
age to a wrongful death case, such as Hemmings, nor does it offer addi-
tional support for this expansion of a landlord's duty.'4 8
b. Adequate Support Available in Matthews and Scott.-Rather
than making this unqualified jump, the majority could have shown
how holding the landlord liable in Hemmings follows directly from
Matthews and Scott. In Matthews, the court explicitly stated that a land-
lord's ability to control a condition may render it liable for defective
or dangerous conditions within the leased premises. 149 A "common
thread" in the cases where the court has found the landlord liable is
the landlord's ability to exercise control over the condition and pre-
vent harm from occurring.150 The distinction between a common
area and a leased premises, therefore, is important because of the pol-
icy considerations behind the distinction, namely that it would be un-
fair to hold a landlord responsible for injuries resulting from
conditions over which it had no control. 15' The common-area distinc-
tion acts as a guideline, rather than a bright-line rule, for ensuring
that the landlord will not be held liable for matters out of his
control.'52
Judge Raker's concerns in dissent do not diminish the applicabil-
ity of Matthews. Judge Raker asserted that Matthews offers no support
145. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (describing the facts of 2310 Madison
Avenue and Kinnier).
146. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing Hemmings's murder).
147. See Scott, 278 Md. at 171-72, 359 A.2d at 555 (exploring the split authority on the
issue of whether third party criminal attacks constitute a superseding cause, thereby reliev-
ing a landlord's liability).
148. See Hemmings, 375 Md. at 542-43, 826 A.2d at 455 (offering no discussion of the
factual differences between injury to property and injury to persons).
149. Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 351 Md. 544, 557, 719 A.2d 119, 125
(1998).
150. Id. at 556-57, 719 A.2d at 125.
151. See id. (stating that the principal reason that landlords are not normally held liable
for injuries that occur within the leased premises is that the landlord has parted with con-
trol (quoting Marshall v. Price, 162 Md. 687, 689, 161 A. 171, 172 (1932)).
152. See id. at 555, 719 A.2d at 124 (asserting that there are exceptions to the general
principle that a landlord should not be held liable for damages that occur within the
leased premises).
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for Hemmings' case.' 53 Judge Raker argued that in Matthews, the
landlord was aware that a tenant violated the lease that contained a
clause prohibiting pets.154 This clause illustrated that the landlord
clearly retained control over the condition in question. 55 Judge
Raker oversimplified the holding in Matthews.156 The court in Mat-
thews specified that there is no simple formula for determining
whether a landlord is liable; rather, a court must balance many factors
depending on the particular circumstances of the case. 157 In deter-
mining a landlord's duty, the court should consider policy concerns
relevant to whether the plaintiff should be protected by law from the
defendant's conduct.
15 8
Scott, a powerful precedent because of its extensive factual similar-
ities to Hemmings, also emphasized that the common area-leased
premises distinction is merely a means for measuring the landlord's
control over the defect. 159 In Scott, the court held that if the landlord
knows or should know of criminal activity in the common areas, he
has a duty to take reasonable measures to eliminate conditions that
might foster such activity.1 6 ° Although the tenant in Scott was mur-
dered in the common area, the reasoning behind the holding can also
logically be applied to situations where the injury occurs within the
leased premises, as long as the dangerous or defective condition is
under the landlord's control.16 1 The reasoning extends because the
court in Scott repeatedly emphasized the importance of the landlord's
control over a dangerous condition, and not simply the location of
this condition. 62 Thus, as long as the landlord has control over a
dangerous condition, his liability should not be precluded solely be-
cause this condition is not within the common area of the property.163
153. Hemmings, 375 Md. at 555, 826 A.2d at 463.
154. Id. at 555-56, 826 A.2d at 463.
155. Matthews, 351 Md. at 565, 719 A.2d at 129.
156. See id. (specifying that the court was not holding that the landlord is liable solely
because he retained, in the lease, control over certain matters within the leased premises).
157. Id. at 565-66, 719 A-2d at 129.
158. Id. at 566, 719 A.2d at 129 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 335 Md. 58, 77, 642 A.2d
180, 189 (1994)).
159. SeeScottv. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 165-66, 169, 359 A.2d 548, 552, 554 (1976) (assert-
ing repeatedly that a landlord may be held liable for criminal activity occurring in common
areas under the landlord's control) (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554.
161. See id. (emphasizing the landlord's ability to control the situation because he knew
of the crime and could control the situation).
162. See id. at 168-73, 359 A.2d at 553-56 (discussing the common area distinction in
conjunction with the landlord's control over the condition).
163. See id. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554 (reasoning that a landlord's duty to exercise reasona-
ble care to ensure safety within the common areas under his control is flexible enough so
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The majority should have reasoned, based on the facts, that hold-
ing the Landlord in Hemmings liable follows logically from the reason-
ing behind the common area-leased premises distinction. Although
Hemmings was murdered in his apartment, the intruder entered
through the rear of the building.1 64 Among the security devices im-
plemented by the Landlord were exterior lights around the property
and a roof light in the back of the building.1 6 5 Although there is con-
testation over the effectiveness of the lighting, there is no question
that the Landlord attempted to provide some exterior lighting, and
that it had exclusive control over the lighting in the rear area of the
building, which is a common area. 166 In dissent, Judge Raker recog-
nized that many courts have held that where a landlord retains con-
trol over a security device, it faces potential liability if a reasonable
person could have seen that the failure to act would render tenants
susceptible to crime. 167 A reasonable person could foresee that the
failure to maintain, or perhaps expand, the security devices at Pelham
Wood could render the tenants susceptible to crime.' 68 The Land-
lord in Hemmings was fully aware of criminal activity on the prem-
ises.a6 9  In addition to complaints from tenants, the police
department, on more than one occasion, asked the Landlord for assis-
tance in monitoring crime. 70 In Scott, where the court held the land-
lord liable for a tenant's murder, the only evidence of the landlord's
knowledge of criminal activity was that it recently learned of five or six
illegal entries into tenants' apartments. 1 71 The landlord in Scott had
no knowledge of crime involving harm to persons in the common ar-
eas before the murder of the tenant's daughter.' 7 2 The Landlord in
as not to make landlords general insurers against crime). The Scott court also reasoned
that, according to Maryland law, landlords have a duty to exercise reasonable care for their
tenant's safety, although they do not have a special duty to protect tenants from crime. Id.
at 167, 359 A.2d at 553. The court found that this duty should be analyzed according to
traditional principles of negligence, such as proximate cause, in order to determine liabil-
ity for a breach. Id.
164. Hemmings, 375 Md. at 528, 826 A.2d at 447.
165. Id. at 528-30, 826 A.2d at 44748.
166. See id. at 528, 826 A.2d at 446-47 (describing exterior lighting as one of the security
devices implemented by the Landlord).
167. Id. at 550-51 n.2, 826 A.2d at 460 n.2 (quoting Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455, 459
(Okla. 1986)).
168. See id. at 529-30, 826 A.2d at 447-48 (detailing the extensive tenant complaints
about crime at Pelham Wood).
169. See id. at 531, 826 A.2d at 448 (stating that the Landlord maintained files of tenant
complaints on the premises, including complaints about armed robbery, robbery, threats
at gunpoint, and theft within apartment units).
170. Id.
171. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 164, 359 A.2d 549, 551 (1976).
172. Id.
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Hemmings, in contrast, had substantial knowledge of violent crime in
the common areas.
173
In addition to general knowledge of criminal activity on the
premises, the Landlord should have realized that the Hemmings' spe-
cific unit could be targeted.' 74 Multiple testimonies from other te-
nants revealed that the rear of the building behind the Hemmings'
apartment was quite dark. t 75 The Hemmings' apartment unit had
been burglarized before their occupancy, and the intruder entered
through the same sliding glass door.1 76 After Mr. Hemmings' murder,
the Landlord installed additional lighting in the rear of the building,
according to one tenant. 77 In totality, these facts indicate that the
majority could have applied Matthews and Scott directly to Hemmings in
order to reach its conclusion, thereby avoiding the illogical connec-
tion of two separate lines of cases. Considering that Scott and Matthews
both emphasized that the landlord's ability to control a dangerous
condition may make him liable for injuries resulting from such a con-
dition,178 the court could have argued for the Landlord's liability
based on his control over the security devices at Pelham Wood. His
control over the security devices on the premises put him in a better
position than the tenants to maintain these devices and avoid criminal
activity.
c. Policy Considerations Support the Landlord's Liability.-In
Hemmings, the majority did not cite any policy reasons to justify its
decision to extend a landlord's liability to tenants for criminal activity
occurring within the leased premises. 179 In contrast, Judge Raker
identified several serious policy concerns in her dissenting opinion.' 8 °
First, Judge Raker stated repeatedly that a landlord does not have a
general duty to ensure that tenants are safe. 8 ' Second, Judge Raker
introduced the possibility that holding a landlord liable for security
measures that it has voluntarily installed might have the effect of dis-
173. Hemmings, 375 Md. at 531, 826 A.2d at 448.
174. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (stating that the unit that the Hem-
mings leased was burglarized before their occupancy).
175. Hemmings, 375 Md. at 529-30, 826 A.2d at 447-48.
176. Id. at 531, 826 A.2d at 448.
177. Id. at 529-30, 826 A.2d at 447.
178. See supra notes 132, 142 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the
landlord's level of control).
179. Hemmings, 375 Md. at 535-48, 826 A.2d at 451-58.
180. Id. at 549-62, 826 A.2d at 459-66.
181. Id. at 550-52, 826 A.2d at 459-60.
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couraging landlords from increasing security.18 2 Judge Raker offered
support from treatises and other jurisdictions for the proposition that
it is unfair, for public policy reasons, to hold landlords liable for crimi-
nal attacks within the leased premises." 3 Judge Raker specifically re-
ferred to the reasons set forth in Kline, which explain why such
liability is unfair: it is often difficult to determine when crimes are
foreseeable; a criminal attack by a third party typically constitutes a
superceding cause; the economic consequences of imposing this duty
on landlords; the conflict with assigning private persons the duty to
protect citizens from crime, as opposed to the government.1 84
Although the majority did not directly refute these concerns, the
court has employed policy arguments in past opinions that would
strengthen the result in Hemmings."s5 Although Judge Raker has a le-
gitimate concern that holding the Landlord in Hemmings liable would
impose an affirmative duty on landlords, this policy consideration
should not be determinative of the issue.18 6 On the other hand, a
landlord is in a better position to promote security on the premises
than individual tenants.'8 7 The tenant has a limited ability to protect
himself, because he has partially submitted to the control of the land-
lord.' By virtue of this control, a duty should be imposed on the
landlord to take reasonable precautionary measures against criminal
attacks. 189 In addition, the majority should have shown that although
Judge Raker argued that holding a landlord liable would provide dis-
182. Id. at 558-59, 826 A.2d at 464-65 (quoting Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632
N.W.2d 666, 675 (Minn. 2001)).
183. Id. at 559-60, 826 A.2d at 465. Judge Raker cited Bartley v. Sweetser, 890 S.W.2d 250,
251 (Ark. 1994), which stated that courts have generally held that it is unfair to impose a
duty to protect on landlords, and ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKi, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND
TENANT 217 (1980), which suggested that the traditional view is that it is unfair to assign
landlords a duty to protect. Id.
184. Id. at 559, 826 A.2d at 465.
185. See Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 351 Md. 544, 570, 719 A.2d 119,
132 (1998) (stating that one incentive for imposing liability is to provide incentive to other
defendants to act in order to avoid such liability); Langley Park Apts., Sec. H., Inc. v. Lund
Adm'r, 234 Md. 402, 408, 199 A.2d 620, 623 (1964) (concluding that it would be impracti-
cal to hold the tenants responsible for clearing the common walkways in the event of snow,
as most tenants would not be able to perform the task).
186. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 566, 719 A.2d at 129 (asserting that various policy consider-
ations should be weighed against each other in determining a landlord's liability).
187. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 480-81 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (stat-
ing that landlords have the control and power to act against assaults from third parties).
188. See id. at 483 (stating that the tenant's ability to protect himself has been limited as
a result of partially submitting to the landlord's control).
189. See id. (asserting that where the landlord is on notice of crime, and has the power
to act preventatively, it is fair to impose on him the duty to do so).
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incentive, evidence exists to the contrary. 19" Holding a landlord liable
in a case like Hemmings provides strong incentive for other landlords
to rectify dangerous conditions on their premises, thereby promoting
safety.'9 1 Furthermore, it would be impractical to assign the tenants
the duty to maintain the exterior lighting of the building because the
average tenant would not have the resources to perform such a
responsibility.' 
9 2
5. Conclusion.-In Hemmings v. Pelham Wood L.L.L.P., the Court
of Appeals considered whether a landlord has a duty to fix a danger-
ous or defective condition of which the landlord knows and is able to
control to prevent a foreseeable third part), criminal attack within the
leased premises.'9 3 In holding that a landlord's duty to provide a rea-
sonable amount of security in the common areas extends to prevent-
ing foreseeable injuries within the leased premises as well, the court
extended landlord liability.' 94 Although this extension was justifiable
and consistent with precedent, the court's argument was weakened by
logical inconsistencies.' 9 5 In reaching this conclusion, the court re-
lied heavily on its holdings in previous cases involving property dam-
age, and should have relied on more relevant cases that address a
landlord's liability to prevent physical attacks on tenants.' 96 In addi-
tion, developing policy considerations to support its holding would
have strengthened the court's argument for this compelling
conclusion.' 97
CATHERINE A. HODGETTS
190. See Matthews, 351 Md. at 570, 719 A.2d at 132 (quoting PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAw OF TORTS § 4, at 25-26 (5th ed. 1984) and stating that when defendants realize
through court decisions that they are in danger of being held liable, there is a strong
incentive to prevent such liability).
191. Id.
192. See Langley Park Apts., Sec. H., Inc. v. Lund Adm'r, 234 Md. 402, 408, 199 A.2d 620,
623 (1964) (concluding that it would be unreasonable to hold the tenants responsible for
clearing the common walkways in the event of snow, as most tenants would not be able to
perform the task).
193. Hemmings, 375 Md. at 526, 826 A.2d at 445-46.
194. Id. at 543, 826 A.2d at 455.
195. See supra notes 142-148 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with rely-
ing on property damage cases for support).
196. See supra notes 149-178 and accompanying text (illustrating how the expansion of a
landlord's liability follows logically from Matthews and Scott).
197. See supra notes 179-192 and accompanying text (describing how various policy con-
siderations support the court's holding).
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B. Attainment of Legal Age: An Interpretation of the Statute
of Limitations
In Mason v. Board of Education of Baltimore County,' the Court of
Appeals of Maryland considered whether, for the purposes of the stat-
ute of limitations, a minor becomes an adult on the day before the
minor's eighteenth birthday or on the day of the minor's eighteenth
birthday.2 The court decided that the common law coming of age
rule3 was the appropriate method of determining a person's age.4 As
such, the court held that Mason, a minor, became an adult the day
before her eighteenth birthday.5 Consequently, although the three-
year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the minor turns
eighteen for causes of action that accrue when a person is a minor,
the court concluded that Mason's suit was barred by the statute of
limitations because the coming of age rule required her to file the suit
on the day before her twenty-first birthday.6 The court based its deci-
sion on the policy arguments promoted by the coming of age rule.7
However, the court's decision is not consistent with the rationale un-
derlying the statute of limitations.' Additionally, the decision does
not accord with the court's own precedent favoring a flexible applica-
tion of the statute of limitations in cases where the plaintiff has contin-
1. 375 Md. 504, 826 A.2d 433 (2003).
2. Id. at 506, 826 A.2d at 433-34.
3. The coming of age rule is the common law rule for computing a person's age. Id.
at 506, 826 A.2d at 434. Age calculation according to the rule includes the day the person
is born; therefore, a person "attains a given age on the day preceding the anniversary of
their birth." Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 514, 826 A.2d at 438; see MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-201 (2002)
("When a cause of action ... accrues in favor of a minor... that person shall file his action
within the lesser of three years or the applicable period of limitations after the date the
disability is removed.").
7. Mason, 375 Md. at 509, 826 A.2d at 435-36. The majority stated that the coming of
age rule was a legal fiction created to further expediency and uniform interpretation of the
law. Id at 508, 826 A.2d at 435. In addition, it offered a mathematical justification for
adopting the rule, stating that "[b]ecause a person is in existence on the day of his
birth.., he has lived one year and one day on the first anniversary of his birth." Id. at 510,
826 A.2d at 436. Adopting the rule in light of this observation made sense because the
common law did not recognize fractions of days, and Maryland has never required mathe-
matic exactitude in computing time. Id. The court also bolstered its argument with an
equitable policy justification to protect minors by not allowing them to "lose part of their
adulthood to a legal fiction." Id.
8. See infra notes 69-94 and accompanying text (describing the policy justifications
behind the statute of limitations).
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uously and diligently pursued the lawsuit.9 Finally, the court's
decision contradicts the equitable justification for the coming of age
rule.10
1. The Case.-In 1993, Shelley Mason was fourteen years old and
a special education student at a public school in Baltimore County."'
For three months, Mason was sexually harassed by male classmates
who touched her inappropriately and made sexual comments to
her.12 As a result, Mason became terrified of going to school. 13 When
Mason's mother reported the abuse to Mason's teacher, the principal,
and the Director of Middle Schools for the Region, each promised to
resolve the situation.14 However, when the boys involved in the abuse
returned from a discussion with the principal, they announced to the
class that Mason had told the principal they had sexually harassed
her.15 In response, the teacher scolded Mason for reporting the
abuse but said nothing when one of the boys called Mason a "liar" and
a "snitch" in front of the entire class.' 6
As a result of the harassment, Mason suffered emotional trauma
and was unable to attend class regularly.17 Mason filed a negligence
suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on April 4, 2000, nam-
ing the Board of Education of Baltimore County, Mason's middle
school principal, and her teacher as defendants."8 The complaint al-
leged that Mason suffered "emotional injury" as a result of negligent
supervision by her teacher and principal. 9
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing
that the statute of limitations barred Mason's claim. 20 To determine
9. See Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 76, 394 A.2d 300, 302 (1978)
(finding that a rigid application of the statute of limitations would harm a reasonably dili-
gent plaintiff because a person who develops a disease years after exposure "cannot have
known the existence of the tort until some injury manifests itself"); see also infra notes 75-94
and accompanying text (explaining situations in which Maryland courts have flexibly ap-
plied the statute of limitations where the plaintiff has diligently pursued her claim).
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
11. Brief for Appellant at 4, Mason v. Bd. of Educ., 375 Md. 504, 826 A.2d 433 (2003)
(No. 44).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Mason v. Bd. of Educ., 143 Md. App. 507, 508, 795 A.2d 211, 211 (2002).
19. Id. at 508-09, 795 A.2d at 212.
20. Id. at 509, 795 A.2d at 212. Mason was allegedly injured while she was a minor. Id.
As a result, she could not file a lawsuit on her own behalf until she attained the age of
majority, which is eighteen. Id. Therefore, the statute of limitations for Mason's claim did
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whether the statute of limitations precluded Mason's claim, the circuit
court applied the coming of age rule, which holds that a person at-
tains a given age on the day preceding his birthday.2 According to
the coming of age rule, the court reasoned that Mason attained the
age of majority on April 3, 1997, even though she was born on April 4,
1979.22 As a result, the circuit court held that the three-year statute of
limitations barred Mason's claim because she had filed it on her
twenty-first birthday-April 4, 2000-which was one day too late.23
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit
court's decision that the statute of limitations barred Mason's claim,
holding that Mason attained eighteen years of age on April 3, 1997,
the day before her birthday. 24 The court reasoned that the Age of
Majority Act and Maryland Rule 1-203, which describes the general
method for computing time, did not answer the question of when a
minor becomes an adult for the purpose of removing the disability of
infancy. 25 However, the court explained that at common law an ex-
ception to the general method for computing time applied when the
time being computed was an individual's age.2 6 Under the coming of
age exception, the court noted that age was calculated by including
the day of birth in the computation. 2 7 As a result, the court con-
cluded that a person attained his legal age at the earliest moment of
the day before his birthday.2 8
In its opinion, the Court of Special Appeals noted that Maryland
adopted English common law and that the Court of Appeals had rec-
ognized the coming of age rule for calculating age in Carolina Freight
Carriers Corp. v. Keane.29 In addition, the court cited a Maryland regu-
lation, COMAR 10.09.24.05(C) (3), that determines eligibility for Med-
not begin to run until she was eighteen years old, regardless of when her cause of action
had accrued. Id.
21. Mason, 375 Md. at 506, 826 A.2d at 434.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 506-07, 826 A.2d at 434.
25. Mason, 143 Md. App. 507, 510, 795 A.2d 211, 212 (2002); see also MD. ANN. CODE
art. I, § 24 (2002). The Age of Majority Act states that the term "minor," as it pertains to
legal age and capacity, refers to persons "who have not attained the age of eighteen years."
Id; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. I, § 36 (2002) (codifying the English common law method
of computing time and stating in relevant part that "[i]n computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default, after
which the designated period of time begins to run is not included ... [but] the last day of
the period so computed is to be included").
26. Mason, 143 Md. App. at 510, 795 A.2d at 212.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 510, 795 A.2d at 213.
29. Id. at 510-11, 795 A.2d at 213.
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ical Assistance benefits as a statutory use of the coming of age rule.30
Although the court appeared hesitant to apply the coming of age rule,
the court ultimately decided to follow it, opining that it is normally
the province of the legislature to change "long-established common
law rules."31
Mason appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals." The
court granted certiorari to determine whether a minor becomes an
adult on the day of his eighteenth birthday or on the day before his
eighteenth birthday for the purpose of determining when the disabil-
ity of infancy is removed.
2. Legal Background.-At common law, calculating a person's le-
gal age followed the coming of age rule, which was an exception to
the general method of computing time.34 While the General Assem-
bly has codified the common law rule for general time computation, it
has not expressly adopted the coming of age rule for determining a
person's age.35 Furthermore, case law has mentioned the coming of
age rule only once but has never applied it.36 However, a trend has
emerged among various states to refuse to apply the coming of age
rule because the rule is contrary to common understanding.3 7 The
trend rejecting the coming of age rule is supported further by the
rationales underlying the existence of statutes of limitations, which
militate towards applying the general method of time computation.38
a. Common Law Computation of Time.-Under the English
common law, the method of computing time was based on the maxim
that a day is an indivisible point in time.3 9 The common law estab-
30. Id. at 513, 795 A.2d at 214.
31. Id. at 515, 795 A.2d at 215.
32. Mason, 375 Md. at 506, 826 A.2d at 433.
33. Id., 826 A.2d at 433-34.
34. Carolina Freight Carriers v. Keane, 311 Md. 335, 345, 534 A.2d 1337, 1342 (1988).
35. See MD. R. 1-203(a) (2003) (stating the general method for calculating time); see
also MD. ANN. CODE art. I, § 36 (2002) (describing the general method for time
computation).
36. Carolina Freight Carriers, 311 Md. at 345, 534 A.2d at 1342.
37. See, e.g., Velazquez v. State, 648 So. 2d 302, 304 (Fla. App. 1995) (acknowledging
the trend that states are declining to adopt the coming of age rule for computing age).
38. See infta note 72 and accompanying text (stating that the purposes of statutes of
limitations include: (1) saving the courts from needing to litigate stale claims and (2) spar-
ing the citizen from having to defend a case after "memories have faded, witnesses have
died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost").
39. See Fitzwilliam's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 300, 302 (K.B. 1604) (noting the difficulty of
computing time in a case involving the interpretation of a will which granted different
interests in an estate according to the language used in the will).
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lished this principle to bring ease and simplicity to time calculations.4 °
Pursuant to this maxim, the rule for computing time excluded the
first day or the day upon which the cause of action accrued. 4' Thus,
under the general method of time computation, a person would at-
tain his legal age on his birthday.42
However, because every person was born at a particular moment
in time, the period of time that a person lives on the day of his birth-
beginning at birth and terminating at the end of the same day-con-
stituted a fraction of a day.4 3 As a result, the common law developed
an exception to the method of general time computation for the pur-
pose of calculating age.44 Under the exception, the law considered a
person born at 3 a.m. to be born at 12 a.m. on that same day, which
would have been the first moment of the day of her birth.45 Although
this person would only be alive for twenty-one hours at the end of the
day he was born, the law considered him to be one day old.46 Thus,
40. See Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Syme, 57 N.E. 168, 169-70 (N.Y. 1900) ("All rules for
computing time are purely arbitrary. If it were not for the terms of the statute, and the
rights which have become fixed by virtue thereof, one rule would, perhaps, be as good as
another.").
41. United States v. Tucker, 407 A.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. App. 1979) (noting that the
general rule of the common law for computing time "excluded the first day and included
the last").
42. See id. at 1070-71 (noting that the general rule for time computation, if applied to
computing ages, would mean that a person attains an age legally on the day of his birthday,
instead of the day before).
43. See Herbert v. Turball, 83 Eng. Rep. 1129, 1129 (KB. 1663) (describing a situation
in which a man created a will and died on the day before his twenty-first birthday). In
constructing the will the court noted that, although the young man died in one instant on
the day before his twenty-first birthday, the effectiveness of the will was contingent on
whether his death was legally valid on the day before or the day of his twenty-first birthday.
Id.
44. Although the origin of the coming of age rule is unknown, the rule was discussed
in the seventeenth century case Nicols v. Ramsel, 86 Eng. Rep. 1072 (KB. 1677). In Nichols,
the court of common pleas applied the coming of age rule, stating:
So in a devise the question was, whether the testator was of age of not? And the
evidence was, that he was born the first day of January in the afternoon of that
day, and died in the morning on the last day of December: and it was held by all
the Judges that he was of full age; for there shall be no fraction of a day.
Id. at 1073. The earlier case most likely being referred to in the Nichols opinion is Herbert v.
Turball. In Herbert, a testator made a will while he was a minor, but he died the day before
his twenty-first birthday. 83 Eng. Rep. at 1129. The court ruled that the will was valid,
stating that "whatever hour he were born is not material, there being no fractions of days."
Id.
45. See Oregon v. Hansen, 743 P.2d 157, 158 (Or. 1987) (stating that the effect of the
exception to the general rule for calculating time was that "a person reached a given age in
years at the first moment of the day before the person's birthday").
46. Id.
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under this exception-the coming of age rule-a person attains his
legal age on the day before his birthday.47
The common law introduced this legal fiction to protect mi-
nors.4" If a minor did not legally attain the age of majority on the day
before her birthday, she would lose the benefit of being alive for a
fraction of time on her birthday because that fraction would not be
calculated in determining her age.49 Instead of penalizing minors,
the common law decided to award them the benefit of living on the
day of their birth and thus included the full day of their birth in the
age calculation. In particular, because attaining the age of majority
entitles adults to certain rights, the coming of age rule ensured that a
minor would not lose part of the rights accompanying adulthood to a
legal fiction. ° Accordingly, a person would become an adult the day
before his birthday and, therefore, be permitted to exercise a right
like voting one day earlier than he would under the general method
used to compute time.5
b. Common Law Computation of Time in Maryland.-Maryland
adopted the English common law through the Maryland Declaration
of Rights.52 Accordingly, Maryland embraced the common law princi-
ple that the law does not recognize fractions of days.53 The Maryland
Legislature codified this common law maxim in Rule 1-203, creating a
47. Id.
48. See United States v. Tucker, 407 A.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. App. 1979) (noting that the
rule was "originally established to aid persons who would experience hardship or loss by
virtue of the general rule of computation" and citing cases in which a minor was protected
by the rule).
49. In In re Richardson, Judge Story stated in the dictum of a bankruptcy case that:
[I]fa man should be born on the first day of February, at 11 o'clock at night, and
should live to the 31st day of January, twenty-one years after, and should at one
o'clock of the morning of that day make his will, and afterwards die by six o'clock
in the evening of the same day, he will be held to be of age, and his will adjudged
good. Here the rule is applied in favor of the party, to put a termination to the
incapacity of infancy.
In reRichardson, 2 Story 571, 20 Fed. Cas. 699, 701, No. 11777 (Mass. Cir. Ct. 1843); see also
Tucker, 407 A.2d at 1070 (citing cases where parties would have lost the right to vote and
lost the entitlement to the proceeds of a trust if their ages had been calculated by the
general common law rule).
50. See Tucker, 407 A.2d at 1070 (explaining the legal fiction that the coming of age
rule represents).
51. See id. (citing cases in which the right to vote would be lost if age were computed
according to the general method of time calculation).
52. MD. DECL. OF RTs. art. 5 (a) (2002); see, e.g., Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361, 378
(1872) (stating that "[uit is true the common law of England has been adopted by the
people of this State; but only so far as it could be made to fit and adjust itself to our local
circumstances and peculiar institutions").
53. Barker v. Borzone, 48 Md. 474, 491-92 (1878).
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general rule for time computation.54 Under Maryland Rule 1-203, to
compute time, "the day of the act, event, or default after which the
designated period of time begins to run is not included" and "[t]he
last day of the period so computed is included. '55 According to Mary-
land Rule 1-203, a person attains his legal age on his birthday.
In 1988, the Court of Appeals mentioned the coming of age rule,
the exception to the general method for time calculation, in Carolina
Freight Carriers Corp. v. Keane.56 In Keane, the court decided a wrongful
death action in favor of the parents of a son who died when he was 21
years, 7 months, and 28 days old.57 Under the Maryland Wrongful
Death Act, the parents could only recover solatium damages58 if their
son died when he was "21 years old or younger. '59 The court noted,
without specifically mentioning the coming of age rule per se, that a
person attains his given age the day before his birthday.6" However,
the court reasoned that if it embraced this rule, the term "twenty-one
years old" would only include people who were within 24 hours of
their twenty-first birthday.61 To avoid this absurd result, the court ulti-
mately adopted the more common and traditional meaning of the
term, holding that "21 years old" referred to the time between a per-
son's twenty-first birthday up to the eve of the person's twenty-second
birthday.6 2 Under the court's decision, a person became twenty-one
years old on the day of his twenty-first birthday.63 The court believed
its conclusion was justified because the common definition gave the
statute a meaning that was consistent with grammar and legislative
purpose because normally a person is considered to be 21 years old
throughout the entire birthday year.64
c. The Trend Rejecting the Common Law Coming of Age Rule to
Compute a Person's Age.-A state trend of calculating age based on the
general time computation method, now referred to as the birthday
54. See MD. R. 1-203(a) (2003).
55. Id.
56. 311 Md. 335, 534 A.2d 1337 (1988).
57. Id. at 336-37, 534 A.2d at 1338.
58. Solatium damages may include "damages for mental anguish, emotional pain and
suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, care, attention, advice,
counsel, training, or guidance where applicable." Id. at 337 n.2, 534 A.2d at 1338-39 n.2.
59. Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. §§ 3-901 to 3-904 (1984)).
60. Id. at 344, 534 A.2d at 1342.
61. Id. at 345, 534 A.2d at 1342.
62. Id. at 346, 534 A.2d at 1343.
63. See id. at 346, 534 A.2d at 1343 (stating that the phrase "21 years old" refers "to one
who has not yet reached the twenty-second birthday but is over 21").
64. Id.
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rule, has begun to develop. Under the birthday rule, a person "attains
a certain age on that person's corresponding birthday. ' 65 State courts
have begun to prefer the birthday rule over the coming of age rule to
calculate the tolling period for the statute of limitations66 and to de-
termine jurisdiction over criminal juveniles.67 States following the
trend prefer the birthday rule because it is consistent with common
65. Velazquez v. State, 648 So. 2d 302, 304 (Fla. App. 1995).
66. Fields v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 818 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1991). In Fields, the
plaintiff claimed she was injured as a minor. Id. at 659. As a result, the two-year statute of
limitations governing her tort claim did not begin to run until the plaintiff became an
adult at the age of eighteen. Id. The plaintiff filed her claim on the "first business day
following her twentieth birthday;" therefore, the court was required to determine when the
plaintiff legally became eighteen to decide whether her claim was still actionable. Id. If
the court had applied the coming of age rule, the plaintiff would have legally become an
adult on the day before her eighteenth birthday. Id. at 660. If the statute of limitations
began running on the day before the plaintiff's eighteenth birthday, the period to file a
claim would have expired two years later on the day before the plaintiffs twentieth birth-
day. Id. Thus, under the coming of age rule the plaintiff would lose her cause of action.
Id. The Fields court decided not to apply the coming of age rule because it was "contrary to
the popular understanding of birthdate" and did not follow the normal method used to
compute time. Id. at 661. The court applied the birthday rule, finding that the plaintiff
became an adult on the day of her birthday. Id. As a result, the two year statute of limita-
tions period expired on the day of her twentieth birthday, saving her cause of action. Id.
Furthermore, in Patterson v. Monmouth Regional High School Board of Education, 537 A.2d
696 (N.J. Super. 1987), the plaintiff brought a claim for an injury which occurred while he
was a minor participating in a gymnastics meet. Id. at 696. Because the plaintiff was in-
jured as a minor, the two year statute of limitations governing his claim began to run when
he became an adult at age eighteen. Id. at 697. The plaintiff filed his claim on the day of
his twenty-first birthday, requiring the court to determine when he legally became eigh-
teen, marking the start of the statute of limitations period. Id. If the coming of age rule
were applied, the plaintiff would attain the legal age of eighteen on the day before his
eighteenth birthday. Id. As a result, the statute of limitations would begin on that day and
expire on the day before the plaintiffs twenty-first birthday. Id. Since the plaintiff filed his
claim on the actual day of his twenty-first birthday, his claim would have been filed one day
too late and the claim would have been barred. Id. However, the Patterson court rejected
the coming of age rule because it was not consistent with the familiar method of time
computation and the rule, which was created to protect minors, did not do so in this case.
Id. at 698-99. The court held that age, for the purposes of the statute of limitations, should
be calculated according to the birthday rule. Id. at 699. Applying the birthday rule, the
plaintiff attained the age of eighteen on the day of his eighteenth birthday. Id. Accord-
ingly, the two year statute of limitations period expired on the day of the plaintiffs twenty-
first birthday saving his claim. Id.
67. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. lafrate, 594 A.2d 293, 295 (Pa. 1991) (rejecting the com-
ing of age exception to determine the age of a defendant accused of aggravated assault).
In lafrate, a minor was arrested for aggravated assault on the night before his eighteenth
birthday. Id. at 294. The prosecution wanted to try the minor as an adult, forcing the
court to determine when the minor legally became eighteen years old. Id. at 294. If the
court applied the coming of age rule, the defendant would legally become an adult on the
day before his eighteenth birthday. Id. at 295. As a result, the defendant would face a
longer sentence, possible "disqualification for public employment and military service, and
loss of civil rights." Id. at 296. The court decided to apply the birthday rule in the context
ofjuvenile crimes because it was more consistent with common conception and conformed
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knowledge, maintains the common law principle that there are no
fractions of days, and more accurately represents the intent of the
state legislatures.6"
d. The Policy Underlying Statutes of Limitations.-Statutes of
limitations represent a legislative policy decision about the timeframe
in which a reasonable person may pursue a claim.69 The statutes are
designed for necessity, convenience, and expediency. 70  Statutes of
limitations "are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not
discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or a voidable and
unavoidable delay."71 The purposes of statutes of limitations are to
(1) assure fairness to the defendant by setting a time limit to ensure
that witnesses and evidence are still available, (2) prevent unfairness
to plaintiffs who exercise reasonable diligence in pursuing a claim by
assuring a reasonable period of time in which claims can be adjudi-
cated, and (3) promote judicial efficiency by denying stale claims.72
As a result of these underlying policies, Maryland has created excep-
tions to the rigid application of the statute of limitations in cases
where the plaintiff diligently pursues his claim. 73 Maryland courts al-
to the stated goals of the Juvenile Act-protecting and rehabilitating juveniles. Id. at 295-
96.
68. See, e.g., laftate, 594 A.2d at 295 (rejecting the coming of age exception because the
rule did not represent common usage, promote justice, or accurately reflect legislative in-
tent). In laftate, the court found that the coming of age rule more accurately reflected the
legislature's intent because the rule is consistent with the common conception that a per-
son attains a given age on his birthday. Id. at 295. The court reasoned that the legislature
was likely aware of this common method of age calculation when they enacted the Juvenile
Act. Id. In addition, the Juvenile Act was enacted to provide protection for juveniles so
they could potentially be rehabilitated. Id. Following the birthday rule would permit the
defendant to receive protection under the Act until the day of his eighteenth birthday. Id.
The court concluded that the extension of the Act's protection under the birthday rule
better promoted justice. Id.
69. Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 76, 394 A.2d 300, 302 (1978)
(noting that "the adoption of statutes of limitations reflect [sic] a policy decision regarding
what constitutes an adequate period of time for a person of ordinary diligence to pursue
his claim") (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 281 Md. 207, 210, 378 A.2d 1100, 1101
(1977).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 210, 378 A.2d at 1102 (noting that statutes of limitation are "devices to spare
the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after
memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost")
(citation omitted).
73. See Haig, 284 Md. at 80, 394 A.2d at 305 (finding that a rigid application of the
statute of limitations would harm a reasonably diligent plaintiff because a person who de-
velops a disease years after exposure "cannot have known the existence of the tort until
some injury manifests itself").
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low flexibility in applying the statute of limitations in certain tort law
cases and in cases where equitable tolling is justified.74
In tort law cases, the Court of Appeals first adopted a more flexi-
ble approach in applying the statute of limitations in Hahn v. Clay-
brook, a medical malpractice case.75 In Hahn, a doctor prescribed
medicine to his patient for a stomach ailment. 76 Years later, the pa-
tient began experiencing discoloration of her skin caused by the med-
ication and brought suit against the doctor for malpractice.77 The
court decided that the statute of limitations began to run when the
plaintiff noticed the discoloration of her skin and not when the physi-
cian committed the negligent act of prescribing the medicine.78 Al-
though the court held that the plaintiffs cause of action was barred by
the statute of limitations, the court recognized that the statute began
to run when the plaintiff noticed the discoloration of her skin.79
The Court of Appeals reaffirmed this principle in Waldman v.
Rohrbaugh.s° In Waldman, a patient sued his former doctor for mal-
practice, alleging that the doctor was negligent during an operation to
fix the patient's broken ankle."' In its opinion, the court discussed
the harsh consequences that often result from strictly applying the
statute of limitations beginning on the day of the negligent act, noting
that blameless victims often would be left without a remedy.8 2 Ulti-
mately, the court decided to make an exception to this general rule,
and held that the statute of limitations begins to run when the patient
knows or should know he has suffered an injury.8" Subsequently, this
approach to the statute of limitations has been extended to all cases of
professional malpractice.8 4
The court has since extended this flexible approach to the statute
of limitations to latent disease cases. In Harig v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp.,15 the court held that a patient's claim was not barred by the
74. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
75. 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917).
76. Id. at 185, 100 A. at 85.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 180, 100 A. at 83.
79. Id. at 187, 100 A. at 86.
80. 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966).
81. Id. at 138, 215 A.2d at 826.
82. Id. at 140, 215 A.2d at 827.
83. Id. at 145, 215 A.2d at 830.
84. See Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 290 A.2d 530 (1972) (legal malpractice); Steel-
workers Holding Co. v. Menefee, 255 Md. 440, 258 A.2d 277 (1969) (architectural malprac-
tice); Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md. 288, 257 A.2d 421 (1969) (accounting malpractice);
Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88, 253 A.2d 904 (1969) (engineering malpractice).
85. 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978).
10012004]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
statute of limitations, referencing the policy rationale underlying the
statute of limitations.8 6 The court reasoned that a patient who devel-
ops a latent disease cannot know that a tort was committed against
him until the disease manifests itself.87 As a result, the patient could
not be charged with "slumbering on his rights," and a rigid applica-
tion of the statute of limitations would result in harming a reasonably
diligent plaintiff.88 By deciding that the plaintiffs cause of action ac-
crued when he discovered the latent disease, the court flexibly applied
the statute of limitations.8 9 In so holding, the court reasoned that
avoiding possible injustice to a diligent plaintiff outweighed the other
rationales behind the statute of limitations.90
Maryland courts have not only flexibly applied the statute of limi-
tations in a number of tort cases, but have also tolled statutes of limita-
tions for equitable reasons as well. Generally, equitable tolling is
permitted when a plaintiff has diligently pursued her claim. 9 Al-
though Maryland has not expressly adopted the federal equitable toll-
ing standard, the Court of Special Appeals applied the equitable
tolling framework in Furst v. Isom.92 Under that framework, a statute
of limitations should be tolled when three factors are present: (1) the
plaintiff has timely notified the defendant of the first claim, (2) the
defendant is not prejudiced in defending against a second claim, and
(3) the plaintiff acts in reasonable and good faith.93 Applying this
framework, the Furst court held that the plaintiffs claim was not
barred because to do so would allow the statute of limitations to be
used as an unjust shield and would not be in accord with the purpose
of the statute of limitations.94 Moreover, Maryland courts have flexi-
bly applied the statute of limitations where the rationale behind the
86. Id. at 75, 394 A.2d at 302.
87. Id. at 80, 394 A.2d at 305.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 83, 394 A.2d at 306.
90. Id.
91. See Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 281 Md. 207, 215, 378 A.2d 1100, 1104
(1977) (noting that "ordinary diligence [is] required of one seeking to toll the statute of
limitations") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bennett v. Baskin & Sears, 77 Md.
App. 56, 76-77, 549 A.2d 393, 402-03 (1988) (holding that a party seeking to toll the statute
of limitations must exercise ordinary diligence in bringing his claim).
92. 85 Md. App. 407, 584 A.2d 108 (1991). In Furst, the court relied on Burnett v. N.Y
Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424 (1965), where the Supreme Court described the theory of
federal equitable tolling as being that a plaintiff should not be barred from suit when "no
policy underlying the statute of limitations is served by barring the suit." Id. at 417, 584
A.2d at 113.
93. Id. at 418, 584 A.2d at 113.
94. Id. at 420, 584 A.2d at 114.
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statute supports the result of the adaptable, and not the rigid,
approach.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Mason v. Board of Education of Balti-
more County, the plaintiff was injured as a minor.95 As a result, the
three-year statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiff at-
tained the age of majority at eighteen years of age. 96 However, be-
cause the plaintiff filed her claim on the day of her twenty-first
birthday, the Maryland Court of Appeals was forced to determine
when the plaintiff became eighteen years old, beginning the statute of
limitations period.97 The Court applied the coming of age rule to
hold that a person attains a given age on the day preceding his birth-
day. 98 As a result, Mason's cause of action for negligence was barred
by the statute of limitations because she filed on her twenty-first birth-
day, which was one day too late.99
Writing for the majority, 0°Judge Raker examined the statute of
limitations governing Mason's cause of action, noting that the statute
tolled for three years after the date that Mason attained the age of
majority because she was a minor at the time of the alleged inci-
dent. 10 1 As a result, the majority concluded that it first had to deter-
mine when Mason attained the age of majority, thus removing the
disability of infancy and starting the statute of limitations period.10 2
Next, the majority compared the general common law method of
computing time with the coming of age rule used to compute a per-
son's age.' 0 3 The court noted that under the general rule, Mason at-
tained the age of majority on her eighteenth birthday; however,
according to the coming of age rule, she became eighteen the day
before her eighteenth birthday.'0 4 The court noted that the coming
of age rule was created as a legal fiction to further expediency and
uniform interpretation of the law.105 The court also observed that the
95. 375 Md. 504, 506, 826 A.2d 433, 434 (2003).
96. Id. at 507, 826 A.2d at 434.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 506, 826 A.2d at 434.
99. Id. at 515, 826 A.2d at 439.
100. The following judges joined in the majority opinion: Wilner, Cathell, Harrell, and
Battaglia. See id. at 506, 826 A.2d at 433.
101. Id. at 506, 826 A.2d at 434; see MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-201 (2002)
("When a cause of action ... accrues in favor of a minor... that person shall file his action
within the lesser of three years or the applicable period of limitations after the date the
disability is removed.").
102. Mason, 375 Md. at 507, 826 A.2d at 434.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 506-09, 826 A.2d at 434-35.
105. Id. at 508, 826 A.2d at 435.
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coming of age rule was constructed according to the common law
principle that the law does not recognize fractions of a day. 10 6 The
court emphasized that Maryland follows this principle because it has
adopted English common law both in the Maryland Declaration of
Rights and in case law.
10 7
The majority also supported the adoption of the coming of age
rule with mathematical and equitable justifications1 "' The courtjusti-
fied the coming of age rule through mathematical reasoning, stating
that, "[b] ecause a person is in existence on the day of his birth.... he
has lived one year and one day on the first anniversary of his birth."1 9
In addition, the court noted that Maryland has never required mathe-
matical exactitude in computing time. 10 The court also cited the eq-
uitable justification for the coming of age rule: to protect minors who
may be harmed by the principle that the law does not recognize frac-
tions of days.111 The court observed that when a minor reaches the
age of majority he is entitled to benefits, such as the right to vote. 2
Thus, the court reasoned, permitting a person to attain his legal age
on the day before his birthday ensures that he will not lose part of his
adulthood to a legal fiction. 1 3
In addition, the court emphasized that the coming of age rule
has "achieved a status of its own" because the rule has existed for a
long period of time.1 14 The court also noted that, although the com-
ing of age rule had not been applied in Maryland, the court identified
the rule in Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Keane.' 15
Ultimately, the court countered the states that had rejected the
coming of age rule by stating that the exception remained in effect in
the majority of jurisdictions that adopted the general common law
rule.116 The majority argued that the coming of age rule applied in
Maryland because a "departure from the common law was solely the
domain of the state legislature."' 1 7 The court opined that applying
the coming of age rule only reduced the extension of the three-year
statute of limitations by one day and, therefore, did not thwart timely
106. Id.
107. Id. at 509, 826 A.2d at 435.
108. Id. at 510-11, 826 A.2d at 436-37.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 510, 826 A.2d at 436.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 511, 826 A.2d at 437.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 514, 826 A.2d at 438.
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filing.11 As a result, the court concluded that Mason attained the age
of majority on April 3, 1997, and her action, filed on April 4, 2000, was
one day too late.' 19
Judge Eldridge, joined by Chief Judge Bell, dissented, alleging
that the majority's conclusion was not mandated by existing law.' 21
Judge Eldridge pointed to clear statutory language adopting the gen-
eral time computation rule to establish the current method of calcu-
lating time in Maryland.12 ' He also noted the lack of statutory
language adopting the common law coming of age rule.' 22 Judge El-
dridge doubted that the adoption of the rule effectuated the major-
ity's justifications of expediency and uniformity of interpretation. 23
In addition, Judge Eldridge argued that it is the province of the Mary-
land Legislature to amend, revise, or repeal common law.124 Judge
Eldridge concluded that the court's application of the coming of age
rule defied common sense and lead to an unfavorable result for Ma-
son, the person who was supposed to benefit from the statute of
limitations. 12
5
4. Analysis.-In Mason v. Board of Education of Baltimore County,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the coming of age rule
mandated that a person attains his legal age on the day before his
birthday.126 The court based its decision on the mathematical and
equitable justifications behind the common law rule, and ultimately
concluded that a departure from the common law was the domain of
the Maryland Legislature.' 27 However, in its decision, the court failed
to examine the rationale behind the statute of limitations and deter-
mine whether applying the coming of age rule would produce a result
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 516, 826 A.2d at 440 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 519, 826 A.2d at 442.
122. Id. Judge Eldridge reasoned that the application of the coming of age rule was not
supported by the justifications provided in the majority's opinion. Id. at 521, 826 A.2d at
442-43. He noted that the mathematical justification, the principle that the law recognizes
no fractions of days, is recognized by both the statutory general rule for computing time
and the coming of age rule. Id. In addition, he noted that applying the coming of age rule
in the case at bar leads to an unfavorable result for a beneficiary of the statute, which is
contrary to the equitable justification cited by the majority. Id.
123. Id. Judge Eldridge opined that uniformity will hardly be achieved by adopting an
exception to the general rule for computing time, which is only applied in certain in-
stances. Id. at 518-19, 826 A.2d at 441. He noted that the General Assembly has abrogated
the coming of age exception by statute in a vast number of instances. Id.
124. Id. at 520, 826 A.2d at 442.
125. Id. at 522, 826 A.2d at 443.
126. Id. at 506, 826 A.2d at 434.
127. Id. at 510-12, 826 A.2d at 436-37.
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consistent with that rationale. 128 Furthermore, the court did not con-
sider Maryland precedent that permits a more flexible application of
the statute of limitations in cases where the plaintiff has diligently pur-
sued his claim. 12' The court's decision produced a result that defies
common sense and does not reflect the underlying policy of the stat-
ute of limitations, which is to (1) assure fairness to the defendant, (2)
prevent unfairness to plaintiffs who exercise reasonable diligence in
pursuing a claim, and (3) promote judicial efficiency.1 30
a. The Result in Mason Is Not Supported by the Equitable Justifi-
cations Behind the Coming of Age Rule.-The equitable justifications for
the coming of age rule conflict with the result in Mason. The coming
of age rule is a legal fiction manufactured by common law to protect
minors who would otherwise be deprived of certain rights of adult-
hood by one day.13 ' Many states have refused to adopt the coming of
age rule, particularly when the rule works to the disadvantage of mi-
nors, a result inconsistent with the original reasons for the rule. 132
States have found that minors are especially prejudiced in cases where
the plaintiffs cause of action for an injury suffered while a minor
would be barred and where ajuvenile defendant would be prosecuted
as an adult as a result of the rule. 33 Applying the coming of age rule
to Mason's case harms the person whom the rule was created to pro-
tect, contradicting both the equitable reason for the rule and the state
trend against applying it to disadvantage minors. 134
Mason allegedly suffered emotional injury when she was sexually
harassed by male students at the age of fourteen. 135 As a result, the
statute of limitations on her claim was tolled until she reached the age
128. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (describing the purpose of the statute
of limitations as establishing a time period in which a reasonable person should pursue a
claim).
129. See supra notes 73-94 and accompanying text (describing situations in which Mary-
land courts have flexibly applied the statute of limitations where plaintiffs have diligently
pursued their claims).
130. See infta notes 140-168 and accompanying text (explaining that the court's decision
in Mason is not consistent with the policy behind the statute of limitations because Mason
diligently pursued her claim and allowing the law suit to continue would not prejudice the
defendant).
131. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (describing the equitable justification
for establishing the coming of age rule as protecting minors).
132. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (describing states that refuse to apply
the coming of age rule to the disadvantage of minors).
133. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying test (listing states choosing not to apply
the coming of age rule in the context of a plaintiff who was injured while still a minor and
in the context of determining criminal status for juveniles).
134. Mason, 375 Md. at 521, 826 A.2d at 443 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 506, 826 A.2d at 434.
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of majority in order to preserve her rights.'36 Under the majority's
coming of age rule, Mason completely lost her cause of action and,
thus, has no redress for her childhood injury.13 7 If the coming of age
rule were designed to protect minors, it clearly has the opposite effect
in this case.13 The course of action consistent with the equitable jus-
tification behind the rule would be to allow Mason to pursue her
cause of action for a childhood injury and not permit her to lose her
right because of a legal fiction.'39
b. The Application of the Coming of Age Rule Is Unsupported by
the Rationale Underlying the Statute of Limitations.-The application of
the coming of age rule in this case is not justified by the rationale
behind the statute of limitations. In Mason, the Court of Appeals in-
terpreted a three-year statute of limitations, which was tolled when
Mason turned eighteen because she was a minor at the time of the
injury."'4 In deciding when Mason attained the age of eighteen, the
court was also deciding whether Mason's claim would be barred by the
statute of limitations."' Accordingly, the court should have consid-
ered the rationale behind the statute of limitations before holding
that the coming of age rule barred Mason's claim.
Under the coming of age rule, Mason attained the age of eigh-
teen the day prior to her birthday, which was April 3, 1979; thus, Ma-
son's claim filed on April 4, 2000, was barred by the statute of
limitations. 1 2 The purpose of the statute of limitations is to (1) as-
sure fairness to the defendant, (2) prevent unfairness to plaintiffs who
exercise reasonable diligence in pursuing a claim, and (3) promote
judicial efficiency."' The court's application of the coming of age
rule, therefore, is not supported by the rationale underlying the stat-
ute of limitations because, in this case, a plaintiff who exercised rea-
136. Id.
137. Id. at 514, 826 A.2d at 438.
138. Id. at 504, 826 A.2d at 443 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
139. See id. at 510-12, 826 A.2d at 436-37 (describing the purpose of the coming of age
rule as to protect the rights which come with adulthood from being lost to a legal fiction
which computes time without recognizing fractions of days).
140. Id. at 507, 826 A.2d at 434; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. I, § 24 (stating in relevant
part that "a person eighteen years of age or more is an adult for all purposes whatsoever
and has the same legal capacity, rights, powers, privileges, duties, liabilities, and responsi-
bilities" as an adult).
141. Mason, 375 Md. at 514, 826 A.2d at 438 (stating that Mason's claim was barred by
the statute of limitations because it was "one day late").
142. Id.
143. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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sonable diligence in pursuing her claim lost her cause of action.14 4
The three-year statute of limitations at issue in this case represents an
arbitrary policy decision by the Maryland Legislature.145 For this rea-
son, the Court of Appeals should follow the more flexible application
of the statute of limitations as it has employed in cases involving equi-
table tolling, medical malpractice, and latent disease.' 46
According to those cases, the Court of Appeals should interpret
the statute to avoid injustice, the purpose for which the statute came
into being.147 In Mason, the result produced by applying the coming
of age rule does not support the policy behind the statute of limita-
tions. 14' The court's decision is unfair to Mason because she exer-
cised reasonable diligence by filing her suit on her twenty-first
birthday, which is the common understanding of when the three-year
statute of limitations period would end.'4 ' The outcome the Court of
Appeals reached by applying the coming of age rule in this case,
therefore, does not reflect the policy underlying the statute of
limitations.
On the other hand, an application of the contrary rule, the birth-
day rule, does not conflict with the policy underlying the statute of
limitations. Under the birthday rule, Mason attained the age of ma-
jority on her eighteenth birthday, April 4, 1979; thus, her action, filed
on April 4, 2000, would not be barred by the three-year statute of limi-
144. See generally Record Extract, Mason (No. 0412). In 1993 and 1994, the plaintiff and
her mother began investigating the sexual harassment incident, causing a number inquir-
ies and interviews with the school to be conducted. Id. at 92-94, 95-96, 145-47. Addition-
ally, the plaintiff's mother filed a sexual harassment claim on behalf of her minor daughter
on January 3, 1994. Id. at 112-21. The sexual harassment claim cites the Baltimore County
Public School System as a defendant and is based on the same factual incidents pursued in
the present claim. Id. Also, the attorney representing the plaintiff in the sexual harass-
ment case, John H. Morris, Jr., remains the plaintiffs attorney in the case at issue. Id. It is
evident that both the plaintiff and her mother have been committed to reaching a satisfac-
tory resolution of the incidents since they occurred, and have continued their efforts
through the filing of the current case.
145. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (stating that the statute of limitations
is a legislative policy decision).
146. See supra notes 73-94 and accompanying text (explaining the flexible application of
the statute of limitations in cases where equitable tolling is justified and in causes of action
concerning professional malpractice and latent disease).
147. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining that statutes of limitation exist
to protect plaintiffs, defendants, and courts from having to litigate stale claims).
148. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining that the statute of limitations
was created to ensure fairness to all parties involved in the litigation).
149. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining that the statute of limitations
functions to ensure that a plaintiff diligently pursues her claims).
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tations.150 Applying the birthday rule in Mason's case does not erode
any of the justifications for the statute of limitations because the result
is fair to both the defendant and the plaintiff.'5 ' Permitting Mason to
pursue her cause of action is fair to the Board of Education because
the memories of those involved have not faded, witnesses are still
available,' 5 2 and the rule did not affect the Board of Education's abil-
ity to plan for the future.'53 The one day difference between the two
rules could not have severely disadvantaged the Board of Education
because it could not have relied on a rule that had never been applied
by the Court of Appeals and is not supported by common knowl-
edge. 114 Thus, permitting Mason to pursue her claim by applying the
birthday rule is in accord with the statute of limitations rationale be-
cause it is fair to both Mason and the Board of Education.
55
Maryland's willingness to extend the statute of limitations in tort
cases where the plaintiff has diligently pursued his claim and in cir-
cumstances where equity requires tolling provides additional support
for permitting Mason to retain her cause of action. 156 Mason's situa-
tion is similar to those tort cases in which the statute of limitations has
been flexibly applied because Mason exercised diligence in pursuing
her claim by beginning an investigation in 1993, pursuing a sexual
harassment claim against the school in 1994, and having the same at-
torney represent her interests from 1994 until the present. 157 Like the
150. See Mason, 375 Md. at 507, 826 A.2d at 434 (noting Mason's argument that she
reached eighteen years on the anniversary of her birth); see also supra note 65 (defining the
birthday rule).
151. See supra note 72 (enumerating (1) fairness to the defendant, (2) preventing un-
fairness to a plaintiff who diligendy pursues his claim, and (3) promoting judicial efficiency
as the policy rationales underlying the statute of limitations).
152. It is clear that the main witnesses, the plaintiff and the defendants, are still available
because they have all at one point been a party to the current lawsuit. Record Extract at
13-38, Mason (No. 0412). In addition, the plaintiff's complaints and the actions of the
defendants were well documented and those documents are included in the record.
153. See Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 665, 464 A.2d 1020, 1026
(1983) (explaining that assuring fairness to the defendant is "accomplished by encourag-
ing promptness in prosecuting actions; suppressing stale or fraudulent claims; avoiding
inconvenience that may stem from delay, such as loss of evidence, fading of memories, and
disappearance of witnesses; and providing the ability to plan for the future without the
uncertainty inherent in potential liability").
154. Prior to Mason, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had never addressed the applica-
tion of the coming of age rule. Mason, 375 Md. at 511, 826 A.2d at 437; see also supra note
68 (reasoning that the states which have rejected the coming of age rule have done so
because the rule is contrary to common knowledge).
155. See supra note 72 (noting that the policy behind the statute of limitations is fairness
to both the plaintiff and the defendant).
156. See supra notes 69-94 and accompanying text (describing the extension of the stat-
ute of limitations in the context of tort cases and under the equitable tolling framework).
157. See Record Extract at 92-96, 14-147, Mason (No. 0412).
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tort plaintiffs, Mason did not slumber on her rights and, therefore,
the statute of limitations should be flexibly applied in her case. 158 Ac-
cording to common knowledge, Mason became an adult on her eight-
eenth birthday, marking the beginning of the statute of limitations for
Mason's claim."' Consequently, Mason exercised reasonable dili-
gence because she filed her claim before the statute of limitations pe-
riod expired.1 60 Although, in tort cases, the discovery of the injury
triggered the cause of action, the rationale for allowing a flexible ap-
plication of the statute of limitations applies equally to Mason's case
because the courts allowed a flexible application when reasonably dili-
gent plaintiffs would otherwise be harmed.'61
In addition, the rationale for equitable tolling is satisfied by the
facts in Mason's case. Under the equitable tolling framework, a stat-
ute of limitations may be extended when there has been (1) timely
notice to the defendant, (2) lack of prejudice to the defendant in
gathering evidence to defend, and (3) diligence and good faith con-
duct by the plaintiff. 6 2 The Board of Education received timely no-
tice of the claim.' 63 In addition, the Board of Education would not be
prejudiced in gathering information for its defense if Mason were al-
lowed to pursue her claim because application of the birthday rule
would have only extended the statute of limitations period by one
day.'64 If the Board of Education would be expected to defend Ma-
son's claim on the day before Mason's birthday, it should similarly be
prepared to present a defense on the following day. Mason made a
good faith effort to diligently file her claim because it was not reasona-
ble for her to consider the coming of age rule as it is unknown, un-
158. See, e.g., Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 80, 394 A.2d 299, 304
(1978) (noting that if the statute of limitations was rigidly applied to the plaintiff's latent
disease claim "a person of ordinary diligence would have an inadequate period of time to
pursue his claim") (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. See Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Keane, 311 Md. 335, 346, 534 A.2d 1337, 1343
(1988) (explaining that the common or traditional understanding of "21 years old" refers
to "one who has not yet reached the twenty-second birthday but is over 21").
160. Mason, 375 Md. at 506-07, 826 A.2d at 434.
161. See supra notes 73-94 and accompanying text (describing tort cases in which Mary-
land courts have flexibly applied the statute of limitations because a rigid application
would harm a diligent plaintiff); see also supra note 144 and accompanying text (noting that
Mason has diligently pursued her claim).
162. Furst v. Isom, 85 Md. App. 407, 418, 584 A.2d 108, 113 (1991).
163. The Board of Education never contested service of process or mentioned it in a
pre-answer motion or as part of their answer. Mo. R. 2-322 (a) (4) (2004) (explaining that a
defendant waives his right to contest service of process if he does not do so in a pre-answer
motion or as part of his answer). See Record Extract at 13-15, Mason (No. 0412).
164. See Mason, 375 Md. at 521-22, 826 A.2d at 443 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
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precedented, and defies common logic.' 65 As a result, Mason's
situation justifies equitable tolling, and she should have been permit-
ted to retain her cause of action.
Applying the coming of age rule to Mason's case results in the
regrettable loss of her cause of action.1 66 The rationale underlying
the statute of limitations and the Maryland precedent extending the
statute of limitations when the plaintiff has diligently pursued her
claim do not support this result.167 The lack of policy and preceden-
tial support, combined with the fact that the coming of age rule has
never been applied in Maryland and is contrary to common knowl-
edge, demonstrate that depriving Mason of her cause of action is
unjust.168
c. Application of the Coming of Age Rule Is Not Mandated.-In
Mason, the Court of Appeals ultimately decided to apply the coming
of age rule because it asserted that changing the common law is the
domain of the Legislature; however, such deference is not mandated
by Maryland law.1 69 The common law has been subject to change
from the day it was adopted by the State of Maryland. 7 ' The same
Maryland Declaration of Rights that the majority used to prove the
common law applicable to Mason's claim also provides that the Legis-
lature may change the common law.' 71 With respect to the coming of
age rule, the Legislature abrogated the common law when it codified
the general time computation method, but it failed to do the same for
165. The Court of Appeals had previously identified the coming of age rule but had not
applied it. Mason, 375 Md. at 511-12, 826 A.2d at 437; see supra note 68 (describing the
state trend against the adoption of the coming of age rule because it is contrary to com-
mon knowledge).
166. Mason, 375 Md. at 521-22, 826 A.2d at 443 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (stating that
"[e]ven though the exception affects only one day in a three year period, the effect is
draconian: complete loss of the plaintiffs cause of action").
167. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (outlining the underlying rationale of the
statute of limitations); see also supra notes 73-94 and accompanying text (explaining Mary-
land precedent extending the statute of limitations for tort cases and in situations where
equitable tolling is permitted).
168. Mason, 375 Md. at 511, 826 A.2d at 437 (noting that the Court of Appeals had not
previously considered applying the coming of age rule); id. at 516, 826 A.2d at 440 (El-
dridge, J., dissenting) (stating that the coming of age rule defies common sense).
169. Id. at 514, 826 A.2d at 438; see also Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 183, 438 A.2d 494,
499 (1981) (pointing out that Maryland common law is subject to change by judicial
decision).
170. In Article 5, the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides that the common law
adopted is "subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the
Legislature of the State." MD. DECL. oF RTs. art. 5 (a) (2002).
171. Id.; see also Mason, 375 Md. at 509, 826 A.2d at 435 (articulating that Maryland
adopted the common law through the Maryland Declaration of Rights).
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the coming of age rule. 172 If the Maryland Legislature preferred the
coming of age rule for age calculation, it could have codified the rule,
as it did for general time computation. 173 Abrogation of the coming
of age rule is further supported by the multitude of Maryland statutes
which specifically adopt the "birthday rule.' 71
The statutes enacted by the Maryland Legislature that change the
common law in terms of age calculation do not suggest that the Legis-
lature knows when to apply the coming of age rule and when to de-
part from it. This assertion suggests that the Legislature
independently chose the language of every statute depending on
whether it desired the age requirement to take effect on a person's
birthday or on the day before. 175 For example, section 16-206 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code pro-
vides that if a child breaks the law and the punishment is suspension
of his driver's license, but that child does not have a license, (i) "If the
child is at least 16 years old on the date of the disposition," the suspen-
sion will commence on the date of the disposition; or (ii) "If the child
is younger than 16 years of age on the date of the disposition," the
suspension will commence on the date the child reaches his 16th
172. See MD. R. 1-203(a) (2003) (stating the general method for calculating time); see
also MD. ANN. CODE art. I, § 36 (2002) (describing the general method for time
computation).
173. Id.
174. The Maryland Legislature has abrogated the coming of age rule by using the word
"birthday" in numerous provisions of the Maryland Code. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD.
PROC. § 3-8A-06 (2002) (providing that if a child "has not reached his 15th birthday," a
juvenile court may waive jurisdiction); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 15-106.1 (2002) (providing
that a "foster care recipient" is based upon residence in a foster care home "on the individ-
ual's 14th birthday"); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-207 (2002) (explaining that the
person nominated by a minor "after his 16th birthday" receives priority in appointment as
guardian for that minor); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-1006 (2002) (noting that paternity
proceedings must happen "before the child's eighteenth birthday"); MD. CODE ANN., INS.
§ 16-508 (2002) (providing that the maturity date of an annuity contract is limited to not
later than "the later of the contract anniversary immediately following the annuitant's 70th
birthday or the tenth anniversary of the contract"); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. I § 5418
(2002) (providing that an applicant must have "attained his eighteenth birthday" to be
eligible for a "tree expert" license); MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 29-303 (2002)
(explaining that state employees' and teachers' pensions shall begin "on the first day of the
month following the member's 55th birthday"); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 16-114.1
(2002) (noting that a corrected photo license will expire either "on the birth date of the
licensee in the fifth year following the issuance of the license," or "60 days after the driver's
21st birthday"); MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 3 (2002) (stating that child welfare services
provided by the State Department "to persons under the age of 18 may continue after their
eighteenth birthday but not beyond their twenty-first birthday").
175. Mason, 375 Md. at 519 n.3, 826 A.2d at 442 n.3 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) ("Much
will depend on the wording in the codes: if the code states 'age of 18,' the coming of age
exception will apply, but if the code states '18th birthday,' the statutory general rule
applies.").
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birthday.' 76 Applying the coming of age rule, (i) if the disposition is
on the day before the child's sixteenth birthday, suspension begins on
that date, but (ii) if the child is younger than sixteen on the date of
the disposition, the suspension will begin on the child's 16th birth-
day. 177 This interpretation leaves a group of children that potentially
fall under both alternatives of the statute when the disposition is on
the day before the child's sixteenth birthday. Under part (i) of the
statute, the child will be sixteen and the suspension will begin on that
date. However, under part (ii) of the statute, for the child who has
not reached his sixteenth birthday, the suspension will not begin until
the following day. The legislature probably did not imagine or intend
this bizarre result.1
78
Common knowledge dictates that a person attains his age on the
day of his birthday.' 79  The common law rule that changes this
method of age calculation has not been applied by a Maryland court
in more than 150 years. 180 Even the Court of Appeals itself chose to
interpret the statute at issue in Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Keane
according to common knowledge, instead of applying the coming of
age rule.' 8 ' These reasons, combined with the specific statutes utiliz-
ing the "birthday rule," support the intent of the Maryland Legislature
to abrogate the coming of age rule.
Additionally, the majority's strict deference to the Legislature to
change the common law is not mandated by Maryland case law.'8 2
The common law may be changed by judicial decision when "in light
of changing conditions or increased knowledge this court finds that it
is a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to the circumstances of our
people."' 8 1 If a child went to the Motor Vehicle Administration
(MVA) on the day before his sixteenth birthday and tried to get a
176. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. I § 16-206 (2002).
177. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (describing the coming of age rule).
178. SeeCarolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Keane, 311 Md. 335, 346, 534 A.2d 1337, 1343
(1988) (interpreting a statute leading to a similar bizarre result and questioning whether
"the legislature [could] reasonably have intended the set of people '21 years old'-to in-
clude only a day's group of people, or only a moment's group").
179. See Mason, 375 Md. at 516, 826 A.2d at 440 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (relating that
the general method of time computation codified by the Maryland Legislature is the com-
mon sense approach).
180. Id. at 511, 826 A.2d at 437 (stating that "[t]his Court has yet to address the applica-
tion of the coming of age rule").
181. 311 Md. 335, 346, 534 A.2d 1337, 1343 (1988).
182. See Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 182, 483 A.2d 494, 499 (1981) (stating that the
common law may be changed by judicial decision).
183. Id.
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driver's license, he would be denied."i 4 A bar owner would not per-
mit a person to drink at her bar on the day before the person's twenty-
first birthday.8 5 A person may not register to vote when the upcom-
ing election is the day before her eighteenth birthday.1 1 6 For these
reasons, the coming of age rule simply defies common sense.8 7 Fur-
thermore, the Court of Special Appeals was tempted to change the
common law rule because common knowledge dictated that a person
attains his age on the anniversary of his birth and invited the Court of
Appeals to change the common law rule in Mason.' The coming of
age rule is a "vestige of the past" as demonstrated by the Legislature's
failure to make the exception statutory law, their outright abrogation
of the rule, and the rule's inconsistence with common knowledge. Ac-
cordingly, the Court of Appeals was not bound by deference to the
Legislature and could have disposed of the old coming of age rule in
favor of a rule that fits common experience.
5. Conclusion.-In Mason v. Board of Education of Baltimore County,
the Court of Appeals decided to apply the coming of age rule to deny
Mason's claim that was filed on the day of her twenty-first birthday."8 9
According to the coming of age rule, Mason became an adult on the
day before her eighteenth birthday, beginning the statute of limita-
tions. o90 As a result, the statute of limitations expired on the day
before Mason's twenty-first birthday, barring her claim because it was
filed one day too late. 1 ' By deciding to apply this archaic common
law rule, the court produced a result that contradicts the equitable
184. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 16-103 (2002) (stating that the MVA "may not issue
a provisional license to any individual who has not reached the age of 16 years, 1 month").
185. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 2B, § 12-108 (2002) (stating that "[a] licensee licensed
under this article, or any employee of the licensee, may not sell or furnish any alcoholic
beverages at any time to a person under 21 years of age").
186. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. I § 3-102 (2002) (requiring that an individual "is at
least 18 years old or will be 18 years old on or before the day of the next succeeding
general or special election" in order to vote).
187. See Mason, 375 Md. at 522, 826 A.2d at 443 (Eldrige, J., dissenting) ("I see little
difference in a statute that is based on an individual reaching the 'age of 18' and one based
on an individual who has reached his or her '18th birthday,' and I doubt that the vast
majority of people would see any difference.").
188. Mason v. Bd. of Educ., 143 Md. App. 507, 514, 795 A.2d 211, 215 (2002); see also
Brief for Appellant at 9, Mason, (No. 44) (discussing the idea that the Court of Special
Appeals expressly invited the Court of Appeals to consider changing the common law
rule).
189. Mason, 375 Md. at 506, 826 A.2d at 434.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 514, 826 A.2d at 438.
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reasons for the rule's creation.1 92 The coming of age rule was created
to protect minors; however, the court's application of the rule in Ma-
son bars a minor's claim entirely. 193 In addition, the court did not
consider the policy rationales of (1) fairness to the defendant, (2)
preventing unfairness to a diligent plaintiff, and (3) judicial efficiency
that underlie the statute of limitations governing Mason's claim.19 4 By
employing a common law rule that has never been applied in Mary-
land and is not consistent with common knowledge, the court barred
a diligent plaintiff from pursuing her claim. This result is not consis-
tent with the policy rationale for the statute of limitations and is a use
of the coming of age rule that contradicts the purpose for which the
rule was created. As a result, the court should have adopted the
"birthday rule" because it represents the common understanding of
age calculation, is supported by the policies underlying the statute of
limitations, and is consistent with Maryland statutes and case law.
LINDSAY L. TURNER
192. See supra notes 131-139 (describing how the court's application of the coming of
age rule conflicts with the equitable reason for its creation: the protection of minors).
193. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text (explaining that the coming of age
rule was created to protect minors to make sure that they would not lose any legal rights as
a result of time calculation and that the decision in Mason has the opposite effect).
194. See supra notes 140-168 and accompanying text (discussing that the coming of age
rule is unsupported by the policy rationales underlying the statute of limitations because
permitting Mason to bring her claim is fair to the defendant and the plaintiff).
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A. Undermining Statutory Purpose: Broadening the Class of Drivers Held
to a Higher Minimum Point Level for License Suspension Jeopardizes Public
Safety and Adds Subjectivity to the Suspension Process
In Toler v. Motor Vehicle Administration,1 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland considered whether section 16-405(b) of the Maryland
Transportation Law Article,2 which allows a driver "required to drive a
motor vehicle in the course of his regular employment" to accrue six-
teen points on his drivers license before it is suspended,' applies to a
licensee whose driving is incidental to his employment.4 The court
held that a driver "required to drive a motor vehicle in the course of
his regular employment" under section 16-405(b) includes not only
professional drivers, defined as a person whose "driving constitutes
their employment" (e.g., taxi drivers), but also licensees such as Toler,
who was employed as a salesman.5 As such, the court found that Toler
could accrue sixteen points-rather than the standard eight points-
before his license could be suspended.6 The court misinterpreted the
statute as one that granted the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA)
leeway in considering the adverse effects license suspension could
have on a driver's employment.7 In so doing, the court created a
broad exception that could swallow the rule by allowing all licensees
who drive incidental to their employment to qualify for the elevated
point level before their license can be suspended.' Thus, the court
undermined the dual purposes of the statute-enhancing public
safety and eliminating subjectivity from the license suspension pro-
1. 373 Md. 214, 817 A.2d 229 (2003).
2. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 16-405(b)(1) (2002). If a licensee is "required to
drive a motor vehicle in the course of his regular employment," sixteen points must accrue
before the license can be suspended. Id.
3. See infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text (discussing the structure of Maryland's
point system).
4. Toler, 373 Md. at 217, 817 A.2d at 231.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 228, 817 A.2d at 238. Section 16-404(a) (3) (i) provides that a licensee who is
not required to drive a motor vehicle in the course of his regular employment can have his
license suspended after he accumulates eight points. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 16-
404(a) (3) (i) (2002).
7. See infra notes 149-170 (discussing the majority's misinterpretation of section 16-
405(b) as a statute that allows the MVA to consider any negative consequences a license
suspension may have on the licensee's employment).
8. See infra notes 178-179 and accompanying text (exploring the possibility of the wide
range of individuals that may drive incidentally to their employment).
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cess.9 The majority failed to uphold the underlying purposes behind
the statute by strictly following the general rule of statutory construc-
tion that two different terms in the same statute generally have two
different meanings.'0 The court should have adopted a reasonable
interpretation of the statute by finding that it only applied to "profes-
sional drivers," thereby maintaining the historical distinction between
driving that is merely incidental to employment and driving that actu-
ally constitutes the employment.1'
1. The Case.-Christopher Toler committed his first speeding of-
fense in 1982 at the age of sixteen.' 2 Over the next seventeen years,
he compiled an extensive driving record. 13 Most notably, in 1999, To-
ler received five points on his driver's license for exceeding the speed
limit by thirty miles per hour, and in December of 2000, he received
an additional three points for failing to reduce speed to avoid an acci-
dent.14 On May 1, 2001, the MVA sent notice to Toler that his license
would be suspended pursuant to section 16-404(a) (3) (i) of the Mary-
land Code, which gives the MVA the authority to suspend the license
of a person who accumulates eight points. 15 In response, Toler re-
9. See infta notes 181-184 and accompanying text (discussing the legislature's intent
for the suspension provisions to protect the public from potentially dangerous drivers and
to ensure objectivity in the suspension process through enacting the point system).
10. See infra notes 189-219 and accompanying text (criticizing the majority's decision
that "professional driver," used in section 16-404 (a), and "required to drive a motor vehi-
cle in the course of his regular employment," used in section 16-405(b), could not have the
same meaning).
11. See infta notes 220-231 and accompanying text (illustrating the manner in which
the majority's decision violated the general rule of statutory construction that statutes
should not be interpreted contrary to common sense).
12. Toler, 373 Md. at 217, 817 A.2d at 231.
13. Id. at 217-19, 817 A.2d at 231-32. In 1986, Toler received his first warning letter
after accumulating four points in a three-month period. Id. at 217, 817 A.2d at 231. After
two more speeding convictions in 1986, Toler received his first point system conference
notice and was given an official reprimand in July of 1987. Id. In December of 1987, he
was again convicted of speeding, which led to a second warning letter. Id. at 218, 817 A.2d
at 231. After an additional speeding violation in August of 1989, Toler received his third
warning letter. Id. Three days before the letter was issued, Toler was again convicted of
speeding, which led to his second conference and reprimand in June of 1990. Id. In 1990,
Toler was convicted twice for speeding and once for failing to drive in the designated lane.
Id. Even though he had accumulated eight points, Toler's license was not suspended; in-
stead, he received his third reprimand. Id. Toler collected three points in 1991 and 1992
for speeding and failing to obey a traffic signal, and he was then issued his fourth warning
letter in 1998 for accruing four points for speeding convictions that occurred in the two
prior years. Id.
14. Id. at 218, 817 A.2d at 231.
15. Id. at 218-19, 817 A.2d at 231-32; MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 16-404(a)(3)(i)
(2002).
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quested an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge
(ALJ).t 6
At the hearing, Toler argued that he was not guilty of either of-
fense and that he was a "safe" driver, despite his record. a7 After ex-
plaining to the ALJ that he owned and operated a door and window
manufacturing and installation company and that his primary role was
in sales, Toler testified that his job required him to drive 100 to 200
miles a day to visitjob sites and make sales calls.'" The ALJ found that
Toler's arguments were irrelevant to the validity of the tickets.' 9 As
such, the ALJ found that the tickets were valid and were already in-
cluded on Toler's record.20 After considering Toler's accumulation
of eight points in a two-year period, as well as his prior driving record,
the ALJ suspended Toler's license for thirty days. 21 However, the ALJ
also ordered the MVA to issue Toler a restricted license that would
allow him to drive only as required by his job.22
Following the ALJ's ruling, Toler argued for the first time that he
was "required to drive a motor vehicle in the course of his regular
employment" and thus fell within the exception of section 16-405(b),
which increased the minimum point requirement to sixteen before
the MVA could suspend his license. 23 The ALJ rejected this argu-
ment, stating that the exception of section 16-405(b) applied to "pro-
fessional drivers," which did not include Toler.24 Toler received the
restricted license that allowed him to drive only for work purposes,
and he sought review of the ALJ's decision that he was not covered by
the section 16-405(b) exception. 25
16. Toler, 373 Md. at 218, 817 A.2d at 232.
17. Brief of Respondent at 4, Toler v. MVA, 373 Md. 214, 817 A.2d 229 (2003) (No.
21).
18. Toler, 373 Md. at 218, 817 A.2d at 232.
19. Record Extract at 27, Toler v. MVA, 373 Md. 214, 817 A.2d 229 (2003) (No. 21).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 28.
22. Id. The MVA has the authority to issue a restricted license under section 16-
404(c) (4), which states that "[t]his subsection does not limit the authority of the [MVA] to
issue a restrictive license or modify a suspension imposed under this subsection." MD.
CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 16-404(c) (4) (2002). Section 16-113 governs the issuances of re-
stricted licenses and allows the MVA to impose any "restrictions applicable to the licensee
that the [MVA] determines appropriate to assure the safe driving of a motor vehicle by the
licensee." Id. § 16-113(a) (iii).
23. Toler, 373 Md. at 219, 817 A.2d at 232; Record Extract at 27-29, Toler (No. 21).
24. Record Extract at 29, Toler (No. 21). The ALJ stated, "what [section 16-405(b)]
relates to, we've always ruled, [is] people who have to drive a bus or a taxi or something
like that as part of their job, driving is their job." Id.
25. Toler, 373 Md. at 219, 817 A.2d at 232.
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The Circuit Court for Prince George's County affirmed the ALJ's
decision, finding that there was no clear error or abuse of discretion
by the ALJ. 26 The court stated that the optimal word of the statute was
"required" and that Toler was not "required" to drive in order to carry
out his home improvement business.2 7 Judge Jackson reasoned that
Toler would still be able to do the home improvements by having
someone else drive him to work, whereas a taxi driver could not have
someone else drive, for him in the course of his employment.2"
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to consider
whether the exception set forth in section 16-405(b), which allows a
licensee who is required to drive a motor vehicle in the course of his
regular employment to accumulate sixteen points before his license is
suspended, covers driving that is incidental to employment in addi-
tion to driving that constitutes the actual job.21
2. Legal Background.-To consider whether the Legislature in-
tended to limit the application of the elevated point level to "profes-
sional drivers," it is important to understand the origin of Maryland's
point system and suspension policy, the Maryland courts' interpreta-
tion of this policy, and the policies and interpretations of other juris-
dictions. At the time the point system was implemented, Maryland
categorized its drivers by occupation; only drivers holding a chauf-
feur's license were permitted to receive payment for transportation,
and thus a statute setting out an exception that referenced a driver's
employment only could have applied to chauffeurs.3 0 Maryland case
law has historically upheld the legislative intent to distinguish between
26. Brief of Respondent at Apx. 18, Toler (No. 21).
27. Id. at Apx. 9. Judge Jackson stated, "the operative word in the Court's view is,
required, to do thejob. I haven't heard how, if a man does home improvement, he has to
drive. Someone else could drive him, and he could do home improvements." Id.
28. Id.
29. Toler, 373 Md. at 219, 817 A.2d at 232. Toler appealed the Circuit Court's decision
directly to the Court of Appeals and the court granted certiorari under Section 12-305 of
the Maryland Code. MD. ANN. CODE, CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 12-305 (2002). The provision
enables the Court of Appeals to review a decision directly from the Circuit Court in the
event that:
a circuit court.., has rendered a final judgment on appeal from an administra-
tive decision under Title 16 of the Transportation Article [and] it appears to the
Court of Appeals, upon petition of a party that: (1) Review is necessary to secure
uniformity of decision, as where the same statute has been construed differently
by two or more judges; or (2) There are other special circumstances rendering it
desirable and in the public interest that the decision be reviewed.
30. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing the origin of the point
system in Maryland).
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classes of drivers, professional and nonprofessional.31 Furthermore,
an analysis of the suspension provisions of other states illustrates that
using exceptions to the point system to accommodate a driver's em-
ployment needs is unique to Maryland.3 2 Lastly, an analysis of the
general rules of statutory construction illustrates that upholding the
purpose underlying the statute is foremost in the application of any
canon of statutory interpretation.
33
a. The Origin of Maryland's Point System and Driver's License
Suspension Policies.-The Maryland Legislature has often recognized
that the goal of the license suspension system is to further public
safety on the highways.34 In 1959, Maryland enacted its point system
to make the driver's license suspension process, which aims to protect
the public's safety, more objective. 5 The point system established
point values for specific offenses and provided for warnings, confer-
ences, suspensions, and revocations of an operator or a chauffeur's
license after accumulating certain minimum point totals.3 6 When the
point system was enacted, drivers were licensed by occupation, rather
than classified by vehicle type, which is the basis of the system today.3 7
Two categories of licenses were issued: drivers who were paid to trans-
port people or property were issued a chauffeur's license," and all
other drivers were issued an operator's license. 9 A driver without a
chauffeur's license could not receive payment for transportation.4 °
The original point system set the minimum point limit at three points
31. See infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative intent be-
hind Maryland's point system and suspension policy).
32. See infra note 62-70 and accompanying text (discussing the point systems and sus-
pension policies of other states).
33. See infra notes 71-107 and accompanying text (discussing statutory interpretation).
34. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Gathright, 485 F.2d 504, 508 (4th Cir. 1973) (finding that
public safety is the legislative purpose behind license revocation policies).
35. 1959 Md. Laws 736. These provisions were later codified as sections 16-405 and 16-
406 in the Transportation Article of the Maryland Code.
36. Id.
37. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 16-104 (2002). Today's categorical classification sys-
tem distinguishes drivers based on the type of vehicle driven. Id. Class A, B, C, and D
licenses entitle the driver to operate various combinations of cars, trucks, and buses. Id. A
Class E license entitles the driver to operate a motorcycle. Id.
38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, § 2(a) (4) (1957) (defining "chauffeur" as "[e]very per-
son who is employed for the purpose of operating a motor vehicle and every person who
operates a motor vehicle while in use as a public or common carrier of persons or prop-
erty, or for hire").
39. Id. § 86(a).
40. See id. § 86 (noting that the term "chauffer" means anyone paid primarily to drive a
motor vehicle).
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for warning letters and five points for conferences. 41 It also estab-
lished an eight-point minimum for suspension and a twelve-point min-
imum for revocation.42 Both of these limits were subject to an
exception that granted the hearing officer the option not to impose a
suspension or revocation if it would "adversely affect" a licensee's em-
ployment.4 An additional part of the exception provided an en-
hanced minimum point level for a driver "required to drive in the
course of his regular employment"-the minimum point level was fif-
teen points for suspension and eighteen points for revocation.44 Fur-
thermore, because chauffeurs were the only drivers permitted to drive
in the course of their regular employment, it was implicit that the
exception only applied to chauffeurs.45
In 1970, the Legislature changed the basis of the license classifica-
tion system from occupation to type of vehicle.46 Thus, the chauffeur
distinction was no longer implicit in the point accumulation section of
the statute, and the Legislature explicitly reinforced this distinction by
adding the term "professional drivers" to the statute. 4 7 The Legisla-
ture made an exception to the minimum number of points required
for a conference-a licensee accumulating five points should be
called in for a conference unless he submits acceptable evidence that
he is a "professional driver."48 The elevated point levels for suspen-
sion and revocation were also increased to sixteen and nineteen
points respectively, but the Legislature chose to retain the "required
to drive a motor vehicle during the course of his regular employment"
language already present in the statute.49 These provisions have re-
mained unchanged for the last thirty-three years.
50
41. 1959 Md. Laws 736.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, § 6-102.2 (1970).
47. 1970 Md. Laws 534.
48. Id. The statute is currently codified at MD. CODE ANN., TRAWsP. II § 16-404(a) (2)
(2002).
49. 1970 Md. Laws 534.
50. These provisions are currently codified at MD. ANN. CODE, TRANsP. II §§ 16-
404(a) (2), 16-405(b) (2002). Section 16-404, titled "Effect of accumulated points," states:
(a) Action by Administration.-The Administration shall take the following actions
for points accumulated within any 2-year period: (1) Send a warning letter to
each individual who accumulates 3 points; (2) Require attendance at a confer-
ence by each individual who accumulates 5 points, except that a Class A, B, or C
licensee who submits evidence acceptable to the Administration that he is a pro-
fessional driver may not be called in until he accumulates 8 points; and (3) Ex-
cept as provided in § 16-405 of this subtitle: (i) Suspend the license of each
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b. The Maryland Judiciary's Application of the Point System and
Suspension Policies of Other Jurisdictions.-In examining the legislative
intent behind the language "required to drive a motor vehicle in the
course of his regular employment," it is helpful to consider the inter-
pretation of this provision by Maryland courts, as well as the interpre-
tation of similar suspension policies by other states.
(1) Maryland.-The Court of Appeals has interpreted the
language in the Maryland Code that grants exceptions for "profes-
sional drivers."'" In 1938, in State v. Depew, Depew was a state auditor,
and he was required to drive to make his assignments.52 Depew, who
had a valid operator's license, was pulled over while returning to Balti-
more City from a business trip to Frederick.5 3 He was charged for
driving without a chauffeur's license, found guilty, and sentenced to
pay a fine.54 The Court of Appeals found that Depew was not re-
quired to have a chauffeur's license because his driving was "purely
incidental to the purposes of his employment" and reversed his con-
viction." The court endorsed the narrow definition of "chauffeur" set
forth by the Supreme Court of Iowa, which only included an em-
ployee paid to drive an automobile and explicitly excluded an em-
ployee paid for anything other than operating a motor vehicle, even if
driving was incidental to that position.56
individual who accumulates 8 points; and (ii) Revoke the license of each individ-
ual who accumulates 12 points.
Section 16-405, titled "Adverse effects on employment of licensee," states:
(a) Hearing officer authorized not to order suspension or revocation.- Except as pro-
vided in §§ 16-205(e) and 16-205.1 of this title, if the suspension or revocation of
a license would affect adversely the employment for opportunity or employment
of a licensee, the hearing officer may: (1) Decline to order the suspension or
revocation; or (2) Cancel or modify the suspension or revocation. (b) Point re-
quirement increased for licensee.-For purposes of § 16-404 of this subtitle, if a licen-
see is required to drive a motor vehicle in the course of his regular employment:
(1) Suspension requires 16 points; and (2) Revocation requires 19 points.
51. State v. Depew, 175 Md. 274, 275, 1 A.2d 626, 627 (1938).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 275-76, 1 A.2d at 627.
54. Id. at 276, 1 A.2d at 627.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 277, 1 A.2d at 627 (citing Des Moines Rug Cleaning Co. v. Auto. Underwrit-
ers, 245 N.W. 215, 218 (Iowa 1932)). The Supreme Court of Iowa found that the employee
was not required to have a chauffeur's license because the task of delivering carpets was
only incidental to his position, which consisted mainly of making rugs and cleaning car-
pets. Des Moines Rug Cleaning Co., 245 N.W. at 218. The Iowa court defined chauffeur as
a person who is employed and paid by the owner of a motor vehicle to drive and
attend to the car; and does not include operators who are not employed and paid
for operating the motor vehicle, and therefore does not include an employee
who receives his compensation for services rendered other than the operation of
1022
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For the next thirty-five years, Maryland appellate courts did not
interpret the "professional driver" exception of section 16-405(b). In
1973, three years after the elimination of the occupation-based licen-
see classification system, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in
General Valet Service, Inc. v. Curley,57 found that the exceptions set forth
for point accumulation in section 16-405(b) distinguished between
operators and chauffeurs. 58 The court recognized that drivers hold-
ing an operator's license were subject to suspension after accumulat-
ing eight points, while drivers with a chauffeur's license did not face
suspension until they accrued fifteen points.59
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, reversed the Court of Special
Appeals on other grounds,6 ° but explicitly endorsed the lower court's
interpretation of section 16-405(b) as it reproduced the text of the
decision verbatim: "suspension of an operator's license is imposed
only after the holder is charged with 8 points, and suspension of a
chauffeur's license is imposed only after the holder is charged with 15
points.
' 61
(2) OtherJurisdictions.-No other Maryland cases have inter-
preted the exceptions to the license suspension provisions; conse-
quently, it is helpful to examine the exceptions to the suspension
policies of other states. The different methods of licensure and sus-
pension vary greatly among jurisdictions. A number of states still re-
tain the distinction between operators and chauffeurs in their
motor vehicles, although in performing such services he may incidentally operate
a motor vehicle.
Id.
57. 16 Md. App. 453, 298 A.2d 190 (1973).
58. Id. at 470, 298 A.2d at 199.
59. Id. The court found that General Valet was not liable for injuries to Curley that
were caused by an employee of General Valet who was engaged in personal business while
using a company van. Id. at 470-71, 298 A.2d at 199. The court held that there was not
sufficient evidence to allow the jury to decide that the employer was negligent in entrust-
ing the vehicle to the employee. Id. at 471, 298 A.2d at 199. Even though the employer
knew that the employee sometimes used the vehicle for personal errands, the court found
that the employer was entitled to rely on the public policy that a driver who had not been
charged with fifteen points against his license was not unfit to drive. Id.
60. Curley v. Gen. Valet Serv., Inc., 270 Md. 248, 267, 311 A.2d 231, 241 (1973). The
court rejected the argument that because the driver had less than fifteen points, General
Valet's permitting him to drive was per se reasonable. Id. Rather, the court held that al-
though the employee's driving record of multiple past violations had not amounted to
fifteen points, General Valet knew about the record, and thus the case was properly submit-
ted to the jury. Id.
61. Id. at 257, 311 A.2d at 236.
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licensing provisions.62 Colorado's suspension procedures mirror
Maryland's suspension system.63 Colorado's motor vehicle provisions
subject drivers to suspension if they accumulate twelve points within a
year or eighteen points within twenty-four months. 64 The minimum
point levels are explicitly greater for chauffeurs who accrue points in the
course of employment.6 5 Colorado courts have consistently reasoned that
for the higher minimum point levels of the chauffeur exception to
apply, the driver must have obtained all the points while in the course
of employment.
66
The majority of other states have developed point systems that do
not grant "professional drivers" special exceptions. These states rea-
son that the main purpose behind the statute is public safety, which
can best be attained if all drivers abide by the same standards.67
Courts in the District of Columbia and Utah have explicitly upheld
statutes applying one minimum point level to all drivers against consti-
tutional challenges.68 North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia
have similar point systems that hold all drivers to the same minimum
point standards.69 Most states give their motor vehicle administrations
the flexibility to alleviate adverse effects on employment caused by sus-
pension by granting them the authority to issue restricted licenses that
allow the licensee to drive for purposes of work during the suspension
62. COLO. REv. STAT. § 4 2-2-127(1)(a) (2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2733 (2002);
MICH. COMP. LAws § 257.319b(1) (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-502(a) (2003).
63. COLO. REv. STAT. § 42-2-127(1)(a) (2002).
64. Id.
65. Id. The Colorado statute contains the following exception:
the accumulation of points causing the subjection to suspension of the license of
a chauffeur who, in the course of employment, has as a principal duty the opera-
tion of a motor vehicle shall be sixteen points in one year, twenty-four points in
two years, or twenty-eight points in four years, if all the points are accumulated
while said chauffeur is in the course of employment.
66. See, e.g., Edwards v. Motor Vehicle Div. Colo. Dep't of Revenue, 520 P.2d 598, 599
(Colo. Ct. App. 1974) (finding that the sixteen point exception for chauffeurs was not
applicable, because even though the plaintiff was a chauffeur he did not accumulate all of
his points while driving in the course of his employment).
67. See, e.g., Glenn v. Comm'rs of D.C., 146 A.2d 575, 576-577 (D.C. 1958) (upholding
the District of Columbia's point system against a discrimination challenge in finding that
applying the same minimum point level to both "professional drivers" and "average driv-
ers" is permissible when the purpose of the point system is to protect the public).
68. Id. at 576-77; Barney v. Cox, 588 P.2d 696, 697 (Utah 1978) (finding that the point
system which held "professional" and "non-professional" drivers to the same minimum
point level was constitutional because the purpose of the statute is not to punish the driver
but to protect the public).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16 (a)(5) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-740 (Law Co-op.
2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-506 (B) (Michie 2002).
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period.7" Thus, using exceptions to the point-system suspension pro-
visions to accommodate a driver's employment needs is unique to
Maryland.
c. Canons of Statutory Interpretation.-The main goal of statu-
tory interpretation is to effectuate legislative intent.71 Many general
rules of statutory construction aid thejudiciary's task of discerning the
legislative intent. The interpretation of a statutory provision should
be consistent with the meanings of surrounding provisions and stat-
utes,7 2 should be compatible with common sense,73 and should not
render words of the provision meaningless.7 1 In addition, it is as-
sumed that the Legislature generally intends that different words of a
statute have different meanings75 and that the same word used multi-
ple times in a statute should have the same meaning. 76 The general
rules of statutory interpretation are not to be followed when strict ad-
herence to the rule will fail to effectuate the legislative purpose be-
hind the statute.77
If the legislative intent is not discernable from the language of a
statute, the court will deem the statute ambiguous. When the lan-
guage of the statute is unambiguous, the court will not look beyond
the plain meaning of the text in interpreting the meaning of the stat-
ute. 7' However, when the language is ambiguous the court will look
70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-740(B) (1) (Law. Co-op. 2002) (providing for the suspension
of a license when various point totals are accumulated, although allowing for the applica-
tion for a restricted license for employed persons). In Florida, one may be granted a re-
stricted license if he can prove that the suspension amounts to a serious hardship and
prevents the person from performing his normal employment duties, which are necessary
to support himself or his family. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.271(2) (a) (West 2001).
71. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 301, 783 A.2d 667, 670
(2001).
72. State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115, 695 A.2d 143, 149 (1997).
73. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 366 Md. at 302, 783 A.2d at 671.
74. Taylor v. Nationsbank, 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645, 654-55 (2001).
75. Cf Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 673, 659 A.2d 1347, 1350 (1995) (recognizing a
presumption that the same words in the same statute have the same meaning, and there-
fore different words are presumed to have different meanings).
76. At. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
77. See, e.g., Whack, 338 Md. at 673, 675, 659 A.2d at 1350 (refusing to follow the gen-
eral rule that the same word will have the same meaning throughout the same section of a
statute, the court found that "conviction" had two different meanings throughout the stat-
ute in order to effectuate the legislative purpose behind the statute).
78. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 366 Md. at 302, 783 A.2d at 670-71 ("Only if the
words of the statute are ambiguous need we seek the Legislature's intent in the legislative
history or other extraneous sources.").
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to the legislative history, the context of the statute, and the purpose of
the statute in order to ascertain the Legislature's intent.79
Western Correctional Institution v. Geiger illustrates the importance
placed on legislative intent when the court interprets an ambiguous
statute.80 In Western Correctional Institution, the court deemed ambigu-
ous section 11-106 of the State Personnel Management System Reform
Act, which prescribed a thirty-day time limit for imposing disciplinary
action on state employees."1 It was not clear under the statute
whether the thirty-day period began when the appointing authority
was first informed of the alleged misconduct or when the appointing
authority was informed of the results of an investigation that substanti-
ated the allegations.8 2 In analyzing the legislative history of the stat-
ute, the court found that the purpose behind the legislation was to
achieve a consistent application of the policies affecting the personnel
and to place a limit on the amount of time in which disciplinary ac-
tion could be taken.83 The court held that to reach these goals, the
thirty-day period must begin when the management is first informed
of the action.8 4
In ascertaining the legislative intent through the legislative his-
tory, the court follows the common rules of statutory interpretation.85
However, there are exceptions to all these rules that allow for depar-
ture from the rule if adhering to the general rule would undermine
86 itithe purpose of the statute. First, it is presumed that the Legislature
intends its enactments to be read consistently and that various provi-
sions will operate in harmony with each other.8 7 In Western Correctional
Institution, the court analyzed the larger context of the phrase in ques-
79. W. Corr. Inst. v. Geiger, 371 Md. 125, 141-42, 807 A.2d 32, 42 (2002).
80. Id. at 143, 807 A.2d at 43.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 129, 807 A.2d at 34.
83. Id. at 145, 807 A.2d at 44.
84. Id. at 144-45, 807 A.2d at 44.
85. See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text (explaining the rules of statutory
interpretation).
86. See Ad. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) ("It is not
unusual for the same word to be used with different meanings in the same act, and there is
no rule of statutory construction which precludes the courts from giving to the word the
meaning which the legislature intended it should have in each instance."); see also Whack v.
Maryland, 338 Md. 665, 675, 659 A.2d 1347, 1351 (1995) (finding that the meaning of
"conviction" may vary within a statute depending on the context of the specific provisions);
State v. Knowles, 90 Md. 646, 654, 45 A. 877, 878 (1900) (construing "may" as "shall" in one
part of a statute, and using it in its permissive sense in a latter part of the same section of
the statute in order to effectuate the legislative intent behind the statute).
87. State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115, 695 A.2d 143, 149 (1997).
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tion that set a time sequence for disciplinary action."8 For the se-
quence to make sense the court inferred that the time period begins
when the management is first informed of the alleged misconduct.89
A second general rule requires the interpretation of the statute to
be reasonable and compatible with common sense.90 In State v.
Brantner, the defendant deleted the text from a letter ajudge wrote to
the defendant's attorney and inserted text stating that the defendant
had been cleared of the criminal charges filed against him, when in
fact he had not. 1 As a result of this action, the State charged the
defendant with the willful and unauthorized alteration of a public
document under the fraud statute, but the court found that this con-
duct did not fall within the fraud statute.92 The court reasoned that
interpreting the definition of "public records" to include all copies gen-
erated by an official or agency in line with the duties of the official or
agency so that the alteration of any one of those copies would consti-
tute fraud defied common sense.93
Another general rule that courts follow in interpreting a statute
requires that words of the statute are not rendered useless by the in-
terpretation. 94 Consequently, the presence of two different words in
the same statute creates an inference that the Legislature meant two
different things.9 5 In Parkinson v. State, 6 the court relied on the pre-
sumption that different words in the same sentence generally have
two different meanings and found that "give" and "sell" did not havethe same meaning." The presumption may be rebutted when the
88. 371 Md. 125, 143, 807 A.2d 32, 43 (2002).
89. Id. at 144-45, 807 A.2d at 43-44.
90. See, e.g., Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 302, 783 A.2d
667, 671 (2001) (stating that "a statute is to be given a reasonable interpretation, not one
that is illogical or incompatible with common sense").
91. 360 Md. 314, 316-17, 758 A.2d 84, 86 (2000).
92. Id. at 323, 758 A.2d at 89; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 45 (1957) (prohibiting
the willful and unauthorized alteration of a public document).
93. Branter, 360 Md. at 323, 758 A.2d at 89.
94. See, e.g., Taylor v. Nationsbank, 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645, 654-55 (2001)
(stating that "the statute should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is
rendered superfluous or nugatory").
95. See Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 736 (D. Md.
1996) (interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act, the court relied on Fourth Circuit
precedent that created an inference that the legislature intended different words to have
different meanings in order to support its decision that "reasonable accommodation" and
"undue hardship" entail different things).
96. 14 Md. 184 (1859).
97. Id. at 194. The court upheld the constitutionality of a statute against a challenge
that it violated Article 3d, section 17 of the Maryland Constitution, which stated that "every
law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described
in the title." Id. at 193. The Act of 1858, chapter 55 prohibited both selling and giving
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statutory purpose and legislative history illustrate that a Legislature
intended for the words to have the same meaning. 98 The corollary
rule is that when a word with one or more meanings is repeated
throughout a statute it is presumed that the word holds the same
meaning throughout the statute, unless it is apparent that a legislature
intended for the words to have different meanings. 99 In Whack v.
State, the court found that the term "convicted" had one meaning in
one part of a statute and a different meaning in a latter part of the
same section of the statute.100 The court recognized that the purpose
of the statute was to impose greater penalties on repeat offenders.'01
To achieve this goal, the court concluded that the second use of the
term "convicted" must encompass convictions pending appeal, while
the first use could take the usual meaning of "the establishment of
guilt prior to, and independent of, the judgment of the court.' 0 2
State v. Knowles10 3 provided an example of the contrary situation
where the same interpretation of one word used multiple times in the
statute would contradict the purpose of the statute. The Court of Ap-
peals, therefore, found that the same word had different meanings in
two parts of the statute.10 4 The court determined that the word "may"
was to be construed as "shall" or "must" in one part of a statute and
then used in its permissive sense in another part of the same sec-
tion.' O The court found that the purpose of the statute was to protect
the public, and in order to achieve this goal, the first "may" was to be
liquor to a minor, while the title of the statute only prohibited the sale of liquor. Id. at 194.
In following the common rule of statutory construction, the court effectuated the legisla-
tive intent and found that the overall purpose of the statute was designed to prevent liquor
procurement by minors, which is one subject and poses no constitutional violation. Id. at
195.
98. See, e.g., Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 673, 659 A.2d 1347, 1350 (1995) (holding
that the meaning of the term "convicted" is dependent upon the purpose and context of
the statute).
99. See Ad. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) ("It is not
unusual for the same word to be used with different meanings in the same act, and there is
no rule of statutory construction which precludes the courts from giving to the word the
meaning which the legislature intended it should have in each instance.").
100. 338 Md. at 675, 659 A.2d at 1351.
101. Id. at 679, 659 A.2d at 1353.
102. Id. at 675, 659 A.2d at 1351.
103. 90 Md. 646, 45 A. 877 (1900).
104. Id. at 655-56, 45 A. at 878.
105. Id. at 653, 45 A. at 877. The Act of 1869, chapter 378, section 5 provided that the
qualifications of a person with a dental diploma "may be examined" by the State Board of
Dental Examiners and after passing an examination his or her name shall be registered
with the Board and a certificate should be issued. Id A latter clause of the same Act stated
that, at the Board's discretion, a person with a dental diploma "may ... be registered
without being subjected to an examination." lI&
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interpreted as "must.' 10 6 Thus, in both Whack and Knowles, the court
interpreted the statutes contrary to the common rule of statutory con-
struction in order to achieve the statutory purpose underlying the
statute. 1
07
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Toler v. Motor Vehicle Administration,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that section 16-405(b), which
allows drivers who are "required to drive a motor vehicle in the course
of his regular employment" to accrue an elevated level of points
before license suspension is considered, is not limited to "professional
drivers," but includes those who drive incidental to their employ-
ment.108 In a 4-3 decision, Judge Wilner, writing for the majority, 10 9
first examined the language of section 16-405(b) and found that the
statute did not clearly indicate the Legislature's intent.110 The court
reasoned that the statute could be construed in a broad sense, as To-
ler argued, to include people who are required to drive incidentally to
their employment, including sales people and repair people."1 In ad-
dition, the court observed that the statute could be interpreted in line
with the MVA's argument that section 16-405(b) is restricted to "pro-
fessional drivers"-people whose driving actually constitutes their em-
ployment, such as taxi drivers and truck drivers.1 2 Because each of
these interpretations was plausible, the court concluded that the stat-
ute was ambiguous.' 13
To interpret the legislative intent of the ambiguous statute, the
court first noted that section 16-405 (b) is part of a comprehensive stat-
ute and must be analyzed as such." 4 Examining the various provi-
sions that set guidelines for the administration of the point system, the
court recognized that the Legislature gave the MVA flexibility to con-
sider adverse effects on a driver's employment when making suspen-
sion decisions." 5  The court grouped section 16-405(b) with
106. Id. at 655, 45 A. at 878.
107. Whack, 338 Md. at 674, 659 A.2d at 1351; Knowles, 90 Md. at 655, 45 A. at 878.
108. 373 Md. at 228, 817 A.2d at 238.
109. Chief Judge Bell along with Judges Eldridge and Cathelljoined the majority opin-
ion. Id. at 216, 817 A.2d at 230.
110. Id. at 221, 817 A.2d at 233.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 221-22, 817 A.2d at 233-34.
2004] 1029
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
provisions of the Maryland Code that allow flexibility in enforcing
suspension." 6
The court then reasoned that the phrase "required to drive a mo-
tor vehicle in the course of his regular employment" encompasses
more than merely "professional drivers.""' 7 The court relied on the
general rule of statutory construction that when a legislature uses two
different words in the same part of a statute the words usually have
two different meanings. 1 8 The court observed that sections 16-
405(b) and 16-404(a) (2) both set forth exceptions to the minimum
number of points a driver can accumulate before the MVA takes ad-
verse action against the driver." 9 Also, the court noted that section
16-404(a) (2) allows for a "professional driver" to accumulate eight
points, instead of the usual five-point minimum before a licensee is
called in for a conference. 120 Furthermore, the court observed that
section 16-405(b) increases the minimum point level from eight
points to sixteen points for a driver "required to drive a motor vehicle
in the course of his regular employment."'' The court followed the
general rule of statutory construction that "when a legislature uses dif-
ferent words, especially in the same section or in a part of the statute
that deals with the same subject, it usually intends different things"
and found that because the legislature used the term "professional
driver" in one section of the statute and "required to drive a motor
vehicle in the course of his regular employment" in another, the
terms were not synonymous. 122
In addition, the court analyzed the history of the licensing provi-
sions of the Maryland Code. 123 It questioned why the Legislature
meant for the exception to refer to "professional drivers" if it did not
use the already defined term "chauffeur" to express this meaning
116. Id. (citing section 16-405(a), which grants the MVA discretion to suspend a license
where the driver's employment or opportunity for employment would be adversely af-
fected, and sections 16-404(c) and 16-113, which give the MVA authority to issue a re-
stricted license during a suspension period).
117. Id. at 228, 817 A.2d at 238.
118. Id. at 223-24, 817 A.2d at 235; see supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing
the general rule of statutory construction that two different words in the same statute usu-
ally have two different meanings).
119. Toler, 373 Md. at 223, 817 A.2d at 235.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (relying on the different word-different meaning common rule of statutory con-
struction to support the "argument that there is some difference [in] the fact that the
Legislature used different language to describe the two classes-'professional driver' in
§ 16-404(a) (2) and 'required to drive a motor vehicle in the course of... regular employ-
ment' in § 16-405(b)-).
123. Id. at 224, 817 A.2d at 235.
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when establishing the point system in 1959.124 The court answered its
own question by prefacing the discussion with an examination of the
evolution of the term "chauffeur," and this examination showed that
from the time "chauffeur" first appeared in the Maryland Code in
1906 it had undergone a variety of changes. 125 The court observed
that the term had been eliminated from the code, reinstated, and had
numerous definitions, some of which were broad and others
narrow. 126
The court also questioned why in 1970, when the Legislature ad-
ded the exception now codified in 16-404(a) (2) it chose to use the
term "professional driver." The court observed that even though the
chauffeur-operator distinction had been eliminated, "chauffeur" was
still a defined term in the Maryland Code.' 27 The majority concluded
that because the Legislature failed to use the "chauffeur" language
when it was readily available each of the three times the Legislature
reviewed these provisions, the Legislature did not intend for "re-
quired to drive a motor vehicle in the course of his regular employ-
ment" to have the same meaning as "chauffeur."1 28
Judge Raker, writing for the dissent, agreed with the majority that
the text of section 16-405(b) was ambiguous. 129 She disagreed with
Judge Wilner's interpretation of the legislative intent derived from the
statute's history.1 30 The dissent focused on a different general rule of
124. Id. at 227, 817 A.2d at 237.
125. Id. at 224, 817 A.2d at 235.
126. Id. at 224-25, 817 A.2d at 235-36. The court noted that in 1906, the Legislature
required the registration of "chauffeurs," defined as persons "operating a motor vehicle as
mechanic, employee or for hire, except employees of manufacturers testing uncompleted
automobiles." Id. at 224, 817 A.2d at 235. The court also recognized that in 1910, the
General Assembly created the Motor Vehicles Department and provided it the authority to
license drivers, but no distinction was made between operators' and chauffeurs' licenses.
Id. In 1912, the court noted that the Legislature restored the distinction when it held
.professional chauffeurs" licenses subject to annual renewal, while ordinary licenses were
valid until suspension or revocation. Id. at 224-25, 817 A.2d at 235. The court observed
that the Legislature defined "professional chauffeur" as "any person operating or running
a motor vehicle for another for salary or wages, and also any person operating or running a
motor vehicle, whether his own or another[']s, for hire or profit." Id. at 225, 817 A.2d at
235. The court also noted that in 1918, the Legislature changed the definition of "chauf-
feur" to any person "operating a motor vehicle for hire, or as an employee of the owner
thereof." Id., 817 A.2d at 235-36. Finally, the court recognized that by 1959, the Legisla-
ture had narrowed the meaning of "chauffeur" to its present definition-a person "who is
employed for the purpose of operating a motor vehicle . . . [or] who operates a motor
vehicle while in use as a public or common carrier of persons or property, or for hire." Id.
at 226, 817 A.2d at 236.
127. Id. at 227-28, 817 A.2d at 237.
128. Id. at 228, 817 A.2d at 237.
129. Id. at 229, 817 A.2d at 238 (Raker, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
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statutory interpretation-a statute should "be given a reasonable in-
terpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible with common
sense."' 3 ' Relying on this rule,Judge Raker argued that the majority's
broad interpretation of section 16-405(b) allowed the exception to
swallow the rule and thus violated common sense. 132 The dissent rea-
soned that under the majority's holding the exception could feasibly
encompass a vast number of people. 133 The dissent noted that it
could apply to anyone who is required to drive in order to get to work,
including attorneys meeting with clients and doctors visiting
patients. 1
3 4
Judge Raker supported her argument for a narrower meaning of
section 16-405(b) with precedent.1 3 5 In State v. Depew, she noted that
the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that a state auditor whose
driving was incidental to his employment was a "chauffeur" within the
meaning of section 16-405 (b). 136 She observed that in 1973, the court
explicitly adopted the Court of Special Appeals' interpretation of sec-
tion 16-405(b) that the eight-point minimum applied to those with an
operator's license, while the fifteen point exception applied to "chauf-
feurs."' 37 Therefore, Judge Raker reasoned, if Toler's driving was
merely incidental to his employment, he was not a "chauffer" and did
not qualify for the 16-405(b) exception. 138
Judge Raker then criticized the majority for its "inconsistent rea-
soning," arguing that the majority violated its own premise that differ-
ent words have different meanings by unequivocally accepting the
terms "chauffeur" and "professional driver" as synonymous.' 39 Ac-
cording to Judge Raker, central to the majority's argument was its rea-
soning that, because the term "chauffeur" is not in section 16-405(b),
the Legislature intended for the exception to be broader than the
chauffeur category. 141 Judge Raker pointed out, however, that
throughout the majority's opinion it was evident that the majority con-
131. Id. at 230, 817 A.2d at 239; W. Corr. Inst. v. Geiger, 371 Md. 125, 142, 807 A.2d 32,
42 (2002); see supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text (mentioning the canon of statutory
interpretation that requires statutory constructions to coincide with common sense).
132. Toler, 373 Md. at 230-31, 817 A.2d at 239 (Raker, J., dissenting); see supra note 94
and accompanying text (explaining that courts should avoid interpretations that nullify the
meaning of a statute).
133. Toler, 373 Md. at 231, 817 A.2d at 239 (Raker, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 231-32, 817 A.2d at 239-40.
136. Id. at 231, 817 A.2d at 239.
137. Id. at 232, 817 A.2d at 240.
138. Id. at 231-32, 817 A.2d at 239-40.
139. Id. at 233, 817 A.2d at 240.
140. Id. at 232-33, 817 A.2d at 240.
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sidered "professional driver" and "chauffeur" to have synonymous
meanings."' Judge Raker concluded by arguing that the majority's
interpretation undermines the purpose of the statute in decreasing
the MVA's ability to apply a clear standard and protect the public.
1 42
4. Analysis.-In Toler v. MVA, the court held that the elevated
point level for a driver's license suspension, which is granted to a per-
son "required to drive a motor vehicle in the course of his regular
employment," applies to licensees whose driving is incidental to their
employment. 143 The majority's decision was flawed for multiple rea-
sons. First, the court misinterpreted section 16-405(b) as a provision
of the Motor Vehicle Code that grants the MVA discretion in consid-
ering any adverse effects the license suspension process may have on a
licensee's employment.1 44 Second, the majority broadened the ex-
cepted class to include licensees whose driving is incidental to their
employment, and thus failed to uphold the dual statutory purposes of
ensuring public safety and maintaining objectivity in the license sus-
pension process.145 Third, in applying the general rule of statutory
construction that two different words in the same statute generally
have two different meanings, 146 the court failed to recognize that the
rule should not be followed when its application would inhibit the
statute's purpose.1 47  Finally, the court's expansion of section 16-
405(b) to include driving that is merely incidental to employment
could feasibly encompass a large portion of licensees and thus runs
contrary to common sense because it allows the exception to swallow
the rule.'14  The majority should have maintained the historical dis-
tinction between driving that is merely incidental to employment and
driving that actually constitutes the employment in holding section
16-405(b) applicable to only professional drivers.
141. Id. at 233, 817 A.2d at 240.
142. Id., 817 A.2d at 240-41.
143. Id. at 228, 817 A.2d at 238.
144. See infra notes 149-160 and accompanying text (arguing that the majority misinter-
preted the license suspension scheme).
145. See infta notes 171-188 and accompanying text (arguing that the majority's interpre-
tation defeats the legislative intent).
146. Toler, 373 Md. at 224, 817 A.2d at 235.
147. See infra notes 189-211 and accompanying text (arguing that the majority misap-
plied the rules of statutory interpretation).
148. See infra notes 220-231 and accompanying text (arguing that because many licen-
sees drive incidental to their work the majority's decision creates too broad an exception to
the license suspension system and renders the statute ineffective byjeopardizing the objec-
tivity and public safety goals that underlie the suspension system).
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a. A Misinterpretation of the Statutory Purpose.-
(1) The Majority Misinterpreted Section 16-405(b).-The major-
ity misinterpreted section 16-405(b) as a provision intended to help
alleviate adverse effects on a licensee's employment from suspen-
sion. 1 49 Even though the point system does offer the MVA discretion
in imposing suspensions when the suspension would negatively affect
the licensee's employment, section 16-405 (b) is not a provision under
which the MVA has the flexibility to consider adverse employment ef-
fects.15 0 Rather, sections 16-404(c)(4) and 16-405(a) are the proper
places to exercise this discretion.
Section 16-404(c) (4) grants the MVA the power to issue a re-
stricted license during a suspension period at its discretion. 15 1 Under
section 16-113, the MVA can issue a license that allows a driver with a
suspended license to drive only for work purposes. 5 2 In addition, sec-
tion 16-405(a) gives the MVA complete authority to decline to order a
suspension or modify a suspension that would "affect adversely" the
employment of a licensee. 153 As the MVA and dissent pointed out,
section 16-405(a) provides the MVA with broad discretion to decline to
suspend a license or to modify a suspension if it adversely affects em-
ployment.15 4 If the MVA finds that a suspension will negatively affect
a licensee's employment, it has complete authority either to withhold
the suspension or to provide the driver with a license that will enable
him to drive to fulfill his employment requirements. 55 These two
broad powers provide the means for the MVA to take the licensee's
employment into consideration, just as it did in Toler's case.' 5 6 By
issuing Toler a restricted license, the MVA permitted him to drive for
work purposes during the thirty-day suspension period, thus eliminat-
ing any adverse effects on his employment."'
Although sections 16-404(c)(4) and 16-405(a) give the MVA
broad authority to consider a driver's employment needs, section 16-
405(b) is a non-discretionary exception that applies to a specific sub-
group of drivers-the class of licensees whose driving constitutes their
149. Toler, 373 Md. at 221-22, 817 A.2d at 233-34.
150. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 16-405(b) (2002).
151. Id. § 16-404(c) (4).
152. Id. § 16-113(a).
153. Id.
154. Toler, 373 Md. at 230, 817 A.2d at 238 (Raker, J., dissenting). Section 16-405(a)
provides that the hearing officer "may" consider adverse effects on employment. MD.
CODE ANN., TRANSP. II §§ 16-113(a) (iii), 16-405(a) (2002).
155. §§ 16-405(a)-(b).
156. Toler, 373 Md. at 218-19, 817 A.2d at 232.
157. Id.
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employment. 158 The MVA does not have any authority under 16-
405(b) to consider the negative effects a license suspension may have
on a driver. 159 The majority's misinterpretation of section 16-405(b)
as an employment aiding provision serves no policy goals since the
MVA already had the flexibility to accommodate employment through
other means.
161
(2) The License Suspension Provisions of Other States Illustrate the
Toler Court's Misinterpretation of the Purpose Behind Section 16-405(b) and
the Scope of the Exception it Sets Forth.-An analysis of the regulations of
other states illustrates the majority's misinterpretation of the purpose
of section 16-405(b) as a means for the MVA to consider negative em-
ployment effects. The majority of states grant their Motor Vehicle De-
partments the flexibility to take adverse employment effects caused by
suspension into consideration by authorizing them to issue restrictive
licenses at their discretion. 16  For example, South Carolina allows a
driver to apply for a restricted license during the time of suspension if
he is employed.' 62 Meanwhile, in Florida, a licensee may be granted a
restricted license if the suspension prohibits the driver from engaging
in his employment and the driver's employment is necessary to sup-
port himself or his family.
16 3
Furthermore, the vast majority of states hold all drivers subject to
the same minimum point levels before remedial action can be
taken.'64 In North Carolina, the Division of Motor Vehicles has the
authority to suspend the licenses of drivers who accumulate a mini-
mum of twelve points within a three-year period, and drivers that ac-
crue points within the three-year period immediately following the
reinstatement of a license that was suspended or revoked are held to
an eight-point minimum standard.' 65 South Carolina's State Highway
Department may suspend a driver's license upon the accumulation of
twelve points. 166 Meanwhile, Virginia requires the Motor Vehicle
Commissioner to suspend the license of a driver who accumulates
158. § 16-405(b).
159. Id.
160. Toler, 373 Md. at 222, 817 A.2d at 234.
161. Eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. 23 § 322.271(2)(a) (West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-7(e)
(2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-170(B) (1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-
329 (Michie 2002); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17B-2-10(a) (Michie Supp. 2003).
162. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-740(B)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002).
163. FLA. STAT. ANN. 23 § 322.271(2)(a) (West 2002).
164. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-740(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002) (holding all driv-
ers to a twelve point minimum for license suspension).
165. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16 (a)(5) (2001).
166. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-740(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002).
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eighteen points within a year or twenty-four points overall.' 67 In addi-
tion, Colorado, the one other state, besides Maryland, that has differ-
ent point minimums in its point system, clearly makes the exception
applicable to chauffeurs only, and adds that to qualify for the excep-
tion the points must have accrued in the course of employment.16
Before the court's decision in Toler, Maryland was an anomaly be-
cause it was the only state that allowed points accrued outside the
course of employment to count towards a higher minimum point level
for license suspension. 69 By misinterpreting section 16-405(b) as
granting the MVA flexibility to take a driver's employment into con-
sideration during the license suspension process, the Court further
expanded Maryland's already generous leeway granted to drivers in
the suspension process. Maryland is now a greater anomaly because it
is the only state that allows non-professional drivers to accrue an ele-
vated level of points before risking a license suspension.170 The wide
disparity between the amount of leeway Maryland will give a driver
facing a possible suspension compared to other states further illus-
trates the court's misinterpretation of section 16-405(b) as a provision
intended to alleviate adverse effects on a licensee's employment
caused by the suspension process.
b. The Dual Statutory Purpose of Ensuring Objectivity and Public
Safety in Issuing Suspension.-The Legislature implemented the point
system in order to add objectivity to the suspension process, 171 which
was intended to protect public safety. 1 72 The court's decision in Toler
frustrated both of these policy goals.
The majority's decision thwarted the Legislature's attempt to add
objectivity to the license suspension process through implementing
the point system. 17' By interpreting the clause "required to drive a
motor vehicle in the course of his regular employment" to include
driving that is incidental to employment, the court created a broad
exception that swallows the rule by blurring the distinction between
167. VA. CODE A'mN. § 46.2-506(B) (Michie 2002).
168. COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-127(1) (a) (2002).
169. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 16405(b) (2002).
170. Toler, 373 Md. at 228, 817 A.2d at 237-38.
171. Id. at 226, 817 A.2d at 236.
172. See United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335, 1346 (D. Md. 1978) (recognizing the
revocation of a license under Maryland's point system is intended to promote public
safety).
173. See id. ("The point system brought a measure of objectivity to the suspension and
revocation regime, as it was based on convictions in court rather than subjective findings by
the Commissioner that the licensee was unfit or unsafe . . .).
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all drivers and those who fall in the excepted class. 174 The decision
allows any licensee who must drive to work to fall within the excep-
tion, and at the very least, it gives these drivers a strong basis for chal-
lenging an application of the eight-point standard. 175 The majority
even recognized that under their broad interpretation salesmen and
repairmen could all fall within the exception.'7 6 The dissent added
attorneys visiting clients, doctors seeing patients, and entertainers go-
ing to performances to this category of possibilities.177 The objective
distinction has been blurred, and it is unclear what requirements a
driver must meet to be deemed "required" to drive in the course of his
employment. This uncertainty illustrates how the court has moved
away from the legislative intent of objectivity underlying the enact-
ment of the point system.'17  The court's decision leaves a tough task
for the MVA in deciding who falls within this exception and who does
not.179 The court should have maintained the historic distinction be-
tween the two classes of drivers,'8 ° but instead the majority blurred
the distinction and added subjectivity back into the suspension
process.
The majority's decision also frustrated the Legislature's efforts to
protect the public's safety through license suspension polices."' The
courts in states that subject all drivers to the same minimum point
levels have found that the single point requirements do not discrimi-
nate against "professional drivers."'8 2 Moreover, the courts have rec-
ognized that the purpose of the statute is to ensure public safety, a
174. Toler, 373 Md. at 230-31, 817 A.2d at 239 (Raker, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 231, 817 A.2d at 239.
176. Id. at 221, 817 A.2d at 233.
177. Id. at 231, 817 A.2d at 239 (Raker, J., dissenting).
178. The facts of Toler offer little guidance-Toler himself brought in two-thirds of his
company's business by driving 100-200 miles a day in order to meet with customers and
visit job sites. Id. at 218, 817 A.2d at 232. The holding of Toler leaves unanswered whether
the distance driven or the "essentialness" of the driving is the important factor, or if they
both must be present and a balancing standard should be used between the two. Also the
number of miles necessary to constitute the requisite distance is unclear, as is the effect of
a licensee's ability to take public transportation on the "essentialness" of their driving.
179. The court's decision leaves open the possibility that the section 16-405(b) exemp-
tion may apply to attorneys who drive to meet their clients, doctors who visit patients, or
people who work construction.
180. Id. at 233, 817 A.2d at 240-41 (Raker, J., dissenting).
181. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (explaining that the purpose of the li-
cense suspension is to protect the public).
182. See, e.g., Glenn v. Comm'rs of D.C., 146 A.2d 575, 576-77 (D.C. 1958) (upholding
the District of Columbia's point system against a discrimination challenge in finding that
applying the same minimum point level to both "professional drivers" and "average driv-
ers" is permissible).
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goal best achieved by holding all drivers to the same standards. 183 Al-
though the Maryland Legislature found that the public could be pro-
tected by holding the small subclass of "professional drivers" to a
lower standard,1 84 as this category is broadened, the statute becomes
increasingly ineffective in protecting the public safety. Toler's circum-
stances illustrate the negative effect on public safety created by the
court's holding. Even without falling in the excepted category of driv-
ers, Toler had a restrictive license and was able to drive for purposes
of work during the time of his license suspension, and he had his reg-
ular license reinstated while he continued to challenge the MVA rul-
ing."' By broadening the excepted class, the court decreased the
point system's incentive to drivers to refrain from breaking traffic
laws, effectively allowing unsafe drivers to stay on the road.8 6 The
court's ruling will not deter Toler or another person in a similar situa-
tion from disobeying traffic regulations. 18' None of the disciplinary
actions the MVA took in the past deterred Toler, and now that his
minimum point total is effectively doubled, it is likely that his viola-
tions will continue in the same pattern that has developed over the
past nineteen years. 88
By mis-grouping section 16-405(b) with the other provisions that
give the MVA flexibility in imposing suspensions that may adversely
affect the employment of the licensee, the court granted more leeway
to drivers who consistently break the law. Thus, the majority reduced
the benefit of the suspension system to enhance public safety and
made the implementation of the suspension provision under the
point system more subjective.
183. See id. (reasoning that all drivers can be held to the same minimum point level
when the purpose of the suspension system is to protect the public).
184. But see id. (reasoning that the legislature need not create two different standards to
be fair to drivers who were on the road the most and had a greater chance of accumulating
points).
185. Toler, 373 Md. at 219, 817 A.2d at 232. The only benefit Toler could obtain by the
court finding that he fell within the excepted class of section 16-405(b) is a higher mini-
mum point level for his next offenses. Id.
186. See Brief of Respondent at Apx. 10, Toler (No. 21). The MVA argued that broaden-
ing the section 16-405(b) exception would not be "consistent with the purpose of the stat-
ute, which is really to protect the public from someone who has really demonstrated
through points or convictions, [or] tickets, that they are not a safe or competent driver."
Id.
187. See Glenn, 146 A.2d at 577 (noting that a strict point suspension system is intended
to correct the deplorable disregard that some drivers display toward traffic regulations").
188. Toler, 373 Md. at 217-18, 817 A.2d at 231. The majority noted that Toler had a
"long and continuous" involvement with the MVA. Id.; see also supra note 13 (discussing
Toler's driving record).
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c. The Failure to Consider Statutory Purpose in the Application of
Common Rules of Statutory Interpretation.-By strictly applying the gen-
eral rule of statutory interpretation that two different words in one
statute generally have two different meanings, the court failed to ef-
fectuate the statutory purpose underlying section 16-405 (b), and it ac-
ted contrary to prior case law and legislative history that distinguished
between two clear classes of drivers. 1i 9 In large part, the majority's
holding rested on its interpretation of the common rule of statutory
interpretation that two different words tend to imply different mean-
ings.' 90 Thus, according to the majority, "professional driver" and "re-
quired to drive a motor vehicle in the course of his regular
employment" could not have the same meaning."'
The common rule states that two different terms generally have
the same meaning, and it is derived from the more basic rule of statu-
tory construction that a statute should be read so that no word or
phrase is superfluous. 9 2 Thus, a court should presume that a legisla-
ture intended for each word to have meaning. 9 3 The historical con-
text surrounding the suspension provisions illustrates that construing
"required to drive a motor vehicle in the course of his regular employ-
ment" as synonymous with "professional driver" does not run afoul of
the rule against superfluous terms. 9 4 As the MVA argued, at the time
the point system was first enacted in 1959, the provision could have
only referred to "chauffeurs" because a driver with an operators' li-
cense was not permitted to receive payment for operating a motor
vehicle.' 9 5 In 1970, when the Legislature made an exception to the
minimum number of points required for a conference applicable only
to "professional drivers," the meaning of section 16-405(b) did not
automatically change.' 9 6 Rather, this provision reinforced the two dis-
tinct categories of drivers maintained by the Legislature since 1906.117
The Legislature usually intends different words to have different
meanings, but the wording of this rule and the terms "generally im-
ply" and "usually" illustrate that there may be exceptions where differ-
189. See State v. Depew, 175 Md. 274, 275, 1 A.2d 626, 627 (1938) (holding that an
employee whose driving was incidental to his employment was an operator and not a
chauffer and need not receive a chauffeur's license).
190. Toler, 373 Md. at 223-24, 817 A.2d at 235.
191. Id. at 228, 817 A.2d at 237-38.
192. Taylor v. Nationsbank, 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645, 654-55 (2001).
193. Id.
194. Brief of Respondent at 9, Toler (No. 21).
195. Id. at 9-10.
196. 1970 Md. Laws 534.
197. 1906 Md. Laws 449.
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ent words have the same meanings. 198 One reason for finding an
exception is illustrated in cases following the corollary rule that the
same words generally have the same meaning. 99 On previous occa-
sions, the court has refused to follow this rule in order to uphold the
purpose of the statute.2 ° ° In Whack, to fulfill the general purpose of
the statute of imposing greater penalties on repeat offenders, the
court interpreted "convicted" to include conviction pending appeal
despite a different meaning of the word used earlier in the statute. 21
Also, in Knowles, to fulfill the purpose of the statute, the court con-
strued the word "may" as "shall" or "must" in one part of a statute and
then used "may" in its permissive sense in another part of the same
section. 20 2 Just as the court in Whack and Knowles departed from the
general rule of statutory interpretation to effectuate the purpose of
the statute, the court in Toler should have weighed the dual purpose
behind the suspension policies and the point system and recognized
that the provisions were an exception to the general rule of different
words requiring different meanings. 20 3 Although the court has not
explicitly held that in any case the different word-different meaning
rule to have an exception, it is notable that in the one case where the
Court of Appeals relied on the rule, it found that even though "give"
and "sell" had different meanings, the overall purpose of the statute to
prevent liquor procurement by minors was not inhibited by using
both terms.20 4
Thus, in Toler, the court could have interpreted "required to
drive" a motor vehicle in the course of his regular employment as sy-
nonymous with "professional driver" without violating the different
word-different meaning rule, because of the leeway built into the gen-
198. See, e.g., Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 736 (D.
Md. 1996) (relying on the general rule that the use of different language creates the infer-
ence that Congress meant different things in finding "reasonable accommodation" and
"undue hardship" have different meanings).
199. Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 673, 659 A.2d 1347, 1350 (1995); State v. Knowles, 90
Md. 646, 654, 45 A. 877, 878 (1900).
200. E.g., Whack, 338 Md. at 674-75, 659 A.2d at 1351 (finding that the meaning of "con-
viction" may vary within a statute depending on the context of the specific provisions);
Knowles, 90 Md. at 654-55, 45 A. at 878 (construing "may" as "shall" in one part of a statute,
and using it in its permissive sense in a latter part of the same section of the statute in
order to effectuate the legislative intent behind the statute).
201. Whack, 338 Md. at 675, 659 A.2d at 1351.
202. Knowles, 90 Md. at 654-55, 45 A. at 878.
203. Cf Whack, 338 Md. at 675, 659 A.2d at 1351; Knowles, 90 Md. at 654-55, 45 A. at 878.
204. Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184, 197-98 (1859).
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eral rule.2 0 5 Instead the court based its decision on a strict interpreta-
tion of the different word-different meaning rule and failed to
effectuate the legislative intent.20 6 The Legislature intended for the
point based suspension system to ensure public safety and objectivity
in the suspension process.2 7 Both of these purposes require that the
exception apply to a distinct subgroup of individuals, and the major-
ity's expansion of the class of exempted individuals undermines the
goals of public safety and objectivity. 208 Interpreting "required to
drive a motor vehicle in the course of his regular employment" as sy-
nonymous with "professional driver" also would have been consistent
with the court's prior case law that holds the meanings of terms sub-
ject to statutory purpose. 2 0
9
Instead of finding an exception to the different word-different
meaning rule in Toler, the court acted contrary to its own prior case
law that upheld the distinction between two classes of drivers.2 0 In
broadening the class of people included in the exception of section
16-405(b), the court acted contrary to the historic interpretation of
the statute by the MVA and the court itself.2 1 1 In Depew, the Court of
Appeals rejected the idea of broadening the excepted licensees to in-
clude driving that was incidental to employment when it found that
an auditor who had to drive to visit clients was not a "chauffeur. ' 21 2 In
1973, the Court of Appeals explicitly endorsed the view of the Court
of Special Appeals that section 16-405 (b) only applied to "professional
drivers." '213 The ALJ and circuit court decisions in Toler both recog-
nized that historically section 16-405(b) has been interpreted as apply-
ing only to "chauffeurs. '2 14 The ALJ in the MVA proceeding expressly
205. See, e.g., Whack, 338 Md. at 674-75, 659 A.2d at 1351 (illustrating an exception to the
general rule that the same word will have the same meaning throughout a statute in order
to fulfill the statutory purpose behind the act).
206. Toler, 373 Md. at 228, 817 A.2d at 237-38.
207. See supra notes 181-184 (discussing the legislative intent behind the point based
license suspension system).
208. See supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text (discussing the inherent problems
in achieving objectivity and public safety when the class of excepted individuals increases).
209. Whack, 338 Md. at 672, 659 A.2d at 1350; Knowles, 90 Md. at 654-55, 45 A. at 878.
210. Curley v. Gen. Valet Serv., Inc., 270 Md. 248, 257, 311 A.2d 231, 236 (1973); State v.
Depew, 175 Md. 274, 275, 1 A.2d 626, 627 (1938).
211. Curley, 270 Md. at 257, 311 A.2d at 235.
212. 175 Md. at 277, 1 A.2d at 627.
213. Curley, 270 Md. at 257, 311 A.2d at 236 (accepting section 16-405(b) to impose
suspension of an operator's license only after the holder is charged with 8 points and
suspension of a chauffeur's license after the holder is charged with 15 points).
214. Record Extract at 29, Toler (No. 21); Brief of Respondent at Apx. 7, Toler (No. 21).
Judge Jackson did not say that Toler was not a chauffer but found that Toler's need to
drive was only incidental to his employment and that he, therefore, did not qualify for the
higher point minimum. Id. at Apx. 9.
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stated that Toler did not fall within the exception because the excep-
tion had historically been interpreted to only apply to "professional
drivers. 215 In the circuit court proceeding, Judge Jackson recognized
that section 16-405(b) would apply only to those whose job actually
"required" them to drive, and Toler did not qualify.216 The majority
in Toler did not distinguish the court's precedent that maintained two
distinct classes of drivers from its current holding.217 In addition, the
court did not offer any explanation as to why the court maintained
this distinction in 1973 if the legislative history illustrated the broader
meaning of "required to drive a motor vehicle in the course of his
regular employment," as the majority argues it does.2 18 Furthermore,
not only did the majority in Toler fail to consider the statutory purpose
when applying the general rules of statutory interpretation, but it also
contradicted its past case law maintaining two distinct categories of
drivers.2 1
9
d. A Possible Interpretation that Is Not Contrary to Common
Sense.-The majority should have placed more emphasis on the gen-
eral rule of statutory interpretation that "a statute is to be given a rea-
sonable interpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible with
common sense."220 A broad interpretation of section 16-405(b) runs
contrary to common sense by allowing the exception to swallow the
rule.221 Even if the court refused to accept that the Legislature did
intend for "required to drive in the course of his regular employment"
to be synonymous with "professional driver," it could have analyzed
"required" consistently with the purpose of the statute to uphold the
rule of statutory interpretation that requires construction to render
meanings that are not contrary to common sense. 222
The Toler majority's broad interpretation of section 16-405(b)
gives the exception an expansive meaning that runs contrary to com-
215. Record Extract at 29, Toler (No. 21).
216. Brief of Respondent at Apx. 9, Toler (No. 21).
217. Toler, 373 Md. at 216-28, 817 A.2d at 230-38.
218. Id.
219. See Depew, 175 Md. at 275, 1 A.2d at 627 (rejecting the petitioner's plea to broaden
the excepted class to include driving that was incidental to employment).
220. W. Corr. Inst. v. Geiger, 371 Md. 125, 142, 807 A.2d 32, 42 (2002).
221. The majority's interpretation of section 16-405(b) allows the potential for a wide
class of drivers to fall within the excepted class of licensees. Toler, 373 Md. at 230-31, 817
A.2d at 239 (Raker, J., dissenting). Thus, the exception will be applicable to many drivers
and the possibility exists for more drivers to fall within the exception than outside of it. Id.
222. See id. (criticizing the majority for interpreting the statute contrary to common
sense).
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mon sense.223 Just as in Brantner, where the court found unreasonable
the definition of "public records" under the fraud statute... as includ-
ing all copies generated by an official or agency in line with the duties
of the official or agency so that the alteration of one of those copies
would constitute fraud, an expansive exception to the point system is
also unreasonable. 225 As previously mentioned, the possibilities of
who may fall within the exception are endless. 226 As the circuit court
and dissent both pointed out, Toler's job of doing home improve-
ments did not "require" him to drive; Toler would be able to do the
home improvements by having someone else drive him to the work-
site. 2 2 7 Based on this interpretation of "required," the court could
have found that Toler did not fall within the exception. In so doing,
the majority would have upheld the statute's dual purposes of public
safety and objectivity.
Instead the majority adopted a broad interpretation of "required"
and established a meaning of section 16-405(b) contrary to common
sense.22' The majority of people with driver's licenses are "required"
to drive to do their job as much as Toler was "required" to drive to do
home improvements, whether they drive to an office building or to
visit clients. 229 With the possibility of most license holders in the state
of Maryland falling within this exception, it is clear that the majority's
interpretation of "required" is contrary to common sense.23" To apply
an elevated point level to all those whose employment may be incon-
venienced by a license suspension is illogical. 2 1 It is unreasonable to
223. Id.
224. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 45 (1957) (prohibiting the willful and unauthorized alter-
ation of a public document).
225. State v. Brantner, 360 Md. 314, 323, 758 A.2d 84, 89 (2000) (accepting the argu-
ment that "an interpretation of the statute to mean that the mere alteration of a copy of a
public record in the hands of a third party is actionable defies common sense") (footnote
omitted).
226. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing the wide range of possible
exceptions to section 16-405(b), including attorneys meeting clients and doctors visiting
patients).
227. Brief of Respondent at Apx. 9, Toler, (No. 21); Toler, 373 Md. at 231, 817 A.2d at
239 (Raker,J., dissenting) (noting that "Toler [did] not dispute that, via a hired chauffeur
or the assistance of a friend, he could perform his job without driving").
228. See Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 302, 783 A.2d 667,
671 (2001) (stating that "a statute is to be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is
illogical or incompatible with common sense").
229. Toler, 373 Md. at 231, 817 A.2d at 239-240 (Raker, J., dissenting) (recognizing that a
wide variety of people need to drive as a part of their employment). Judge Raker further
noted that "[e]mployees' need to get to their place of employment will always be 'incident
to their work."' Id. at 231 n.1, 817 A.2d at 239 n.1.
230. Id. at 230-31, 817 A.2d at 239.
231. Id.
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presume that the Legislature intended to raise the minimum point
level for such a broad class of people when it provided the MVA with
the explicit authority to issue restricted licenses to alleviate any ad-
verse employment effects.
5. Conclusion.-In Toler v. Motor Vehicle Administration, the Court
of Appeals held that section 16-405(b) of the Maryland Transporta-
tion Law Article, which allows drivers who are "required to drive a
motor vehicle in the course of [their] regular employment" to accrue
an elevated level of points before their license is suspended, applies to
licensees whose driving is merely incidental to their employment.232
The court misinterpreted section 16-405(b) as a statute that gives the
MA discretion to consider any adverse affects license suspension may
have on the individual's employment.2 3 The majority's broadening
of the excepted class of drivers puts even more leeway in Maryland's
already lenient license suspension policies.234 By allowing a wider
range of licensees to accumulate double the point totals applied to
ordinary drivers before the MVA can consider license suspension, the
decision reduces any enhancements the point system has on public
safety and adds subjectivity back into the suspension process.233 The
court failed to take into account the dual purposes of the statute of
ensuring the objectivity of the suspension system and protecting pub-
lic safety, by strictly applying the general rule of statutory construction
that different words in the same statutes have different meanings and
not properly recognizing this situation as an exception to the rule.2 3 6
The majority's interpretation violates general notions of common
sense and allows the exception to swallow the rule by broadening the
statute to include a vast number of licensees who may drive inciden-
tally to their employment and bluring the distinction between two cat-
232. Id. at 228, 817 A.2d at 238.
233. See supra notes 149-160 and accompanying text (arguing that section 16405 (b)
does not give the MVA authority to consider the adverse effects a license suspension could
have on a driver's employment, while setting forth the provisions of the Motor Vehicle
Code that do take potential hardships on a licensee's employment into consideration).
234. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (analyzing the suspension provisions
of other states to illustrate the uniqueness of Maryland's provisions).
235. See supra notes 171-188 and accompanying text (discussing the manner in which
broadening the class of drivers subject to the elevated point level fails to uphold the dual
statutory purposes of section 16-405(b)).
236. See supra notes 189-219 and accompanying text (criticizing the majority's decision
that the term "professional driver" used in section 16-404(a) prevented the language of
section 16-405(b), "required to drive a motor vehicle in the course of his regular employ-
ment," from having the same meaning as "professional driver").
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egories of drivers-professional drivers and all other licensees-that
the Legislature has maintained for the past ninety-seven years.23 7
CORTNEY L. MADEA
237. See supra notes 220-231 (arguing that the court violated the general rule of statutory
construction that statutes should be interpreted in line with common sense by finding
allowing a broad class of drivers to accrue an elevated point level before invoking the
license suspension system).
10452004]
Recent Decision:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. An Unnecessary Expansion of the Limited Collateral Order Doctrine
In United States v. Ferebe,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered whether an order denying a defen-
dant's motion to strike a death notice as untimely filed was immedi-
ately appealable.2 The court also examined the standard used by
lowdr courts to determine whether this notice was reasonably filed
under the Death Notice statute.' The court held that the district
court's refusal to strike the notice constituted a collateral order and,
as such, was immediately appealable.4 Furthermore, the court con-
cluded the Death Notice statute requires district courts to evaluate
whether notice of intention to seek the death penalty was reasonably
filed by making an objective assessment as to the reasonableness of
the timing before the actual trial begins.' The Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion expanded the narrow body of criminal cases the Supreme Court
has set aside as immediately appealable under the collateral order
doctrine.6 In fact, at the time of the decision in Ferebe, the Supreme
Court had allowed immediate appeal of an issue in only three circum-
1. 332 F.3d 722 (4th Cir. 2003).
2. Id. at 724.
3. Id. at 725. The "Death Notice statute," 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2000), states:
If, in a case involving an offense [for which the defendant is death-eligible], the
attorney for the government believes that the circumstances of the offense are
such that a sentence of death is justified under this chapter, the attorney shall, a
reasonable time before the trial or before acceptance by the court of a plea of
guilty, sign and file with the court, and serve on the defendant, a notice.
§ 3593(a).
4. Ferebe, 332 F.3d at 730. The court explained that the motion was collateral because
an order denying a motion to strike a death notice under section 3593(a)'s timeliness
provision is "conclusive, collateral to the merits, and if wrongly decided [would] irrepara-
bly deprive capital defendants of an important right." Id.
5. Id. at 724.
6. The collateral order doctrine enables an issue to be immediately appealed rather
than await a final decision in the criminal case if the issue is fully addressed in the lower
court, is separate from the principal issue in the criminal trial, and if to await final decision
of the criminal case would significantly undermine the rights of the accused. See, e.g., Ab-
ney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1977).
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stances in a criminal case. 7 Because the Supreme Court has applied
the collateral order doctrine under so few circumstances, it would
have been consistent with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence if the
Fourth Circuit had not applied the collateral order doctrine in this
case. The lower court's order refusing to strike the death notice could
have awaited final judgment in the case without irreversible loss to the
defendant, and thus the third prong of the collateral order doctrine
was not satisfied.' By instead allowing interlocutory appeal of the or-
der, the court's decision permits capital defendants to interfere with
pre-trial proceedings, while at the same time jeopardizing their consti-
tutional right to a speedy trial and compromising the efficiency of the
criminal justice system.9 The Ferebe court's decision, therefore, dimin-
ishes the strength and effectiveness of the legal system that the final
judgment rule was designed to protect."0
1. The Case.-On September 16, 1997, Donald Lee Ferebe was
indicted on two counts of murder for the shooting deaths of Benja-
min Harvey Page and Yolanda Evans.1 1 The prosecution sought the
death penalty for both murder counts, and in May of 1998, the United
States Attorney General authorized the death penalty for Ferebe, but
only for the murder of Page.12 Ferebe was already serving a life sen-
tence for a related, murder conviction; therefore, the district court al-
lowed Ferebe to postpone trial for the murders of Page and Evans
until after he appealed the prior conviction.13 The Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the prior conviction in September of 1999, and in January of
2000, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.1 4 Five months later, the
prosecution offered Ferebe concurrent life sentences if he pled guilty
7. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (the denial of a motion to reduce bail
constitutes a collateral order); Abney, 431 U.S. at 659 (a double jeopardy claim fits the
collateral order exception); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 591 (1979) (a claim that the
Speech and Debate Clause has been violated is immediately appealable under the collat-
eral order doctrine). Additionally, after Ferebe was decided, the Supreme Court utilized the
collateral order doctrine in a fourth criminal case and held an order requiring a defendant
to take medication involuntarily to stand trial was immediately appealable. Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166, 177 (2003).
8. See infra notes 181-196 and accompanying text (explaining that the use of the col-
lateral order doctrine should be limited to rights that will be irretrievably lost if appeal
must await final judgment).
9. See infra notes 197-210 and accompanying text (analyzing the effects that the inter-
locutory appeal has on the court system).
10. Id.
11. Ferebe, 332 F.3d at 724.
12. Id. at 741 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 741-42.
14. Id. at 742.
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to both new murder charges. t5 Ferebe rejected the offer in October
of 2000.16
In December of 2000, the district court held a hearing and sched-
uled Ferebe's trial for September 10, 2001.1" On May 28, 2001, the
prosecution asked the Attorney General to reconsider authorizing the
death penalty for Ferebe's second murder charge.1 8 Before receiving
a response from the Attorney General, however, Ferebe's attorney no-
tified the prosecution that, as originally offered, Ferebe would plead
guilty to both murders in exchange for concurrent life sentences. 19
Consequently, in June of 2001, both parties signed a formal plea
agreement to this effect. 2° Because the Attorney General had to ap-
prove the agreement, both the parties and the court agreed to sus-
pend trial preparations while awaiting the Attorney General's
decision. 1
The Attorney General approved the death penalty for the second
murder on July 6, 2001 but twenty days later informed the prosecution
that the plea agreement was unacceptable.2 2 The parties and the
court then met on July 31, 2001 to discuss the case.23 At this meeting,
defense counsel announced that Ferebe still planned to plead guilty
to the charges. 24 Defense counsel explained that because the prose-
cution had not filed notice of an intent to seek the death penalty, the
prosecution could not seek a sentence beyond life imprisonment.25
The government replied by filing a formal notice of its intent to seek
the death penalty for both murder charges the next day.26 In re-
sponse, Ferebe filed a motion with the district court to strike and bar
the death notice, stating that the notice was untimely filed both be-
cause it was filed years after he was indicted and because it was filed
just a short time before his trial was scheduled to commence. 27
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. At this hearing the prosecution also withdrew its offer of concurrent life
sentences in exchange for a guilty plea because Ferebe formally had rejected the offer. Id.
18. Id. at 725.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 726.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The government was required to file notice of its intent to seek the death pen-
alty under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2000). Id. at 742.
27. Id.; see supra note 3 (providing the text of the Death Notice statute and explaining
that a death notice must be filed a "reasonable time" before trial).
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The district court held a hearing on Ferebe's motion on Septem-
ber 7, 2001 and five days later issued an oral opinion denying the
motion to strike the death penalty notice. 28 The court found that Fer-
ebe had actual, although not formal, notice of intent to seek the death
penalty for the first murder count and that preparation for the second
count was not substantially different than that for the first count.29 In
analyzing whether the notice was reasonable, the court concluded
that the statutory requirement that the prosecution serve the notice a
"reasonable time before the trial" required considering any prejudice
the defendant faced as a result of the timing of the notice."0 The
court also postponed the trial date to a mutually agreeable date.3 '
Ferebe filed an interlocutory appeal of the district court's order
denying his motion to strike the death penalty notice as untimely.
3 2
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered whether a district court's order denying a motion to strike
a death notice for being untimely filed fell under the collateral order
doctrine and therefore was immediately appealable.33
2. Legal Background.-Although the United States Constitution
does not provide an explicit right to an appeal in either criminal or
civil cases, it does grant Congress the power to create statutes regulat-
ing judicial appeals. 4 Under this authority, Congress enacted the Ju-
diciary Act of 1789 to enable parties to appeal final judgments entered
in United States district courts.35 It was not until 1949 that the Su-
preme Court first interpreted this statutory rule that all appeals await
final judgment to encompass an exception, the collateral order doc-
trine,36 which the Court later held could enable certain orders in a
28. Ferebe, 332 F.3d at 726.
29. Id. at 743 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 744.
33. Id. at 726.
34. Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution states in relevant part: "the
[S]upreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations, as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2.
35. 1 Stat. 73. The current statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000), was derived from this
initial act and states "the courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
36. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (holding that
because an order requiring a district court to follow state law was final in the lower court
and separate from the actual case, it could be immediately appealed without awaiting final
judgment).
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criminal case to be immediately appealed. 37 The Court articulated
that to meet this collateral order exception in a criminal case, the
order must satisfy three requirements in the lower court: (1) conclu-
sively resolve the disputed question, (2) involve an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effec-
tively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment.38 To determine
whether an order was immediately appealable under the collateral or-
der doctrine, the Court began to consider whether the contested
claim contained an inherent right not to be subjected to a jury trial
and consequently required intermediary appeal to preserve the defen-
dant's right not to endure trial.3 9 The Court has been particularly
reluctant to apply the collateral order doctrine in the criminal arena,
using the doctrine only three times by 2003 to allow intermediate ap-
peal for an interlocutory order within a criminal case.4" Following the
Supreme Court's example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has applied the collateral order doctrine reticently to
issues that it deems satisfy the three-prong test of the doctrine.4
a. The Supreme Court Articulates a Limited Exception to the Rule
that Appeals Must Await Final Judgment.-The Supreme Court has con-
tinuously adhered to the congressionally mandated requirement that
only final decisions and decrees of federal district courts can be ap-
pealed to higher courts,42 particularly for criminal cases.43 In Cob-
bledick v. United States," the Court explained that judicial review
historically has been limited to final judgments of the lower courts
except when this limitation would "practically defeat the right to any
review at all."'45 The Cobbledick Court considered whether an order
denying a motion to repeal a subpoena requiring a witness to come
before a grand jury was a final decision and could therefore be imme-
37. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951).
38. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1977).
39. See id. (holding that a double jeopardy claim protects against the trial itself and
thus could be immediately appealed).
40. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (outlining the cases in which the Supreme
Court had applied the collateral order doctrine to permit immediate appeal of interlocu-
tory orders).
41. See infra notes 115-128 (giving examples of Fourth Circuit decisions involving the
collateral order doctrine).
42. For a criminal case, this statutory rule limits appellate review to cases where the
defendant has been convicted and sentenced for the crime committed. Flanagan v. United
States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (citing Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937)).
43. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (listing the select instances in which the
Supreme Court has allowed an appeal before final judgment in criminal cases).
44. 309 U.S. 323 (1940).
45. Id. at 324-25.
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diately appealed.46 The Court held that the order must await final
judgment and explained that neither a party nor a witness to the
cause of action could immediately appeal an issue that arose during
litigation to stall the proceedings before the final decision.4 7 The
Court explained that for policy reasons, finality of review, particularly
in the criminal arena, is essential for the success of the legal system.48
Therefore, the Court concluded that appeal of issues in most criminal
cases should await a final judgment in the cause of action.49
The Supreme Court first articulated an exception to the rule that
all appeals must await final judgment in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp.5" In Cohen, the Court considered whether an order requir-
ing a district court to abide by New Jersey law was immediately appeal-
able.51 The Court held that the order was final within the district
court and was separate from the actual cause of action; therefore, it
could not be included in one final appeal.52 Consequently, the order
created a narrow exception to the general rule that appeals must await
final judgment.5 The Court explained that the purpose of statutorily
limiting appeals to final decisions was to forbid appeal on incomplete,
intermediary issues as separate components rather than combining all
issues into one final review.54 The Court reasoned the order requir-
ing the district court to follow state law was immediately appealable
because it completely disposed of a right that was separate from the
stockholder's derivative action and did not need to be deliberated as a
substantive part of the case. 55 In Cohen, the Supreme Court first estab-
lished the collateral order doctrine, a narrow exception to the con-
gressional statute which mandates appeals await final judgment.56
Although Cohen established a limited exception to the final judg-
ment rule for a civil case, it was not until Stack v. BoyleY' that the Su-
46. Id. at 324.
47. Id. at 326.
48. Id. at 325-26.
49. Id. at 324-25.
50. 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949).
51. Id. at 543. NewJersey law required an unsuccessful plaintiff who had a small inter-
est in an action, such as a shareholder, to be held liable for all litigation expenses and to
provide security for these expenses prior to prosecution of their action. Id. at 544-45.
52. Id at 546.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 546-47. The Court further noted that not every order dealing with security
would be subject to immediate appeal, but because this interlocutory appeal had nothing
to do with the main cause of action, it was subject to an exception to the final judgment
mandate. Id at 547.
56. Id. at 546.
57. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
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preme Court first used the collateral order doctrine in a criminal case
to hold that an order denying a motion to reduce bail is also immedi-
ately appealable.58 In Stack, the defendant's bail was set at a much
higher amount than that set for similar offenses without substantive
evidence as to why the amount was so high.59 The Court found the
district court's denial of the motion to reduce bail to be a final deci-
sion and thus immediately appealable under Cohen.6' The Court rea-
soned that "there is no discretion to refuse to reduce excessive bail. 61
In holding the order immediately appealable as a final decision, the
Court expanded use of the collateral order doctrine exception from
civil to criminal cases.62 This decision paved the way for future inter-
locutory orders to be immediately appealed before final judgment in
the actual criminal trial.
Because the Supreme Court did not specifically address whether
all pre-indictment motions were immediately appealable following
Stack, a split developed in the circuits as to whether these motions
automatically fell under the collateral order doctrine.63 The Court
addressed this split over ten years after Stack and held that all pre-
indictment motions are not immediately appealable in DiBella v.
United States.64 The defense in DiBella argued that the collateral order
doctrine applied to a pre-trial order to suppress evidence obtained
through an unreasonable search and seizure in a criminal case. 65 The
Court noted that the existence of a pre-indictment motion alone is
insufficient to automatically create an intermediate appeal. 66 Specifi-
cally, the Court reasoned that suppression motions such as the order
to suppress evidence are not separate from the cause of action be-
cause they will affect the proceedings and results of the actual trial.67
The motion was not an independent issue and therefore allowing in-
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 3. The government explained that bail was set higher than that for offenses
with similar penalties because these particular defendants were considered part of a con-
spiracy and were therefore more likely to leave the jurisdiction upon receiving bail. Id. at
5-6.
60. Id. at 6.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Compare DiBella v. United States, 284 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1960) (expressing the view
that pre-indictment motions are immediately appealable), rev'd, DiBella v. United States,
369 U.S. 121 (1962), with United States v. Williams, 227 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1955) (expres-
sing the view that pre-indictment motions are interlocutory), and Zacarias v. United States,
261 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1958) (same).
64. 369 U.S. 121, 131-33 (1962).
65. Id. at 121-22.
66. Id. at 131.
67. Id. at 127.
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termediate appeal would cause "serious disruption to the conduct of a
criminal trial."6 The Court emphasized that these orders are simply
part of the process leading to the criminal trial.69 This holding ce-
mented the Court's position that the existence of a pre-indictment
motion alone does not provide an automatic intermediate appeal,
thereby further constricting the Court's application of the collateral
order doctrine.7"
b. The Supreme Court Outlines the Required Elements of the Collat-
eral Order Doctrine.-Once the Supreme Court established that the col-
lateral order doctrine could apply to criminal cases but did not
automatically apply to pre-indictment motions, the Court needed to
articulate a workable standard for orders to satisfy the collateral order
doctrine. The Supreme Court defined the three prongs necessary to
fulfill the collateral order doctrine in Abney v. United States.7 The is-
sue in Abney was whether an order denying a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the charges violated the Double Jeopardy Clause was im-
mediately appealable.72 The Court outlined three prongs that an or-
der must meet to satisfy the collateral order doctrine.73 An order
must (1) conclusively resolve the disputed question, (2) involve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action,
and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment."
The Court found the first prong was satisfied because there were no
further steps to take in the district court to avoid the trial the defen-
dant claimed would violate his protection against double jeopardy;
therefore, the denial of the order was the district court's final dismis-
sal of the claim.75 The order fulfilled the second prong because the
defendant's claim that he should not be subjected to trial had nothing
to do with his culpability in the conspiracy charges he faced.76 The
accused did not challenge the merits of the case or any of the evi-
dence against him, as was the case in DiBella.7 7 Finally, the Court held
68. Id. at 129.
69. Id. at 131.
70. Id.
71. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
72. Id. at 653.
73. Id. at 659.
74. Id. at 659-60.
75. Id. at 659.
76. Id. at 660.
77. Id. In DiBella v. United States, the defense sought to suppress evidence obtained
through an allegedly unlawful search and seizure. 369 U.S. 121, 122 (1962). The Court
held the second prong of the collateral order doctrine was not satisfied because the claim
would affect the evidence presented as well as the conduct of the trial itself. Id. at 127.
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that the order met the final prong; the defendant's right would be
"significantly undermined" if the appeal had to await final judgment
because the defendant would be forced to endure a trial he claimed
he had a right to avoid.78 The Court based this holding on the fact
that it previously had construed the Double Jeopardy Clause as pro-
tecting against both being convicted and being tried twice for the
same crime.79 A double jeopardy claim is therefore a narrow excep-
tion to the rule that all appeals must await final judgment because it
satisfies all three required prongs of the collateral order doctrine."
After the Supreme Court established three specific elements re-
quired to satisfy the collateral order doctrine, the Court began rigidly
applying these three prongs to orders within criminal cases to deter-
mine whether the orders could be immediately appealed. For exam-
ple, in United States v. MacDonald,8 the Supreme Court refused to
extend the collateral order doctrine further into the criminal arena
for an order denying a defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment
based on the denial of the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.82 The Court reasoned
that the order was not immediately appealable by applying the three
prongs of the collateral order doctrine explicitly set forth in Abney.83
The Court explained that the defendant had not fulfilled the first
prong because the issue of whether his right to a speedy trial was vio-
lated was not fully disposed of until after an evaluation of the particu-
lar facts of the case, which, the Court reasoned, usually can be done
only upon completion of the trial.84 The Court further reasoned that
the defendant did not satisfy the second prong because in most situa-
tions the actual case is intertwined with how the passage of time has
affected the defendant's ability to assert his innocence; therefore, a
speedy trial claim is not adequately independent of the issues at
trial.85 Finally, the Court held that the defendant did not meet the
78. Abney, 431 U.S. at 660.
79. Id. at 660-61.
80. Id. at 659.
81. 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
82. Id. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in relevant part,
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and pub-
lic trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This clause is commonly referred to as the Speedy
Trial Clause.
83. MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 861.
84. Id. at 859.
85. Id. at 859-60. The Court distinguished double jeopardy claims from speedy trial
cases on this ground. Id. The Court reasoned that while a double jeopardy claim is sepa-
rate from the trial itself, a speedy trial claim intertwines the prejudice the defendant may
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third prong because the Speedy Trial Clause, unlike the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause, does not provide a right not to be tried.86 Therefore, the
Court concluded that no fundamental right would be lost if the claim
were not upheld prior to trial.8 7 The Court concluded that such
claims are not immediately appealable because a speedy trial claim
does not satisfy any of the three prongs outlined in Abney.
88
Despite strict adherence to the three prongs of the collateral or-
der doctrine, the Supreme Court is willing to expand the doctrine
further in the criminal context when the order fits the required
prongs. Helstoski v. MeanoM9 concerned a former congressman's argu-
ment that a grand jury analysis of his legislative acts violated the
Speech and Debate Clause.9 ° In holding that the claim constituted a
collateral order, the Court compared the Speech and Debate Clause
to the Double Jeopardy Clause when considering the three prongs of
the collateral order doctrine.9' The Court reasoned that the claim
met the first prong because, like a double jeopardy claim, once the
speech and debate claim is denied there are no additional steps the
lower court can take to prevent the trial itself.92 The order satisfied
the second prong because, although the defendant did challenge the
evidence to be presented at trial, this dispute would end if the indict-
ment were overruled.9 Lastly, central to the argument that the claim
fulfilled the third prong was the Court's previous determination that
the Speech and Debate Clause protected congressional members
suffer with the events that transpire at the actual trial. Id. at 859. In addition, the Court
reasoned that a double jeopardy claim does not question the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence, but a speedy trial claim usually posits that the amount of time that has passed from
arrest to trial adversely affected the defendant's ability to prove his innocence. Id. There-
fore, the speedy trial claim is tied to the defendant's culpability. Id
86. Id. at 861.
87. Id. at 860-61. The Double Jeopardy Clause, on the other hand, protects an individ-
ual not only from being convicted twice for the same crime but also from being tried twice
for the same crime; therefore, to disallow immediate appeal and await final judgment
would eliminate this inherent right of the clause itself. Id. at 861-62.
88. Id. at 861.
89. 442 U.S. 500 (1979).
90. Id. at 504-05. These acts included allegations that the defendant, at the time he was
a member of Congress, solicited and accepted bribes from aliens in exchange for introduc-
ing private bills into the House of Representatives that would allow the aliens to remain in
the United States. Id. at 502. The Speech and Debate Clause provides, in relevant part,
that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not
be questioned in any other Place." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
91. Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 506-07.
92. Id. The Court specifically stated that "[o]nce a motion to dismiss is denied, there is
nothing the [congressman] can do under that Clause in the trial court to prevent the
trial." Id. at 507.
93. Id.
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from the trial itself, not just from the results of the trial.9 4 Therefore,
the Court reasoned that review of a claim involving the Speech and
Debate Clause must occur before trial to protect this constitutional
right to avoid trial.9 5 The Court found that the order was collateral
because it met all three prongs and involved the right not to be sub-
jected to trial.9 6
Five years later in Flanagan v. United States, 7 the Supreme Court
held that the pretrial disqualification of defense counsel in a criminal
case was not a collateral order because it did not meet any of the
prongs of the collateral order doctrine and, more specifically, it did
not inherently contain a right not to be tried.9 8 In Flanagan, one firm
originally represented four defendants in a criminal case.99 Subse-
quently, three defendants decided to try their cases separate from the
fourth defendant.'0 0 The district court disqualified the firm from rep-
resenting any of the defendants on the theory that it had received
confidential information from all of them.'0 ' The Court emphasized
the importance to both the defendant and society of shortening the
time between arrest and sentencing in criminal cases, a right encom-
passed in the Sixth Amendment guarantee to a speedy trial.10 2 Exam-
ining the elements of the collateral order doctrine, the Court
explained that the right not to have counsel disqualified, unlike an
order denying bail reduction, would not be lost if the defendants were
convicted.1 0 3 Next, the Court noted that the defendants' right to
counsel of their choice fits into the category of rights of all criminal
defendants, that is, "merely a right not to be convicted in certain cir-
cumstances."10 4 Unlike the Speech and Debate Clause or the Double
94. Id. at 508 (citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967)).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
98. Id. at 269.
99. Id. at 261.
100. Id. The defendants felt the government's evidence against defendant Flanagan was
much more substantial than that against them and it would therefore affect their chances
of acquittal if all the cases were tried together. Id.
101. Id. at 262; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c) (stating that when two or more defendants
have been charged for the same crime and have the same counsel, the court should inter-
vene to protect each defendant's right to counsel unless there is obviously no conflict of
interest).
102. Fanagan, 465 U.S. at 264. The Court explained that "[a]s the Sixth Amend-
ment[ ] . . .indicates, the accused may have a strong interest in speedy resolution of the
charges against him. In addition, there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial
which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused." Id.
(citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
103. Id. at 266.
104. Id. at 267.
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Jeopardy Clause, 10 5 the right not to have counsel disqualified "is in no
danger of becoming moot upon conviction and sentence."' 0 6 There-
fore, the Court held that the right did not fall under the collateral
order doctrine because it would not be lost if appeal awaited final
judgment. 107
Similarly, in Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.,' 08 the
Supreme Court found a district court order dismissing a settlement
agreement was not immediately appealable because the right could be
sufficiently corrected upon appeal from a final judgment in the
case.109 The Court explained that even if a settlement agreement pro-
tected a right not to stand trial, this fact alone was insufficient to allow
the order to fall under the collateral order doctrine.'1 0 The Court
noted that it consistently had emphasized the collateral order doc-
trine as a narrow exception to the general rule that appeals await final
judgment and had explained in numerous instances congressional
dislike for partial litigation.1"' The defendant's rights could be re-
viewed effectively after final judgment of the action in a way that the
right not to endure a second trial for the same crime could not be.
1 2
Consequently, the case did not satisfy this third prong of the collateral
order doctrine because the defendant would not lose its rights under
the settlement agreement if forced to await final judgment to appeal
the agreement's dismissal.1
3
c. The Fourth Circuit Follows the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence
for Intermediary Appeals.-Following the guidance of the Supreme
Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also
has applied the collateral order doctrine when the issue satisfies the
three prongs outlined in Abney. For example, in United States v.
Smith," 4 the court found a district court's order denying a defen-
dant's motion to dismiss an indictment due to the prosecution's deci-
105. See supra notes 78-79 and 94-95 and accompanying text (explaining that both the
Double Jeopardy Clause and Speech and Debate Clause encompass a right not to be tried,
and therefore meet the third prong of the collateral order doctrine).
106. Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 266.
107. Id. at 266-67.
108. 511 U.S. 863 (1994).
109. Id. at 869. The Court considered only the third prong of the collateral order doc-
trine because the establishment of the first two prongs was not contested and failure of the
third prong was alone sufficient to deny appeal. Id. at 868-69.
110. Id. at 871.
111. Id at 867-68.
112. Id. at 881.
113. Id.
114. 851 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1988).
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sion to try him as an adult rather than as a juvenile to be immediately
appealable.' 15 The court explained that the order met the first prong
of the collateral order doctrine because the district court had conclu-
sively determined that the defendant would be tried as an adult at the
trial level." 6 The court then explained that a defendant's juvenile
status is detached from his guilt or innocence of the crimes of which
he is accused, thus satisfying the second prong of the collateral order
doctrine.117 The court reasoned that the claim fulfilled the third
prong because, although ajuvenile still could contest being tried as an
adult after the trial, many of the rights he would have had as a juve-
nile, such as the right to have court records sealed, would be effec-
tively lost."' The court likened the protection of juveniles to the
protection against double jeopardy, where the Supreme Court previ-
ously had applied the collateral order doctrine.119 Therefore, the
court stated that the order denying dismissal due to the defendant's
juvenile status fit the collateral order doctrine and was immediately
appealable. 120
Although the Fourth Circuit has used the collateral order doc-
trine in select situations, the court has generally followed the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence and maintained that the doctrine is a narrow
exception that should be applied only in limited circumstances t.12
United States v. Blackwel1'22 exemplified this reticence when the Fourth
Circuit considered whether an order transferring venue to a North
Carolina district court could be appealed immediately. 123 The de-
fendants argued that a Kentucky district court did not have the au-
thority to transfer their case back to North Carolina.124 The court
115. Id. at 708.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. The court explained that in a juvenile proceeding, the defendant's court
records are sealed and there are limitations to the inquires that can be made into these
records. ld In addition, the defendant does not have to be photographed and no infor-
mation about the defendant, such as his name or picture, can be released. Id. If the defen-
dant were to be tried as an adult and then appeal, these rights would be lost. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 201 F.3d 536, 537-38 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining
that the sentence is the final judgment in a criminal case and therefore an appeal can only
occur after sentencing); United States v. Buchanan, 946 F.2d 325, 326 (4th Cir. 1991)
(stating that "[i]n criminal cases, a final judgment is not deemed to have occurred until
after conviction and imposition of sentence"); United States v. Blackwell, 900 F.2d 742, 747
(4th Cir. 1990) (noting that the collateral order doctrine should be applied with the "ut-
most strictness in criminal cases").
122. 900 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1990).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 746.
1058 [VOL. 63:1046
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
explained that there was some basis to believe the first two prongs of
the collateral order doctrine were satisfied because the district court
had entered its final decision to the defendants' argument of an im-
proper transfer and the issue was clearly separate from the defend-
ants' culpability.' 2' The court reasoned that the claim of an improper
venue transfer did not fulfill the third prong because if the defend-
ants were convicted, they could appeal and argue that the district
court did not have proper venue from the beginning. 126 Because the
trial would not violate the defendants' rights, appealing the order
through the usual appellate manner was the appropriate form of re-
lief.12 7 Following the Supreme Court's example, the Fourth Circuit
held the collateral order doctrine did not apply because the right
would not be lost upon final judgment. 121
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In United States v. Ferebe, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a district
court's denial of a motion to strike a notice of intention to seek the
death penalty because it was untimely filed was immediately appeala-
ble under the collateral order doctrine. 129 In this 2-1 decision, Judge
Luttig, writing for the majority, 130 explained that death notices satisfy
the three prongs that the Supreme Court outlined for an order to
qualify for interlocutory appeal: (1) it must fully dispose of the dis-
puted issue, (2) it must settle an issue completely separate from the
cause of action, and (3) it must involve an important right that would
be lost irreparably if not reviewed until finaljudgment.13 ' The court
further held that the timeliness of the filing of notice under the Death
Notice statute should be evaluated under a pre-trial inquiry into the
"objective reasonableness" of the timing of the filing. 132 The court
explained that the statute should not be examined under a post-trial
inquiry looking at the prejudice the defendant suffered at trial be-
cause the statute was meant to be "prophylactic" rather than
remedial. 13
3
125. Id. at 747.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Ferebe, 332 F.3d at 726.
130. Id. Judge Michael joined in the opinion. Id. at 723.
131. See id. at 726 (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977)).
132. Id. at 724.
133. Id. at 727. As the court further explained, looking at the prejudice the defendant
suffered under a post-trial inquiry would transform the statute into a remedial one de-
signed to remedy the actual prejudice the specific defendant endured. Id. Because the
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The court noted that the first prong of the collateral order doc-
trine mandates that the lower court completely dispose of the issue.13 4
The court explained that this element was satisfied because the dis-
trict court had denied the motion to strike the death notice and had
scheduled a trial. 135 The court reasoned that because the statute is
meant to be "prophylactic," the accused has a right to reasonable no-
tice of the prosecution's intent to seek the death penalty as well as a
right to avoid suffering through a capital trial without proper no-
tice. 136 Because the district court already had denied the motion and
set a trial, the court reasoned that the only alternative-besides inter-
locutory review-would be to force the defendant to endure a trial for
his life without this statutorily required notice. 3 ' Therefore, the
court explained that there were no further steps to take in the district
court to avoid the trial. 1 38
The court noted that the second prong of the collateral order
doctrine requires the disputed order to be completely separate from
the prosecution's case.' 39 As the court explained, the second prong
was satisfied because whether Ferebe had received reasonable notice
was not connected to his criminal culpability for the murders. 4 ° The
court reiterated the importance of determining timeliness under the
pre-trial objective standard to ensure that the issue does not become
intertwined with the cause of action.14 ' The court explained that if
the statute were incorrectly interpreted to protect the right to notice
but not the right not to stand trial, then the second prong would not
be satisfied because the effect of the timing of the notice on the de-
fendant's culpability could only be evaluated after the trial; therefore,
the collateral order doctrine would be inapplicable.' 4 2
Finally, the court found that the timeliness of a death notice satis-
fied the final prong of the collateral order doctrine because the right
probably would be irretrievably lost if it was not immediately re-
viewed. 14 3 Because the statute guarantees the right not to stand trial
without reasonable notice, the court noted that this right would van-
district court employed this post-trial prejudice standard, the court remanded the case
back to the trial court under the proper standard. Id. at 724.
134. Id. at 727.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 727-28.
137. Id. at 728.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 726 (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977)).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 729.
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ish if not reviewed until after trial.1 44 The court's analysis again
turned on the fundamental rights that the Death Notice statute pro-
vides.1 45 If the statute only provided the right not to be convicted and
sentenced without sufficient preparation, the court reasoned, then
the mere fact that the defendant will have to stand trial without ade-
quate notice does not automatically eliminate the right.14 6 Because
the court found the statute to contain the right not to stand trial, how-
ever, it concluded that the right would be lost irretrievably if the de-
fendant was tried without adequate notice.
147
Having held the order reviewable under the collateral order doc-
trine, the court next interpreted the statute to require a pretrial in-
quiry into the objective reasonableness of the time of the filing of the
death notice to ensure that the accused is not tried for capital punish-
ment without first receiving adequate notice. 4 8 The court reasoned
that the defendant's rights are denied when a capital case moves to
trial without the accused receiving adequate notice of the prosecutor's
intent to seek the death penalty, regardless of whether the defendant
was actually prejudiced by the timing of the notice. 149 The court re-
jected the idea that the right to a timely death notice is comparable to
the speedy trial right.15 ° Keeping in mind that the Supreme Court
had previously determined an alleged violation of the speedy trial
right is subject to the post-trial prejudice analysis rather than the pre-
trial inquiry, the court explained that the speedy trial right protects
the defendant as well as society.1 51 In contrast, the court observed
that the Death Notice statute protects only the defendant.152 The
court further noted that violation of the speedy trial right may be ad-
vantageous to the defendant, in that the delay in trial caused by the
144. Id. The court explained that "[t]he focus in this third prong is not on whether a
court can later adjudicate the claim asserted . . . [r]ather, the focus is on whether the
assurances underlying the asserted right will be reneged upon if review is delayed until
after trial." Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 729-30.
147. Id. at 730.
148. Id. The court noted that both the district court and the dissent failed to consider
this aspect of the statute. Id. at 731. Both interpreted the statute as instead requiring a
post-trial, harmless error inquiry, which the majority felt did not fully protect the rights
guaranteed in the statute because such an inquiry only assessed injury based on actual
prejudice to the defendant after the completion of the trial. Id. at 730-31.
149. Id. at 732.
150. Id. at 734.
151. Id. (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972), which held that the speedy
trial right should be assessed by examining prejudice to the defendant as one factor).
152. Id.
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violation may cause witnesses to become unavailable or forgetful, t53
while a violation of the Death Notice statute never benefits the ac-
cused. 154 Finally, the court reasoned that the speedy trial right is
vague because it is difficult to determine what length of time consti-
tutes too long 155 whereas the Death Notice statute lacks this ambigu-
ity.' 56 In the absence of the defining characteristics of a speedy trial
right that the Supreme Court relied on in Barker v. Wingo157 the
Fourth Circuit dismissed application of the post-trial prejudice stan-
dard for the Death Notice statute.1 58
Instead, the court reasoned that the right to receive a death no-
tice within a reasonable time was comparable to the right not to be
placed in double jeopardy.15 9 The court explained that both a death
notice and a double jeopardy claim encompass a right not to be
tried.16 ° Additionally, the court noted that charging instruments,
such as indictments and death notices, protect the fairness of criminal
proceedings, provide notice to the accused before trial, and invalidate
the trial if there is a violation of these rights. 6' Based on these simi-
larities, the court reasoned that because the Supreme Court never had
utilized the prejudice standard for double jeopardy claims, the stan-
dard should not apply to death notice claims. 162
Finally, the court outlined factors a court must consider to deter-
mine whether there is reasonable time remaining after a death notice
is filed but before trial commences: "1) the nature of the charges
presented in the indictment; 2) the nature of the aggravating factors
provided in the Death Notice; 3) the period of time remaining before
trial, measured at the instant the Death Notice was filed... ; and...
4) the status of discovery in the proceedings."' 63 The court empha-
sized that this list was not exclusive, and that other factors may be
relevant depending on the circumstances.' 64
In his dissent, Judge Niemeyer argued that the court should dis-
miss the appeal as interlocutory because the trial court could only ac-
153. Id. at 734-35 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 521).
154. Id.
155. Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 521).
156. Id.
157. Id. In Barker, the Supreme Court noted that these three characteristics made the
speedy trial right different from other constitutional rights. 407 U.S. at 519.
158. Ferebe, 332 F.3d at 735.
159. Id. at 736.
160. Id. at 735.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 736.
163. Id. at 737 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).
164. Id.
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curately determine the reasonableness of the notice after the actual
trial occurred.' 65 Judge Niemeyer noted that the collateral order doc-
trine previously has been applied only in three criminal instances, and
the Supreme Court has emphasized that it is a limited exception be-
cause of congressional dislike for "piecemeal litigation. "166 Judge
Niemeyer explained that the Death Notice statute merely provides de-
fendants with a guarantee that they will have adequate time to prepare
between the issuance of the notice and the trial, but does not give the
accused a right not to stand trial for a capital offense without reasona-
ble notice. 16  He compared the death penalty notice to the speedy
trial right in that both rely on prejudice to determine the effect that
the delay ultimately had on the quality of the defendant's defense. 16
Judge Niemeyer next analyzed the Death Notice statute in light of
the three prongs of the collateral order doctrine. 169 He reasoned the
district court's ruling did not constitute a final ruling but was "merely
speculative" because the defendant could renew the motion to strike
the intention to seek the death penalty in the district court during or
after trial.' 7 ° He also determined that the timeliness of the notice was
not sufficiently separate from the merits of the case because the court
could only determine whether the defendant received notice a rea-
sonable time before trial by considering how their preparation for
trial was affected, which depended upon the evidence and complexity
of the case.17' Finally, because the timeliness objection is still review-
able after the trial is completed, Judge Niemeyer concluded that the
right to receive notice of the prosecutor's intent to seek the death
penalty is not a right that would be lost if the defendant had to await
final judgment.' 2 Judge Niemeyer, therefore, concluded the Fourth
Circuit did not have jurisdiction to hear the defendant's appeal until
after trial and a final judgment was issued because the order did not
satisfy the three prongs of the collateral order doctrine.17 3
4. Analysis.-In United States v. Ferebe, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an order denying a motion to
165. Id. at 740-41 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 745; see supra note 7 and accompanying text (listing three instances at the
time of the decision where the Supreme Court had allowed use of the collateral order
doctrine for a criminal case).
167. Ferebe, 332 F.3d at 746-47.
168. Id. at 749.
169. Id. at 750.
170. Id. at 751.
171. Id. at 751-52.
172. Id. at 752.
173. Id. at 753.
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strike a death notice as untimely filed was immediately appealable
under the collateral order doctrine. 174 The court reasoned that the
Death Notice statute provides a defendant the right not to stand trial
for his life without first receiving reasonable notice of the govern-
ment's intent to seek the death penalty.' 75 In so holding, the court
added this class of appeals into the small category set forth by the
Supreme Court under the collateral order doctrine.' 76 Because the
Supreme Court continuously has stressed that the collateral order
doctrine is the exception and should apply only in limited situa-
tions, "' it would have been more consistent with the Supreme Court's
reasoning for the Fourth Circuit to restrain from applying the doc-
trine so liberally. The Ferebe order was an issue that could await final
judgment without irreversible loss and thus did not satisfy the third
prong of the collateral order doctrine test, which requires the issue to
be irreparably lost if the defendant is forced to await a final deci-
sion.' 78 Instead, by permitting intermediate appeal, the court's deci-
sion allows capital defendants to interfere with pre-trial proceedings
while simultaneously jeopardizing their constitutional right to a
speedy trial, as well as compromising the general efficiency and cost of
maintaining the criminal justice system.17 9 Consequently, the Ferebe
court's unnecessary use of the collateral order doctrine diminishes the
strength and effectiveness of the legal system that the final decision
rule is meant to protect.'8 °
a. Appealing the Order to Strike the Death Notice Should Have
Awaited Final Judgment.-
(1) Ferebe Disregards the Supreme Court's Reasoning in Digi-
tal.-Although the Ferebe court correctly applied the test set forth in
Abney 8' to find that orders concerning the Death Notice statute are
final decisions in the lower court separate from the defendant's culpa-
174. Id. at 726.
175. Id. at 727-28.
176. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining the collateral order doctrine
and that the Supreme Court has used it in only four instances for a criminal case).
177. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867-68 (1994)
(noting the Court has continuously explained the congressional dislike for piecemeal liti-
gation and that consequently the collateral order doctrine should be applied sparingly).
178. See infra notes 181-196 and accompanying text (explaining that use of the collateral
order doctrine should be limited to rights which will be irreparably lost if appeal must
await final judgment).
179. See infra notes 197-210 and accompanying text (analyzing the effects that intermedi-
ate appeal has on the legal system).
180. Id.
181. See supra note 6 (discussing the three prongs of the collateral order doctrine).
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bility and thus meet the first two prongs of the collateral order doc-
trine, the court incorrectly applied the third prong to hold that the
decision would be irretrievably lost if review were to await a final deci-
sion in the case.1 12 An order denying a motion to strike the death
notice as untimely filed fully disposes of the issue in the lower court
and thus satisfies the first prong because the lower court has conclu-
sively determined that notice was adequately given before trial and
nothing further can be done in the lower court until the trial oc-
curs.183 The Death Notice statute also meets the second prong of the
collateral order doctrine because it is an entirely separate issue from
the cause of action; the timeliness of the death notice had no relation
to Ferebe's culpability in the murders.184 The Death Notice statute,
however, does not satisfy the third prong of the collateral order doc-
trine because the right will not be lost forever upon final decision of
the issue. Because the order does not fulfill all three required prongs
of the doctrine, it cannot be immediately appealed and therefore
should await final judgment.185  Consequently, the Fourth Circuit
should not have found the issue satisfied the collateral order doctrine.
The Fourth Circuit incorrectly reasoned that the Death Notice
statute protects against a right to stand trial, a right that would be lost
irretrievably if the appeal were to await a final decision. In Digital
Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., the Supreme Court explained
that every pretrial right could be considered a right not to stand trial,
and consequently the argument that a defendant has a right to avoid
trial should be regarded with skepticism and does not render an order
immediately appealable. 86 The Court noted that without an "explicit
182. See Ferebe, 332 F.3d at 752 (Neimeyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that an "untimely
death penalty notice remains effectively reviewable upon final judgment").
183. SeeAbney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977) (interpreting this requirement
to mean that there were no additional steps available in the district court after the defen-
dant's double jeopardy laim was denied without holding trial and thereby violating the
defendant's Fifth Amendment claim); see also supra notes 134-138 and accompanying text
(illustrating the Ferebe court holding that the Death Notice statute adequately met the first
prong because nothing further could be done in the lower court).
184. See Abney, 431 U.S. at 659 (explaining that a double jeopardy claim is collateral
from the defendant's guilt or innocence of the accused crime and therefore satisfies the
second prong of the collateral order doctrine); see also supra notes 139-142 and accompany-
ing text (explaining the Ferebe court holding that the order fulfilled the second prong of
the collateral order doctrine).
185. See supra text accompanying note 38 (explaining that an order must meet all three
prongs of the collateral order doctrine to be considered "collateral").
186. 511 U.S. 863, 873 (1994). The Court went on to explain that because so many
rights could encompass a right to avoid trial, allowing immediate appeal merely because
there may exist a right not to be tried would grant the appellant a wide spectrum to force
his opponent to be burdened with cost and delay each and every time this right may exist.
Id.
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statutory or constitutional guarantee that trial will not occur," there is
no right to an intermediate appeal." 7 Although allowing use of the
collateral order doctrine in Abney, the Court explained that the
Double Jeopardy Clause protects an individual from being "twice put
in jeopardy" for the same crime, which continuously has been inter-
preted to encompass the longstanding premise that an individual has
a right to avoid criminal trial and punishment twice for the same
crime.1 88 Because the Death Notice statute does not explicitly state
nor is it an established principle that the statute protects a right to
avoid trial, the right can be fully vindicated upon final judgment of
the criminal trial itself."8 9 By reading the statute as encompassing a
right not to be tried in addition to a right to reasonable notice, the
Ferebe court unduly expanded the statute to fit the third prong of the
collateral order doctrine and to avoid the final judgment rule. 190 Be-
cause any pretrial order can be read as a right not to be tried, the
holding in Ferebe has set the stage for future courts to read that any
order will be lost irretrievably if it cannot be immediately appealed.
(2) The Effect of the Order on a Defendant Does Not Automatically
Establish Irrevocable Loss.-Because the collateral order doctrine should
be applied sparingly,19' the unavoidable effects that a trial can have
on any criminal defendant are insufficient to satisfy the third prong of
the doctrine and normally will not create a right that will be lost irre-
trievably if review must await final judgment.'92 Although lack of rea-
sonable notice of intention to seek the death penalty will affect the
criminal defendant in some way, it is indistinguishable from the nu-
merous "pretrial judicial decisions that affect the rights of criminal
187. Id. at 874 (quoting Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 801
(1989)).
188. Abney, 431 U.S. at 660-61.
189. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860-61 (1978) (explaining that
because the Speedy Trial Clause never has been interpreted to protect against a right to be
tried, it does not constitute an important right that would be lost if review awaited final
judgment); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 267 (1984) (expanding this view and
holding that review must await final judgment even if the wait may violate a defendant's
constitutional right, as exemplified by the denial of an interlocutory appeal for an order
disqualifying defense counsel, which may affect "the asserted right to counsel of one's
choice").
190. Ferebe, 332 F.3d at 729.
191. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (illustrating a preference for the final judg-
ment rule by showing the Supreme Court's reluctance to use the collateral order doctrine
generally in criminal proceedings).
192. See, e.g., Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 266 (holding that an order denying objection to
counsel's disqualification would not become moot upon completion of trial and conse-
quently could wait until the final decision in the trial, and that even if the defendant's
rights were affected by the order, they still must await final judgment).
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defendants yet must await completion of trial court proceedings for
review." 93 An accused, even if ultimately found innocent, must in
most criminal cases suffer through the difficult experience of a trial as
part of the American criminal justice system.194 In Blackwell, the
Fourth Circuit explained that even upon conviction most defendants
still can vindicate their rights by appealing and arguing that the pre-
trial order was improper; if they are successful, the conviction will be
overturned. 9" Although Ferebe may be forced to endure a capital
trial without reasonable notice, unquestionably a difficult experience
for any individual, he retains the right to appeal the district court's
denial of the order to suppress the death notice upon completion of
trial.196 Therefore, the right would not have been irreparably lost if
Ferebe was forced to await final judgment to appeal it.
b. The Court's Misapplication of the Collateral Order Doctrine Dis-
rupts the Efficiency of the Legal System.-
(1) Expanded Use of the Collateral Order Doctrine Allows Defend-
ants to Inappropriately Interfere with Criminal Proceedings.-By holding
that an order denying a motion to strike a death notice can be imme-
diately appealed under the collateral order doctrine, the court in Fer-
ebe misapplied the narrow exception to the rule that all appeals await
final judgment. 97 In Abney, the Court explained that the long-stand-
ing preference for finality before appeal in criminal cases was estab-
lished to promote an efficient legal system. 198 Because defendants
can use intermediate appeals to interfere with the proceedings, the
efficiency of the system is put in jeopardy by unnecessary expansions
of the collateral order doctrine as the courts move toward extinguish-
ing the final judgment rule. 9 9 There always will be a substantial
amount of time between the accused's arrest and the prosecutor's de-
cision to seek the death penalty; accordingly, any accused could attack
the reasonableness of the notice and, if his motion is denied, immedi-
193. Id. at 270.
194. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). The Supreme Court ex-
pressly noted that "[b] earing the discomfiture and cost of a prosecution for crime even by
an innocent person is one of the painful obligations of citizenship." Id.
195. United States v. Blackwell, 900 F.2d 742, 747 (1990).
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (providing appellate jurisdiction for all final decisions of
district courts).
197. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (illustrating a preference for the final judg-
ment rule by showing the Supreme Court's reluctance to use the collateral order doctrine
generally in criminal proceedings).
198. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977) (quoting DiBella v. United States,
369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962)).
199. Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 325-26.
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ately appeal the denial under the collateral order doctrine. 200 The
Fourth Circuit's holding in Ferebe thus gives the defendant a measure
of unintended control over the proceeding. 20 1
In Cobbledick, the Supreme Court explained that allowing inter-
mediary appeal also can lead to harassment by the defendant and dis-
ruption of the case's momentum.20 2  Disallowing frequent
intermediate appeals, on the other hand, helps maintain respect for
trial courts and their judges' decisions,203 which yields a more effi-
cient legal system overall. Indeed, the Cobbledick Court explained that
the purpose of the final judgment rule is to promote a "healthy legal
system. ' 2 4 The delays caused by intermediary appeals further test the
health of the criminal justice system because they create an overall
more costly and unhealthy legal system.20 5
(2) Expanding the Collateral Order Doctrine also Compromises the
Speedy Trial Right.-Just as defendants could use the Ferebe court's
holding to slow the criminal justice system, prosecutors also can use
the same holding to infringe upon the defendant's constitutional
200. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 862-63 (denying pretrial appeal
for a speedy trial claim and noting that one argument for the denial was that any defen-
dant could make the motion and, if not granted, seek intermediate appeal).
201. Ferebe, 332 F.3d at 729-30. Under the majority's opinion, the defendant can imme-
diately appeal any denial of the reasonableness of intention to seek the death penalty and
thereby affect the proceedings by delaying the actual criminal trial. Id.
202. Cobbledick, 309 U.S. 325-26; see also Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264
(1984) (indicating that by limiting appeal to final judgments, parties have less opportunity
to "clog the courts" and burden the opposing side with numerous cases within a single
dispute); DiBella, 369 U.S. at 129 (arguing that allowing intermediate appeal, on the other
hand, can lead to harassment because the delay may jeopardize the availability of evidence
or witnesses at the criminal trial).
203. Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 263-64. The Court explained that because trial judges must
make numerous prejudgment decisions throughout the litigation process, limiting inter-
ference by the higher courts maintains deference and respect for these decisions. Id. at
264.
204. 309 U.S. at 326. As the Court explained, the congressional statute mandating that
appeals await final judgment was enacted in a quest to promulgate the most effective legal
system possible. Id. at 325-26; see also Michael D. Green, From Here to Attorney's Fees: Certainty,
Efficiency, and Fairness in the Journey to the Appellate Courts, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 207, 213-17
(1984) (analyzing the numerous ways the final decision requirement promotes judicial
efficiency).
205. Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 326 (explaining that the congressional rule that appeals await
final judgment was created to promote efficiency throughout the criminal justice system);
see also Pamela Johns, Comment, Interlocutory Appeals in Criminal Trials: Appellate Review of
Vindictive Prosecution, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 373 (1982) (continuously noting that the final
judgment rule is designed to promote the administration of justice).
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right to a speedy trial.2°6 By allowing intermediate appeal, the speedy
trial right is unavoidably slowed as the defendant must submit to pre-
trial appeals before the merits of the case are reached. In DiBella, the
Supreme Court echoed this sentiment by noting that the "delays and
disruptions" that arise in conjunction with intermediate appeal affect
the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial as well as the efficiency of
criminal law in general. 2 7 The public also maintains an interest in a
speedy trial guarantee because a delay may affect the strength of the
prosecution's case, increase society's cost in keeping defendants in
pretrial detention, and allow defendants a longer period to commit
additional crimes while on bail. 2 8 The Fourth Circuit's expansion of
the collateral order doctrine eventually could render the speedy trial
guarantee virtually obsolete because all pretrial orders could be imme-
diately appealed, each one delaying the trial date.2" 9 The court's deci-
sion hindered the legal system by improperly retracting the
constitutional right to a speedy trial.210
5. Conclusion.-In United States v. Ferebe, the Fourth Circuit held
that an order denying a motion to strike a death notice as untimely
filed was immediately appealable under the collateral order doc-
trine. 21  The decision extended the application of the collateral or-
der doctrine to the denial of an order that could have awaited appeal
upon final judgment.212 The Ferebe court's decision overlooked the
Supreme Court's directive in Digital that the collateral order doctrine,
a limited exception to the accepted rule that appeals must await final
decisions, should be applied sparingly.213 The court's decision dis-
courages the efficiency and health of the legal system in that it allows
defendants to inappropriately interfere with the operation of the
criminal justice system as well as compromises their right to a speedy
206. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed").
207. DiBella, 369 U.S. at 126.
208. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 862 (1978). The Court explained that,
although the defendant may be willing to accept any delays and waive their speedy trial
right, the delay also may affect these important societal interests. Id.
209. Id.
210. See supra note 206 (noting that the Speedy Trial Clause guarantees the right to a
speedy trial in a criminal prosecution).
211. Ferebe, 332 F.3d at 726.
212. Id. at 722.
213. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994) (citing Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985)).
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and efficient trial.214 Therefore, it would have been consistent with
established precedent for the Fourth Circuit to refrain from ex-
panding the collateral order doctrine and allow the appellate process
to operate as established by Congress, upon final judgment in the
cause of action.215
KATHRYN GLASGOW SEIFER
214. See supra notes 202-213 and accompanying text (explaining policy reasons for limit-
ing appeal to final judgment). These policy reasons include preventing the defendant
from disrupting the case and adding costs to the legal system, maintaining respect for
lower courts and their decisions, and upholding both the defendants and the societal inter-
est in a speedy trial. Id.
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (stating that the appeal process should stem from final
decisions in the lower courts.
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